Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Note 10.====

====Note 10. Peirce (CE 1, 281&ndash;282)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| Our next business is to find out which is which.

<p>Our next business is to find out which is which. For this purpose we must consider that each principle is to be proved by the kind of inference which it supports.</p>

| For this purpose we must consider that each principle

 

| is to be proved by the kind of inference which it supports.

<p>The ground of deductive inference then must be established deductively; that is by reasoning from determinant to determinate, or in other words by reasoning from definition.  But this kind of reasoning can only be applied to an object whose character depends upon its definition. Now of most objects it is the definition which depends upon the character;  and so the definition must therefore itself rest on induction or hypothesis.  But the principle of deduction must rest on nothing but deduction, and therefore it must relate to something whose character depends upon its definition. Now the only objects of which this is true are symbols; they indeed are created by their definition;  while neither forms nor things are.  Hence, the principle of deduction must relate to the symbolizability of symbols.</p>

 

| The ground of deductive inference then must be established deductively;

<p>The principle of hypothetic inference must be established hypothetically, that is by reasoning from determinate to determinant.  Now it is clear that this kind of reasoning is applicable only to that which is determined by what it determines;  or that which is only subject to truth and falsehood so far as its determinate is, and is thus of itself pure ''zero''.  Now this is the case with nothing whatever except the pure forms;  they indeed are what they are only in so far as they determine some symbol or object.  Hence the principle of hypothetic inference must relate to the symbolizability of forms.</p>

| that is by reasoning from determinant to determinate, or in other words

 

| by reasoning from definition.  But this kind of reasoning can only be

<p>The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively, that is by reasoning from parts to whole.  This kind of reasoning can apply only to those objects whose parts collectively are their whole. Now of symbols this is not true.  If I write ''man'' here and ''dog'' here that does not constitute the symbol of ''man and dog'', for symbols have to be reduced to the unity of symbolization which Kant calls the unity of apperception and unless this be indicated by some special mark they do not constitute a whole.  In the same way forms have to determine the same matter before they are added;  if the curtains are green and the wainscot yellow that does not make a ''yellow-green''.  But with things it is altogether different;  wrench the blade and handle of a knife apart and the form of the knife has disappeared but they are the same thing &mdash; the same matter &mdash; that they were before.  Hence, the principle of induction must relate to the symbolizability of things.</p>

| applied to an object whose character depends upon its definition.

 

| Now of most objects it is the definition which depends upon the

<p>All these principles must as principles be universal. Hence they are as follows: &mdash;</p>

| character;  and so the definition must therefore itself rest on

 

| induction or hypothesis.  But the principle of deduction must

<p>All things, forms, symbols are symbolizable.</p>

| rest on nothing but deduction, and therefore it must relate

 

| to something whose character depends upon its definition.

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 281&ndash;282</p>

| Now the only objects of which this is true are symbols;

 

| they indeed are created by their definition;  while

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| neither forms nor things are.  Hence, the principle

</blockquote>

| of deduction must relate to the symbolizability of

| symbols.

| The principle of hypothetic inference must be established hypothetically,

| that is by reasoning from determinate to determinant.  Now it is clear that

| this kind of reasoning is applicable only to that which is determined by what

| it determines;  or that which is only subject to truth and falsehood so far as

| its determinate is, and is thus of itself pure 'zero'.  Now this is the case with

| nothing whatever except the pure forms;  they indeed are what they are only in so

| far as they determine some symbol or object.  Hence the principle of hypothetic

| inference must relate to the symbolizability of forms.

| The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively,

| that is by reasoning from parts to whole.  This kind of reasoning can

| apply only to those objects whose parts collectively are their whole.

| Now of symbols this is not true.  If I write 'man' here and 'dog' here

| that does not constitute the symbol of 'man and dog', for symbols have

| to be reduced to the unity of symbolization which Kant calls the unity

| of apperception and unless this be indicated by some special mark they

| do not constitute a whole.  In the same way forms have to determine the

| same matter before they are added;  if the curtains are green and the

| wainscot yellow that does not make a 'yellow-green'.  But with things

| it is altogether different;  wrench the blade and handle of a knife

| apart and the form of the knife has dissappeared but they are the

| same thing -- the same matter -- that they were before.  Hence,

| the principle of induction must relate to the symbolizability

| of things.

| All these principles must as principles be universal.

| Hence they are as follows: --

| All things, forms, symbols are symbolizable.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 281-282.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

==Locations Cited==

==Locations Cited==