Directory:Logic Museum/Radulphus Brito/Quaestiones super Artem veterem

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Radulphus Brito – Questions on the Old Logic (UP)

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Introduction

This is a translation of two questions from the book on the 'Old Logic' by the modist writer Radulphus Brito, written probably in the early fourteenth century. The questions are (i) whether an utterance signifies the same whether the thing it denotes exists or not, a favourite topic of the modistae, and whether 'there is a man' follows from 'there is a dead man', another favoured topic. This is one of a series of translations and discussions to do with the question of whether a per se proposition (one whose predicate is included in the subject, such as 'every man is an animal') is true when the subject does not exist. Other texts from the late thirteenth century include work by Duns Scotus (link to follow), Boethius of Dacia, Siger of Brabant, Simon of Faversham, and others.

Edition

The edition used here was of Quaestiones super Artem Veterem (Questions on the old logic), taken from a version digitised by the Fondos digitalizados de la Universidad de Sevilla, by Johannes Rubeus Vercellensis and Albertinus Vercellensis, Venice, published about 1499. Title page reads 'Magistri Rodulphus Britonis super arte veteri'.

The digital library operates a permalink policy, i.e. they are committed to any link given a their specified format always working, even if the site or internet address of the sourced pages is changed. Single pages (images) should be quoted using the following example format..

http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/3-8-log-1/start.htm?image=00005 [1]

Summary

The passages here are two questions on Aristotle's Perihermanias or On Interpretation, summarised as follows.

Question I is whether an utterance signifies the same whether the thing it denotes exists or not.

First negative argument An utterance signifies the essence of a thing, but the essence of a thing is not the same when the thing exists as when it does not exist. Second negative argument. What remains the same is not the essence of the thing but rather the concept of the thing. Third negative argument There is no unequivocal term that is common to being and non being. First positive argument. If utterances lost their meaning because the things they signify were destroyed, we would continually have to impose new meanings on the same terms, as things are destroyed. But we do not do this. Socrates always signifies Socrates, whether he exists or does not exist. Second positive argument. Also, what a term signifies is what we understand by it. But our understanding of a term remains the same whether the thing exists or not. We understand the same by 'Socrates' whether he exists or not.

Determination. Brito says that an utterance signifies the same whether a thing exists or not, although the thing signified is not the same, however, what is signified by a term should not be confused with the object signified itself. Signifying establishes understanding in our minds, our understanding of an object such as Socrates is the same, whether Socrates exists or not, thus the signification is the same. Moreover the same phantasm of Socrates remains in our minds, whether he exists or not. However, the thing itself (Socrates) does not remain the same, for what is signified is the 'quiddity', or its essence. This is not the same when the thing is destroyed, for the essence of a thing is destroyed with it. We must therefore distinguish between a thing as it is signified (Socrates as signified by 'Socrates') and the thing which is signified (Socrates himself). The first remains the same, the second does not, for it perishes.

Ad 1 An utterance does signify the essence of a thing, but this falls under the logical nature of understanding. And the essence of a thing does not remain the same according what exists, except as far as what is understood and signified, Thus what is signified, as signified, remains the same. Ad 2 The concept of the thing does stay the same, yet under that concept there is something formal signified, and because it is formal, it remains the same. Hence the thing signified, as it is signified, remains the same, though not the thing signified itself. Ad 3 There is nothing common to being and non being under the proper reasons taken. When it is said that what is signified is not the same, it does not follow that with the thing not existing the signifying utterance does not signify such a thing, but as it is existing.

Question II is whether 'a dead man, therefore a man' is a valid inference.

First positive argument. 'Socrates is a man therefore there is a man' is valid, therefore 'Socrates is a dead man therefore there is a man' is also valid, by similar reasoning. Moreover 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore he is dead' is valid. Second positive argument. Anything follows from two contradictory statements. But the antecedent 'Socrates is a dead man' involves two contradictory statements, namely, being one and not one, because in 'man' we understand one, but in 'dead', not one. Therefore 'there is man' follows from the antecedent and so 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' is valid. First negative argument. On the other hand, Aristotle says that when one part of a composite entity 'diminishes' the logical nature of the other, we cannot infer the conclusion, as in the present case.

