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{P.Q}(x, y) = Disj(m C M) ( {P}(x, m) . {Q}(m, y) ).
 
{P.Q}(x, y) = Disj(m C M) ( {P}(x, m) . {Q}(m, y) ).
  −
      
1.4  Outlook of the Project:  All Ways Lead to Inquiry
 
1.4  Outlook of the Project:  All Ways Lead to Inquiry
  −
  −
  −
1.4  Outlook of the Project:  All Ways Lead to Inquiry
  −
  −
      
I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the
 
I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the
   
term "scientific method".  Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from
 
term "scientific method".  Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from
   
being the shorter term, because of the following advantages:
 
being the shorter term, because of the following advantages:
  −
      
1.  It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation
 
1.  It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation
   
     to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge
 
     to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge
   
     that merely aims at such a method.
 
     that merely aims at such a method.
  −
      
2.  It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being,
 
2.  It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being,
   
     of how much "method" there is in science.
 
     of how much "method" there is in science.
  −
      
This Subdivision and the next deal with opposite aspects of inquiry.
 
This Subdivision and the next deal with opposite aspects of inquiry.
   
In many ways it might have been better to interlace the opposing points
 
In many ways it might have been better to interlace the opposing points
   
of comparison, taking them up in a parallel fashion, but this plan was
 
of comparison, taking them up in a parallel fashion, but this plan was
   
judged to be too distracting for a first approach.  In other ways, the
 
judged to be too distracting for a first approach.  In other ways, the
   
negative sides of each topic are prior in point of time to the positive
 
negative sides of each topic are prior in point of time to the positive
   
sides of the issue, but sensible people like to see the light at the end
 
sides of the issue, but sensible people like to see the light at the end
   
of the tunnel before they trouble themselves with the obscurities of the
 
of the tunnel before they trouble themselves with the obscurities of the
   
intervening journey.  Thus, this subdivison of the text emphasizes the
 
intervening journey.  Thus, this subdivison of the text emphasizes the
   
positive features of inquiry and the positive qualities of its objective,
 
positive features of inquiry and the positive qualities of its objective,
   
while the next Subdivision is reserved to examine the negative aspects
 
while the next Subdivision is reserved to examine the negative aspects
   
of each question.
 
of each question.
  −
      
In the order of nature, the absence of a feature naturally precedes the
 
In the order of nature, the absence of a feature naturally precedes the
   
full development of its presence.  In the order of discussion, however,
 
full development of its presence.  In the order of discussion, however,
   
positive terms must be proposed if it is desired to say anything at all.
 
positive terms must be proposed if it is desired to say anything at all.
    
The discussion in this Subdivision is placed to serve a primer, declaring
 
The discussion in this Subdivision is placed to serve a primer, declaring
   
at least the names of enough positive concepts to propose addressing the
 
at least the names of enough positive concepts to propose addressing the
   
negative conditions of knowledge in which inquiry necessarily starts.
 
negative conditions of knowledge in which inquiry necessarily starts.
  −
      
In this Subdivision I stand back once again from the problem of inquiry
 
In this Subdivision I stand back once again from the problem of inquiry
   
and allow myself take a more distant view of the subject, settling into
 
and allow myself take a more distant view of the subject, settling into
   
what I think is a comfortable and a natural account of inquiry, the best
 
what I think is a comfortable and a natural account of inquiry, the best
   
that I have at my command, and attending to the task of describing its
 
that I have at my command, and attending to the task of describing its
   
positive features in a positive light.  I present my personal view of
 
positive features in a positive light.  I present my personal view of
   
inquiry as I currently understand it, without stopping to justify every
 
inquiry as I currently understand it, without stopping to justify every
   
concept in detail or to examine every objection that might be made to
 
concept in detail or to examine every objection that might be made to
   
this view.  In the next Subdivision I discuss a few of the more obvious
 
this view.  In the next Subdivision I discuss a few of the more obvious
   
problems that stand in the way of this view and I try to remove a few
 
problems that stand in the way of this view and I try to remove a few
   
of the more tractable obscurities that appear ready to be cleared up.
 
of the more tractable obscurities that appear ready to be cleared up.
   
The fact that I treat them as my "personal insights" does not mean that
 
The fact that I treat them as my "personal insights" does not mean that
   
all of these ideas about inquiry originate with me, but only that I have
 
all of these ideas about inquiry originate with me, but only that I have
   
come to adopt them for my personal use.  There will be many occasions,
 
come to adopt them for my personal use.  There will be many occasions,
   
the next time that I go over this ground, to point out the sources of
 
the next time that I go over this ground, to point out the sources of
   
these ideas, so far as I know them.
 
these ideas, so far as I know them.
  −
      
The reader may take my apology for this style of presentation to be
 
The reader may take my apology for this style of presentation to be
   
implicit in its dogmatic character.  It is done this way in a first
 
implicit in its dogmatic character.  It is done this way in a first
   
approach for the sake of avoiding an immense number of distractions,
 
approach for the sake of avoiding an immense number of distractions,
   
each of which is not being slighted but demands to be addressed in
 
each of which is not being slighted but demands to be addressed in
   
its own good time.  I want to convey the general drift of my current
 
its own good time.  I want to convey the general drift of my current
   
model, however conjectural, naive, uncritical, and unreflective it
 
model, however conjectural, naive, uncritical, and unreflective it
   
may seem.
 
may seem.
   Line 12,043: Line 11,984:     
Try as I may, I've never seen a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing:
 
Try as I may, I've never seen a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing:
   
To take for granted nothing more than is already given, to set out from nothing
 
To take for granted nothing more than is already given, to set out from nothing
   
but absolutely certain beginnings, to move forward with nothing but absolutely
 
but absolutely certain beginnings, to move forward with nothing but absolutely
   
certain means of proceeding.  In particular, the present inquiry into inquiry,
 
certain means of proceeding.  In particular, the present inquiry into inquiry,
   
foreshadowed in the form y_0 = y·y, ought not to be misconstrued as a device
 
foreshadowed in the form y_0 = y·y, ought not to be misconstrued as a device
   
for magically generating a theory of inquiry from nothing.  Like any other
 
for magically generating a theory of inquiry from nothing.  Like any other
   
inquiry, it requires an agent to invest in a conjecture, to make a guess
 
inquiry, it requires an agent to invest in a conjecture, to make a guess
   
about the pertinent features of the subject of interest, and to choose
 
about the pertinent features of the subject of interest, and to choose
   
the actions, the aspects, and the attitudes with regard to the subject
 
the actions, the aspects, and the attitudes with regard to the subject
   
that are critical to achieving the intended objectives of the study.
 
that are critical to achieving the intended objectives of the study.
  −
      
I can sum all this up by saying that an inquiry requires an inquirer to
 
I can sum all this up by saying that an inquiry requires an inquirer to
   
suggest a hypothesis about the subject of interest and then to put that
 
suggest a hypothesis about the subject of interest and then to put that
   
particular model of the subject to the test.  This in turn requires one
 
particular model of the subject to the test.  This in turn requires one
   
to devote a modicum of personal effort to the task of testing the chosen
 
to devote a modicum of personal effort to the task of testing the chosen
   
hypothesis, to put a quantum of personal interest at stake for the sake
 
hypothesis, to put a quantum of personal interest at stake for the sake
   
of finding out whether the model fits the subject, and, overall, to take
 
of finding out whether the model fits the subject, and, overall, to take
   
the risk of being wrong.  Any model that is feasible is also defeasible,
 
the risk of being wrong.  Any model that is feasible is also defeasible,
   
at least, where it concerns a contingent subject of contingent inquiry.
 
at least, where it concerns a contingent subject of contingent inquiry.
  −
      
The first step, then, of an inquiry into inquiry, is to put forth a tentative
 
The first step, then, of an inquiry into inquiry, is to put forth a tentative
   
model of inquiry, to make a hypothesis about the features of inquiry that are
 
model of inquiry, to make a hypothesis about the features of inquiry that are
   
essential to explaining its experienced characteristics, and thus, in a sense,
 
essential to explaining its experienced characteristics, and thus, in a sense,
   
to make a guess at the very definition of inquiry.  This requirement seems both
 
to make a guess at the very definition of inquiry.  This requirement seems both
   
obvious and outrageous at the same time.  One is perfectly justified in objecting
 
obvious and outrageous at the same time.  One is perfectly justified in objecting
   
that there is much that precedes this so-called "first step", namely, the body of
 
that there is much that precedes this so-called "first step", namely, the body of
   
experience that prepares one to see it and the mass of observation that prompts one
 
experience that prepares one to see it and the mass of observation that prompts one
   
to take it.  I can deal with this objection by making a distinction between mundane
 
to take it.  I can deal with this objection by making a distinction between mundane
   
experience and olympian theory, and then by saying that the making of a conjecture
 
experience and olympian theory, and then by saying that the making of a conjecture
   
is really the first "theoretical" step, but this is a hedge that covers the tracks
 
is really the first "theoretical" step, but this is a hedge that covers the tracks
   
of theory in a very deceptive way, hiding how early in the empirical process the
 
of theory in a very deceptive way, hiding how early in the empirical process the
   
"cloven hoof" of theory actually enters.
 
"cloven hoof" of theory actually enters.
  −
      
Leaving behind the mythical states of "pure" experience and "naive" observation,
 
Leaving behind the mythical states of "pure" experience and "naive" observation,
   
and at least by the time that one has come to give a name to the subject of the
 
and at least by the time that one has come to give a name to the subject of the
   
investigation, one's trek through the data is already half-shod, half-fettered
 
investigation, one's trek through the data is already half-shod, half-fettered
   
by the connotations of the name, and in their turn by all of the concepts that
 
by the connotations of the name, and in their turn by all of the concepts that
   
it invokes in its train.  That name, the concepts that it suggests, and the
 
it invokes in its train.  That name, the concepts that it suggests, and the
   
tacit but vague definition of the subject that this complex of associations
 
tacit but vague definition of the subject that this complex of associations
   
is already beginning to constellate, to attract certain experiences to the
 
is already beginning to constellate, to attract certain experiences to the
   
complex, and to filter out other observations from having any bearing on
 
complex, and to filter out other observations from having any bearing on
   
the subject matter.  By this time, one is already busy translating one's
 
the subject matter.  By this time, one is already busy translating one's
   
empirical acquaintance with the subject into an arrangement of concepts
 
empirical acquaintance with the subject into an arrangement of concepts
   
that is intended to define its essential nature.
 
that is intended to define its essential nature.
  −
      
An array of concepts that is set up in order to capture the essence
 
An array of concepts that is set up in order to capture the essence
   
of a subject is a provisional definition of it, an implicit model
 
of a subject is a provisional definition of it, an implicit model
   
of the subject that contains the makings of an explicit theory.
 
of the subject that contains the makings of an explicit theory.
   
It amounts to a selection from the phenomenal aspects of the
 
It amounts to a selection from the phenomenal aspects of the
   
subject, expresses a guess about its relevant features, and
 
subject, expresses a guess about its relevant features, and
   
constitutes a hypothesis in explanation of its experienced
 
constitutes a hypothesis in explanation of its experienced
   
characteristics.  This incipient order of model or theory
 
characteristics.  This incipient order of model or theory
   
is tantamount to a definition because it sets bounds on
 
is tantamount to a definition because it sets bounds on
   
the "stretches" and the "holds" of a term -- that is,
 
the "stretches" and the "holds" of a term -- that is,
   
the extension, intension, and intention of the term --
 
the extension, intension, and intention of the term --
   
but this is not the kind of definition that has to
 
but this is not the kind of definition that has to
   
be taken on faith, that constitutes the first and
 
be taken on faith, that constitutes the first and
   
the last word on the subject.  In other words,
 
the last word on the subject.  In other words,
   
it is an empirical definition, one that is
 
it is an empirical definition, one that is
   
subject to being falsified in reference
 
subject to being falsified in reference
   
to its intended subject, by failing to
 
to its intended subject, by failing to
   
indicate the necessary, the pertinent,
 
indicate the necessary, the pertinent,
   
or the relevant features that account
 
or the relevant features that account
   
for the presence of its phenomena or
 
for the presence of its phenomena or
   
the persistence of its process.
 
the persistence of its process.
  −
      
If I reflect on the conduct of inquiry,
 
If I reflect on the conduct of inquiry,
   
seeking to fix it in a fitting image
 
seeking to fix it in a fitting image
   
and trying to cast it in a positive
 
and trying to cast it in a positive
   
light, the best I can do is this:
 
light, the best I can do is this:
  −
      
Inquiry is a process that aims at achieving belief or knowledge.
 
Inquiry is a process that aims at achieving belief or knowledge.
  −
      
But even this simple a description already plunges the discussion deep into
 
But even this simple a description already plunges the discussion deep into
   
a number of obscurities.  Most prominently, there is the disjunction between
 
a number of obscurities.  Most prominently, there is the disjunction between
   
belief and knowledge that cries out to be explained or resolved.  Stirring a
 
belief and knowledge that cries out to be explained or resolved.  Stirring a
   
little beneath the surface, and not quite fading into the background, many of
 
little beneath the surface, and not quite fading into the background, many of
   
the other terms that are invoked in the description are capable of hiding the
 
the other terms that are invoked in the description are capable of hiding the
   
entire contents of the original ignorance that the image as a whole is aimed
 
entire contents of the original ignorance that the image as a whole is aimed
   
to dispell.  And yet there is nothing that I can do in this avowedly positive
 
to dispell.  And yet there is nothing that I can do in this avowedly positive
   
context but to mark these points down as topics for future discussion.
 
context but to mark these points down as topics for future discussion.
   −
 
+
There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit,
 
  −
There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit,
  −
 
   
at least partially, in the text of the above description.
 
at least partially, in the text of the above description.
   
Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions.
 
Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions.
  −
  −
  −
o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o
  −
  −
      
I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the term "scientific method".  Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from being the shorter term, because of the following advantages:  (1) It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge that merely aims at such a method.  (2) It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being, of how much "method" there is in science.
 
I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the term "scientific method".  Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from being the shorter term, because of the following advantages:  (1) It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge that merely aims at such a method.  (2) It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being, of how much "method" there is in science.
Line 12,787: Line 12,638:     
Example 6.
 
Example 6.
  −
      
Example 7.
 
Example 7.
Line 12,841: Line 12,690:     
In order to improve the character of the discussion on this score ...
 
In order to improve the character of the discussion on this score ...
 +
 +
==References==
    
<pre>
 
<pre>
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
Aristotle, "On The Soul", in 'Aristotle, Volume 8',
 +
W.S. Hett (trans.), Heinemann, London, UK, 1936, 1986.
   −
IDS. Additional Notes
+
Charniak, E. & McDermott, D.V.,
 +
'Introduction to Artificial Intelligence',
 +
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1985.
   −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
2.  Charniak, E., Riesbeck, C.K., & McDermott, D.V.  Artificial Intelligence Programming.  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1980.
   −
CFRNote 78
+
3Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E., & Thagard, P.R.  Induction:  Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery.  MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986.
   −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
4.  O'Rorke, P.  Review of AAAI 1990 Spring Symposium on Automated Abduction.  SIGART Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 3.  ACM Press, October 1990, p. 12-17.
   −
MW = Matthew West:
+
5.  Pearl, J.  Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference.  Revised 2nd printing.  Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991.
   −
MW: Do you have a Cactus Manual all in one place please?
+
6.  Peng, Y. & Reggia, J.A.  Abductive Inference Models for Diagnostic Problem-Solving.  Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1990.
   −
the documentation for my 'theme one' program
+
7.  Sowa, J.F.  Conceptual Structures:  Information Processing in Mind and Machine. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1984.
that I wrote up for my quant psy master's
  −
contains the last thing like an official
  −
manual that I wrote, also an expository
  −
introduction to the cactus language and
  −
its application to prop calc examples.
  −
may still have an ancient ascii version,
  −
or else the medieval 'word' doc, or i can
  −
send the mac belle version by snail express
  −
if you can vouchsafe me your postal address.
     −
in the mean time, i append a few of the expositions that
+
8.  Sowa, J.F. (ed.)  Principles of Semantic Networks:  Explorations in the Representation of Knowledge.  Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991.
i have outlined here/elsewhere over the last year on-line.
     −
pre-scanning this whole mess'o'messages for you,
+
Dewey, J. (1991).  How We Think.  Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.  Originally published 1910.
I find one that looks to me shortest & sweetest:
     −
http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg05694.html
+
Shakespeare, Wm.  (1988).  William Shakespeare: The Complete Works.  Compact Edition.  S. Wells & G. Taylor (eds.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
 +
</pre>
   −
since this particular synopsis is mercifully short, i will copy it out here
+
==Notes==
and use it to explain surcatenation, along with a few other thing that i am
  −
guessing might be puzzling at first sight about what in hey's going on here.
     −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~ARCHIVE~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
<pre>
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
Reflective Extension of Logical Graphs (Ref Log)
+
IDS.  Email Format
 +
 
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
Here is a formal introduction to the RefLog Syntax.
+
| Document History
 +
|
 +
| Subject:  Inquiry Driven Systems:  An Inquiry Into Inquiry
 +
| Contact:  Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
 +
| Version:  Draft 10.00
 +
| Created:  23 Jun 1996
 +
| Revised:  02 Mar 2003
 +
| Advisor:  M.A. Zohdy
 +
| Setting:  Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
   −
Formally speaking, we have the following set-up:
+
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
   −
Set out the "alphabet of punctuation marks" $M$ = {" ", ",", "(", ")"}.
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
The elements of $M$ are vocalized as "blank, "comma", "links", "right".
     −
1There is a parametric family of formal languages of character strings
+
IDSAdditional Notes
    such that, for each set $X$ of variable names $X$ = {"x_1", ..., "x_k"},
  −
    there is a formal language L($X$) over the alphabet A($X$) = $M$ |_| $X$.
  −
    The grammar can be given in gory detail, but most folks know it already.
     −
| Examples.  If $X$ = {"x", "y"}, then these are typical strings in L($X$):
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
|
  −
| " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ...
     −
2There is a parallel family of formal languages of graphical structures,
+
CFRNote 78
    generically known as "painted and rooted cacti" (PARC's), that exist in
  −
    a one-to-one correspondence with these string expressions, being more or
  −
    less roughly, at a suitable level of abstraction, their parse graphs as
  −
    data structures in the computer.  The PARC's for the above formulas are:
     −
| Examples.
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
|                                                                x  y      x  y
  −
|                                                                o   o       o---o
  −
|                        x      y            x y    x  y      \ /        \ /
  −
|        o               o     o              o      o---o        o          o
  −
|        |    x    y    |      |    x y      |      \ /        |          |
  −
|  @    @    @    @    @      @      @      @        @          @          @      ...
  −
|
  −
| " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ...
     −
Together, these two families of formal languages constitute a system
+
MW = Matthew West:
that is called the "reflective extension of logical graphs" (Ref Log).
     −
Strictly speaking, Ref Log is an abstract or "uninterpreted" formal system,
+
MW: Do you have a Cactus Manual all in one place please?
but its expressions enjoy, as a rule, two dual interpretations that assign
  −
them the meanings of propositions or sentences in "zeroth order logic" (ZOL),
  −
to wit, what Peirce called the "alpha level" of his systems of logical graphs.
     −
For example, the string expression "(x (y))" parses into the following graph:
+
the documentation for my 'theme one' program
 
