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| | <pre> | | <pre> |
| − | Appendix A: Sources
| + | Appendix A: Sources |
| − | Aristotle: On Interpretation
| + | Aristotle: On Interpretation |
| − | Chapter 1
| + | Chapter 1 |
| | | | |
| − | {1} Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions
| + | {1} Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions |
| − | of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As
| + | of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As |
| − | writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men.
| + | writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. |
| − | But the mental affections themselves, of which these words
| + | But the mental affections themselves, of which these words |
| − | are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind,
| + | are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, |
| − | as are also the objects of which those affections are
| + | as are also the objects of which those affections are |
| − | representations or likenesses, images, copies.
| + | representations or likenesses, images, copies. |
| | | | |
| − | Aristotle: Prior Analytics
| + | Aristotle: Prior Analytics |
| − | Book 1 Chapter 4
| + | Book 1 Chapter 4 |
| − | {1} When three terms are so related to one another that the last
| + | {1} When three terms are so related to one another that the last |
| − | is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly
| + | is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly |
| − | contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit
| + | contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit |
| − | of perfect syllogism. By 'middle term' I mean that which both is
| + | of perfect syllogism. By 'middle term' I mean that which both is |
| − | contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is
| + | contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is |
| − | the middle by its position also; and by 'extremes' (a) that which
| + | the middle by its position also; and by 'extremes' (a) that which |
| − | is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is
| + | is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is |
| − | contained. For if A is predicated of all B, and B of all C,
| + | contained. For if A is predicated of all B, and B of all C, |
| − | A must necessarily be predicated of all C. ... I call this kind
| + | A must necessarily be predicated of all C. ... I call this kind |
| − | of figure the First.
| + | of figure the First. |
| | | | |
| − | Chapter 5
| + | Chapter 5 |
| | | | |
| − | {2} When the same term applies to all of one subject and to none
| + | {2} When the same term applies to all of one subject and to none |
| − | of the other, or to all or none of both, I call this kind of
| + | of the other, or to all or none of both, I call this kind of |
| − | figure the Second; and in it by the middle term I mean that which
| + | figure the Second; and in it by the middle term I mean that which |
| − | is predicated of both subjects; by the extreme terms, the subjects
| + | is predicated of both subjects; by the extreme terms, the subjects |
| − | of which the middle is predicated; by the major term, that which
| + | of which the middle is predicated; by the major term, that which |
| − | comes next to the middle; and by the minor that which is more
| + | comes next to the middle; and by the minor that which is more |
| − | distant from it. The middle is placed outside the extreme terms,
| + | distant from it. The middle is placed outside the extreme terms, |
| − | and is first by position.
| + | and is first by position. |
| | | | |
| − | Chapter 6
| + | Chapter 6 |
| | | | |
| − | {3} If one of the terms applies to all and the other to none of
| + | {3} If one of the terms applies to all and the other to none of |
| − | the same subject, or if both terms apply to all or none of it,
| + | the same subject, or if both terms apply to all or none of it, |
| − | I call this kind of figure the Third; and in it by the middle I
| + | I call this kind of figure the Third; and in it by the middle I |
| − | mean that of which both the predications are made; by extremes
| + | mean that of which both the predications are made; by extremes |
| − | the predicates; by the major term that which is [further from?]
| + | the predicates; by the major term that which is [further from?] |
| − | the middle; and by the minor that which is nearer to it. The
| + | the middle; and by the minor that which is nearer to it. The |
| − | middle is placed outside the extremes, and is last by position.
| + | middle is placed outside the extremes, and is last by position. |
| | | | |
| − | Book 2 Chapter 21
| + | Book 2 Chapter 21 |
| | | | |
| − | {1} Similarly too with the theory in the Meno that learning is
| + | {1} Similarly too with the theory in the Meno that learning is |
| − | recollection. For in no case do we find that we have previous
| + | recollection. For in no case do we find that we have previous |
| − | knowledge of the individual, but we do find that in the process
| + | knowledge of the individual, but we do find that in the process |
| − | of induction we acquire knowledge of particular things just as
| + | of induction we acquire knowledge of particular things just as |
| − | though we could remember them; for there are some things which we
| + | though we could remember them; for there are some things which we |
| − | know immediately: e.g., if we know that X is a triangle we know
| + | know immediately: e.g., if we know that X is a triangle we know |
| − | that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles.