Determination. Brito argues that the argument involves a fallacy because it advances from what is said in a qualified sense, to what is said without qualification, and so it is not valid. In the antecedent (Socrates is a dead man), the word 'man' is used in a qualified sense (as with - my example - the word 'diamond' in 'fake diamond').

Ad 1. The argument by similar reason that is invoked here is not valid. For 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is something dead' is a valid argument, since 'dead' is taken in the same way in the antecedent and consequent. But the argument 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' is not similar, for in the consequent 'man' is taken 'according to itself', but in the antecedent, as required by 'dead'. Ad 2 While a conclusion from two contradictories is certainly valid, 'Socrates is a dead man' does not involve contradictories. For 'man' does not stand here for a man in an unqualifed sense.

Primary Sources

(1974), Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum tertium De anima, ed. W. Fauser, in Der Kommentar der Radulphus Brito zu Buch 111 De anima, Beitrдge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters NF 12, Mьnster: Aschendorff.]] (1975), Sophisma 'Aliquis homo est species', ed. J. Pinborg, in 'Radulphus Brito's sophism on second intentions', Vivarium, pp. 119-52. ]] (1978), Sophisma 'Rationale est animal', ed. S. Ebbesen, in 'The Sophism Rationale est animal by Radulphus Brito', Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-age Grec et Latin 24, pp. 85-120.]] (1978), Quaestiones super libros Topicorum Boethii, ed. N.J. Green-Pedersen and J. Pinborg, in 'Radulphus Brito: Commentary on Boethius' De differentiis topicis and the sophism Omnis homo est omnis homo', Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-age Grec et Latin 26, pp. 1-92.]] (1978), Sophisma 'Omnis homo est omnis homo', ed. N.J. Green-Pedersen and J. Pinborg, in 'Radulphus Brito: Commentary on Boethius' De differentiis topicis and the sophism Omnis homo est omnis homo', Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-age Grec et Latin 26, pp. 93-114.]] (1980), Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii, ed. J. Pinborg, Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-age Grec et Latin 35, pp. 56-142.]] (1980), Quaestiones super Priscianum minorem, ed. H.W. Enders and J. Pinborg, in Grammatica speculativa 3/1-2, Stuttgart and Bad Constatt: Fromann-Holzboog.]] (1981-2), Quaestiones super Artem veterem and Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum, ed. S. Ebbesen and J. Pinborg, in 'Gennadios and western scholasticism: Radulphus Brito's Ars Vetus in Greek translation', Classica et Mediaevalia 33, pp. 263-319.

References

• Covington, Michael A. 1984. Syntactic theory in the High Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Marenbon, J., Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350), Routledge 1991, c. 8.
• Pinborg, J., Die Entwicklung de Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter, Beitrдge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Texte und Untersuchungen 42/2 Mьnster: Aschendorff; Copenhagen: Frost-Hansen (1967).
• Rosier, Irиne. 1983. La grammaire spйculative des modistes. Lille: Presses Universitaires.

