Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Excerpt 15====

====Excerpt 15.  Peirce (CE 1, 174&ndash;175)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| But not to follow this subject too far, we have

<p>But not to follow this subject too far, we have now established three species of representations: ''copies'', ''signs'', and ''symbols'';  of the last of which only logic treats.  A second approximation to a definition of it then will be, the science of symbols in general and as such.  But this definition is still too broad;  this might, indeed, form the definition of a certain science which would be a branch of Semiotic or the general science of representations which might be called Symbolistic, and of this logic would be a species.  But logic only considers symbols from a particular point of view.</p>

| now established three species of representations:

 

| 'copies', 'signs', and 'symbols';  of the last of

<p>A symbol in general and as such has three relations. The first is its relation to the pure Idea or Logos and this (from the analogy of the grammatical terms for the pronouns I, It, Thou) I call its relation of the first person, since it is its relation to its own essence.  The second is its relation to the Consciousness as being thinkable, or to any language as being translatable, which I call its relation to the second person, since it refers to its power of appealing to a mind.  The third is its relation to its object, which I call its relation to the third person or It.  Every symbol is subject to three distinct systems of formal law as conditions of its taking up these three relations.  If it violates either one of these three codes, the condition of its having either of the three relations, it ceases to be a symbol and makes ''nonsense''.  Nonsense is that which has a certain resemblance to a symbol without being a symbol.  But since it simulates the symbolic character it is usually only one of the three codes which it violates;  at any rate, flagrantly.  Hence there should be at least three different kinds of nonsense.  And accordingly we remark that that we call nonsense meaningless, absurd, or quibbling, in different cases.  If a symbol violates the conditions of its being a determination of the pure Idea or logos, it may be so nearly a determination thereof as to be perfectly intelligible.  If for instance instead of ''I am'' one should say ''I is''. ''I is'' is in itself meaningless, it violates the conditions of its relation to the form it is meant to embody.  Thus we see that the conditions of the relation of the first person are the laws of grammar.</p>

| which only logic treats.  A second approximation to

 

| a definition of it then will be, the science of symbols

<p>I will now take another example.  I know my opinion is false, still I hold it. This is grammatical, but the difficulty is that it violates the conditions of its having an object.  Observe that this is precisely the difficulty. It not only cannot be a determination of this or that object, but it cannot be a determination of any object, whatever.  This is the whole difficulty.  I say that, I receive contradictories into one opinion or symbolical representation;  now this implies that it is a symbol of nothing.  Here is another example: This very proposition is false.  This is a proposition to which the law of excluded middle namely that every symbol must be false or true, does not apply.  For if it is false it is thereby true.  And if not false it is thereby not true.  Now why does not this law apply to this proposition.  Simply because it does itself state that it has no object.  It talks of itself and only of itself and has no external relation whatever.  These examples show that logical laws only hold good, as conditions of a symbol's having an object.  The fact that it has often been called the science of truth confirms this view.</p>

| in general and as such.  But this definition is still

 

| too broad;  this might, indeed, form the definition of

<p>I define logic therefore as the science of the conditions which enable symbols in general to refer to objects.</p>

| a certain science which would be a branch of Semiotic

 

| or the general science of representations which might

<p>At the same time ''symbolistic'' in general gives a trivium consisting of Universal Grammar, Logic, and Universal Rhetoric, using this last term to signify the science of the formal conditions of intelligibility of symbols.</p>

| be called Symbolistic, and of this logic would be

 

| a species.  But logic only considers symbols

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 174&ndash;175</p>

| from a particular point of view.

 

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| A symbol in general and as such has three relations.

</blockquote>

| The first is its relation to the pure Idea or Logos

| and this (from the analogy of the grammatical terms

| for the pronouns I, It, Thou) I call its relation

| of the first person, since it is its relation to

| its own essence.  The second is its relation to

| the Consciousness as being thinkable, or to any

| language as being translatable, which I call its

| relation to the second person, since it refers to

| its power of appealing to a mind.  The third is its

| relation to its object, which I call its relation to

| the third person or It.  Every symbol is subject to

| three distinct systems of formal law as conditions

| of its taking up these three relations.  If it

| violates either one of these three codes, the

| condition of its having either of the three

| relations, it ceases to be a symbol and makes

| 'nonsense'.  Nonsense is that which has a certain

| resemblance to a symbol without being a symbol.  But

| since it simulates the symbolic character it is usually

| only one of the three codes which it violates;  at any rate,

| flagrantly.  Hence there should be at least three different kinds

| of nonsense.  And accordingly we remark that that we call nonsense

| meaningless, absurd, or quibbling, in different cases.  If a symbol

| violates the conditions of its being a determination of the pure

| Idea or logos, it may be so nearly a determination thereof as

| to be perfectly intelligible.  If for instance instead

| of 'I am' one should say 'I is'.

| 'I is' is in itself meaningless,

| it violates the conditions of its

| relation to the form it is meant

| to embody.  Thus we see that the

| conditions of the relation of the

| first person are the laws of grammar.

| I will now take another example.  I know my opinion is false, still I hold it.

| This is grammatical, but the difficulty is that it violates the conditions

| of its having an object.  Observe that this is precisely the difficulty.

| It not only cannot be a determination of this or that object, but it

| cannot be a determination of any object, whatever.  This is the

| whole difficulty.  I say that, I receive contradictories into

| one opinion or symbolical representation;  now this implies

| that it is a symbol of nothing.  Here is another example:

| This very proposition is false.  This is a proposition to

| which the law of excluded middle namely that every symbol

| must be false or true, does not apply.  For if it is false it

| is thereby true.  And if not false it is thereby not true.  Now

| why does not this law apply to this proposition.  Simply because it

| does itself state that it has no object.  It talks of itself and only

| of itself and has no external relation whatever.  These examples show

| that logical laws only hold good, as conditions of a symbol's having

| an object.  The fact that it has often been called the science of

| truth confirms this view.

| I define logic therefore as the science of the conditions

| which enable symbols in general to refer to objects.

| At the same time 'symbolistic' in general gives a trivium consisting of

| Universal Grammar, Logic, and Universal Rhetoric, using this last term to

| signify the science of the formal conditions of intelligibility of symbols.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 174-175.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

====Excerpt 16====

====Excerpt 16====