+
that I wrote up for my quant psy master's
|      x  y
+
contains the last thing like an official
|      o---o
+
manual that I wrote, also an expository
|      |
+
introduction to the cactus language and
|      @
+
its application to prop calc examples.
 +
may still have an ancient ascii version,
 +
or else the medieval 'word' doc, or i can
 +
send the mac belle version by snail express
 +
if you can vouchsafe me your postal address.
 +
 
 +
in the mean time, i append a few of the expositions that
 +
i have outlined here/elsewhere over the last year on-line.
   −
You can "deparse" the string off the graph by traversing
+
pre-scanning this whole mess'o'messages for you,
it like so, reading off the marks and varnames as you go.
+
I find one that looks to me shortest & sweetest:
   −
|  o---x->(--y---o
+
http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg05694.html
|  ^            |
  −
|  |  x  (  y  |
  −
|  |  o-----o  v
  −
|  |  |  )      )
  −
|  (  (|)        )
  −
|  ^  |        |
  −
|  |  @        v
     −
In the "existential" interpretation of RefLog,
+
since this particular synopsis is mercifully short, i will copy it out here
in which I do my own thinking most of the time,
+
and use it to explain surcatenation, along with a few other thing that i am
concatenation of expressions has the meaning of
+
guessing might be puzzling at first sight about what in hey's going on here.
logical conjunction, while "(x)" has the meaning
+
 
of "not x", and so the above string and graph have
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~ARCHIVE~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
a meaning of "x => y", "x implies y", "if x then y",
  −
"not x without y", or anything else that's equivalent.
  −
The blank expression is assigned the value of "true".
  −
Hence, the expression "()" takes the value of "false".
  −
The bracket expression "(x_1, x_2, ..., x_k)" is given
  −
the meaning "Exactly one of the x_j is false, j=1..k".
  −
Therefore, "((x_1),(x_2), ...,(x_k))" partitions the
  −
universe of discourse, saying "Just one x_j is true".
     −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
Reflective Extension of Logical Graphs (Ref Log)
   −
CFR. Note 83
+
Here is a formal introduction to the RefLog Syntax.
   −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
Formally speaking, we have the following set-up:
   −
| Tantum ergo sacramentum
+
Set out the "alphabet of punctuation marks" $M$ = {" ", ",", "(", ")"}.
|  veneremur cernui,
+
The elements of $M$ are vocalized as "blank, "comma", "links", "right".
| et antiquum documentum
+
 
|  novo cedat ritui,
+
1.  There is a parametric family of formal languages of character strings
| praestet fides supplementum
+
    such that, for each set $X$ of variable names $X$ = {"x_1", ..., "x_k"},
|   sensuum defectui.
+
    there is a formal language L($X$) over the alphabet A($X$) = $M$ |_| $X$.
 +
    The grammar can be given in gory detail, but most folks know it already.
 +
 
 +
| Examples. If $X$ = {"x", "y"}, then these are typical strings in L($X$):
 
|
 
|
| So great therefore a sacrifice
+
| " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ...
|  let us humbly adore
  −
| and let the old law yield
  −
|  to the new rite;
  −
| let faith supplement
  −
|  the shortcoming of the senses.
  −
|
  −
| Lyric by Thomas Aquinas,
  −
| Music by Amadeus Mozart, KV 142 & 197.
     −
The increasing ossification of asciification
+
2.  There is a parallel family of formal languages of graphical structures,
is heaping up way too many old bones to bear.
+
    generically known as "painted and rooted cacti" (PARC's), that exist in
So I am going to shift my anklage a bit, and
+
    a one-to-one correspondence with these string expressions, being more or
try out a new set of conventions for a while,
+
    less roughly, at a suitable level of abstraction, their parse graphs as
to see if I can lighten the overloading obit.
+
    data structures in the computer.  The PARC's for the above formulas are:
 
  −
Let us try to reserve script and singly-underscored fake-fonts or formats
  −
for the names of sets, as in the notations !O!, !S!, !I! that I will now
  −
set aside and use from now on for the Object, Sign, Interpretant domains,
  −
respectively, of an arbitrary sign relation !L! c !O! x !S! x !I!.
     −
Among other benefits, this will serve to liberate the plain faced characters
+
| Examples.
for employment as the non-terminal symbols of our formal grammars, rendering
+
|                                                                x  y      x  y
our formal grammatical productions far less $Capitalistic$, !Exclamatory!,
+
|                                                                o  o      o---o
and overbearingly prescriptive than they be otherwise hell-bent to become.
+
|                        x      y            x y    x  y      \ /        \ /
 +
|        o                o      o              o      o---o        o          o
 +
|        |    x    y    |      |    x y      |      \ /        |          |
 +
|  @    @    @    @    @      @      @      @        @          @          @      ...
 +
|
 +
| " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ...
   −
So let me try out this new rite to see how it works out,
+
Together, these two families of formal languages constitute a system
And I will not pause to rewrite the old law in its font,
+
that is called the "reflective extension of logical graphs" (Ref Log).
But advise you solely of its transformed instantiations,
  −
And fix my faith on imagination to sense the supplement.
     −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
Strictly speaking, Ref Log is an abstract or "uninterpreted" formal system,
 +
but its expressions enjoy, as a rule, two dual interpretations that assign
 +
them the meanings of propositions or sentences in "zeroth order logic" (ZOL),
 +
to wit, what Peirce called the "alpha level" of his systems of logical graphs.
   −
CFR.  Note 92
+
For example, the string expression "(x (y))" parses into the following graph:
   −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
|      x  y
 +
|      o---o
 +
|      |
 +
|      @
   −
I need to try and say some things at his point about
+
You can "deparse" the string off the graph by traversing
why formal language theory is interesting and useful,
+
it like so, reading off the marks and varnames as you go.
but all I have at the moment are random remembrances
  −
and reflections that enter my mind from time to time.
     −
In many ways, the study of formal languages and grammars
+
|  o---x->(--y---o
is a paradigm, more, a paragon, of the situation that we
+
|  ^            |
face whenever we inquire into a complex reality, that is,
+
|  |  x  (  y  |
all of the ever-renewed sources of puzzling phenomena or
+
|  |  o-----o  v
pressing problems that we call a world.
+
|  |  |  )      )
 
+
|  (  (|)        )
The archtypical place of formal language theory is well
+
|  ^  |        |
understood in many quarters, and has been from the very
+
|  |  @        v
outset of its constellation as an independent viewpoint.
     −
In this paradigmatic (analogical or exemplary) way of
+
In the "existential" interpretation of RefLog,
understanding it, a formal language is the "data" and
+
in which I do my own thinking most of the time,
a formal grammar is the "theory", and the question is,
+
concatenation of expressions has the meaning of
as always, whether a theory accounts for and explains
+
logical conjunction, while "(x)" has the meaning
the data, a "fitting" relationship that may be viewed
+
of "not x", and so the above string and graph have
in many ways, for one, the way that a theory might be
+
a meaning of "x => y", "x implies y", "if x then y",
said to "generate" the data, or perhaps better stated,
+
"not x without y", or anything else that's equivalent.
not just to "cook" in a precociously specious fashion
+
The blank expression is assigned the value of "true".
but more like to "regenerate" the form after the fact.
+
Hence, the expression "()" takes the value of "false".
 +
The bracket expression "(x_1, x_2, ..., x_k)" is given
 +
the meaning "Exactly one of the x_j is false, j=1..k".
 +
Therefore, "((x_1),(x_2), ...,(x_k))" partitions the
 +
universe of discourse, saying "Just one x_j is true".
   −
That's all that I can manage to express at the moment,
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
but maybe it will supply a grub-stake of motivational
  −
victuals for the grueling labors of exploration ahead.
     −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
+
CFRNote 83
 
  −
IDSOutline
      
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
Inquiry Driven Systems
+
| Tantum ergo sacramentum
 +
|  veneremur cernui,
 +
| et antiquum documentum
 +
|  novo cedat ritui,
 +
| praestet fides supplementum
 +
|  sensuum defectui.
 +
|
 +
| So great therefore a sacrifice
 +
|  let us humbly adore
 +
| and let the old law yield
 +
|  to the new rite;
 +
| let faith supplement
 +
|  the shortcoming of the senses.
 +
|
 +
| Lyric by Thomas Aquinas,
 +
| Music by Amadeus Mozart, KV 142 & 197.
   −
1. Research Proposal
+
The increasing ossification of asciification
 +
is heaping up way too many old bones to bear.
 +
So I am going to shift my anklage a bit, and
 +
try out a new set of conventions for a while,
 +
to see if I can lighten the overloading obit.
   −
1.1.  Outline of the Project:  Inquiry Into Inquiry
+
Let us try to reserve script and singly-underscored fake-fonts or formats
 +
for the names of sets, as in the notations !O!, !S!, !I! that I will now
 +
set aside and use from now on for the Object, Sign, Interpretant domains,
 +
respectively, of an arbitrary sign relation !L! c !O! x !S! x !I!.
   −
1.1.1.  Problem
+
Among other benefits, this will serve to liberate the plain faced characters
 +
for employment as the non-terminal symbols of our formal grammars, rendering
 +
our formal grammatical productions far less $Capitalistic$, !Exclamatory!,
 +
and overbearingly prescriptive than they be otherwise hell-bent to become.
   −
1.1.2.  Method
+
So let me try out this new rite to see how it works out,
 +
And I will not pause to rewrite the old law in its font,
 +
But advise you solely of its transformed instantiations,
 +
And fix my faith on imagination to sense the supplement.
   −
1.1.2.1.  The Paradigmatic & Process-Analytic Phase
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.1.2.2The Paraphrastic & Faculty-Synthetic Phase
+
CFRNote 92
   −
1.1.2.3.  Reprise of Methods
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.1.3.  Criterion
+
I need to try and say some things at his point about
 +
why formal language theory is interesting and useful,
 +
but all I have at the moment are random remembrances
 +
and reflections that enter my mind from time to time.
   −
1.1.4.  Application
+
In many ways, the study of formal languages and grammars
 +
is a paradigm, more, a paragon, of the situation that we
 +
face whenever we inquire into a complex reality, that is,
 +
all of the ever-renewed sources of puzzling phenomena or
 +
pressing problems that we call a world.
   −
1.2.  Onus of the Project:  No Way But Inquiry
+
The archtypical place of formal language theory is well
 +
understood in many quarters, and has been from the very
 +
outset of its constellation as an independent viewpoint.
   −
1.2.1.  A Modulating Prelude
+
In this paradigmatic (analogical or exemplary) way of
 
+
understanding it, a formal language is the "data" and
1.2.2. A Fugitive Canon
+
a formal grammar is the "theory", and the question is,
 +
as always, whether a theory accounts for and explains
 +
the data, a "fitting" relationship that may be viewed
 +
in many ways, for one, the way that a theory might be
 +
said to "generate" the data, or perhaps better stated,
 +
not just to "cook" in a precociously specious fashion
 +
but more like to "regenerate" the form after the fact.
    +
That's all that I can manage to express at the moment,
 +
but maybe it will supply a grub-stake of motivational
 +
victuals for the grueling labors of exploration ahead.
    +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3Option of the Project:  A Way Up To Inquiry
+
IDSIncitatory Note 1
   −
1.3.1.  Initial Analysis of Inquiry Allegro Aperto
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.2.  Discussion of Discussion
+
| Each ground-principle must be proved entirely
 
+
| by that same kind of inference which it supports.
1.3.3.  Discussion of Formalization:  General Topics
+
|
 
+
| But we cannot arrive at any conclusion
1.3.3.1.  A Formal Charge
+
| by mere deduction except about symbols.
 
+
|
1.3.3.2.  A Formalization of Formalization?
+
| We cannot arrive at any conclusion
 
+
| by mere induction except about things.
1.3.3.3. A Formalization of Discussion?
+
|
 
+
| And we cannot arrive at any conclusion
1.3.3.4.  A Concept of Formalization
+
| by mere hypothesis except about forms.
 
+
|
1.3.3.5.  A Formal Approach
+
| C.S. Peirce, CE 1, page 290.
 
+
|
1.3.3.6.  A Formal Development
+
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "On the Logic of Science",
 +
| Harvard University Lectures (1865), pages 161-302 in:
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition',
 +
|'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
 +
| Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
   −
1.3.3.7.  A Formal Perasion
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.4Discussion of Formalization:  Concrete Examples
+
IDSMeditative Note 1
   −
1.3.4.1.  Formal Models:  A Sketch
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.4.2.  Sign Relations:  A Primer
+
I would like to start from a "common sense practical" (CSP) point of view,
 +
and, indeed, never to lose sight of what appears evident from that station,
 +
no matter how many levels of abstract remove and abstruse mention it might
 +
become necessary to interpose along the way.
   −
1.3.4.3.  Semiotic Equivalence Relations
+
So let's examine this initial caltrop
 +
"descriptive/normative/prescriptive"
 +
from the CSP POV, if you will.
   −
1.3.4.4.  Graphical Representations
+
Reading "Descriptive" to mean "What it is",
 +
while "Normative" means "What it oughta be",
 +
and "Prescriptive" says "Make it so, or else",
 +
I will have very little to say about the last,
 +
and only be able to focus on the distinctions
 +
that may exist among the first two dimensions.
   −
1.3.4.5.  Taking Stock
+
From the beginning, from this point of view, difficult words,
 +
like "inquiry", "logic", "truth", and so on, must be taken
 +
as initially indexical, inchoately succeeding at little
 +
more than pointing to a realm of experience that may
 +
or may not be common to the e-mitter and re-mitter.
   −
1.3.4.6.  The "Meta" Question
+
I suspect that this stanza is likely to be controversial,
 +
so I'll pause at this point for the countrapunctal verse.
   −
1.3.4.7.  Iconic Signs
+
Or for a rest ...
   −
1.3.4.8.  The Conflict of Interpretations
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.4.9Indexical Signs
+
IDSMeditative Note 2
   −
1.3.4.10.  Sundry Problems
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.4.11.  Review & Prospect
+
So I may begin with an object and a sign in a tenuous relation,
 +
with the subject matter indexed under the topic name "inquiry",
 +
where the sign originates from a "just noticeable differential"
 +
of information about the object, and not a single "figit" more.
 +
Few would call this a foundation -- I only call it a beginning.
   −
1.3.4.12.  Objective Plans & Levels
+
Yet another of many ...
   −
1.3.4.13Formalization of OF:  Objective Levels
+
But it does provide us with a clue to a signficant difference,
 +
however much this difference is bound by this origin to raise
 +
itself from egg, germ, seed, spore, or whatever it is that is
 +
infinitesimal in its initial conditionIn this disjointness
 +
of an archetype where what begins, what leads, and what rules
 +
are not so trivially identical to one another, one encounters
 +
the brand of beginning that begins in the middle of the story,
 +
and has no need of any other foundation but the medium itself.
   −
1.3.4.14.  Application of OF:  Generic Level
+
["sign-ficant" [stet]]
   −
1.3.4.15.  Application of OF:  Motive Level
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.4.16The Integration of Frameworks
+
IDSObligatory Note 1
   −
1.3.4.17.  Recapitulation:  A Brush with Symbols
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.4.18.  C'est Moi
+
While I remain compelled to remain silent on the status of the absolute fiat,
 +
the irrelative notion of the unmotivated motion and the disinterested stance,
 +
let me then turn to the other axes of description, descriptive vs. normative.
 +
Axes of description, indeed, you can almost hear one branch of the recursion
 +
already beginning to wind up its whine to the verge of a howl, but toss it a
 +
sop and try to persevere in the quest.
   −
1.3.4.19.  Entr'acte
+
In this view, I regard the very idea of a norm as invoking its due pragma --
 +
aim, business, concern, desire, end, function, goal, intention, interest,
 +
objective, purpose, its names are legion -- and the good sense of the
 +
norm is simply to suggest what one ought to do, contingent, of course,
 +
on one's motive to achieve that pragma.
   −
1.3.5Discussion of Formalization:  Specific Objects
+
If we keep in mind the kinds of "applied research task" (ART) that your
 +
everyday artist, designer, engineer, mathematician, scientist, or other
 +
type of technical worker has to carry out on an everyday basis, we note
 +
how these axes of description can be used to frame their activities and
 +
to depict their forms of conduct, without mistaking either the frame or
 +
the picture for the object of the picture so framedNor does any body
 +
imagine that the observer must flatten out into a single plane or align
 +
with a single axis, in order to make a vantage of the frame so pictured.
   −
1.3.5.1.  The Will to Form
+
Common sense practical wit tells us that effective action toward the
 +
achievement of a desirable result will naturally depend on acquiring
 +
good descriptions of the lay of the land in which we hope to advance.
   −
1.3.5.2.  The Forms of Reasoning
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.5.3A Fork in the Road
+
IDSProjective Note 1
   −
1.3.5.4.  A Forged Bond
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.5.5. A Formal Account
+
Good morning. Thanks. I had a bad night.
 +
I blame Bernard Morand, who wrote me this:
   −
1.3.5.6.  Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
+
BM: But this looks as some God's view.
 +
    What about us, finite humans, occupied
 +
    in counting the instants of our lives?
 +
    And thus condemned to try to improve
 +
    the fate of our successors?
   −
1.3.5.7.  Steps & Tests of Formalization
+
When you think of this in the future, and of course you may never,
 +
you may blame him too, for in writing this he has "erged" me on
 +
to return to my deserted dissertation work, into which I have
 +
poured my life for lo! these too many years to count, truly,
 +
if you stop to contemplate the fact that time is relative.
   −
1.3.5.8.  Puck, the Ref
+
In that time I have come to the view that we really need
 +
a good "theory of inquiry" (TOI), for all sorts of very
 +
practical and crucial reasons, also, that we cannot get
 +
a good TOI without its being, at one and the same time,
 +
a good "theory of information" (TOI too), and also that
 +
an integral constituent of TOI 1 and TOI 2 would have to
 +
be a good "theory of representation and semiosis" (TORAS) --
 +
"Bull!?", you say, well, so be it.
   −
1.3.5.9. Partial Formalizations
+
Further, I think that it is abundantly evident by now that
 +
we will get no such good theories of signs or science from
 +
the "establishment philosophy of science" (EPOS?) -- which
 +
has managed to mince and to trash the best available tries
 +
at such theories for over a hundred years now. But Hey! --
 +
don't take my word for it -- waste a century of your own.
   −
1.3.5.10.  A Formal Utility
+
We just got our regular email back,
 +
so I think that I can now get going --
 +
Yes, I have lost the ability to think
 +
if not literally writing 'to' somebody.
   −
1.3.5.11.  A Formal Aesthetic
+
When it begins, it begins like this:
   −
1.3.5.12.  A Formal Apology
+
Why am I asking this question?
   −
1.3.5.13.  A Formal Suspicion
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.5.14The Double Aspect of Concepts
+
IDSProjective Note 2
   −
1.3.5.15.  A Formal Permission
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.5.16. A Formal Invention
+
So we may rest assured that we do have a "subject matter", an empirical domain,
 +
or a realm of experience that is indexed, however dimly, generally, or vaguely,
 +
by the word "inquiry", and only the question how best to describe it remains
 +
in doubt at this stage of the play. If we wanted to cast our net as widely
 +
as possible, at the risk of anticipating a bounding hypothesis, we could
 +
think of all the world's creatures bright and beautiful and of how they
 +
conduct themselves when faced with some moment of uncertainty, where
 +
their aim is to cope with a surprising phenomenon or to deal with
 +
a problematic situation that meets them in the course of their
 +
ever-ongoing struggles to live, to revive, and to thrive.
   −
1.3.6. Recursion in Perpetuity
+
Now, neither the fact that we begin with a descriptive task,
 +
nor the fact that it remains of interest for its own sake,
 +
necessarily means that we must end there, for it is also
 +
the means to a further end, of learning how to better
 +
our own skill at inquiry, which means in our time
 +
the building of tools that help with the task.
   −
1.3.7.  Processus, Regressus, Progressus
+
I hope I have made this sound as truly and
 +
as trivially obvious as it ought to be.
   −
1.3.8.  Rondeau Tempo di Menuetto
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.9Reconnaissance
+
IDSReflective Note 1
   −
1.3.9.1.  The Informal Context
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.9.2The Epitext
+
In reflecting on what in the world a "Theory of Inquiry" (TOI) might be,
 