Latin	English
144 CONSEQUENTER quaeritur, utrum vox significet idem re existente et non existente. Et arguitur quod non quia voces significant essentiam rei, modo essentia rei non est eadem re existente et non existente, ideo &c. Maior patet ex praecedenti quaestione, minor de se patet, quia re existente essentia rei non est corrupta, immo habet esse extra animam, sed re non existente illa essentia rei est corrupta. Responsio	Consequently, it is asked whether an utterance signifies the same with the thing [it denotes] existing or [et] not existing. 1. And it is argued that [it does] not because utterances signify the essence of a thing, but the essence of a thing is not the same with the thing existing and not existing, therefore &c. The major is clear from the preceding question, the minor is clear de se, because with a thing existing the essence of the thing is not corrupted. Or rather, it has being outside the soul, but with the thing not existing, that essence of the thing is corrupted.
Item tu dicis quod re existente et non existente vox idem significat modo illud quod manet idem re existente non est essentia rei sed magis conceptus rei, ergo significatum vocis est conceptus et non essentia rei, modo hoc est falsum, ut probatum est in alia quaestione, ergo re existente et non existente vox non significat idem, immo re non existente, vox cadit a suo significato. Responsio	2. Likewise, you say that with the thing existing and not existing, the utterance signifies the same, but that which remains the same with the thing existing is not the essence of the thing but rather [magis] the concept of the thing. Therefore the significate of the utterance is a concept and not the essence of the thing. But this is false, as was proved in the other question, therefore with the thing existing and not existing an utterance may not signify the same, or rather, with the thing not existing, the utterance falls from its significate.
Item enti et non enti nihil est commune univocum, modo re existente est ens et ipsa non existente est non ens, ergo res existens et non existens, non habet unam rationem intelligendi nec significandi, ergo re existente et non existente voces non significant idem. Responsio	3. Likewise, there is nothing univocal common to a being and a non being, but with the thing existing it is a being, and with the thing not existing, it is a non being, therefore a thing existing, and a thing not existing, do not have a single logical nature of understanding, nor of signifying. Therefore with a thing existing and not existing, utterances do not signify the same.
IN OPPOSITUM arguitur, quia si re corrupta, vox non significaret idem, sed caderet a suo significato, tunc oporteret esse novam impositionem vocum corrupta re, modo nos non dicimus istud, immo dicimus quod sortes semper significat sortem, sive sit sive non sit, et tamen dicimus quod sorte non existente, sortes significat sortem, quare &c.	IN OPPOSITION, 1. it is argued that if, with the thing destroyed, an utterance were not to signify the same, but were to fall from its significate, then there would have to be a new imposition of utterances, with the thing destroyed. But we do not say that. Rather, we say that Socrates always signifies Socrates, whether he exists or does not exist, and nevertheless we say that with Socrates not existing, Socrates signifies Socrates, wherefore &c.
Item illud quod significatur per terminum intelligitur per ipsum, modo intellectus idem intelligit re existente et non existente, [quia] per sortem, sive sit sive non sit semper idem [144b] intelligit, ergo &c.	2. Likewise, that which is signified by a term is understood through it, but the understanding understands the same with a thing existing and not existing, because by Socrates, whether he exists or does not exist, it understands the same, therefore &c.
Ad istam quaestionem dico duo primo quod vox idem significat re existente et non existente, secundo dico quod quantum ad significatum vocis non est idem re existente et non existente. Primum declaratur sic, quia illud quod per vocem intelligitur per vocem significatur, modo idem intelligitur per vocem sive res sit sive non sit, ergo idem significatur per vocem sive res sit sive non sit. Maior patet quia significare est intellectum constituere ergo quod intellectus intelligit idem per vocem significat et loquitur de primo intellectu et non de causa intellectus sicut intellectus intelligit unum relativorum per alterum et tamen unum significat alterum.	To this question, I say two things. First, that an utterance signifies the same with a thing existing or not. Second, I say that as far as the significate of the utterance, it is not the same with a thing existing or not. The first [claim] is clarified thus. For that which is understood by an utterance is signified by the utterance, but the same thing is understood by an utterance whether the thing exists or not. Therefore the same is signified by an utterance whether the thing exists or not. The major [premiss] is clear, because signifying establishes understanding. Therefore what the understanding understands, signifies the same by the utterance, and speaks of the primary understanding and not of the cause of understanding, just as the understanding understands one [of two related things] through the other, and yet one signifies the other.
