Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Excerpt 19====

====Excerpt 19.  Peirce (CE 1, 183&ndash;184)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| Now all symbolization is of three objects, at once;  the first is a possible thing,

<p>Now all symbolization is of three objects, at once;  the first is a possible thing, the second is a possible form, the third is a possible symbol.  It will be objected that the two latter are not properly objects.  We have hitherto regarded the symbol as ''standing for'' the thing, as a concrete determination of its form, and addressing a symbol;  and it is true that it is only by referring to a possible thing that a symbol has an objective relation, it is only by bearing in it a form that it has any subjective relation, and it is only by equaling another symbol that it has any tuistical relation.  But this objective relation once given to a symbol is at once applicable to all to which it necessarily refers;  and this is shown by the fact of our regarding every symbol as ''connotative'' as well as ''denotative'', and by our regarding one word as standing for another whenever we endeavor to clear up a little obscurity of meaning.  And the reason that this is so is that the possible symbol and the possible form to which a symbol is related each relate also to that thing which is its immediate object.  Things, forms, and symbols, therefore, are symbolized in every symbolization.  And this being so, it is natural to suppose that our three principles of inference which we know already refer to some three objects of symbolization, refer to these.</p>

| the second is a possible form, the third is a possible symbol.  It will be objected

 

| that the two latter are not properly objects.  We have hitherto regarded the symbol

<p>That such really is the case admits of proof.  For the principle of inference ''à priori'' must be established ''à priori'';  that is by reasoning analytically from determinant to determinate, in other words from definition.  But this can only be applied to an object whose characteristics depend upon its definition.  Now of most things the definition depends upon the character, the definition of a symbol alone determines its character. Hence the principle of inference ''à priori'' must relate to symbols.  The principle of inference ''à posteriori'' must be established ''à posteriori'', that is by reasoning from determinate to determinant.  This is only applicable to that which is determined by what it determines;  in other words, to that which is only subject to the truth and falsehood which affects its determinant and which in itself is mere ''zero''.  But this is only true of pure forms.  Hence the principle of inference ''à posteriori'' must relate to pure form. The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively;  that is by reasoning from parts to whole.  This is only applicable to that whose whole is given in the sum of the parts;  and this is only the case with things.  Hence the principle of inductive inference must relate to things.</p>

| as 'standing for' the thing, as a concrete determination of its form, and addressing

 

| a symbol;  and it is true that it is only by referring to a possible thing that a

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 183&ndash;184</p>

| symbol has an objective relation, it is only by bearing in it a form that it has

 

| any subjective relation, and it is only by equaling another symbol that it has any

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| tuistical relation.  But this objective relation once given to a symbol is at once

</blockquote>

| applicable to all to which it necessarily refers;  and this is shown by the fact

| of our regarding every symbol as 'connotative' as well as 'denotative', and by our

| regarding one word as standing for another whenever we endeavor to clear up a little

| obscurity of meaning.  And the reason that this is so is that the possible symbol and

| the possible form to which a symbol is related each relate also to that thing which

| is its immediate object.  Things, forms, and symbols, therefore, are symbolized in

| every symbolization.  And this being so, it is natural to suppose that our three

| principles of inference which we know already refer to some three objects of

| symbolization, refer to these.

| That such really is the case admits of proof.  For the principle of inference 'à priori'

| must be established 'à priori';  that is by reasoning analytically from determinant to

| determinate, in other words from definition.  But this can only be applied to an object

| whose characteristics depend upon its definition.  Now of most things the definition

| depends upon the character, the definition of a symbol alone determines its character.

| Hence the principle of inference 'à priori' must relate to symbols.  The principle of

| inference 'à posteriori' must be established 'à posteriori', that is by reasoning from

| determinate to determinant.  This is only applicable to that which is determined by what

| it determines;  in other words, to that which is only subject to the truth and falsehood

| which affects its determinant and which in itself is mere 'zero'.  But this is only true

| of pure forms.  Hence the principle of inference 'à posteriori' must relate to pure form.

| The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively;  that is by reasoning

| from parts to whole.  This is only applicable to that whose whole is given in the sum of the

| parts;  and this is only the case with things.  Hence the principle of inductive inference

| must relate to things.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 183-184.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

====Excerpt 20====

====Excerpt 20====