Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Excerpt 16====

====Excerpt 16.  Peirce (CE 1, 179)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| The consideration of this imperfect datum leads us to make

<p>The consideration of this imperfect datum leads us to make a fundamental observation;  namely, that the problem how we can make an induction is one and the same with the problem how we can make any general statement, with reason;  for there is no way left in which such a statement can originate except from induction or pure fiction.  Hereby, we strike down at once all attempts at solving the problem as involve the supposition of a major premiss as a datum.  Such explanations merely show that we can arrive at one general statement by deduction from another, while they leave the real question, untouched.  The peculiar merit of Aristotle's theory is that after the objectionable portion of it is swept away and after it has thereby been left utterly powerless to account for any certainty or even probability in the inference from induction, we still retain these ''forms'' which show what the ''actual process'' is.</p>

| a fundamental observation;  namely, that the problem how we

 

| can make an induction is one and the same with the problem how

<p>And what is this process?  We have in the apodictic conclusion, some most extraordinary observation, as for example that a great number of animals &mdash; namely neat and deer, feed only upon vegetables. This proposition, be it remarked, need not have had any generality;  if the animals observed instead of being all ''neat'' had been so very various that we knew not what to say of them except that they were ''herbivora'' and ''cloven-footed'', the effect would have been to render the argument simply irresistable.  In addition to this datum, we have another;  namely that these same animals are all cloven-footed.  Now it would not be so very strange that all cloven-footed animals should be herbivora;  animals of a particular structure very likely may use a particular food. But if this be indeed so, then all the marvel of the conclusion is explained away.  So in order to avoid a marvel which must in some form be accepted, we are led to believe what is easy to believe though it is entirely uncertain.</p>

| we can make any general statement, with reason;  for there is

 

| no way left in which such a statement can originate except from

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 179</p>

| induction or pure fiction.  Hereby, we strike down at once all

 

| attempts at solving the problem as involve the supposition of

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| a major premiss as a datum.  Such explanations merely show

</blockquote>

| that we can arrive at one general statement by deduction

| from another, while they leave the real question,

| untouched.  The peculiar merit of Aristotle's

| theory is that after the objectionable portion

| of it is swept away and after it has thereby been

| left utterly powerless to account for any certainty

| or even probability in the inference from induction,

| we still retain these 'forms' which show what the

| 'actual process' is.

| And what is this process?  We have in the apodictic conclusion,

| some most extraordinary observation, as for example that a great

| number of animals -- namely neat and deer, feed only upon vegetables.

| This proposition, be it remarked, need not have had any generality;  if

| the animals observed instead of being all 'neat' had been so very various

| that we knew not what to say of them except that they were 'herbivora' and

| 'cloven-footed', the effect would have been to render the argument simply

| irresistable.  In addition to this datum, we have another;  namely that

| these same animals are all cloven-footed.  Now it would not be so very

| strange that all cloven-footed animals should be herbivora;  animals

| of a particular structure very likely may use a particular food.

| But if this be indeed so, then all the marvel of the conclusion

| is explained away.  So in order to avoid a marvel which must in

| some form be accepted, we are led to believe what is easy to

| believe though it is entirely uncertain.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 179.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

====Excerpt 17====

====Excerpt 17====