Maior probatur quia ubicumque manet eadem ratio intelligendi manet idem fantasma in fantasia sive sit res sive non sit. Modo ex eodem fantasmate sumitur eadem ratio intelligendi, ergo eadem ratio manet sive res sit sive non sit. Maior patet, scilicet, quod idem fantasma maneat sive res sit sive non sit, quia abeuntibus sensibilibus manent sensus et fantasie, ergo idem fantasma manet sive res sit sive non sit sicut exempli gratia, si videam sortem et recedat a me, postea idem fantasma manet in fantasia, modo sicut prius et hoc quodlibet experitur in seipso, scilicet quod idem intelligit sive res sit sive non sit, ita quod accidit rei quod sit extra animam ad hoc quod intelligitur, unde intelligit sortem, et intelligit hominem, non tamen oportet quod sit ita vera sortes est homo, ita quod sortes, sit extra animam, ergo &c.	The minor [reading minor] premiss is proved, because wheresoever the same reason of understanding remains, the same phantasm in our fantasy remains, whether the thing exists or not. But from the same phantasm is taken the same reason of understanding, therefore the same reason remains whether the thing exists or not. The major is clear, namely, that the same phantasm remains whether the thing exists or not, because with the sensible [objects] departing, the senses and the fantasy [reading fantasia] remain. Therefore the same phantasm remains whether the thing exists or not. Just as, for example, if I see Socrates and he recedes from me, afterwards the same phantasm remains in fantasy, now, just as before and, whatever one experiences in oneself, namely, that one understands the same whether the thing exists or not, so that it is an accident of the thing that exists outside the soul in respect of what is understood, wherefore one understands Socrates, and understands man. Nevertheless it does not have to be that 'Socrates is a man' is true in such a way that Socrates exists outside the soul, therefore &c.
Secundum declaratur sic, scilicet quod illud quod est significatum per vocem non sit idem re existente et non existente, quia illud quod est significatum per vocem est quiditas rei et essentia illa autem non est eadem re existente et non existente, quia re non existente corrumpitur rei essentia, quia generatio et corruptio sunt ad substantiam, generatio enim et corruptio est transmutatio totius in totum. Unde re corrupta non 145 manet essentia rei ut quidam dicunt non enim manet in anima quia esse in anima est esse actuale, et secundum quid ipsius rei et non essentiale nec extra animam manet.	The second is clarified thus, namely that what is the significate of an utterance is not the same whether the thing exists or not, because that which is signified by an utterance is the quiddity of the thing, and [its] essence. But that is not the same whether the thing exists or not, because with the thing not existing, the essence of the thing is destroyed, because generation and destruction are in respect of a substance, for generation and destruction are the transmutation of the whole, in the whole. Wherefore, with a thing destroyed, the essence of a thing, as certain persons say, does not remain. For it does not remain in the soul, because being in the soul is actual being [esse actuale], and, in a qualified sense, of the thing itself, and not essential nor does it remain outside the soul.
Ideo re corrupta non manet essentia rei, et ideo quod est significatum non manet re existente et non existente, et ita ista sunt simul, scilicet quod significatur, ut significatum est manet idem re existente et non existente, et tamen illud quod est significatum manet idem quia quando dico vox significat dico significatum non secundum illud quod est absolute sed ut significatum est, et quia eadem ratio manet idem re existente et non existente. Ideo significatum ut significatum est manet idem etiam vox significans et non significans, sed illud quod est significatum absolute non manet idem re existente et non existente, quia sicut differt dicere hominem album secundum quod album, et hominem qui est albus, quia qui dicit hominem secundum quod album dicit hominem sub ratione albi, qui autem dicit hominem qui est, dicit hominem est differt dicere, significatum ut significatum et illud quod est significatum ut formale in significato ut est significatum est ratio significandi quia illa manet eadem re existente et non existente. Ideo dico quod significatum ut significatum est manet idem et ideo aliqui dicunt quod significatum manet idem re existente et non existente, et significatum non manet idem. Ad istam intentionem loquuntur, quia quando dicunt quod significatio manet eadem intelligunt quod significatum ut significatum est manet idem, sed quando dicunt quod significatum ut notificant manet idem, hoc est id quod est significatum non manet idem re existente et non existente.	