MyWikiBiz, Author Your Legacy — Friday November 22, 2024
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, 04:00, 10 January 2008
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| =====1.2.1.1. Observation and Action===== | | =====1.2.1.1. Observation and Action===== |
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− | <pre>
| + | It seems clear that observations are a special type of action, and that actions are a special type of observable event. At least, actions are events that may come to be observed, if only in the way that outcomes of eventual effects are recognized to confirm the hypotheses of specific causes. Is every action in some sense an observation? Is every observable event in some sense an observation, a commemoration, an event whose occasion serves to observe something else? If this were so, then the concepts of observation and action would be special cases of each other. Computer scientists will have no trouble accepting the mutual recursion of complex notions, so long as the conceptual instrument as a whole does its job, and so long as the recursion bottoms out somewhere. The mutual definition can find its limit in two ways. It can ground out centrally, with a single category of primitive element that has all the relevant aspects being analyzed, here both perception and action. It can scatter peripherally, resolving into simple elements that distinctively belong to one category or another. |
− | It seems clear that observations are a special type of action, and that actions | |
− | are a special type of observable event. At least, actions are events that may | |
− | come to be observed, if only in the way that outcomes of eventual effects are | |
− | recognized to confirm the hypotheses of specific causes. Is every action in | |
− | some sense an observation? Is every observable event in some sense an | |
− | observation, a commemoration, an event whose occasion serves to observe | |
− | something else? If this were so, then the concepts of observation and action | |
− | would be special cases of each other. Computer scientists will have no trouble | |
− | accepting the mutual recursion of complex notions, so long as the conceptual | |
− | instrument as a whole does its job, and so long as the recursion bottoms out | |
− | somewhere. The mutual definition can find its limit in two ways. It can ground | |
− | out centrally, with a single category of primitive element that has all the | |
− | relevant aspects being analyzed, here both perception and action. It can | |
− | scatter peripherally, resolving into simple elements that distinctively belong | |
− | to one category or another. | |
− | </pre>
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| | | |
| =====1.2.1.2. Observation and Observables===== | | =====1.2.1.2. Observation and Observables===== |