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| </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
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− | ====Excerpt 18==== | + | ====Excerpt 18. Peirce (CE 1, 183)==== |
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− | <pre> | + | <blockquote> |
− | | We come now to the question, what is the 'rationale' of these three kinds
| + | <p>We come now to the question, what is the ''rationale'' of these three kinds of reasoning. And first let us understand precisely what we intend by this. It is clear then that it is none of our business to inquire in what manner we think when we reason, for we have already seen that logic is wholly separate from psychology. What we seek is an explicit statement of the logical ground of these different kinds of inference. This logical ground will have two parts, 1st the ground of possibility and 2nd the ground of proceedure. The ground of possibility is the special property of symbols upon which every inference of a certain kind rests. The ground of proceedure is the property of symbols which makes a certain inference possible from certain premisses. The ground of possibility must be both discovered and demonstrated, fully. The ground of proceedure must be exhibited in outline, but it is not requisite to fill up all the details of this subject, especially as that would lead us too far into the technicalities of logic.</p> |
− | | of reasoning. And first let us understand precisely what we intend by this.
| + | |
− | | It is clear then that it is none of our business to inquire in what manner we
| + | <p>As the three kinds of reasoning are entirely distinct, each must have a different ground of possibility; and the principle of each kind must be proved by that same kind of inference for it would be absurd to attempt to rest it on a weaker kind of inference and to rest it on one as strong as itself would be simply to reduce it to that other kind of reasoning. Moreover, these principles must be logical principles because we do not seek any other ground now, than a logical ground. As logical principles, they will not relate to the symbol in itself or in its relation to equivalent symbols but wholly in its relation to what it symbolizes. In other words it will relate to the symbolization of objects.</p> |
− | | think when we reason, for we have already seen that logic is wholly separate
| + | |
− | | from psychology. What we seek is an explicit statement of the logical ground
| + | <p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 183</p> |
− | | of these different kinds of inference. This logical ground will have two parts,
| + | |
− | | 1st the ground of possibility and 2nd the ground of proceedure. The ground of
| + | <p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p> |
− | | possibility is the special property of symbols upon which every inference of
| + | </blockquote> |
− | | a certain kind rests. The ground of proceedure is the property of symbols
| |
− | | which makes a certain inference possible from certain premisses. The
| |
− | | ground of possibility must be both discovered and demonstrated, fully.
| |
− | | The ground of proceedure must be exhibited in outline, but it is not
| |
− | | requisite to fill up all the details of this subject, especially
| |
− | | as that would lead us too far into the technicalities of logic.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | As the three kinds of reasoning are entirely distinct, each must have
| |
− | | a different ground of possibility; and the principle of each kind must
| |
− | | be proved by that same kind of inference for it would be absurd to attempt
| |
− | | to rest it on a weaker kind of inference and to rest it on one as strong as
| |
− | | itself would be simply to reduce it to that other kind of reasoning. Moreover,
| |
− | | these principles must be logical principles because we do not seek any other
| |
− | | ground now, than a logical ground. As logical principles, they will not
| |
− | | relate to the symbol in itself or in its relation to equivalent symbols
| |
− | | but wholly in its relation to what it symbolizes. In other words
| |
− | | it will relate to the symbolization of objects.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 183.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | Chrales Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
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− | |'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
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− | | Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| |
− | </pre> | |
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| ====Excerpt 19==== | | ====Excerpt 19==== |