+
it occurs to me that there are many different things that one might mean
1.3.9.3.  The Formative Tension
+
by such a theory. It could just be any number of things that one asserts
 +
or has a mind to assert about the ostensible subject matterBut it has
 +
been my experience that one can assert pretty much whatever one chooses,
 +
and others will choose to heed it or ignore it on many different grounds,
 +
the grounds themselves being a matter of choice, conditioning, or custom.
   −
1.3.10.  Recurring Themes
+
But I am looking for theories that work, that is to say, theories that
 +
are subject to probation through proof, probability, and programming.
   −
1.3.10.1.  Preliminary Notions
+
Astute readers will have noticed that I've already attempted to finesse
 +
a very important, and most likely "infinessible" issue, to wit, that of
 +
the scruples dividing descriptive, normative, and prescriptive theories.
   −
1.3.10.2.  Intermediary Notions
+
I will think about that, and get back to you.
   −
1.3.10.3.  Propositions & Sentences
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.10.4Empirical Types & Rational Types
+
IDSReflective Note 2
   −
1.3.10.5.  Articulate Sentences
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.3.10.6.  Stretching Principles
+
| How will I approach this problem about the nature of inquiry?
 +
|
 +
| The simplest answer is this:
 +
|
 +
| I will apply the method of inquiry to the problem of inquiry's nature.
 +
|
 +
| This is the most concise and comprehensive answer that I know, but
 +
| it is likely to sound facetious at this point. On the other hand,
 +
| if I did not actually use the method of inquiry that I describe
 +
| as inquiry, how could the results possibly be taken seriously?
 +
| Accordingly, the questions of methodological self-application
 +
| and self-referential consistency will be found at the center
 +
| of this research.
   −
1.3.10.7.  Stretching Operations
+
These lines image in compact form the crux of the problem,
 +
the crucible of the method, and the character that marks
 +
relation between the two, if indeed they really are two,
 +
in a form whose extended development will wind its way
 +
through many a later page of the present exposition.
   −
1.3.10.8.  The Cactus Patch
+
But let me just point out at this point some of
 +
the reasons why I have found the prerequisite
 +
of an inquiry into inquiry to be inescapable.
   −
1.3.10.9. The Cactus Language:  Syntax
+
Let us entertain the idea, for the sake of getting the inquiry started,
 +
if nothing else, that it is admissible to use a word like "inquiry" as
 +
an initially indefinite indicator of an ostensible object of inquiry.
 +
If we ever again find ourselves being puzzled how our reasoning can
 +
chastize its own entailments this way, we may remind ourselves of
 +
that fine old line between our "logica docens' (logic as taught)
 +
and our "logica utens" (logic as used). With this distinction
 +
in mind, we can dispell the initial puzzlement by saying that
 +
we are using a capacity for inquiry that we do not know how
 +
to formalize yet in order to examine the forms of inquiry
 +
that various thinkers have been able, at least partially,
 +
to formalize.
   −
1.3.10.10.  The Cactus Language: Stylistics
+
The dilemma that we face has the following structure:
   −
1.3.10.11.  The Cactus Language:  Mechanics
+
If we recommend to all a method of inquiry that
 +
we ourselves do not use in a pinch, precisely
 +
in a pinch where we need to study an issue
 +
as important as the nature of inquiry,
 +
then who would take our advice?
   −
1.3.10.12.  The Cactus Language:  Semantics
+
So it seems that there is no choice
 
+
but to study inquiry, the pragma,
1.3.10.13. Stretching Exercises
+
by way of inquiry, the praxis,
 +
that is to say, recursively.
   −
1.3.10.14.  Syntactic Transformations
+
Incidentally, many variations on this theme are
 +
thoroughly developed in Peirce's "Lectures" of
 +
1865 and 1866 and recapitulated in his early
 +
study "On a New List of Categories" (1867).
   −
1.3.10.15.  Derived Equivalence Relations
+
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-main.htm
   −
1.3.10.16.  Digression on Derived Relations
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
    +
IDS.  Work Area
    +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
   −
1.4.  Outlook of the Project:  All Ways Lead to Inquiry
+
From this point of view, inquiry is form of conduct,
 +
an applied research task, like many others that we
 +
have to carry out, and that can be done either
 +
better or worse.
   −
1.4.1.  The Matrix of Inquiry
+
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 
  −
1.4.1.1.  Inquiry as Conduct
  −
 
  −
1.4.1.2.  Types of Conduct
  −
 
  −
1.4.1.3.  Perils of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.4.1.4.  Forms of Relations
  −
 
  −
1.4.1.5.  Models of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.4.2.  The Moment of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.4.3.  The Modes of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.4.3.1.  Deductive Reasoning
  −
 
  −
1.4.3.2.  Inductive Reasoning
  −
 
  −
1.4.3.3.  Abductive Reasoning
  −
 
  −
1.4.3.4.  Analogical Reasoning
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
1.5.Obstacles to the Project:  In the Way of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.5.1.  The Initial Unpleasantness
  −
 
  −
1.5.2.  The Justification Trap
  −
 
  −
1.5.3.  A Formal Apology
  −
 
  −
1.5.3.1.  Category Double-Takes
  −
 
  −
1.5.3.2.  Conceptual Extensions
  −
 
  −
1.5.3.3.  Explosional Recombinations
  −
 
  −
1.5.3.4.  Interpretive Frameworks
  −
 
  −
1.5.4.  A Material Exigency
  −
 
  −
1.5.5.  A Reconciliation of Accounts
  −
 
  −
1.5.6.  Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.5.7.  Empirical Considerations
  −
 
  −
1.5.8.  Computational Considerations
  −
 
  −
1.5.8.1.  A Form of Recursion
  −
 
  −
1.5.8.2.  A Power of Abstraction
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
1.6.  Orientation of the Project:  A Way Into Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.6.1.  Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.6.2.  Terms of Analysis
  −
 
  −
1.6.2.1.  Digression on Signs
  −
 
  −
1.6.2.2.  Empirical Status of ID
  −
 
  −
1.6.3.  Expansion of Terms
  −
 
  −
1.6.3.1.  Agency
  −
 
  −
1.6.3.2.  Abstraction
  −
 
  −
1.6.3.3.  Analogy
  −
 
  −
1.6.3.4.  Accuracy
  −
 
  −
1.6.3.5.  Authenticity
  −
 
  −
1.6.4.  Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
  −
 
  −
1.6.4.1.  A Mistaken ID
  −
 
  −
1.6.4.2.  Phenomenology of Doubt
  −
 
  −
1.6.4.3.  Modalities of Knowledge
  −
 
  −
1.6.5.  Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
  −
 
  −
1.6.6.  Interpretive Systems
  −
 
  −
1.6.6.1.  Syntactic Systems
  −
 
  −
1.6.6.2.  Semantic Systems
  −
 
  −
1.6.6.3.  Pragmatic Systems
  −
 
  −
1.6.7.  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
1.6.7.1.  A Definition of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.6.7.2.  The Faculty of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.6.7.3.  A Definition of Determination
  −
 
  −
1.6.7.4.  A Definition of Definition
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
1.7.  Organization of the Project:  A Way Through Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.7.1.  The Problem:  Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
  −
 
  −
1.7.2.  The Method:  Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
  −
 
  −
1.7.2.1.  Conditions for the Possibility of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.7.2.2.  Conditions for the Success of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
 
  −
1.7.3.  The Criterion:  Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
  −
 
  −
1.7.3.1.  The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test.
  −
 
  −
1.7.3.2.  Enabling Provision 1:  The Scenes & Context of Inquiry.
  −
 
  −
1.7.3.3.  Enabling Provision 2:  The Stages & Content of Inquiry.
  −
 
  −
1.8.  Objectives of the Project:  Inquiry All the Way
  −
 
  −
1.8.1.  Substantial Objective
  −
 
  −
1.8.1.1.  Objective 1a:  The Propositions as Types Analogy.
  −
 
  −
1.8.1.2.  Objective 1b:  The Styles of Proof Development.
  −
 
  −
1.8.1.3.  Objective 1c:  The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority.
  −
 
  −
1.8.2.  Instrumental Objective
  −
 
  −
1.8.3.  Coordination of Objectives
  −
 
  −
1.8.4.  Recapitulation:  Da Capo, Al Segno
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
2.  Discussion of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
2.1.  Approaches to Inquiry
  −
 
  −
2.1.1.  The Classical Framework:  Syllogistic Approaches
  −
 
  −
2.1.2.  The Pragmatic Framework:  Sign-Theoretic Approaches
  −
 
  −
2.1.3.  The Dynamical Framework:  System-Theoretic Approaches
  −
 
  −
2.1.3.1.  Inquiry & Computation
  −
 
  −
2.1.3.2.  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
2.2.  The Context of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
2.2.1.  The Field of Observation
  −
 
  −
2.2.2.  The Problem of Reflection
  −
 
  −
2.2.3.  The Problem of Reconstruction
  −
 
  −
2.2.4.  The Trivializing of Integration
  −
 
  −
2.2.5.  Tensions in the Field of Observation
  −
 
  −
2.2.6.  Problems of Representation & Communication
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
2.3.  The Conduct of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
2.3.1.  Introduction
  −
 
  −
2.3.2.  The Types of Reasoning
  −
 
  −
2.3.2.1.  Deduction
  −
 
  −
2.3.2.2.  Induction
  −
 
  −
2.3.2.3.  Abduction
  −
 
  −
2.3.3.  Hybrid Types of Inference
  −
 
  −
2.3.3.1.  Analogy
  −
 
  −
2.3.3.2.  Inquiry
  −
 
  −
2.3.4.  Details of Induction
  −
 
  −
2.3.4.1.  Learning
  −
 
  −
2.3.4.2.  Transfer
  −
 
  −
2.3.4.3.  Testing
  −
 
  −
2.3.5.  The Stages of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
3.  The Medium & Its Message
  −
 
  −
3.1.  Reflective Expression
  −
 
  −
3.1.1.  Casual Reflection
  −
 
  −
3.1.1.1.  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
 
  −
3.1.1.2.  Analogical Recursion
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.  Conscious Reflection
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.1.  The Signal Moment
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.2.  The Symbolic Object
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.3.  The Endeavor to Communicate
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.4.  The Medium of Communication
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.5.  The Ark of Types:  The Order of Things to Come.
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.6.  The Epitext
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.7.  The Context of Interpretation
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.8.  The Formative Tension
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.9.  The Vehicle of Communication:  Reflection on the Scene, Reflection on the Self.
  −
 
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.10.  (7)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.11.  (6)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.12.  Recursions:  Possible, Actual, Necessary
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.13.  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.14.  (3)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.15.  The Freedom of Interpretation
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.16.  The Eternal Return
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.17.  (1)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.18.  Information in Formation
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.19.  Reflectively Indexical Texts
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.20.  (4)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.21.  (5)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.22.  (6)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.23.  (7)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.24.  (8)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.25.  The Discursive Universe
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.26.  (7)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.27.  (6)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.28.  (5)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.29.  (4)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.30.  (3)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.31.  (2)
  −
 
  −
3.1.2.32.  (1)
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
3.2.  Reflective Inquiry
  −
 
  −
3.2.1.  Integrity & Unity of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
3.2.2.  Apparitions & Allegations
  −
 
  −
3.2.3.  A Reflective Heuristic
  −
 
  −
3.2.4.  Either/Or:  A Sense of Absence
  −
 
  −
3.2.5.  Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
  −
 
  −
3.2.6.  Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
  −
 
  −
3.2.7.  Synthetic A Priori Truths
  −
 
  −
3.2.8.  Priorisms of Normative Sciences
  −
 
  −
3.2.9.  Principle of Rational Action
  −
 
  −
3.2.10.  The Pragmatic Cosmos
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.1.  Principals Versus Principles
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.2.  The Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.3.  An Early Description of Interpretation
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.4.  Descriptions of the Mind
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.5.  Of Signs & the Mind
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.6.  Questions of Justification
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.7.  The Experience of Satisfaction
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.8.  An Organizational Difficulty
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.9.  Pragmatic Certainties
  −
 
  −
3.2.11.10.  Problems & Methods
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
3.3.  Reflection on Reflection
  −
 
  −
3.4.  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
 
  −
3.4.1.  The Phenomenology of Reflection
  −
 
  −
3.4.2.  A Candid Point of View
  −
 
  −
3.4.3.  A Projective Point of View
  −
 
  −
3.4.4.  A Formal Point of View
  −
 
  −
3.4.5.  Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
  −
 
  −
3.4.6.  Basic Notions of Group Theory
  −
 
  −
3.4.7.  Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
  −
 
  −
3.4.8.  A Perspective on Computation
  −
 
  −
3.4.9.  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Introduction
  −
 
  −
3.4.10.  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Examples
  −
 
  −
3.4.11.  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Application
  −
 
  −
3.4.12.  Issue 1:  The Status of Signs
  −
 
  −
3.4.13.  Issue 2:  The Status of Sets
  −
 
  −
3.4.14.  Issue 3:  The Status of Variables
  −
 
  −
3.4.15.  Propositional Calculus
  −
 
  −
3.4.16.  Recursive Aspects
  −
 
  −
3.4.17.  Patterns of Self-Reference
  −
 
  −
3.4.18.  Practical Intuitions
  −
 
  −
3.4.19.  Examples of Self-Reference
  −
 
  −
3.4.20.  Three Views of Systems
  −
 
  −
3.4.21.  Building Bridges Between Representations
  −
 
  −
3.4.22.  Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
 
  −
3.4.23.  Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
 
  −
3.4.24.  Literal Intensional Representations
  −
 
  −
 
  −
3.4.25.  Analytic Intensional Representations
  −
 
  −
3.4.26.  Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
  −
 
  −
3.4.27.  Differential Logic & Group Operations
  −
 
  −
3.4.28.  The Bridge:  From Obstruction to Opportunity
  −
 
  −
3.4.29.  Projects of Representation
  −
 
  −
3.4.30.  Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
  −
 
  −
3.4.31.  Generic Orders of Relations
  −
 
  −
3.4.32.  Partiality:  Selective Operations
  −
 
  −
3.4.33.  Sign Relational Complexes
  −
 
  −
3.4.34.  Set-Theoretic Constructions
  −
 
  −
3.4.35.  Reducibility of Sign Relations
  −
 
  −
3.4.36.  Irreducibly Triadic Relations
  −
 
  −
3.4.37.  Propositional Types
  −
 
  −
3.4.38.  Considering the Source
  −
 
  −
3.4.39.  Prospective Indices:  Pointers to Future Work
  −
 
  −
3.4.40.  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
 
  −
3.4.41.  Elective & Motive Forces
  −
 
  −
3.4.42.  Sign Processes:  A Start
  −
 
  −
3.4.43.  Reflective Extensions
  −
 
  −
3.4.44.  Reflections on Closure
  −
 
  −
3.4.45.  Intelligence => Critical Reflection
  −
 
  −
3.4.46.  Looking Ahead
  −
 
  −
3.4.47.  Mutually Intelligible Codes
  −
 
  −
3.4.48.  Discourse Analysis:  Ways & Means
  −
 
  −
3.4.49.  Combinations of Sign Relations
  −
 
  −
3.4.50.  Revisiting the Source
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
3.5.  Divertimento:  Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
  −
 
  −
3.5.1.  Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
  −
 
  −
3.5.2.  Searching for Parameters
  −
 
  −
3.5.3.  Defect Analysis
  −
 
  −
3.5.4.  The Pragmatic Critique
  −
 
  −
3.5.5.  Pragmatic Operating Notions
  −
 
  −
3.5.6.  Defects of Presentation
  −
 
  −
3.5.7.  Dues to Process
  −
 
  −
3.5.8.  Duties to Purpose
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
3.6.  Computational Design Philosophy
  −
 
  −
3.6.1.  Intentional Objects & Attitudes
  −
 
  −
3.6.2.  Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
  −
 
  −
3.6.3.  Propositional Reasoning About Relations
  −
 
  −
3.6.4.  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
 
  −
3.6.5.  Discussion of Examples
  −
 
  −
3.6.6.  Information & Inquiry
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
4.  Overview of the Domain:  Interpretive Inquiry
  −
 
  −
4.1.  Interpretive Bearings:  Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
  −
 
  −
4.1.1.  Catwalks:  Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
  −
 
  −
4.1.1.1.  Eponymous Ancestors:  The Precursors of Abstraction?
  −
 
  −
4.1.1.2  Reticles:  Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue
  −
 
  −
4.1.2.  Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
  −
 
  −
4.2.  Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
4.2.1.  The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
  −
 
  −
4.2.1.1.  Sign Relations
  −
 
  −
4.2.1.2.  Types of Signs
  −
 
  −
4.2.2.  The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
4.2.2.1.  Abduction
  −
 