| + | that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles. |
| − | Similarly too in all other cases.
| + | Similarly too in all other cases. |
| | | | |
| − | {2} Thus whereas we observe particular things by universal
| + | {2} Thus whereas we observe particular things by universal |
| − | knowledge, we do not know them by the knowledge peculiar to them.
| + | knowledge, we do not know them by the knowledge peculiar to them. |
| − | Hence it is possible to be mistaken about them, not because we
| + | Hence it is possible to be mistaken about them, not because we |
| − | have contrary knowledge about them, but because, although we have
| + | have contrary knowledge about them, but because, although we have |
| − | universal knowledge of them, we are mistaken in our particular
| + | universal knowledge of them, we are mistaken in our particular |
| − | knowledge.
| + | knowledge. |
| | | | |
| − | Book 2 Chapter 23
| + | Book 2 Chapter 23 |
| | | | |
| − | {1} Induction epagwgh, or inductive reasoning, consists in
| + | {1} Induction (epagoge), or inductive reasoning, consists in |
| − | establishing a relation between one extreme term and the middle
| + | establishing a relation between one extreme term and the middle |
| − | term by means of the other extreme; e.g., if B is the middle term
| + | term by means of the other extreme; e.g., if B is the middle term |
| − | of A and C, in proving by means of C that A applies to B; for this
| + | of A and C, in proving by means of C that A applies to B; for this |
| − | is how we effect inductions. E.g., let A stand for 'long-lived',
| + | is how we effect inductions. E.g., let A stand for 'long-lived', |
| − | B for 'that which has no bile' and C for the long-lived
| + | B for 'that which has no bile' and C for the long-lived |
| − | individuals such as man and horse and mule. Then A applies to the
| + | individuals such as man and horse and mule. Then A applies to the |
| − | whole of C, for every bileless animal is long-lived. But B, 'not
| + | whole of C, for every bileless animal is long-lived. But B, 'not |
| − | having bile', also applies to all C. Then if C is convertible
| + | having bile', also applies to all C. Then if C is convertible |
| − | with B, i.e., if the middle term is not wider in extension,
| + | with B, i.e., if the middle term is not wider in extension, |
| − | A must apply to B.
| + | A must apply to B. |
| | | | |
| − | {2} This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or
| + | {2} This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or |
| − | immediate premiss. Where there is a middle term, the syllogism
| + | immediate premiss. Where there is a middle term, the syllogism |
| − | proceeds by means of the middle; where there is not, it proceeds
| + | proceeds by means of the middle; where there is not, it proceeds |
| − | by induction. There is a sense in which induction is opposed to
| + | by induction. There is a sense in which induction is opposed to |
| − | syllogism, for the latter shows by the middle term that the major
| + | syllogism, for the latter shows by the middle term that the major |
| − | extreme applies to the third, while the former shows by means of
| + | extreme applies to the third, while the former shows by means of |
| − | the third that the major extreme applies to the middle. Thus by
| + | the third that the major extreme applies to the middle. Thus by |
| − | nature the syllogism by means of the middle is prior and more
| + | nature the syllogism by means of the middle is prior and more |
| − | knowable; but syllogism by induction is more apparent to us.