For this reason, with a thing destroyed, the essence of the thing does not remain, and for that reason what is signified does not remain with the thing existing and not existing, and thus those are [true] together, namely what is signified, as it is signified, remains the same whether a thing exists or not, and nevertheless that which is signified remains the same remains the same. For when I say an utterance signifies, I say 'what is signified' not according to that which exists absolutely, but as it is signified, and because the same logical nature [ratio] remains the same with the thing existing or not. For that reason, the thing signified as it is signified, remains the same, also an utterance signifying and not signifying. But that which is signified absolutely does not remain the same whether a thing exists or not, because just as it is different to say 'a white man according as [he is] white', and 'a man who is white', because one who says 'a man according as [he is] white', means a man under the logical nature of white, but one who says 'a man who is [white]', means that a man is [white], it is different to say, 'what is signified, as signified', and 'that which is signified', as what is formal in what is signified, as it is signified, is the reason of signifying, because that remains the same whether the thing exists or not. For that reason I say that what is signified, as it is signified, remains the same and for that reason certain people say that what is signified remains the same whether a thing exists or not, and what is signified does not remain the same. To that intention they speak, because when they say that the signification remains the same, they understand that what is signified, as it is signified, remains the same, but when they say that the thing signified, as they make known, remains the same, this is that what is signified does not remain the same with the thing existing or not.
TUNC AD RATIONES.	THEN [IN REPLY] TO THE ARGUMENTS.
Ad primam cum dicitur vox significat rei essentiam, verum est tamen hoc est sub aliqua ratione intelligendi. Et cum dicitur rei essentia non manet eadem &c, [145b] verum est secundum id quod est, tamen quantum ad esse intellectum et significatum manet eadem re existente et non existente, et ideo significatum ut significatum manet idem, quia formale in significato manet idem, et ratio significandi, ergo &c.	1. To the first, when it is said that an utterance signifies the essence of a thing, it is true, nevertheless this falls under the logical nature of understanding. And when it is said the essence of a thing does not remain the same &c, it is true according to that which exists, yet as far as being that is understood and signified, it remains the same, whether the thing exists or not. And for that reason what is signified, as signified, remains the same, because what is formal, in what is signified, remains the same, and [so] the reason of signifying, &c.
Ad aliam cum dicitur conceptus rei &c, verum est, tamen sub illo conceptu est aliquod significatum formale, et ideo quod est formale idem manet, ideo significatum ut significatum est licet illud quod significatum est non maneat idem, et ideo re non existente vox non est significatum per rationem significandi rem immediate.	2. To the [second], when it is said that the concept of a thing &c, it is true, yet under that concept there is something formal that is signified, and for the reason that is it formal, it remains the same, [and] for that reason the thing signified, as it is signified [remains the same], although that which is signified may not remain the same. And for that reason, when the thing does not exist, an utterance is not a significate by reason of signifying a thing immediately.
Ad aliam cum dicitur enti et non enti et cetera, verum est sub propriis rationibus sumptis, cum dicitur, ergo re existente et non existente non est idem significatum non sequitur quia re non existente vox significans non significat talem rem, ut autem existens est, immo significat ipsam ut existens est sicut quia sortes, semper significat sortem sive sit sive non sit. Unde sorti corrupto sortes non est sortes, immo significat sortem eodem modo est in aliis, ideo &c.	3. To the [third], when it is said [there is nothing common] to being and non being &c, it is true under the proper reasons taken. When it is said, therefore, with a thing existing [or] not existing, what is signified is not the same, it does not follow that with the thing not existing the signifying utterance does not signify such a thing, but as it is existent, or rather, it signifies that thing just as it is existing, just as Socrates always signifies Socrates whether he exists or not. Wherefore, with Socrates destroyed, Socrates is not Socrates, or rather, it signifies Socrates in the same way it is in the other [cases] &c.