  −
4.2.2.2.  Deduction
  −
 
  −
4.2.2.3.  Induction
  −
 
  −
4.3.  Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
4.3.1.  "Index":  A Program for Learning Formal Languages
  −
 
  −
4.3.2.  "Study":  A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
  −
 
  −
5.  Discussion & Development of Objectives
  −
 
  −
5.1.  Objective 1a:  Propositions as Types
  −
 
  −
5.2.  Objective 1b:  Proof Styles & Developments
  −
 
  −
5.3.  Objective 1c:  Interpretation & Authority
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  References
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
Aristotle, "On The Soul", in 'Aristotle, Volume 8',
  −
W.S. Hett (trans.), Heinemann, London, UK, 1936, 1986.
  −
 
  −
Charniak, E. & McDermott, D.V.,
  −
'Introduction to Artificial Intelligence',
  −
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1985.
  −
 
  −
2.  Charniak, E., Riesbeck, C.K., & McDermott, D.V.  Artificial Intelligence Programming.  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1980.
  −
 
  −
3.  Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E., & Thagard, P.R.  Induction:  Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery.  MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986.
  −
 
  −
4.  O'Rorke, P.  Review of AAAI 1990 Spring Symposium on Automated Abduction.  SIGART Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 3.  ACM Press, October 1990, p. 12-17.
  −
 
  −
5.  Pearl, J.  Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems:  Networks of Plausible Inference.  Revised 2nd printing.  Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991.
  −
 
  −
6.  Peng, Y. & Reggia, J.A.  Abductive Inference Models for Diagnostic Problem-Solving.  Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1990.
  −
 
  −
7.  Sowa, J.F.  Conceptual Structures:  Information Processing in Mind and Machine.  Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1984.
  −
 
  −
8.  Sowa, J.F. (ed.)  Principles of Semantic Networks:  Explorations in the Representation of Knowledge.  Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991.
  −
 
  −
Dewey, J. (1991).  How We Think.  Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.  Originally published 1910.
  −
 
  −
Shakespeare, Wm.  (1988).  William Shakespeare:  The Complete Works.  Compact Edition.  S. Wells & G. Taylor (eds.).  Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Email Format
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
| Document History
  −
|
  −
| Subject:  Inquiry Driven Systems:  An Inquiry Into Inquiry
  −
| Contact:  Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
  −
| Version:  Draft 10.00
  −
| Created:  23 Jun 1996
  −
| Revised:  02 Mar 2003
  −
| Advisor:  M.A. Zohdy
  −
| Setting:  Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
  −
 
  −
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Incitatory Note 1
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
| Each ground-principle must be proved entirely
  −
| by that same kind of inference which it supports.
  −
|
  −
| But we cannot arrive at any conclusion
  −
| by mere deduction except about symbols.
  −
|
  −
| We cannot arrive at any conclusion
  −
| by mere induction except about things.
  −
|
  −
| And we cannot arrive at any conclusion
  −
| by mere hypothesis except about forms.
  −
|
  −
| C.S. Peirce, CE 1, page 290.
  −
|
  −
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "On the Logic of Science",
  −
| Harvard University Lectures (1865), pages 161-302 in:
  −
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce:  A Chronological Edition',
  −
|'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
  −
| Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Incitatory Note 2
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Meditative Note 1
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
I would like to start from a "common sense practical" (CSP) point of view,
  −
and, indeed, never to lose sight of what appears evident from that station,
  −
no matter how many levels of abstract remove and abstruse mention it might
  −
become necessary to interpose along the way.
  −
 
  −
So let's examine this initial caltrop
  −
"descriptive/normative/prescriptive"
  −
from the CSP POV, if you will.
  −
 
  −
Reading "Descriptive" to mean "What it is",
  −
while "Normative" means "What it oughta be",
  −
and "Prescriptive" says "Make it so, or else",
  −
I will have very little to say about the last,
  −
and only be able to focus on the distinctions
  −
that may exist among the first two dimensions.
  −
 
  −
From the beginning, from this point of view, difficult words,
  −
like "inquiry", "logic", "truth", and so on, must be taken
  −
as initially indexical, inchoately succeeding at little
  −
more than pointing to a realm of experience that may
  −
or may not be common to the e-mitter and re-mitter.
  −
 
  −
I suspect that this stanza is likely to be controversial,
  −
so I'll pause at this point for the countrapunctal verse.
  −
 
  −
Or for a rest ...
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Meditative Note 2
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
So I may begin with an object and a sign in a tenuous relation,
  −
with the subject matter indexed under the topic name "inquiry",
  −
where the sign originates from a "just noticeable differential"
  −
of information about the object, and not a single "figit" more.
  −
Few would call this a foundation -- I only call it a beginning.
  −
 
  −
Yet another of many ...
  −
 
  −
But it does provide us with a clue to a signficant difference,
  −
however much this difference is bound by this origin to raise
  −
itself from egg, germ, seed, spore, or whatever it is that is
  −
infinitesimal in its initial condition.  In this disjointness
  −
of an archetype where what begins, what leads, and what rules
  −
are not so trivially identical to one another, one encounters
  −
the brand of beginning that begins in the middle of the story,
  −
and has no need of any other foundation but the medium itself.
  −
 
  −
["sign-ficant" [stet]]
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Meditative Note 3
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Obligatory Note 1
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
While I remain compelled to remain silent on the status of the absolute fiat,
  −
the irrelative notion of the unmotivated motion and the disinterested stance,
  −
let me then turn to the other axes of description, descriptive vs. normative.
  −
Axes of description, indeed, you can almost hear one branch of the recursion
  −
already beginning to wind up its whine to the verge of a howl, but toss it a
  −
sop and try to persevere in the quest.
  −
 
  −
In this view, I regard the very idea of a norm as invoking its due pragma --
  −
aim, business, concern, desire, end, function, goal, intention, interest,
  −
objective, purpose, its names are legion -- and the good sense of the
  −
norm is simply to suggest what one ought to do, contingent, of course,
  −
on one's motive to achieve that pragma.
  −
 
  −
If we keep in mind the kinds of "applied research task" (ART) that your
  −
everyday artist, designer, engineer, mathematician, scientist, or other
  −
type of technical worker has to carry out on an everyday basis, we note
  −
how these axes of description can be used to frame their activities and
  −
to depict their forms of conduct, without mistaking either the frame or
  −
the picture for the object of the picture so framed.  Nor does any body
  −
imagine that the observer must flatten out into a single plane or align
  −
with a single axis, in order to make a vantage of the frame so pictured.
  −
 
  −
Common sense practical wit tells us that effective action toward the
  −
achievement of a desirable result will naturally depend on acquiring
  −
good descriptions of the lay of the land in which we hope to advance.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Obligatory Note 2
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Projective Note 1
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
Good morning.  Thanks.  I had a bad night.
  −
I blame Bernard Morand, who wrote me this:
  −
 
  −
BM: But this looks as some God's view.
  −
    What about us, finite humans, occupied
  −
    in counting the instants of our lives?
  −
    And thus condemned to try to improve
  −
    the fate of our successors?
  −
 
  −
When you think of this in the future, and of course you may never,
  −
you may blame him too, for in writing this he has "erged" me on
  −
to return to my deserted dissertation work, into which I have
  −
poured my life for lo! these too many years to count, truly,
  −
if you stop to contemplate the fact that time is relative.
  −
 
  −
In that time I have come to the view that we really need
  −
a good "theory of inquiry" (TOI), for all sorts of very
  −
practical and crucial reasons, also, that we cannot get
  −
a good TOI without its being, at one and the same time,
  −
a good "theory of information" (TOI too), and also that
  −
an integral constituent of TOI 1 and TOI 2 would have to
  −
be a good "theory of representation and semiosis" (TORAS) --
  −
"Bull!?", you say, well, so be it.
  −
 
  −
Further, I think that it is abundantly evident by now that
  −
we will get no such good theories of signs or science from
  −
the "establishment philosophy of science" (EPOS?) -- which
  −
has managed to mince and to trash the best available tries
  −
at such theories for over a hundred years now.  But Hey! --
  −
don't take my word for it -- waste a century of your own.
  −
 
  −
We just got our regular email back,
  −
so I think that I can now get going --
  −
Yes, I have lost the ability to think
  −
if not literally writing 'to' somebody.
  −
 
  −
When it begins, it begins like this:
  −
 
  −
Why am I asking this question?
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Projective Note 2
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
So we may rest assured that we do have a "subject matter", an empirical domain,
  −
or a realm of experience that is indexed, however dimly, generally, or vaguely,
  −
by the word "inquiry", and only the question how best to describe it remains
  −
in doubt at this stage of the play.  If we wanted to cast our net as widely
  −
as possible, at the risk of anticipating a bounding hypothesis, we could
  −
think of all the world's creatures bright and beautiful and of how they
  −
conduct themselves when faced with some moment of uncertainty, where
  −
their aim is to cope with a surprising phenomenon or to deal with
  −
a problematic situation that meets them in the course of their
  −
ever-ongoing struggles to live, to revive, and to thrive.
  −
 
  −
Now, neither the fact that we begin with a descriptive task,
  −
nor the fact that it remains of interest for its own sake,
  −
necessarily means that we must end there, for it is also
  −
the means to a further end, of learning how to better
  −
our own skill at inquiry, which means in our time
  −
the building of tools that help with the task.
  −
 
  −
I hope I have made this sound as truly and
  −
as trivially obvious as it ought to be.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Reflective Note 1
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
In reflecting on what in the world a "Theory of Inquiry" (TOI) might be,
  −
it occurs to me that there are many different things that one might mean
  −
by such a theory.  It could just be any number of things that one asserts
  −
or has a mind to assert about the ostensible subject matter.  But it has
  −
been my experience that one can assert pretty much whatever one chooses,
  −
and others will choose to heed it or ignore it on many different grounds,
  −
the grounds themselves being a matter of choice, conditioning, or custom.
  −
 
  −
But I am looking for theories that work, that is to say, theories that
  −
are subject to probation through proof, probability, and programming.
  −
 
  −
Astute readers will have noticed that I've already attempted to finesse
  −
a very important, and most likely "infinessible" issue, to wit, that of
  −
the scruples dividing descriptive, normative, and prescriptive theories.
  −
 
  −
I will think about that, and get back to you.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Reflective Note 2
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
| How will I approach this problem about the nature of inquiry?
  −
|
  −
| The simplest answer is this:
  −
|
  −
| I will apply the method of inquiry to the problem of inquiry's nature.
  −
|
  −
| This is the most concise and comprehensive answer that I know, but
  −
| it is likely to sound facetious at this point.  On the other hand,
  −
| if I did not actually use the method of inquiry that I describe
  −
| as inquiry, how could the results possibly be taken seriously?
  −
| Accordingly, the questions of methodological self-application
  −
| and self-referential consistency will be found at the center
  −
| of this research.
  −
 
  −
These lines image in compact form the crux of the problem,
  −
the crucible of the method, and the character that marks
  −
relation between the two, if indeed they really are two,
  −
in a form whose extended development will wind its way
  −
through many a later page of the present exposition.
  −
 
  −
But let me just point out at this point some of
  −
the reasons why I have found the prerequisite
  −
of an inquiry into inquiry to be inescapable.
  −
 
  −
Let us entertain the idea, for the sake of getting the inquiry started,
  −
if nothing else, that it is admissible to use a word like "inquiry" as
  −
an initially indefinite indicator of an ostensible object of inquiry.
  −
If we ever again find ourselves being puzzled how our reasoning can
  −
chastize its own entailments this way, we may remind ourselves of
  −
that fine old line between our "logica docens' (logic as taught)
  −
and our "logica utens" (logic as used).  With this distinction
  −
in mind, we can dispell the initial puzzlement by saying that
  −
we are using a capacity for inquiry that we do not know how
  −
to formalize yet in order to examine the forms of inquiry
  −
that various thinkers have been able, at least partially,
  −
to formalize.
  −
 
  −
The dilemma that we face has the following structure:
  −
 
  −
If we recommend to all a method of inquiry that
  −
we ourselves do not use in a pinch, precisely
  −
in a pinch where we need to study an issue
  −
as important as the nature of inquiry,
  −
then who would take our advice?
  −
 
  −
So it seems that there is no choice
  −
but to study inquiry, the pragma,
  −
by way of inquiry, the praxis,
  −
that is to say, recursively.
  −
 
  −
Incidentally, many variations on this theme are
  −
thoroughly developed in Peirce's "Lectures" of
  −
1865 and 1866 and recapitulated in his early
  −
study "On a New List of Categories" (1867).
  −
 
  −
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-main.htm
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Reflective Note 3
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Work Area
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
From this point of view, inquiry is form of conduct,
  −
an applied research task, like may others that we
  −
have to carry out, and that can be done either
  −
better or worse.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Outline
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
1.  Introduction
  −
1.1.  Outline of the Project:  Inquiry Into Inquiry
  −
1.1.1.  Problem
  −
1.1.2.  Method
  −
1.1.2.1.  The Paradigmatic and Process-Analytic Phase
  −
1.1.2.2.  The Paraphrastic and Faculty-Synthetic Phase
  −
1.1.2.3.  Reprise of Methods
  −
1.1.3.  Criterion
  −
1.1.4.  Application
  −
 
  −
1.2.  Onus of the Project:  No Way But Inquiry
  −
1.2.1.  A Modulating Prelude
  −
1.2.2.  A Fugitive Canon
  −
 
  −
1.3.  Opening of the Project:  A Way Up To Inquiry
  −
1.3.1.  Initial Analysis of Inquiry Allegro Aperto
  −
1.3.2.  Discussion of Discussion
  −
1.3.3.  Discussion of Formalization:  General Topics
  −
1.3.3.1.  A Formal Charge
  −
1.3.3.2.  A Formalization of Formalization?
  −
1.3.3.3.  A Formalization of Discussion?
  −
1.3.3.4.  A Concept of Formalization
  −
1.3.3.5.  A Formal Approach
  −
1.3.3.6.  A Formal Development
  −
1.3.3.7  A Formal Persuasion
  −
1.3.4.  Discussion of Formalization:  Concrete Examples
  −
1.3.4.1.  Formal Models:  A Sketch
  −
1.3.4.2.  Sign Relations:  A Primer
  −
1.3.4.3.  Semiotic Equivalence Relations
  −
1.3.4.4.  Graphical Representations
  −
1.3.4.5.  Taking Stock
  −
1.3.4.6.  The "Meta" Question
  −
1.3.4.7.  Iconic Signs
  −
1.3.4.8.  The Conflict of Interpretations
  −
1.3.4.9.  Indexical Signs
  −
1.3.4.10.  Sundry Problems
  −
1.3.4.11.  Review and Prospect
  −
1.3.4.12.  Objective Plans & Levels
  −
1.3.4.13.  Formalization of OF:  Objective Levels
  −
1.3.4.14.  Application of OF:  Generic Level
  −
1.3.4.15.  Application of OF:  Motive Level
  −
1.3.4.16.  The Integration of Frameworks
  −
1.3.4.17.  Recapitulation:  A Brush with Symbols
  −
1.3.4.18.  C'est Moi
  −
1.3.4.19.  Entr'acte
  −
 
  −
1.3.5  Discussion of Formalization:  Specific Objects
  −
1.3.5.1  The Will to Form
  −
1.3.5.2  The Forms of Reasoning
  −
1.3.5.3  A Fork in the Road
  −
1.3.5.4  A Forged Bond
  −
1.3.5.5  A Formal Account
  −
1.3.5.6  Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
  −
1.3.5.7  Steps and Tests of Formalization
  −
1.3.5.8  Puck, the Ref
  −
1.3.5.9  Partial Formalizations
  −
1.3.5.10  A Formal Utility
  −
1.3.5.11  A Formal Aesthetic
  −
1.3.5.12  A Formal Apology
  −
1.3.5.13  A Formal Suspicion
  −
1.3.5.14  The Double Aspect of Concepts
  −
1.3.5.15  A Formal Permission
  −
1.3.5.16  A Formal Invention
  −
1.3.6  Recursion in Perpetuity
  −
1.3.7  Processus, Regressus, Progressus
  −
1.3.8  Rondeau Tempo di Menuetto
  −
1.3.9  Reconnaissance
  −
1.3.9.1  The Informal Context
  −
1.3.9.2  The Epitext
  −
1.3.9.3  The Formative Tension
  −
1.3.10  Recurring Themes
  −
1.3.10.1  Preliminary Notions
  −
1.3.10.2  Intermediary Notions
  −
1.3.10.3  Propositions and Sentences
  −
1.3.10.4  Empirical Types and Rational Types
  −
1.3.10.5  Articulate Sentences
  −
1.3.10.6  Stretching Principles
  −
1.3.10.7  Stretching Operations
  −
1.3.10.8  The Cactus Patch
  −
1.3.10.9  The Cactus Language:  Syntax
  −
1.3.10.10  The Cactus Language:  Stylistics
  −
1.3.10.11  The Cactus Language:  Mechanics
  −
1.3.10.12  The Cactus Language:  Semantics
  −
1.3.10.13  Stretching Exercises
  −
1.3.10.14  Syntactic Transformations
  −
1.3.10.15  Derived Equivalence Relations
  −
1.3.10.16  Digression on Derived Relations
  −
 
  −
1.4  Outlook of the Project:  All Ways Lead to Inquiry
  −
1.4.1  The Matrix of Inquiry
  −
1.4.1.1  Inquiry as Conduct
  −
1.4.1.2  Types of Conduct
  −
1.4.1.3  Perils of Inquiry
  −
1.4.1.4  Forms of Relations
  −
1.4.1.5  Models of Inquiry
  −
1.4.2  The Moment of Inquiry
  −
1.4.3  The Modes of Inquiry
  −
1.4.3.1  Deductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.2  Inductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.3  Abductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.4  Analogical Reasoning
  −
 
  −
1.5  Obstacles to the Project:  In the Way of Inquiry
  −
1.5.1  The Initial Unpleasantness
  −
1.5.2  The Justification Trap
  −
1.5.3  A Formal Apology
  −
1.5.3.1  Category Double-Takes
  −
1.5.3.2  Conceptual Extensions
  −
1.5.3.3  Explosional Recombinations
  −
1.5.3.4  Interpretive Frameworks
  −
1.5.4  A Material Exigency
  −
1.5.5  A Reconciliation of Accounts
  −
1.5.6  Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
  −
1.5.7  Empirical Considerations
  −
1.5.8  Computational Considerations
  −
1.5.8.1  A Form of Recursion
  −
1.5.8.2  A Power of Abstraction
  −
 