| + | knowable; but syllogism by induction is more apparent to us. |
| | | | |
| − | Book 2 Chapter 24
| + | Book 2 Chapter 24 |
| | | | |
| − | {1} We have an Example paradeigma when the major extreme is shown
| + | {1} We have an Example (paradeigma) when the major extreme is shown |
| − | to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar to
| + | to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar to |
| − | the third. It must be known both that the middle applies to the
| + | the third. It must be known both that the middle applies to the |
| − | third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the
| + | third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the |
| − | third. E.g., let A be 'bad', B 'to make war on neighbors',
| + | third. E.g., let A be 'bad', B 'to make war on neighbors', |
| − | C 'Athens against Thebes' and D 'Thebes against Phocis'. Then
| + | C 'Athens against Thebes' and D 'Thebes against Phocis'. Then |
| − | if we require to prove that war against Thebes is bad, we must be
| + | if we require to prove that war against Thebes is bad, we must be |
| − | satisfied that war against neighbors is bad. Evidence of this can
| + | satisfied that war against neighbors is bad. Evidence of this can |
| − | be drawn from similar examples, e.g., that war by Thebes against
| + | be drawn from similar examples, e.g., that war by Thebes against |
| − | Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbors is bad, and war
| + | Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbors is bad, and war |
| − | against Thebes is against neighbors, it is evident that war
| + | against Thebes is against neighbors, it is evident that war |
| − | against Thebes is bad. Now it is evident that B applies to C
| + | against Thebes is bad. Now it is evident that B applies to C |
| − | and D (for they are both examples of making war on neighbors),
| + | and D (for they are both examples of making war on neighbors), |
| − | and A to D (since the war against Phocis did Thebes no good); but
| + | and A to D (since the war against Phocis did Thebes no good); but |
| − | that A applies to B will be proved by means of D. ...
| + | that A applies to B will be proved by means of D. ... |
| | | | |
| − | {2} Thus it is evident that an example represents the relation,
| + | {2} Thus it is evident that an example represents the relation, |
| − | not of part to whole or of whole to part, but of one part to
| + | not of part to whole or of whole to part, but of one part to |
| − | another, where both are subordinate to the same general term,
| + | another, where both are subordinate to the same general term, |
| − | and one of them is known. It differs from induction in that the
| + | and one of them is known. It differs from induction in that the |
| − | latter, as we saw, shows from an examination of all the individual
| + | latter, as we saw, shows from an examination of all the individual |
| − | cases that the [major] extreme applies to the middle, and does not
| + | cases that the [major] extreme applies to the middle, and does not |
| − | connect the conclusion with the [minor] extreme; whereas the
| + | connect the conclusion with the [minor] extreme; whereas the |
| − | example does connect it and does not use all the individual cases
| + | example does connect it and does not use all the individual cases |
| − | for its proof.
| + | for its proof. |
| | | | |
| − | Book 2 Chapter 25
| + | Book 2 Chapter 25 |
| | | | |
| − | {1} We have Reduction apagwgh (a) when it is obvious that the
| + | {1} We have Reduction (apagoge) (a) when it is obvious that the |
| − | first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to
| + | first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to |
| − | the last term is not obvious, yet nevertheless is more probable or
| + | the last term is not obvious, yet nevertheless is more probable or |
| − | not less probable than the conclusion; or (b) if there are not
| + | not less probable than the conclusion; or (b) if there are not |
| − | many intermediate terms between the last and the middle; for in
| + | many intermediate terms between the last and the middle; for in |
| − | all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge.
| + | all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge. |
| | | | |
| − | {2} (a) E.g., let A stand for 'that which can be taught', B for
| + | {2} (a) E.g., let A stand for 'that which can be taught', B for |
| − | 'knowledge' and C for 'morality'. Then that knowledge can be
| + | 'knowledge' and C for 'morality'. Then that knowledge can be |
| − | taught is evident; but whether virtue is knowledge is not clear.
| + | taught is evident; but whether virtue is knowledge is not clear. |
| − | Then if BC is not less probable or is more probable than AC, we
| + | Then if BC is not less probable or is more probable than AC, we |
| − | have reduction; for we are nearer to knowledge for having
| + | have reduction; for we are nearer to knowledge for having |
| − | introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge
| + | introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge |
| − | that AC is true.