178 Consequenter quaeritur: Utrum sequatur homo mortuus ergo homo.	Consequently it is asked: whether 'a dead man, therefore a man' follows.
Et arguitur quod sic: 1. quia sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes homo mortuus ergo est homo. Antecedens patet, quia idem sequitur ad se, quia mortuum est idem sorti mortuo. Probatio consequentiae, quia tu non probares consequentiam esse negandam vel non negares nisi quia mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis sed hoc non est verum. Probo quia sicut mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis sicut homo de ratione mortui et tamen hoc non obstante bene sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes est homo mortuus ergo sortes est homo. Responsio	And it is argued that it is so, as follows. 1. Because it follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore by a similar [argument] it follows, 'Socrates [is] a man therefore there is a man'. The antecedent is clear, because the same thing follows from itself, because [some] dead [thing] is the same as a dead Socrates. The proof of the consequent, because you would not prove the consequent to be denied, or you would not deny [it] unless because [being] dead diminishes the logical nature of a man, but this is not true. I prove because just as [being] dead diminishes in respect of the logical nature of man, just as man [diminishes] the logical nature of [being] dead, and nevertheless this notwithstanding it validly [bene] follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore he is dead', therefore by a similar [reasoning] it follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is a man'.
2. Item, quandocumque in aliquo antecedente includuntur duo contradictoria ad ipsum sequitur quodlibet ipsorum ut dicitur quarto metaphysicae, scilicet, sortes vel aliquis talis est homo mortuus includuntur duo contradictoria, scilicet, unum et non unum, quia in homine intelligitur unum et in mortuo non unum ergo ad antecedens sequitur quodlibet istorum, et sic sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo. Responsio	2. Likewise, whenever in some antecedent two contradictories are involved, there follows anything you like from this, as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, namely, Socrates, or some such person, is a dead man involves two contradictories, namely, one and not one, because in 'man' is understood one, and in 'dead', not one, therefore from the antecedent there follows any of those things, and thus it follows 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man'.
OPPOSITUM vult philosophus quod quando talia sunt composita quorum unum diminuit de ratione alterius, tunc non licet ex talibus coniunctis inferret divisum, quia ibi est oppositio in obiecto ut homo mortuus ergo homo.	On the opposing side, the Philosopher would have it that when such things are composite of which one diminishes the logical nature of the other, then it is not allowed that from such conjunctions there is implied [inferret] a divided conclusion, because in such a case [ibi] there is opposition in obiecto, as in 'a dead man, therefore a man'.
Dico quod non sequitur homo mortuus ergo homo, quia illa consequentia est nulla in qua est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter sed dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, ergo homo, est fallacia secundum quid et simpli[178b]citer, ergo &c. Maior patet quia omnis consequentia sophystica impedit consequentiam syllogisticam et bonam. Minor declaratur, quia dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, hic tenetur homo pro esse secundum quid ratione de li mortuum, sed quando dicitur ergo sortes est homo, ergo in ista consequentia homo secundum se sumptum tenetur pro esse simpliciter, et quia sumo in antecedente hominem esse secundum quid ut dictum est ideo proceditur ibi a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter non valet consequentia.	I say that 'a dead man, therefore a man' does not follow, because there is nothing is a [valid] consequence in which there is fallacy of 'with and without qualification'. But in saying 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore [there is] a man' is a fallacy with and without qualification, therefore &c. The major is clear because every sophistical consequence prevents a consequence which is syllogistical and valid. The minor is clarified, because in saying 'Socrates is a dead man', here 'man' is held for being in a qualified sense, by reason of the word 'dead'. But when we say 'therefore Socrates is a man', therefore in that consequence 'man', taken according to itself, is taken for being in an unqualified sense. And because in the antecedent I take 'a man being' in a qualified sense, as was said, for that reason [the argument] advances from what is said in a qualified sense, to what is said without qualification, the consequence is not valid.