  −
1.6  Orientation of the Project:  A Way Into Inquiry
  −
1.6.1  Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
1.6.2  Terms of Analysis
  −
1.6.2.1  Digression on Signs
  −
1.6.2.2  Empirical Status of ID
  −
1.6.3  Expansion of Terms
  −
1.6.3.1  Agency
  −
1.6.3.2  Abstraction
  −
1.6.3.3  Analogy
  −
1.6.3.4  Accuracy
  −
1.6.3.5  Authenticity
  −
1.6.4  Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
  −
1.6.4.1  A Mistaken ID
  −
1.6.4.2  Phenomenology of Doubt
  −
1.6.4.3  Modalities of Knowledge
  −
1.6.5  Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
  −
1.6.6  Interpretive Systems
  −
1.6.6.1  Syntactic Systems
  −
1.6.6.2  Semantic Systems
  −
1.6.6.3  Pragmatic Systems
  −
1.6.7  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
1.6.7.1  A Definition of Inquiry
  −
1.6.7.2  The Faculty of Inquiry
  −
1.6.7.3  A Definition of Determination
  −
1.6.7.4  A Definition of Definition
  −
 
  −
1.7  Organization of the Project:  A Way Through Inquiry
  −
1.7.1  The Problem:  Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
  −
1.7.2  The Method:  Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
  −
1.7.2.1  Conditions for the Possibility
  −
of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
1.7.2.2  Conditions for the Success of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
1.7.3  The Criterion:  Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
  −
1.7.3.1  The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test
  −
1.7.3.2  Enabling Provision 1:  The Scenes & Context of Inquiry
  −
1.7.3.3  Enabling Provision 2:  The Stages & Content of Inquiry
  −
1.8  Objectives of the Project:  Inquiry All the Way
  −
1.8.1  Substantial Objective
  −
1.8.1.1  Objective 1a:  The Propositions as Types Analogy
  −
1.8.1.2  Objective 1b:  The Styles of Proof Development
  −
1.8.1.3  Objective 1c:  The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority
  −
1.8.2  Instrumental Objective
  −
1.8.3  Coordination of Objectives
  −
1.8.4  Recapitulation -- Da Capo, Al Segno
  −
 
  −
2.  Discussion of Inquiry
  −
2.1  Approaches to Inquiry
  −
2.1.1  The Classical Framework:  Syllogistic Approaches
  −
2.1.2  The Pragmatic Framework:  Sign-Theoretic Approaches
  −
2.1.3  The Dynamical Framework:  System-Theoretic Approaches
  −
2.1.3.1  Inquiry & Computation
  −
2.1.3.2  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
2.2  The Context of Inquiry
  −
2.2.1  The Field of Observation
  −
2.2.2  The Problem of Reflection
  −
2.2.3  The Problem of Reconstruction
  −
2.2.4  The Trivializing of Integration
  −
2.2.5  Tensions in the Field of Observation
  −
2.2.6  Problems of Representation & Communication
  −
 
  −
2.3  The Conduct of Inquiry
  −
2.3.1  Introduction
  −
2.3.2  The Types of Reasoning
  −
2.3.2.1  Deduction
  −
2.3.2.2  Induction
  −
2.3.2.3  Abduction
  −
2.3.3  Hybrid Types of Inference
  −
2.3.3.1  Analogy
  −
2.3.3.2  Inquiry
  −
2.3.4  Details of Induction
  −
2.3.4.1  Learning
  −
2.3.4.2  Transfer
  −
2.3.4.3  Testing
  −
2.3.5  The Stages of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
3.  The Medium & Its Message
  −
3.1  Reflective Expression
  −
3.1.1  Casual Reflection
  −
3.1.1.1  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
3.1.1.2  Analogical Recursion
  −
3.1.2  Conscious Reflection
  −
3.1.2.1  The Signal Moment
  −
3.1.2.2  The Symbolic Object
  −
3.1.2.3  The Endeavor to Communicate
  −
3.1.2.4  The Medium of Communication
  −
3.1.2.5  The Ark of Types:
  −
The Order of Things to Come.
  −
3.1.2.6  The Epitext
  −
3.1.2.7  The Context of Interpretation
  −
3.1.2.8  The Formative Tension
  −
3.1.2.9  The Vehicle of Communication:
  −
Reflection on the Scene,
  −
Reflection on the Self.
  −
3.1.2.10  (7)
  −
3.1.2.11  (6)
  −
3.1.2.12  Recursions:  Possible, Actual, Necessary
  −
3.1.2.13  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
3.1.2.14  (3)
  −
3.1.2.15  The Freedom of Interpretation
  −
3.1.2.16  The Eternal Return
  −
3.1.2.17  (1)
  −
3.1.2.18  Information in Formation
  −
3.1.2.19  Reflectively Indexical Texts
  −
3.1.2.20  (4)
  −
3.1.2.21  (5)
  −
3.1.2.22  (6)
  −
3.1.2.23  (7)
  −
3.1.2.24  (8)
  −
3.1.2.25  The Discursive Universe
  −
3.1.2.26  (7)
  −
3.1.2.27  (6)
  −
3.1.2.28  (5)
  −
3.1.2.29  (4)
  −
3.1.2.30  (3)
  −
3.1.2.31  (2)
  −
3.1.2.32  (1)
  −
 
  −
3.2  Reflective Inquiry
  −
3.2.1  Integrity and Unity of Inquiry
  −
3.2.2  Apparitions & Allegations
  −
3.2.3  A Reflective Heuristic
  −
3.2.4  Either/Or:  A Sense of Absence
  −
3.2.5  Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
  −
3.2.6  Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
  −
3.2.7  Synthetic A Priori Truths
  −
3.2.8  Priorisms of Normative Sciences
  −
3.2.9  Principle of Rational Action
  −
3.2.10  The Pragmatic Cosmos
  −
3.2.11  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
3.2.11.1  Principals Versus Principles
  −
3.2.11.2  The Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
3.2.11.3  An Early Description of Interpretation
  −
3.2.11.4  Descriptions of the Mind
  −
3.2.11.5  Of Signs & the Mind
  −
3.2.11.6  Questions of Justification
  −
3.2.11.7  The Experience of Satisfaction
  −
3.2.11.8  An Organizational Difficulty
  −
3.2.11.9  Pragmatic Certainties
  −
3.2.11.10  Problems & Methods
  −
 
  −
3.3  Reflection on Reflection
  −
3.4  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
3.4.1  The Phenomenology of Reflection
  −
3.4.2  A Candid Point of View
  −
3.4.3  A Projective Point of View
  −
3.4.4  A Formal Point of View
  −
3.4.5  Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
  −
3.4.6  Basic Notions of Group Theory
  −
3.4.7  Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
  −
3.4.8  A Perspective on Computation
  −
3.4.9  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Introduction
  −
3.4.10  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Examples
  −
3.4.11  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Application
  −
3.4.12  Issue 1:  The Status of Signs
  −
3.4.13  Issue 2:  The Status of Sets
  −
3.4.14  Issue 3:  The Status of Variables
  −
3.4.15  Propositional Calculus
  −
3.4.16  Recursive Aspects
  −
3.4.17  Patterns of Self-Reference
  −
3.4.18  Practical Intuitions
  −
3.4.19  Examples of Self-Reference
  −
3.4.20  Three Views of Systems
  −
3.4.21  Building Bridges Between Representations
  −
3.4.22  Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.23  Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.24  Literal Intensional Representations
  −
3.4.25  Analytic Intensional Representations
  −
3.4.26  Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
  −
3.4.27  Differential Logic & Group Operations
  −
3.4.28  The Bridge:  From Obstruction to Opportunity
  −
3.4.29  Projects of Representation
  −
3.4.30  Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
  −
3.4.31  Generic Orders of Relations
  −
3.4.32  Partiality:  Selective Operations
  −
3.4.33  Sign Relational Complexes
  −
3.4.34  Set-Theoretic Constructions
  −
3.4.35  Reducibility of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.36  Irreducibly Triadic Relations
  −
3.4.37  Propositional Types
  −
3.4.38  Considering the Source
  −
3.4.39  Prospective Indices:  Pointers to Future Work
  −
3.4.40  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
3.4.41  Elective & Motive Forces
  −
3.4.42  Sign Processes:  A Start
  −
3.4.43  Reflective Extensions
  −
3.4.44  Reflections on Closure
  −
3.4.45  Intelligence => Critical Reflection
  −
3.4.46  Looking Ahead
  −
3.4.47  Mutually Intelligible Codes
  −
3.4.48  Discourse Analysis:  Ways & Means
  −
3.4.49  Combinations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.50  Revisiting the Source
  −
3.5  Divertimento:
  −
Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
  −
3.5.1  Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
  −
3.5.2  Searching for Parameters
  −
3.5.3  Defect Analysis
  −
3.5.4  The Pragmatic Critique
  −
3.5.5  Pragmatic Operating Notions
  −
3.5.6  Defects of Presentation
  −
3.5.7  Dues to Process
  −
3.5.8  Duties to Purpose
  −
3.6  Computational Design Philosophy
  −
3.6.1  Intentional Objects & Attitudes
  −
3.6.2  Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
  −
3.6.3  Propositional Reasoning About Relations
  −
3.6.4  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
3.6.5  Discussion of Examples
  −
3.6.6  Information & Inquiry
  −
 
  −
4.  Overview of the Domain:  Interpretive Inquiry
  −
4.1  Interpretive Bearings:  Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
  −
4.1.1  Catwalks:  Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
  −
4.1.1.1  Eponymous Ancestors:
  −
The Precursors of Abstraction?
  −
4.1.1.2  Reticles:
  −
Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue.
  −
4.1.2  Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
  −
4.2  Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
4.2.1  The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
  −
4.2.1.1  Sign Relations
  −
4.2.1.2  Types of Signs
  −
4.2.2  The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
  −
4.2.2.1  Abduction
  −
4.2.2.2  Deduction
  −
4.2.2.3  Induction
  −
4.3  Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
4.3.1  "Index":  A Program for Learning Formal Languages
  −
4.3.2  "Study":  A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
  −
5.  Discussion & Development of Objectives
  −
5.1  Objective 1a:  Propositions as Types
  −
5.2  Objective 1b:  Proof Styles & Developments
  −
5.3  Objective 1c:  Interpretation & Authority
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Ontology List
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04618.html
  −
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04621.html
  −
03.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04626.html
  −
04.
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Incitatory Notes
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04637.html
  −
02.
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Meditative Notes
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04622.html
  −
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04636.html
  −
03.
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Obligatory Notes
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04623.html
  −
02.
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Projective Notes
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04619.html
  −
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04625.html
  −
03.
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Reflective Notes
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04620.html
  −
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04631.html
  −
03.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Inquiry List
  −
 
  −
01.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Email Label
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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  −
| Title:    Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
| Author:  Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
  −
| Version:  Draft 10.01
  −
| Created:  23 Jun 1996
  −
| Revised:  07 Apr 2003
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
SUO List -- 04 Jan 2001
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02678.html
  −
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02679.html
  −
03.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02682.html
  −
04.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02685.html
  −
05.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02695.html
  −
06.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02697.html
  −
07.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02720.html
  −
08.  http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg03943.html
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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  −
IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
Ontology List -- Jan-Aug 2001
  −
 
  −
Systems Engineering Interest Statement
  −
 
  −
00.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd103.html#00272
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00272.html
  −
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00273.html
  −
03.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00276.html
  −
04.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00279.html
  −
05.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00289.html
  −
06.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00291.html
  −
07.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00314.html
  −
 
  −
Inquiry Driven Systems Essay 1
  −
 
  −
08.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg01535.html
  −
 
  −
Systems Engineering Dissertation
  −
 
  −
00.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd103.html#03071
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09.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03071.html
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10.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03136.html
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
Arisbe List -- Jan 2002
  −
 
  −
http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2002-January/thread.html#1247
  −
 
  −
Ontology List -- Jan 2002
  −
 
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd36.html#03604
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03604.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.5.  Taking Stock
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03605.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.6.  The "Meta" Question
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03607.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.7.  Iconic Signs
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03608.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.8.  The Conflict of Interpretations
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03609.html
  −
 
  −
Comment
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03613.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.9.  Indexical Signs
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03610.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.10.  Sundry Problems
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03611.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.11.  Review and Prospect
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03614.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.12.  Objective Plans and Levels
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03615.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03616.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.13.  Formalization of OF:  Objective Levels
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03617.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03618.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03619.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.14.  Application of OF:  Generic Level
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03620.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03621.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03622.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03623.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.15.  Application of OF:  Motive Level
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03624.html
  −
 
  −
Comment
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03625.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03626.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.16.  Integration of Frameworks
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03627.html
  −
 
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Comment
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03629.html
  −
 
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1.3.4.17  Recapitulation:  A Brush with Symbols
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03630.html
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Comment
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03631.html
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03634.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03636.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03638.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03639.html
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1.3.4.18.  C'est Moi
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03640.html
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1.3.4.19  Entr'acte
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03642.html
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Comment
  −
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03645.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03647.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03648.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03649.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03650.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03652.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03657.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03659.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03660.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03661.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03662.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03663.html
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http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03664.html
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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Inquiry Into Inquiry (I^3)
  −
 
  −
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02959.html
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02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02961.html
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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JA: 1.3.10.3  Propositions & Sentences
  −
01: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07444.html
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02: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07409.html
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03: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07416.html
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04: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07435.html
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05: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07443.html
  −
06: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07449.html
  −
 
  −
JA: 1.3.10.4  Empirical Types & Rational Types
  −
07: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07455.html
  −
 
  −
JA: 1.3.10.5  Articulate Sentences
  −
08: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07459.html
  −
09: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07461.html
  −
 
  −
JA: 1.3.10.6  Stretching Principles
  −
10: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07466.html
  −
11: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07469.html
  −
 
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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IDS.  Discussion Notes
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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IDS.  Discussion Note 0
  −
 
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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  −
JA = Jon Awbrey
  −
SZ = Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  −
 
  −
SZ: You generate a seemingly endless stream of "inquiry" -- some
  −
    of which seems to ramble and some of which is quite facinating.
  −
 
  −
SZ: Now you have started to torture me with Nietzsche :)
  −
 
  −
SZ: I catch just enough of the stream to want to keep watching but
  −
    I find I need a statement of systematic intent.  I know it is
  −
    inquiry into inquiry but can you summarise for me in brief
  −
    where you want to go and how you intend to get there.
  −
 
  −
SZ: Are these the endless streets of Eurpoean cities in which we can
  −
    occassionally find ourself lost, or do we wander a US city that
  −
    has had the luxury of laying down a grid first?
  −
 
  −
This is the document formerly known as my dissertation proposal --
  −
in a system engineering program that I returned to school to do
  −
as a kind of capstone / 2nd childhood / unfinished symphony,
  −
mostly from '91 to '99.  The formal beginning of it can be
  −
found starting here:
  −
 
  −
http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
  −
 
  −
But I think most folks on the SemioCom List had seen the earlier parts
  −
a couple of years ago, so I started at a point where I was starting
  −
to re-write some things slghtly clearer than the last time, I hope.
  −
 
  −
The immediate excuse/occasion of my thinking on this stuff again was
  −
the intermittent/interminable discussion that Bernard and I have been
  −
having on the nature of the "formalization arrow", plus many questions
  −
about what would constitute non-trivial examples of sign relations or
  −
truly significant applications of the pragmatic theory of signs, and
  −
what kind of conceptual/software architecture it would take to support
  −
thinking about this level of complexity.  So I was trying to bring folks
  −
up to date with the "state of my art" (SOMA) circa 1996 before I ventured
  −
to return to those issues.
  −
 
  −
Don't worry overmuch about the Nietzsche -- the stuff that I put in epigraphs
  −
is called the "epitext", and it is often intended to serve more as an exercise
  −
in counterpoint, if not fugue, than as a statement of the main theme.  Still,
  −
Freddy Nightmare was being remarkably Apollonian in these passages, I think.
  −
 
  −
Back to N'Orleans ...
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Discussion Note 1
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
JA = Jon Awbrey
  −
BM = Bernard Morand
  −
 
  −
Re: IDS 118.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001557.html
  −
In: IDS.      http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
  −
 
  −
I will go ahead and start a reply but I have to be on the road
  −
to memorial day visits with out of town family in a little while,
  −
so I will continue later tonight.
  −
 
  −
I should explain that this document arose out of the communication
  −
situation with my advisor, committee, and other professors over the
  −
better part of a decade.  These people had very good backgrounds in
  −
computer science, (control and optimal) systems engineering, and also
  −
mathematics.  So they already had a sense of how scientific method and
  −
the formal sciences work, a sense of how they are applied in practical
  −
settings, and a sense of how one uses empirical and statistical methods
  −
to test the fitness of these applications on a recurring, incrementally
  −
self-correcting basis.  So the train of inquiry is already in motion,
  −
and does not wait at the station for a good theory of how it works.
  −
No one is going to stop the train and fire up the boilers again
  −
from scratch.  If I think that C.S. Peirce would make a better
  −
conductor or engineer for the locomotion of inquiry, and not
  −
just another "featherbedder" philosophy of science, I have
  −
to show what he contributes to what is already under way.
  −
That is to be contrasted with the epi-cartesian method
  −
of flagging down the train, tearing up the rails, and
  −
trying to justify its existence and motivation from
  −
a standstill.
  −
 
  −
At any rate, this is the problem that I continually faced
  −
in trying to write this erstwhile dissertation proposal,
  −
and it forced me to work in a very different way from
  −
anything that I had ever tried before, for instance,
  −
where I could pretend to begin by just writing down
  −
a bunch of axiomatic definitions as if it were the
  −
first day of creation, and then following up their
  −
consequences as best I could.  Instead of doing
  −
that, I had to write my opera 'in medias res'.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Discussion Note 2
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
JA = Jon Awbrey
  −
BM = Bernard Morand
  −
 
  −
Re: IDS 118.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001557.html
  −
In: IDS.      http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
  −
 
  −
JA: It is important to realize that a "sampling relation", to express it
  −
    roughly, is a special case of a sign relation.  Aside from acting on
  −
    sign relations and creating an association between sign relations, a
  −
    sampling relation is also involved in a larger sign relation, at least,
  −
    it can be subsumed within a general order of sign relations that allows
  −
    sign relations themselves to be taken as the objects, the signs, and the
  −
    interpretants of what can be called a "higher order" (HO) sign relation.
  −
    Considered with respect to its full potential, its use, and its purpose,
  −
    a sampling relation does not fall outside the closure of sign relations.
  −
    To be precise, a sampling relation falls within the denotative component
  −
    of a higher order sign relation, since the sign relation sampled is the
  −
    object of study and the sample is taken as a sign of it.
  −
 
  −
BM: I was away for the last whole week and I could not read your previous notes.
  −
    This paragraph of what seems to be some prolegomena for further explanations
  −
    caught my attention.  A "sampling relation" can be subsumed within a general
  −
    order of sign relations:  well, you seem to define the sampling case as some
  −
    kind of reverted hypostatic abstraction.
  −
 