| + | that AC is true. |
| | | | |
| − | {3} (b) Or again we have reduction if there are not many
| + | {3} (b) Or again we have reduction if there are not many |
| − | intermediate terms between B and C; for in this case too we are
| + | intermediate terms between B and C; for in this case too we are |
| − | brought nearer to knowledge. E.g., suppose that D is 'to square',
| + | brought nearer to knowledge. E.g., suppose that D is 'to square', |
| − | E 'rectilinear figure' and F 'circle'. Assuming that between
| + | E 'rectilinear figure' and F 'circle'. Assuming that between |
| − | E and F there is only one intermediate term - that the circle
| + | E and F there is only one intermediate term - that the circle |
| − | becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of lunules -
| + | becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of lunules - |
| − | we should approximate to knowledge.
| + | we should approximate to knowledge. |
| | | | |
| − | {4} When, however, BC is not more probable than AC, or there are
| + | {4} When, however, BC is not more probable than AC, or there are |
| − | several intermediate terms, I do not use the expression
| + | several intermediate terms, I do not use the expression |
| − | 'reduction'; nor when the proposition BC is immediate; for such
| + | 'reduction'; nor when the proposition BC is immediate; for such |
| − | a statement implies knowledge.
| + | a statement implies knowledge. |
| | | | |
| − | Book 2 Chapter 27
| + | Book 2 Chapter 27 |
| | | | |
| − | {1} A probability eikoV is not the same as a sign shmeion. The
| + | {1} A probability (eikos) is not the same as a sign (semeion). The |
| − | former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know
| + | former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know |
| − | to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a
| + | to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a |
| − | particular way, is a probability: e.g., that the envious are
| + | particular way, is a probability: e.g., that the envious are |
| − | malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate. A sign,
| + | malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate. A sign, |
| − | however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or
| + | however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or |
| − | generally accepted. That which coexists with something else,
| + | generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, |
| − | or before or after whose happening something else has happened,
| + | or before or after whose happening something else has happened, |
| − | is a sign of that something's having happened or being.
| + | is a sign of that something's having happened or being. |
| | | | |
| − | {2} An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs; and
| + | {2} An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs; and |
| − | a sign can be taken in three ways - in just as many ways as there
| + | a sign can be taken in three ways - in just as many ways as there |
| − | are of taking the middle term in the several figures ...
| + | are of taking the middle term in the several figures ... |
| | | | |
| − | {3} We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their
| + | {3} We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their |
| − | middle term as an index tekmhrion (for the name 'index' is given
| + | middle term as an index (tekmerion) (for the name 'index' is given |
| − | to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially
| + | to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially |
| − | of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes
| + | of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes |
| − | as 'signs', and that which is drawn from the middle as an 'index'.
| + | as 'signs', and that which is drawn from the middle as an 'index'. |
| − | For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is
| + | For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is |
| − | most generally accepted and most true.
| + | most generally accepted and most true. |
| | + | |
| | + | Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric |
| | | | |
| − | Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric
| + | Book 1 Chapter 2 |
| | | | |
| − | Book 1 Chapter 2 | + | {1} But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as |
| | + | Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the |
| | + | syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; |
| | + | for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and |
| | + | the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call |
| | + | an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical |
| | + | induction. |
| | | | |
| − | {1} But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as
| + | {2} But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism |
| − | Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the
| + | are necessary, ... it is evident that the materials from which |
| − | syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric;
| + | enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the |
| − | for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and
| + | most part only generally true; and these materials being |
| − | the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call
| + | probabilities and signs, it follows that these two elements must |
| − | an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical
| + | correspond to these two kinds of propositions, each to each. ... |
| − | induction.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | {2} But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism
| |
| − | are necessary, ... it is evident that the materials from which
| |
| − | enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the
| |
| − | most part only generally true; and these materials being
| |
| − | probabilities and signs, it follows that these two elements must
| |
| − | correspond to these two kinds of propositions, each to each. ...
| |
| | </pre> | | </pre> |