Et tu dices, ergo non erit hic oppositio in obiecto homo mortuus, si li homo stans secundum exigentiam mortui stet secundum quid et tamen philosophus dicit quod est oppositio in obiecto ibi.	And you say, therefore there will not be opposition in obiecto in the case of 'dead man', if the word 'man' stands as required by 'dead', it will stand without qualification, and nevertheless the philosopher says that it is opposition in obiecto.
Dicendum quod philosophus non intellexit quod sit oppositio in obiecto dicendo homo mortuus, ergo homo, et propter hoc dicit quod est oppositio in obiecto, scilicet, in addito sicut ergo in antecedente non est oppositio in addito, ideo ibi stat homo, secundum exigentiam mortui. Sed in antecedente in habitudine ad consequens est oppositio et sic intellexit philosophus.	It must be said that the philosopher did not understand that there is opposition in obiecto in saying 'a dead man, therefore a man', and on account of this he says that there is opposition in obiecto, namely, in what is added just as, therefore, in the antecedent there is not opposition in what is added. For that reason, 'man' stands there as required by 'dead'. But in the antecedent in relation [habitudine] to the consequent there is opposition and thus the Philosopher understood [it].
TUNC AD rationes. Ad primam cum dicitur sortes est homo mortuus ergo est mortuus, ergo a simili sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo. Dico quod non est simile, quia homo in antecedente stat secundum exigentiam mortui et ideo sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est mortuus, sed non sequitur sortes est homo mortuus, ergo est homo quia hic sumitur secundum se, sed in antecedente sumitur secundum exigentiam mortui, et sic aliter sumitur in antecedente et aliter in consequente, cum dicitur sicut mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis ita econverso verum est homo secundum se sumptus sed homo sumptus in hoc aggregato non diminuit de ratione mortui.	Now for the arguments. To the first, when it is said that 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is something dead' [follows], therefore by similar [reasoning] 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' follows. I say that it is not similar [reasoning], because 'man' in the antecedent stands as required by 'dead', and for that reason 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is something dead' [follows], but 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore there is a man' does not follow, because ['man'] is taken here according to itself, but in the antecedent it is taken required by 'dead'. And thus it is taken one way in the antecedent and another way in the consequent. When it is said that just as 'dead' diminishes the logical nature of man, thus, conversely, man taken according to itself, it is true. But man taken in the aggregate [expression], does not diminish the logical nature of 'dead'.
Ad aliam cum dicitur quandocumque in aliquo antecedente sumuntur duo contradictoria {et} verum est et cum dicitur in illo antecedente sortes est homo mortuus includuntur duo contradictoria, falsum est, quia dicendo sortes est homo mortuus, homo hic non stat pro homine vivo vel vero, sed secundum exigentiam mortui ut visum est. Unde si acciperetur secundum se, sic esset contradictio. Unde bene est oppositum in obiecto inter homine et mortuum, ratione de li hominis secundum se sumpti in consequente, et ratione de li mortui 179sumpti in consequente ut dictum est sed secundum quod aggregatum simul in antecedente dicendo homo mortuus, quia tunc homo teneretur secundum exigentiam mortui et sic non opponuntur.	To the other, when it is said, whenever in any antecedent there are taken two contradictories, it is true, and when it is said, in that antecedent 'Socrates is a dead man', there are two contradictories involved, it is false, because in saying 'Socrates is a dead man', 'man' here does not stand for a living or true man, but as it is required by 'dead', as we saw. Wherefore, if it were taken according to itself, there would be a contradiction. Wherefore, rightly [bene] there is opposition in obiecto between 'man' and 'dead', by reason of the word 'man', taken according to itself in the consequent, and by reason of the word 'dead' taken in the consequent, as was said, but according as the aggregate together in the antecedent by saying 'dead man', because then 'man' would be held [as] required by 'dead', and thus they are not opposed.

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