  −
I may have to wait for you to explain what you mean by
  −
this "reverted hypostatic abstraction".  In the meantime,
  −
what I am trying to say is this:  If we approach "inquiry"
  −
as an empirical domain or a quasi-natural phenomenon, taking
  −
the word "inquiry" as a pointer to a certain field of activity
  −
going on in the world, then whatever theory of inquiry we may
  −
form will be based on our local sample of experience with this
  −
domain of practice.  At least, this would be the starting gate
  −
in any other empirical domain.  So the object is "all inquiry"
  −
and the sign is "our sample of experience with all inquiry".
  −
Indeed, we will ask whether the sample is "representative"
  −
of the object domain, and a sensible method will try to
  −
take steps to ensure that it is.  Recall that the
  −
root "sem-" in Hippocrates, from whom Aristotle
  −
learned to appreciate abductive or diagnostic
  −
reasoning, connotes "sample" or "specimen".
  −
 
  −
BM: Or to refer to the replica device between a legisign and its
  −
    sinsigns.  If this is really your intend, you are missing a
  −
    third, I think.  Namely the fact that sampling involves to
  −
    my sense particularizing much more than singularizing a
  −
    general type.
  −
 
  −
Yes, we know that the sample is more particular than the object domain
  −
of interest, and thus gives us partial information.  Indeed, since the
  −
notion of "inquiry" is a rational concept, the domain "inquiry" is not
  −
bounded by any finite experience or by all human experience together.
  −
Thus we have to take measures that give us confidence of collecting a
  −
"fair", "representative", or "typical" sample.  This is only possible
  −
in the long run, of course.  Our initial sample is likely to be wholly
  −
opportunistic and thus full of biases and "partialities".
  −
 
  −
This was partly the point of reverting to Aristotle's 'Peri Psyche' --
  −
we possess and exercise an aptitude for inquiry long before we have
  −
reflected on it sufficiently to formalize or objectify the smallest
  −
sample of it.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Discussion Note 3
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
JA = Jon Awbrey
  −
BM = Bernard Morand
  −
 
  −
Re: IDS 118.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001557.html
  −
In: IDS.      http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
  −
 
  −
BM: Doing so, you surely get the benefit of applying the signhood properties
  −
    to sample relations because you assume from the beginning the idea that
  −
    they don't fall outside the closure of sign relations.  This is the great
  −
    deductive machinery used in inquiry.  But aren't you dismissing from the
  −
    start his other friends, induction and abduction?  As your text appears
  −
    to be a basic framework in order to inquire into inquiry, this would be
  −
    a too severe restriction.
  −
 
  −
I am merely saying that we can learn about X in general
  −
by looking at examples of X, whether X is "inquiries" or
  −
"sign relations" or anything else.  Reasoning by way of
  −
examples, analogies, or "paradigms" was classified by
  −
Aristotle as a mixed form of reasoning that combined
  −
induction of a rule and deduction of a similar fact,
  −
while Peirce gave a couple of different analyses of
  −
analogy that involved all three types of reasoning.
  −
So I do not know why you say it is all deductive.
  −
If one took the definition of a sign relation on
  −
the basis of an a priori dictate, or authority,
  −
then it might be so, but all sorts of abstract
  −
definitions turn out to be useless for a given
  −
purpose, and so Peirce's definition of a sign
  −
has to prove its usefulness in the effort to
  −
understand the object phenomena in question.
  −
 
  −
BM: From another side, it would throw tychism out of the picture:
  −
    you know, these samples which have absolutely not any subsumers.
  −
 
  −
I did not understand this comment fully.  But choosing
  −
random samples is a favorite way of getting fair ones.
  −
 
  −
BM: Your precision in the last sentence of the paragraph doesn't make
  −
    it more convenient in restricting sample relation to fall into the
  −
    denotative component of HO.  The term "component" would deserve to
  −
    be itself defined:  a restriction onto the !O! x !S! columns in L?
  −
 
  −
I made what seems like a simple observation, and hardly a novel one
  −
if one considers the etymology and a host of classical discussions.
  −
What use we make of the observation is another thing.  I agree that
  −
the word "component" is very multi-purpose -- here I conformed to
  −
the usage that refers to factors of a product as "components",
  −
as distinct from the sense used in relational "composition".
  −
I plead the poverty of language.
  −
 
  −
BM: While I think that the component idea is at work in
  −
    sign relations, splitting them into a denotative part
  −
    and into another (?) connotative part would amount to
  −
    presume the problem at hand already solved.  Reference to
  −
    components opens the difficult question (at least for me)
  −
    of the effective properties of composition relationship.
  −
 
  −
I don't understand this.  We are operating in a situation of
  −
partial information.  We have focal sign relations that we can
  −
objectify enough to study in detail, learning at least something
  −
about the properties and variety of sign relations, at least some
  −
of which learning will apply to classes of sign relations beyond
  −
our immediate focus, perhaps even a little to the sign relation
  −
in which we are embedded when we consider the relation of these
  −
focal sign relations to the general class.  Some people would
  −
call this a "hermeneutic circle", I think.
  −
 
  −
BM: In short, the sign relation sampled is not the object of study
  −
    if it is not at the same time its interpretant, I think (and
  −
    then the concept of model is just newly born!)
  −
 
  −
The objective class of interest is "all" sign relations.
  −
The sample that we have under the microscope is taken to
  −
provide us with information about the object domain of
  −
all sign relations, which it can do by virtue of the
  −
fact that it "represents" the object domain more or
  −
less well.  If we transform the sample in some way,
  −
or act on the information that it provides, then
  −
we generate an interpretant sign of the sample.
  −
Yes, I agree with that.  I will have to ask
  −
what sense of the word "model" you mean in
  −
this context, though.
  −
 
  −
BM: Finally, what does it mean for a sample to be TAKEN AS a sign of
  −
    some study?  The difficulty seems to me that the answer presupposes
  −
    the whole semiosis theory itself.  I am not arguing here against the
  −
    possibility of this method, I am just trying to say that it would be
  −
    inaccurate to pretend escaping its complexity as a starting point.
  −
    On the contrary, I think that to begin with the assumption of
  −
    complexity will end (perhaps) into simplicity.
  −
 
  −
Yes, there is a shade of difference between passive experience,
  −
where we take the samples that come our way, willy nilly, and
  −
active experimentation, where we contrive to gather samples
  −
under more contrived or controlled conditions, but none of
  −
these variations are unique to the theory of signs or the
  −
theory of inquiry.  I do not know how I can presuppose
  −
something that I am still in the middle of supposing.
  −
That is, I do not view the theory of sign relations
  −
or the theory of inquiry as finished products that
  −
I might presuppose, or what would be the point of
  −
an inquiry into their nature?  I do have my pet
  −
hypotheses, of course, but they are uncertain.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Discussion Note 4
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
JA = Jon Awbrey
  −
BM = Bernard Morand
  −
 
  −
Re: IDS Discuss 1.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001560.html
  −
In: IDS Discuss.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1560
  −
 
  −
JA: I should explain that this document arose out of the communication
  −
    situation with my advisor, committee, and other professors over the
  −
    better part of a decade.  These people had very good backgrounds in
  −
    computer science, (control and optimal) systems engineering, and also
  −
    mathematics.  So they already had a sense of how scientific method and
  −
    the formal sciences work, a sense of how they are applied in practical
  −
    settings, and a sense of how one uses empirical and statistical methods
  −
    to test the fitness of these applications on a recurring, incrementally
  −
    self-correcting basis.  So the train of inquiry is already in motion,
  −
    and does not wait at the station for a good theory of how it works.
  −
    No one is going to stop the train and fire up the boilers again
  −
    from scratch.  If I think that C.S. Peirce would make a better
  −
    conductor or engineer for the locomotion of inquiry, and not
  −
    just another "featherbedder" philosophy of science, I have
  −
    to show what he contributes to what is already under way.
  −
    That is to be contrasted with the epi-cartesian method
  −
    of flagging down the train, tearing up the rails, and
  −
    trying to justify its existence and motivation from
  −
    a standstill.
  −
 
  −
BM: Agreed on the whole and the details, Jon.  Except my suspicion
  −
    for "empirical method" for which I prefer "experimental" but
  −
    we already discussed that.
  −
 
  −
Okay.  Those are basically synonyms to me.  But I make no
  −
inference from "empirical" to "radically naive empiricism",
  −
or anything like that.  Indeed, one of the principal jobs of
  −
this whole project, that began long before I started trying to
  −
document what I had been doing all along, was to integrate the
  −
empirical data-driven and rational concept-driven modes of work.
  −
Perhaps we could agree just between us -- I have already given up
  −
trying to convert the masses (= effete minds) -- that "empiricism"
  −
and "rationalism" are the names of heuristic attitudes, angles of
  −
approach to be adopted on alternate weekdays, not the brands of
  −
jealous religions that demand a fear and trembling either-or.
  −
 
  −
But I admit that I still see a residue of difference
  −
between passive and active experience that comes up
  −
all the time in the actual practice of research.
  −
It is why we have consent forms, for example.
  −
I had been meaning for a while now to take
  −
it up under a separate thread, entitled
  −
the "Lessons Of Play" (LOP), but I am
  −
not ready to say what I think yet.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Discussion Note 5
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
JA = Jon Awbrey
  −
BM = Bernard Morand
  −
 
  −
Re: IDS Discuss 3.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001562.html
  −
In: IDS Discuss.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1560
  −
 
  −
BM: Doing so, you surely get the benefit of applying the signhood properties
  −
    to sample relations because you assume from the beginning the idea that
  −
    they don't fall outside the closure of sign relations.  This is the great
  −
    deductive machinery used in inquiry.  But aren't you dismissing from the
  −
    start his other friends, induction and abduction?  As your text appears
  −
    to be a basic framework in order to inquire into inquiry, this would be
  −
    a too severe restriction.
  −
 
  −
JA: I am merely saying that we can learn about X in general
  −
    by looking at examples of X, whether X is "inquiries" or
  −
    "sign relations" or anything else.
  −
 
  −
BM: All the difficulty resides in the meaning of "example" I think.
  −
    From which place can we judge that x is an example of some
  −
    (partially determined) X?  This will become even more
  −
    difficult when we will have to make a selection
  −
    between several candidates x_i for learning X.
  −
 
  −
That is why we begin with easy examples.
  −
 
  −
It looks like some kind of Zenoesque "impossibility
  −
of getting out of the starting blocks" difficulty here --
  −
before Achilles can take a step he has to take a semi-step,
  −
before he can take a semi-step he has to take a demi-semi-step,
  −
before he can take a demi-semi-step he has to take a hemi-demi-semi-step, ...
  −
 
  −
This is the influence of epi-cartesion thinking again,
  −
and I used to be sorely afflicted with it, so I know,
  −
but Peirce, and already Aristotle before him, gave us
  −
the way out with the abductive step of making a guess.
  −
We want to minimize our risk, of course, but there is
  −
an irreducible minimum of uncertainty that has to be
  −
tolerated if thought and action are not to remain in
  −
a state of utter paralysis.
  −
 
  −
So, can we read Peirce's definition of a sign relation and
  −
use it to pick out some concrete and simple examples of
  −
sign relations, or not?  It's not much use if we can't.
  −
Can I point to some examples of "inquiry" that are so
  −
clearly examples of what we want to talk about that
  −
both I and my committee will agree that they fit
  −
the general description?  Yes, though I might
  −
have to defer to their language to do so,
  −
calling it "research" or "applications
  −
of scientific method" just by way of
  −
getting out of the starting blocks.
  −
 
  −
If we get good at thinking about the simple examples,
  −
then it may be worth the trouble to try and tackle the
  −
harder cases.  From my experience, 3-adic relations are
  −
so difficult to think about that it will take some help
  −
from software e-virons before we get much better at it.
  −
 
  −
JA: Reasoning by way of examples, analogies, or "paradigms" was classified by
  −
    Aristotle as a mixed form of reasoning that combined induction of a rule
  −
    and deduction of a similar fact, while Peirce gave a couple of different
  −
    analyses of analogy that involved all three types of reasoning.  So I do
  −
    not know why you say it is all deductive.  If one took the definition of
  −
    a sign relation on the basis of an a priori dictate, or authority, then it
  −
    might be so, but all sorts of abstract definitions turn out to be useless
  −
    for a given purpose, and so Peirce's definition of a sign has to prove its
  −
    usefulness in the effort to understand the object phenomena in question.
  −
 
  −
BM: Agreed
  −
 
  −
BM: From another side, it would throw tychism out of the picture:
  −
    you know, these samples which have absolutely not any subsumers.
  −
 
  −
JA: I did not understand this comment fully.  But choosing
  −
    random samples is a favorite way of getting fair ones.
  −
 
  −
BM: This is a very complex problem but it is at the heart of the question of
  −
    induction.  You certainly know that we can't elaborate true (absolute)
  −
    random samples.  It seems that we have to admit in consequence that
  −
    probabilities fall into the domain of mathematics.  The sampling
  −
    procedures of statisticians fall into the domain of experimental
  −
    sciences and both have to be not confused.
  −
 
  −
Yes, there is no reason to expect that inquiry into inquiry
  −
will be any less complex than inquiry into anything else,
  −
but I sense that I may have misunderstood your comment.
  −
 
  −
There are, of course, complications arising here over the difference
  −
between descriptive sciences and normative sciences and what mix of
  −
the two a particular person wants to focus on.  But later, maybe.
  −
 
  −
BM: Your precision in the last sentence of the paragraph doesn't make
  −
    it more convenient in restricting sample relation to fall into the
  −
    denotative component of HO.  The term "component" would deserve to
  −
    be itself defined:  a restriction onto the !O! x !S! columns in L?
  −
 
  −
JA: I made what seems like a simple observation, and hardly a novel one
  −
    if one considers the etymology and a host of classical discussions.
  −
    What use we make of the observation is another thing.  I agree that
  −
    the word "component" is very multi-purpose -- here I conformed to
  −
    the usage that refers to factors of a product as "components",
  −
    as distinct from the sense used in relational "composition".
  −
    I plead the poverty of language.
  −
 
  −
BM: Hum.  Could you expand a little bit?  This is not very familiar to me.
  −
    In relational composition, why does the relations couldn't be seen as
  −
    the factors of a product?
  −
 
  −
All I can do here is note the variety of usage.  People will often
  −
call the domains in a cartesian product or a direct product by the
  −
name of "components" and they will speak of the "decomposition" of
  −
a space X into the form of a product X = X_1 x ... x X_k, but not
  −
be thinking of functional composition or relational composition
  −
when they say this.  I don't know any way around this, except
  −
to use adjectives in front of the ambiguous words whenever
  −
there's a chance of confusion.
  −
 
  −
If I have a 2-adic relation L that happens to be a composite of
  −
two other 2-adic relations, L = M o N, then I'd tend to say that
  −
L factors into M and N, or that M o N is "a" decomposition of L,
  −
but M and N are not "the" factors of L or "the" components of L,
  −
because we have no "unique factorization" theorem for relations
  −
in general.  So maybe that explains the nuance of usage.  Maybe.
  −
 
  −
BM: While I think that the component idea is at work in
  −
    sign relations, splitting them into a denotative part
  −
    and into another (?) connotative part would amount to
  −
    presume the problem at hand already solved.  Reference to
  −
    components opens the difficult question (at least for me)
  −
    of the effective properties of composition relationship.
  −
 
  −
JA: I don't understand this.  We are operating in a situation of
  −
    partial information.  We have focal sign relations that we can
  −
    objectify enough to study in detail, learning at least something
  −
    about the properties and variety of sign relations, at least some
  −
    of which learning will apply to classes of sign relations beyond
  −
    our immediate focus, perhaps even a little to the sign relation
  −
    in which we are embedded when we consider the relation of these
  −
    focal sign relations to the general class.  Some people would
  −
    call this a "hermeneutic circle", I think.
  −
 
  −
BM: Yes, this is the strategy of learning which amounts for me to what
  −
    I poorly call synthesis.  But there is its opposite too, analysis
  −
    that goes backward and allows to explain facts.  The whole secret
  −
    of the method is articulating both of them together.  Proceeding
  −
    this way, there is no more circle but something like a spiral.
  −
 
  −
Yes, not all circles are vicious.  I understand all these things
  −
on the model of recursive descent down to some basis that is so
  −
simple as to be immediate -- what we do in top-down programming
  −
or stepwise refinement -- and a spiral is a good image of that.
  −
 
  −
BM: On this point I am actually reading a book from K-O Apel
  −
    "Expliquer-Comprendre:  La controverse centrale des sciences
  −
    humaines".  It is a very fine book the first chapters of which
  −
    are difficult to read but it's a very great illumination when
  −
    arriving at the middle of the book. It is a French translation
  −
    from German.  I don't know if there is an English one.
  −
 
  −
I will see if I can find it.
  −
 
  −
BM: In short, the sign relation sampled is not the object of study
  −
    if it is not at the same time its interpretant, I think (and then
  −
    the concept of model is just newly born!)
  −
 
  −
JA: The objective class of interest is "all" sign relations.
  −
    The sample that we have under the microscope is taken to
  −
    provide us with information about the object domain of
  −
    all sign relations, which it can do by virtue of the
  −
    fact that it "represents" the object domain more or
  −
    less well.  If we transform the sample in some way,
  −
    or act on the information that it provides, then
  −
    we generate an interpretant sign of the sample.
  −
    Yes, I agree with that.  I will have to ask
  −
    what sense of the word "model" you mean in
  −
    this context, though.
  −
 
  −
BM: I think of it as a pure synonym for sign, in all contexts.
  −
    And as for the case of signs there are 10 or 66 cases of
  −
    models.  This is just an intuition of mine, not a theorem :-)
  −
 
  −
BM: Finally, what does it mean for a sample to be TAKEN AS a sign of
  −
    some study?  The difficulty seems to me that the answer presupposes
  −
    the whole semiosis theory itself.  I am not arguing here against the
  −
    possibility of this method, I am just trying to say that it would be
  −
    inaccurate to pretend escaping its complexity as a starting point.
  −
    On the contrary, I think that to begin with the assumption of
  −
    complexity will end (perhaps) into simplicity.
  −
 
  −
JA: Yes, there is a shade of difference between passive experience,
  −
    where we take the samples that come our way, willy nilly, and
  −
    active experimentation, where we contrive to gather samples
  −
    under more contrived or controlled conditions, but none of
  −
    these variations are unique to the theory of signs or the
  −
    theory of inquiry.  I do not know how I can presuppose
  −
    something that I am still in the middle of supposing.
  −
    That is, I do not view the theory of sign relations
  −
    or the theory of inquiry as finished products that
  −
    I might presuppose, or what would be the point of
  −
    an inquiry into their nature?  I do have my pet
  −
    hypotheses, of course, but they are uncertain.
  −
 
