Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Note 8.====

====Note 8. Peirce (CE 1, 280)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| But there are three distinct kinds of inference;

<p>But there are three distinct kinds of inference; inconvertible and different in their conception. There must, therefore, be three different principles to serve for their grounds.  These three principles must also be indemonstrable;  that is to say, each of them so far as it can be proved must be proved by means of that kind of inference of which it is the ground.  For if the principle of either kind of inference were proved by another kind of inference, the former kind of inference would be reduced to the latter;  and since the different kinds of inference are in all respects different this cannot be. You will say that it is no proof of these principles at all to support them by that which they themselves support.  But I take it for granted at the outset, as I said at the beginning of my first lecture, that induction and hypothesis have their own validity.  The question before us is ''why'' they are valid.  The principles, therefore, of which we are in search, are not to be used to prove that the three kinds of inference are valid, but only to show how they come to be valid, and the proof of them consists in showing that they determine the validity of the three kinds of inference.</p>

| inconvertible and different in their conception.

 

| There must, therefore, be three different principles

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 280</p>

| to serve for their grounds.  These three principles

 

| must also be indemonstrable;  that is to say, each

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| of them so far as it can be proved must be proved

</blockquote>

| by means of that kind of inference of which it

| is the ground.  For if the principle of either

| kind of inference were proved by another kind

| of inference, the former kind of inference

| would be reduced to the latter;  and since

| the different kinds of inference are in

| all respects different this cannot be.

| You will say that it is no proof of

| these principles at all to support

| them by that which they themselves

| support.  But I take it for granted

| at the outset, as I said at the beginning

| of my first lecture, that induction and hypothesis

| have their own validity.  The question before us is 'why'

| they are valid.  The principles, therefore, of which we

| are in search, are not to be used to prove that the

| three kinds of inference are valid, but only to

| show how they come to be valid, and the proof

| of them consists in showing that they

| determine the validity of the

| three kinds of inference.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 280.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

====Note 9.====

====Note 9.====