  −
BM: Yes.  However I would add the following amendment.  What any individual
  −
    inquirer (you, me or him) necessarily presupposes is the totality of
  −
    the previous inquiries.  As such they aren't personal hypotheses,
  −
    and they have to be rendered explicit.  If it was not the case
  −
    inquiry couldn't grow.  We need them in order to be able to
  −
    experiment with samples.  Perhaps it is there that we are
  −
    quite departing the one from the other.
  −
 
  −
That's kind of what I mean by 'in medias res'.  But now the distinction
  −
between "consciously presuppose" and "unconsciously presuppose" raises
  −
its head.  I recently had to invoke the term "quasi-belief" to discuss
  −
this issue.  It can take a considerable effort of critical reflection
  −
to recognize that we are acting just as if certain propositions hold.
  −
Again, consider Aristotle's 3-fold:
  −
 
  −
| Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is
  −
| realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the
  −
| word actuality is used in two senses, illustrated
  −
| by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the
  −
| exercise of it (theorein).
  −
 
  −
I think that his reputation as dichotomous thinker is greatly exaggerated.
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
IDS.  Discussion Note 6
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
 
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
 
  −
1.  Introduction
  −
1.1.  Outline of the Project:  Inquiry Into Inquiry
  −
1.1.1.  Problem
  −
1.1.2.  Method
  −
1.1.2.1.  The Paradigmatic and Process-Analytic Phase
  −
1.1.2.2.  The Paraphrastic and Faculty-Synthetic Phase
  −
1.1.2.3.  Reprise of Methods
  −
1.1.3.  Criterion
  −
1.1.4.  Application
  −
 
  −
1.2.  Onus of the Project:  No Way But Inquiry
  −
1.2.1.  A Modulating Prelude
  −
1.2.2.  A Fugitive Canon
  −
 
  −
1.3.  Opening of the Project:  A Way Up To Inquiry
  −
1.3.1.  Initial Analysis of Inquiry Allegro Aperto
  −
1.3.2.  Discussion of Discussion
  −
1.3.3.  Discussion of Formalization:  General Topics
  −
1.3.3.1.  A Formal Charge
  −
1.3.3.2.  A Formalization of Formalization?
  −
1.3.3.3.  A Formalization of Discussion?
  −
1.3.3.4.  A Concept of Formalization
  −
1.3.3.5.  A Formal Approach
  −
1.3.3.6.  A Formal Development
  −
1.3.3.7  A Formal Persuasion
  −
1.3.4.  Discussion of Formalization:  Concrete Examples
  −
1.3.4.1.  Formal Models:  A Sketch
  −
1.3.4.2.  Sign Relations:  A Primer
  −
1.3.4.3.  Semiotic Equivalence Relations
  −
1.3.4.4.  Graphical Representations
  −
1.3.4.5.  Taking Stock
  −
1.3.4.6.  The "Meta" Question
  −
1.3.4.7.  Iconic Signs
  −
1.3.4.8.  The Conflict of Interpretations
  −
1.3.4.9.  Indexical Signs
  −
1.3.4.10.  Sundry Problems
  −
1.3.4.11.  Review and Prospect
  −
1.3.4.12.  Objective Plans & Levels
  −
1.3.4.13.  Formalization of OF:  Objective Levels
  −
1.3.4.14.  Application of OF:  Generic Level
  −
1.3.4.15.  Application of OF:  Motive Level
  −
1.3.4.16.  The Integration of Frameworks
  −
1.3.4.17.  Recapitulation:  A Brush with Symbols
  −
1.3.4.18.  C'est Moi
  −
1.3.4.19.  Entr'acte
  −
 
  −
1.3.5  Discussion of Formalization:  Specific Objects
  −
1.3.5.1  The Will to Form
  −
1.3.5.2  The Forms of Reasoning
  −
1.3.5.3  A Fork in the Road
  −
1.3.5.4  A Forged Bond
  −
1.3.5.5  A Formal Account
  −
1.3.5.6  Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
  −
1.3.5.7  Steps and Tests of Formalization
  −
1.3.5.8  Puck, the Ref
  −
1.3.5.9  Partial Formalizations
  −
1.3.5.10  A Formal Utility
  −
1.3.5.11  A Formal Aesthetic
  −
1.3.5.12  A Formal Apology
  −
1.3.5.13  A Formal Suspicion
  −
1.3.5.14  The Double Aspect of Concepts
  −
1.3.5.15  A Formal Permission
  −
1.3.5.16  A Formal Invention
  −
1.3.6  Recursion in Perpetuity
  −
1.3.7  Processus, Regressus, Progressus
  −
1.3.8  Rondeau Tempo di Menuetto
  −
1.3.9  Reconnaissance
  −
1.3.9.1  The Informal Context
  −
1.3.9.2  The Epitext
  −
1.3.9.3  The Formative Tension
  −
1.3.10  Recurring Themes
  −
1.3.10.1  Preliminary Notions
  −
1.3.10.2  Intermediary Notions
  −
1.3.10.3  Propositions and Sentences
  −
1.3.10.4  Empirical Types and Rational Types
  −
1.3.10.5  Articulate Sentences
  −
1.3.10.6  Stretching Principles
  −
1.3.10.7  Stretching Operations
  −
1.3.10.8  The Cactus Patch
  −
1.3.10.9  The Cactus Language:  Syntax
  −
1.3.10.10  The Cactus Language:  Stylistics
  −
1.3.10.11  The Cactus Language:  Mechanics
  −
1.3.10.12  The Cactus Language:  Semantics
  −
1.3.10.13  Stretching Exercises
  −
1.3.10.14  Syntactic Transformations
  −
1.3.10.15  Derived Equivalence Relations
  −
1.3.10.16  Digression on Derived Relations
  −
 
  −
1.4  Outlook of the Project:  All Ways Lead to Inquiry
  −
1.4.1  The Matrix of Inquiry
  −
1.4.1.1  Inquiry as Conduct
  −
1.4.1.2  Types of Conduct
  −
1.4.1.3  Perils of Inquiry
  −
1.4.1.4  Forms of Relations
  −
1.4.1.5  Models of Inquiry
  −
1.4.2  The Moment of Inquiry
  −
1.4.3  The Modes of Inquiry
  −
1.4.3.1  Deductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.2  Inductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.3  Abductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.4  Analogical Reasoning
  −
 
  −
1.5  Obstacles to the Project:  In the Way of Inquiry
  −
1.5.1  The Initial Unpleasantness
  −
1.5.2  The Justification Trap
  −
1.5.3  A Formal Apology
  −
1.5.3.1  Category Double-Takes
  −
1.5.3.2  Conceptual Extensions
  −
1.5.3.3  Explosional Recombinations
  −
1.5.3.4  Interpretive Frameworks
  −
1.5.4  A Material Exigency
  −
1.5.5  A Reconciliation of Accounts
  −
1.5.6  Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
  −
1.5.7  Empirical Considerations
  −
1.5.8  Computational Considerations
  −
1.5.8.1  A Form of Recursion
  −
1.5.8.2  A Power of Abstraction
  −
 
  −
1.6  Orientation of the Project:  A Way Into Inquiry
  −
1.6.1  Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
1.6.2  Terms of Analysis
  −
1.6.2.1  Digression on Signs
  −
1.6.2.2  Empirical Status of ID
  −
1.6.3  Expansion of Terms
  −
1.6.3.1  Agency
  −
1.6.3.2  Abstraction
  −
1.6.3.3  Analogy
  −
1.6.3.4  Accuracy
  −
1.6.3.5  Authenticity
  −
1.6.4  Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
  −
1.6.4.1  A Mistaken ID
  −
1.6.4.2  Phenomenology of Doubt
  −
1.6.4.3  Modalities of Knowledge
  −
1.6.5  Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
  −
1.6.6  Interpretive Systems
  −
1.6.6.1  Syntactic Systems
  −
1.6.6.2  Semantic Systems
  −
1.6.6.3  Pragmatic Systems
  −
1.6.7  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
1.6.7.1  A Definition of Inquiry
  −
1.6.7.2  The Faculty of Inquiry
  −
1.6.7.3  A Definition of Determination
  −
1.6.7.4  A Definition of Definition
  −
 
  −
1.7  Organization of the Project:  A Way Through Inquiry
  −
1.7.1  The Problem:  Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
  −
1.7.2  The Method:  Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
  −
1.7.2.1  Conditions for the Possibility
  −
of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
1.7.2.2  Conditions for the Success of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
1.7.3  The Criterion:  Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
  −
1.7.3.1  The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test
  −
1.7.3.2  Enabling Provision 1:  The Scenes & Context of Inquiry
  −
1.7.3.3  Enabling Provision 2:  The Stages & Content of Inquiry
  −
1.8  Objectives of the Project:  Inquiry All the Way
  −
1.8.1  Substantial Objective
  −
1.8.1.1  Objective 1a:  The Propositions as Types Analogy
  −
1.8.1.2  Objective 1b:  The Styles of Proof Development
  −
1.8.1.3  Objective 1c:  The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority
  −
1.8.2  Instrumental Objective
  −
1.8.3  Coordination of Objectives
  −
1.8.4  Recapitulation -- Da Capo, Al Segno
  −
 
  −
2.  Discussion of Inquiry
  −
2.1  Approaches to Inquiry
  −
2.1.1  The Classical Framework:  Syllogistic Approaches
  −
2.1.2  The Pragmatic Framework:  Sign-Theoretic Approaches
  −
2.1.3  The Dynamical Framework:  System-Theoretic Approaches
  −
2.1.3.1  Inquiry & Computation
  −
2.1.3.2  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
2.2  The Context of Inquiry
  −
2.2.1  The Field of Observation
  −
2.2.2  The Problem of Reflection
  −
2.2.3  The Problem of Reconstruction
  −
2.2.4  The Trivializing of Integration
  −
2.2.5  Tensions in the Field of Observation
  −
2.2.6  Problems of Representation & Communication
  −
 
  −
2.3  The Conduct of Inquiry
  −
2.3.1  Introduction
  −
2.3.2  The Types of Reasoning
  −
2.3.2.1  Deduction
  −
2.3.2.2  Induction
  −
2.3.2.3  Abduction
  −
2.3.3  Hybrid Types of Inference
  −
2.3.3.1  Analogy
  −
2.3.3.2  Inquiry
  −
2.3.4  Details of Induction
  −
2.3.4.1  Learning
  −
2.3.4.2  Transfer
  −
2.3.4.3  Testing
  −
2.3.5  The Stages of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
3.  The Medium & Its Message
  −
3.1  Reflective Expression
  −
3.1.1  Casual Reflection
  −
3.1.1.1  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
3.1.1.2  Analogical Recursion
  −
3.1.2  Conscious Reflection
  −
3.1.2.1  The Signal Moment
  −
3.1.2.2  The Symbolic Object
  −
3.1.2.3  The Endeavor to Communicate
  −
3.1.2.4  The Medium of Communication
  −
3.1.2.5  The Ark of Types:
  −
The Order of Things to Come.
  −
3.1.2.6  The Epitext
  −
3.1.2.7  The Context of Interpretation
  −
3.1.2.8  The Formative Tension
  −
3.1.2.9  The Vehicle of Communication:
  −
Reflection on the Scene,
  −
Reflection on the Self.
  −
3.1.2.10  (7)
  −
3.1.2.11  (6)
  −
3.1.2.12  Recursions:  Possible, Actual, Necessary
  −
3.1.2.13  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
3.1.2.14  (3)
  −
3.1.2.15  The Freedom of Interpretation
  −
3.1.2.16  The Eternal Return
  −
3.1.2.17  (1)
  −
3.1.2.18  Information in Formation
  −
3.1.2.19  Reflectively Indexical Texts
  −
3.1.2.20  (4)
  −
3.1.2.21  (5)
  −
3.1.2.22  (6)
  −
3.1.2.23  (7)
  −
3.1.2.24  (8)
  −
3.1.2.25  The Discursive Universe
  −
3.1.2.26  (7)
  −
3.1.2.27  (6)
  −
3.1.2.28  (5)
  −
3.1.2.29  (4)
  −
3.1.2.30  (3)
  −
3.1.2.31  (2)
  −
3.1.2.32  (1)
  −
 
  −
3.2  Reflective Inquiry
  −
3.2.1  Integrity and Unity of Inquiry
  −
3.2.2  Apparitions & Allegations
  −
3.2.3  A Reflective Heuristic
  −
3.2.4  Either/Or:  A Sense of Absence
  −
3.2.5  Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
  −
3.2.6  Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
  −
3.2.7  Synthetic A Priori Truths
  −
3.2.8  Priorisms of Normative Sciences
  −
3.2.9  Principle of Rational Action
  −
3.2.10  The Pragmatic Cosmos
  −
3.2.11  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
3.2.11.1  Principals Versus Principles
  −
3.2.11.2  The Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
3.2.11.3  An Early Description of Interpretation
  −
3.2.11.4  Descriptions of the Mind
  −
3.2.11.5  Of Signs & the Mind
  −
3.2.11.6  Questions of Justification
  −
3.2.11.7  The Experience of Satisfaction
  −
3.2.11.8  An Organizational Difficulty
  −
3.2.11.9  Pragmatic Certainties
  −
3.2.11.10  Problems & Methods
  −
 
  −
3.3  Reflection on Reflection
  −
3.4  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
3.4.1  The Phenomenology of Reflection
  −
3.4.2  A Candid Point of View
  −
3.4.3  A Projective Point of View
  −
3.4.4  A Formal Point of View
  −
3.4.5  Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
  −
3.4.6  Basic Notions of Group Theory
  −
3.4.7  Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
  −
3.4.8  A Perspective on Computation
  −
3.4.9  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Introduction
  −
3.4.10  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Examples
  −
3.4.11  Higher Order Sign Relations:  Application
  −
3.4.12  Issue 1:  The Status of Signs
  −
3.4.13  Issue 2:  The Status of Sets
  −
3.4.14  Issue 3:  The Status of Variables
  −
3.4.15  Propositional Calculus
  −
3.4.16  Recursive Aspects
  −
3.4.17  Patterns of Self-Reference
  −
3.4.18  Practical Intuitions
  −
3.4.19  Examples of Self-Reference
  −
3.4.20  Three Views of Systems
  −
3.4.21  Building Bridges Between Representations
  −
3.4.22  Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.23  Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.24  Literal Intensional Representations
  −
3.4.25  Analytic Intensional Representations
  −
3.4.26  Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
  −
3.4.27  Differential Logic & Group Operations
  −
3.4.28  The Bridge:  From Obstruction to Opportunity
  −
3.4.29  Projects of Representation
  −
3.4.30  Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
  −
3.4.31  Generic Orders of Relations
  −
3.4.32  Partiality:  Selective Operations
  −
3.4.33  Sign Relational Complexes
  −
3.4.34  Set-Theoretic Constructions
  −
3.4.35  Reducibility of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.36  Irreducibly Triadic Relations
  −
3.4.37  Propositional Types
  −
3.4.38  Considering the Source
  −
3.4.39  Prospective Indices:  Pointers to Future Work
  −
3.4.40  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
3.4.41  Elective & Motive Forces
  −
3.4.42  Sign Processes:  A Start
  −
3.4.43  Reflective Extensions
  −
3.4.44  Reflections on Closure
  −
3.4.45  Intelligence => Critical Reflection
  −
3.4.46  Looking Ahead
  −
3.4.47  Mutually Intelligible Codes
  −
3.4.48  Discourse Analysis:  Ways & Means
  −
3.4.49  Combinations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.50  Revisiting the Source
  −
3.5  Divertimento:
  −
Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
  −
3.5.1  Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
  −
3.5.2  Searching for Parameters
  −
3.5.3  Defect Analysis
  −
3.5.4  The Pragmatic Critique
  −
3.5.5  Pragmatic Operating Notions
  −
3.5.6  Defects of Presentation
  −
3.5.7  Dues to Process
  −
3.5.8  Duties to Purpose
  −
3.6  Computational Design Philosophy
  −
3.6.1  Intentional Objects & Attitudes
  −
3.6.2  Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
  −
3.6.3  Propositional Reasoning About Relations
  −
3.6.4  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
3.6.5  Discussion of Examples
  −
3.6.6  Information & Inquiry
  −
 
  −
4.  Overview of the Domain:  Interpretive Inquiry
  −
4.1  Interpretive Bearings:  Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
  −
4.1.1  Catwalks:  Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
  −
4.1.1.1  Eponymous Ancestors:
  −
The Precursors of Abstraction?
  −
4.1.1.2  Reticles:
  −
Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue.
  −
4.1.2  Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
  −
4.2  Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
4.2.1  The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
  −
4.2.1.1  Sign Relations
  −
4.2.1.2  Types of Signs
  −
4.2.2  The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
  −
4.2.2.1  Abduction
  −
4.2.2.2  Deduction
  −
4.2.2.3  Induction
  −
4.3  Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
4.3.1  "Index":  A Program for Learning Formal Languages
  −
4.3.2  "Study":  A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
  −
5.  Discussion & Development of Objectives
  −
5.1  Objective 1a:  Propositions as Types
  −
5.2  Objective 1b:  Proof Styles & Developments
  −
5.3  Objective 1c:  Interpretation & Authority
  −
 
  −
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
  −
 
  −
Jon Awbrey, "Inquiry Driven Systems:  Inquiry Into Inquiry"
  −
IDS.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
  −
IDS.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1564
  −
IDS.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/thread.html#1574
  −
IDS.  http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.12.  Objective Plans and Levels
  −
IDS 46.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001485.html
  −
IDS 47.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001486.html
  −
IDS 48.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001487.html
  −
IDS 49.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001488.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.13.  Formalization of OF:  Objective Levels
  −
IDS 50.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001489.html
  −
IDS 51.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001490.html
  −
IDS 52.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001491.html
  −
IDS 53.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001492.html
  −
IDS 54.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001493.html
  −
IDS 55.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001494.html
  −
 
  −
1.3.4.14.  Application of OF:  Generic Level
  −
IDS 56.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001495.html
  −
IDS 57.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001496.html
  −
IDS 58.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001497.html
  −
IDS 59.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001498.html
  −
IDS 60.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001499.html
  −
IDS 61.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001500.html
  −
IDS 62.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001501.html
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IDS 63.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001502.html
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1.3.4.15.  Application of OF:  Motive Level
  −
IDS 64.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001503.html
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IDS 65.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001504.html
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1.3.4.16.  The Integration of Frameworks
  −
IDS 66.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001505.html
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IDS 67.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001506.html
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1.3.4.17.  Recapitulation:  A Brush with Symbols
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IDS 68.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001507.html
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IDS 69.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001508.html
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1.3.4.18.  C'est Moi
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IDS 70.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001509.html
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IDS 71.    http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001510.html
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- 2004
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000.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
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000.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1564
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000.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/thread.html#1574
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001.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001434.html
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002.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001435.html
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003.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001436.html
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004.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001437.html
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016.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001452.html
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019.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001455.html
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020.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001457.html
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021.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001458.html
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022.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001459.html
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023.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001460.html
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024.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001461.html
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025.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001462.html
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026.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001463.html
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027.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001464.html
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028.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001465.html
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029.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001466.html
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030.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001467.html
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031.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001468.html
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032.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001469.html
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033.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001470.html
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034.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001471.html
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035.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001472.html
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036.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001473.html
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037.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001474.html
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038.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001475.html
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039.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001478.html
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040.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001479.html
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041.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001480.html
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042.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001481.html
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043.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001482.html
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044.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001483.html
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046.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001485.html
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047.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001486.html
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048.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001487.html
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058.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001497.html
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059.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001498.html
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060.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001499.html
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061.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001500.html
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062.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001501.html
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063.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001502.html
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064.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001503.html
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065.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001504.html
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066.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001505.html
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067.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001506.html
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068.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001507.html
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072.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001511.html
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074.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001513.html
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075.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001514.html
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077.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001516.html
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078.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001517.html
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079.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001518.html
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080.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001519.html
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081.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001520.html
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082.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001521.html
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083.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001522.html
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084.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001523.html
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085.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001524.html
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090.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001529.html
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091.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001530.html
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092.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001531.html
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093.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001532.html
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094.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001533.html
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095.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001534.html
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096.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001535.html
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097.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001536.html
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098.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001537.html
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099.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001538.html
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100.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001539.html
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101.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001540.html
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102.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001541.html
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103.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001542.html
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107.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001546.html
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108.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001547.html
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109.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001548.html
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110.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001549.html
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111.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001550.html
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112.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001551.html
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113.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001552.html
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114.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001553.html
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115.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001554.html
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116.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001555.html
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117.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001556.html
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118.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001557.html
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119.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001559.html
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120.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001564.html
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121.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001565.html
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122.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001566.html
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123.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001567.html
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124.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001568.html
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125.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001569.html
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126.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001570.html
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127.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001571.html
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128.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001572.html
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129.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001573.html
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130.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001574.html
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131.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001575.html
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132.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001577.html
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133.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001578.html
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134.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001579.html
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135.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001580.html
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136.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001581.html
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137.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001582.html
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138.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001583.html
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139.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001584.html
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140.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001585.html
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141.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001586.html
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142.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001587.html
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143.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001588.html
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144.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001589.html
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145.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001590.html
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176.
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IDS.  Inquiry Driven Systems -- Discussion
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  −
00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1560
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00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/thread.html#1576
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01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001560.html
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02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001561.html
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03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001562.html
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04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001563.html
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05.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001576.html
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06.
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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</pre>
  −
 
  −
==Outline==
  −
 
  −
<pre>
  −
Inquiry Driven Systems (07 Apr 2003)
  −
1.  Research Proposal
  −
1.1  Outline of the Project : Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
1.1.1  Problem
  −
1.1.2  Method
  −
1.1.2.1  The Paradigmatic & Process-Analytic Phase.
  −
1.1.2.2  The Paraphrastic & Faculty-Synthetic Phase.
  −
1.1.2.3  Reprise of Methods
  −
1.1.3  Criterion
  −
1.1.4  Application
  −
1.2  Onus of the Project : No Way But Inquiry
  −
1.2.1  A Modulating Prelude
  −
1.2.2  A Fugitive Canon
  −
 
  −
1.3  Option of the Project : A Way Up To Inquiry
  −
1.3.1  Initial Analysis of Inquiry : Allegro Aperto
  −
1.3.2  Discussion of Discussion
  −
1.3.3  Discussion of Formalization : General Topics
  −
1.3.3.1  A Formal Charge
  −
1.3.3.2  A Formalization of Formalization?
  −
1.3.3.3  A Formalization of Discussion?
  −
1.3.3.4  A Concept of Formalization
  −
1.3.3.5  A Formal Approach
  −
1.3.3.6  A Formal Development
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1.3.3.7  A Formal Persuasion
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1.3.4  Discussion of Formalization : Concrete Examples
  −
1.3.4.1  Formal Models : A Sketch
  −
1.3.4.2  Sign Relations : A Primer
  −
1.3.4.3  Semiotic Equivalence Relations
  −
1.3.4.4  Graphical Representations
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1.3.4.5  Taking Stock
  −
1.3.4.6  The "Meta" Question
  −
1.3.4.7  Iconic Signs
  −
1.3.4.8  The Conflict of Interpretations
  −
1.3.4.9  Indexical Signs
  −
1.3.4.10  Sundry Problems
  −
1.3.4.11  Review & Prospect
  −
1.3.4.12  Objective Plans & Levels
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1.3.4.13  Formalization of OF : Objective Levels
  −
1.3.4.14  Application of OF : Generic Level
  −
1.3.4.15  Application of OF : Motive Level
  −
1.3.4.16  The Integration of Frameworks
  −
1.3.4.17  Recapitulation : A Brush with Symbols
  −
1.3.4.18  C'est Moi
  −
1.3.4.19  Entr'acte
  −
1.3.5  Discussion of Formalization : Specific Objects
  −
1.3.5.1  The Will to Form
  −
1.3.5.2  The Forms of Reasoning
  −
1.3.5.3  A Fork in the Road
  −
1.3.5.4  A Forged Bond
  −
1.3.5.5  A Formal Account
  −
1.3.5.6  Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
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1.3.5.7  Steps & Tests of Formalization
  −
1.3.5.8  Puck, the Ref
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1.3.5.9  Partial Formalizations
  −
1.3.5.10  A Formal Utility
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1.3.5.11  A Formal Aesthetic
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1.3.5.12  A Formal Apology
  −
1.3.5.13  A Formal Suspicion
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1.3.5.14  The Double Aspect of Concepts
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1.3.5.15  A Formal Permission
  −
1.3.5.16  A Formal Invention
  −
1.3.6  Recursion in Perpetuity
  −
1.3.7  Processus, Regressus, Progressus
  −
1.3.8  Rondeau : Tempo di Menuetto
  −
1.3.9  Reconnaissance
  −
1.3.9.1  The Informal Context
  −
1.3.9.2  The Epitext
  −
1.3.9.3  The Formative Tension
  −
1.3.10  Recurring Themes
  −
1.3.10.1  Preliminary Notions
  −
1.3.10.2  Intermediary Notions
  −
1.3.10.3  Propositions & Sentences
  −
1.3.10.4  Empirical Types & Rational Types
  −
1.3.10.5  Articulate Sentences
  −
1.3.10.6  Stretching Principles
  −
1.3.10.7  Stretching Operations
  −
1.3.10.8  The Cactus Patch
  −
1.3.10.9  The Cactus Language : Syntax
  −
1.3.10.10  The Cactus Language : Stylistics
  −
1.3.10.11  The Cactus Language : Mechanics
  −
1.3.10.12  The Cactus Language : Semantics
  −
1.3.10.13  Stretching Exercises
  −
1.3.10.14  Syntactic Transformations
  −
1.3.10.15  Derived Equivalence Relations
  −
1.3.10.16  Digression on Derived Relations
  −
 
  −
1.4  Outlook of the Project : All Ways Lead to Inquiry
  −
1.4.1  The Matrix of Inquiry
  −
1.4.1.1  Inquiry as Conduct
  −
1.4.1.2  Types of Conduct
  −
1.4.1.3  Perils of Inquiry
  −
1.4.1.4  Forms of Relations
  −
1.4.1.5  Models of Inquiry
  −
1.4.2  The Moment of Inquiry
  −
1.4.3  The Modes of Inquiry
  −
1.4.3.1  Deductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.2  Inductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.3  Abductive Reasoning
  −
1.4.3.4  Analogical Reasoning
  −
...
  −
 
  −
1.5  Obstacles to the Project : In the Way of Inquiry
  −
1.5.1  The Initial Unpleasantness
  −
1.5.2  The Justification Trap
  −
1.5.3  A Formal Apology
  −
1.5.3.1  Category Double-Takes
  −
1.5.3.2  Conceptual Extensions
  −
1.5.3.3  Explosional Recombinations
  −
1.5.3.4  Interpretive Frameworks
  −
1.5.4  A Material Exigency
  −
1.5.5  A Reconciliation of Accounts
  −
1.5.6  Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
  −
1.5.7  Empirical Considerations
  −
1.5.8  Computational Considerations
  −
1.5.8.1  A Form of Recursion
  −
1.5.8.2  A Power of Abstraction
  −
 
  −
1.6  Orientation of the Project : A Way Into Inquiry
  −
1.6.1  Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
1.6.2  Terms of Analysis
  −
1.6.2.1  Digression on Signs
  −
1.6.2.2  Empirical Status of ID
  −
1.6.3  Expansion of Terms
  −
1.6.3.1  Agency
  −
1.6.3.2  Abstraction
  −
1.6.3.3  Analogy
  −
1.6.3.4  Accuracy
  −
1.6.3.5  Authenticity
  −
1.6.4  Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
  −
1.6.4.1  A Mistaken ID
  −
1.6.4.2  Phenomenology of Doubt
  −
1.6.4.3  Modalities of Knowledge
  −
1.6.5  Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
  −
1.6.6  Interpretive Systems
  −
1.6.6.1  Syntactic Systems
  −
1.6.6.2  Semantic Systems
  −
1.6.6.3  Pragmatic Systems
  −
1.6.7  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
1.6.7.1  A Definition of Inquiry
  −
1.6.7.2  The Faculty of Inquiry
  −
1.6.7.3  A Definition of Determination
  −
1.6.7.4  A Definition of Definition
  −
 
  −
1.7  Organization of the Project : A Way Through Inquiry
  −
1.7.1  The Problem : Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
  −
1.7.2  The Method : Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
  −
1.7.2.1  Conditions for the Possibility
  −
of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
1.7.2.2  Conditions for the Success
  −
of Inquiry into Inquiry
  −
1.7.3  The Criterion : Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
  −
1.7.3.1  The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test.
  −
1.7.3.2  Enabling Provision 1 : The Scenes & Context of Inquiry.
  −
1.7.3.3  Enabling Provision 2 : The Stages & Content of Inquiry.
  −
1.8  Objectives of the Project : Inquiry All the Way
  −
1.8.1  Substantial Objective
  −
1.8.1.1  Objective 1a : The Propositions as Types Analogy.
  −
1.8.1.2  Objective 1b : The Styles of Proof Development.
  −
1.8.1.3  Objective 1c : The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority.
  −
1.8.2  Instrumental Objective
  −
1.8.3  Coordination of Objectives
  −
1.8.4  Recapitulation : Da Capo, Al Segno
  −
 
  −
2.  Discussion of Inquiry
  −
2.1  Approaches to Inquiry
  −
2.1.1  The Classical Framework : Syllogistic Approaches
  −
2.1.2  The Pragmatic Framework : Sign-Theoretic Approaches
  −
2.1.3  The Dynamical Framework : System-Theoretic Approaches
  −
2.1.3.1  Inquiry & Computation
  −
2.1.3.2  Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
2.2  The Context of Inquiry
  −
2.2.1  The Field of Observation
  −
2.2.2  The Problem of Reflection
  −
2.2.3  The Problem of Reconstruction
  −
2.2.4  The Trivializing of Integration
  −
2.2.5  Tensions in the Field of Observation
  −
2.2.6  Problems of Representation & Communication
  −
 
  −
2.3  The Conduct of Inquiry
  −
2.3.1  Introduction
  −
2.3.2  The Types of Reasoning
  −
2.3.2.1  Deduction
  −
2.3.2.2  Induction
  −
2.3.2.3  Abduction
  −
2.3.3  Hybrid Types of Inference
  −
2.3.3.1  Analogy
  −
2.3.3.2  Inquiry
  −
2.3.4  Details of Induction
  −
2.3.4.1  Learning
  −
2.3.4.2  Transfer
  −
2.3.4.3  Testing
  −
2.3.5  The Stages of Inquiry
  −
 
  −
3.  The Medium & Its Message
  −
3.1  Reflective Expression
  −
3.1.1  Casual Reflection
  −
3.1.1.1  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
3.1.1.2  Analogical Recursion
  −
3.1.2  Conscious Reflection
  −
3.1.2.1  The Signal Moment
  −
3.1.2.2  The Symbolic Object
  −
3.1.2.3  The Endeavor to Communicate
  −
3.1.2.4  The Medium of Communication
  −
3.1.2.5  The Ark of Types : The Order of Things to Come.
  −
3.1.2.6  The Epitext
  −
3.1.2.7  The Context of Interpretation
  −
3.1.2.8  The Formative Tension
  −
3.1.2.9  The Vehicle of Communication :
  −
        Reflection on the Scene,
  −
        Reflection on the Self.
  −
3.1.2.10  (7)
  −
3.1.2.11  (6)
  −
3.1.2.12  Recursions : Possible, Actual, Necessary
  −
3.1.2.13  Ostensibly Recursive Texts
  −
3.1.2.14  (3)
  −
3.1.2.15  The Freedom of Interpretation
  −
3.1.2.16  The Eternal Return
  −
3.1.2.17  (1)
  −
3.1.2.18  Information in Formation
  −
3.1.2.19  Reflectively Indexical Texts
  −
3.1.2.20  (4)
  −
3.1.2.21  (5)
  −
3.1.2.22  (6)
  −
3.1.2.23  (7)
  −
3.1.2.24  (8)
  −
3.1.2.25  The Discursive Universe
  −
3.1.2.26  (7)
  −
3.1.2.27  (6)
  −
3.1.2.28  (5)
  −
3.1.2.29  (4)
  −
3.1.2.30  (3)
  −
3.1.2.31  (2)
  −
3.1.2.32  (1)
  −
 
  −
3.2  Reflective Inquiry
  −
3.2.1  Integrity & Unity of Inquiry
  −
3.2.2  Apparitions & Allegations
  −
3.2.3  A Reflective Heuristic
  −
3.2.4  Either/Or : A Sense of Absence
  −
3.2.5  Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
  −
3.2.6  Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
  −
3.2.7  Synthetic A Priori Truths
  −
3.2.8  Priorisms of Normative Sciences
  −
3.2.9  Principle of Rational Action
  −
3.2.10  The Pragmatic Cosmos
  −
3.2.11  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
3.2.11.1  Principals Versus Principles
  −
3.2.11.2  The Initial Description of Inquiry
  −
3.2.11.3  An Early Description of Interpretation
  −
3.2.11.4  Descriptions of the Mind
  −
3.2.11.5  Of Signs & the Mind
  −
3.2.11.6  Questions of Justification
  −
3.2.11.7  The Experience of Satisfaction
  −
3.2.11.8  An Organizational Difficulty
  −
3.2.11.9  Pragmatic Certainties
  −
3.2.11.10  Problems & Methods
  −
 
  −
3.3  Reflection on Reflection
  −
3.4  Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
  −
3.4.1  The Phenomenology of Reflection
  −
3.4.2  A Candid Point of View
  −
3.4.3  A Projective Point of View
  −
3.4.4  A Formal Point of View
  −
3.4.5  Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
  −
3.4.6  Basic Notions of Group Theory
  −
3.4.7  Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
  −
3.4.8  A Perspective on Computation
  −
3.4.9  Higher Order Sign Relations : Introduction
  −
3.4.10  Higher Order Sign Relations : Examples
  −
3.4.11  Higher Order Sign Relations : Application
  −
3.4.12  Issue 1 : The Status of Signs
  −
3.4.13  Issue 2 : The Status of Sets
  −
3.4.14  Issue 3 : The Status of Variables
  −
3.4.15  Propositional Calculus
  −
3.4.16  Recursive Aspects
  −
3.4.17  Patterns of Self-Reference
  −
3.4.18  Practical Intuitions
  −
3.4.19  Examples of Self-Reference
  −
3.4.20  Three Views of Systems
  −
3.4.21  Building Bridges Between Representations
  −
3.4.22  Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.23  Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.24  Literal Intensional Representations
  −
3.4.25  Analytic Intensional Representations
  −
3.4.26  Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
  −
3.4.27  Differential Logic & Group Operations
  −
3.4.28  The Bridge : From Obstruction to Opportunity
  −
3.4.29  Projects of Representation
  −
3.4.30  Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
  −
3.4.31  Generic Orders of Relations
  −
3.4.32  Partiality : Selective Operations
  −
3.4.33  Sign Relational Complexes
  −
3.4.34  Set-Theoretic Constructions
  −
3.4.35  Reducibility of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.36  Irreducibly Triadic Relations
  −
3.4.37  Propositional Types
  −
3.4.38  Considering the Source
  −
3.4.39  Prospective Indices : Pointers to Future Work
  −
3.4.40  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
3.4.41  Elective & Motive Forces
  −
3.4.42  Sign Processes : A Start
  −
3.4.43  Reflective Extensions
  −
3.4.44  Reflections on Closure
  −
3.4.45  Intelligence => Critical Reflection
  −
3.4.46  Looking Ahead
  −
3.4.47  Mutually Intelligible Codes
  −
3.4.48  Discourse Analysis : Ways & Means
  −
3.4.49  Combinations of Sign Relations
  −
3.4.50  Revisiting the Source
  −
3.5  Divertimento : Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
  −
3.5.1  Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
  −
3.5.2  Searching for Parameters
  −
3.5.3  Defect Analysis
  −
3.5.4  The Pragmatic Critique
  −
3.5.5  Pragmatic Operating Notions
  −
3.5.6  Defects of Presentation
  −
3.5.7  Dues to Process
  −
3.5.8  Duties to Purpose
  −
3.6  Computational Design Philosophy
  −
3.6.1  Intentional Objects & Attitudes
  −
3.6.2  Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
  −
3.6.3  Propositional Reasoning About Relations
  −
3.6.4  Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
  −
3.6.5  Discussion of Examples
  −
3.6.6  Information & Inquiry
  −
 
  −
4.  Overview of the Domain : Interpretive Inquiry
  −
4.1  Interpretive Bearings : Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
  −
4.1.1  Catwalks : Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
  −
4.1.1.1  Eponymous Ancestors : The Precursors of Abstraction?
  −
4.1.1.2  Reticles : Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue.
  −
4.1.2  Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
  −
4.2  Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
4.2.1  The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
  −
4.2.1.1  Sign Relations
  −
4.2.1.2  Types of Signs
  −
4.2.2  The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
  −
4.2.2.1  Abduction
  −
4.2.2.2  Deduction
  −
4.2.2.3  Induction
  −
4.3  Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
  −
4.3.1  "Index" :  A Program for Learning Formal Languages
  −
4.3.2  "Study" :  A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
  −
5.  Discussion & Development of Objectives
  −
5.1  Objective 1a : Propositions as Types
  −
5.2  Objective 1b : Proof Styles & Developments
  −
5.3  Objective 1c : Interpretation & Authority
   
</pre>
 
</pre>
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