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| {P.Q}(x, y) = Disj(m C M) ( {P}(x, m) . {Q}(m, y) ). | | {P.Q}(x, y) = Disj(m C M) ( {P}(x, m) . {Q}(m, y) ). |
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| 1.4 Outlook of the Project: All Ways Lead to Inquiry | | 1.4 Outlook of the Project: All Ways Lead to Inquiry |
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− | 1.4 Outlook of the Project: All Ways Lead to Inquiry
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| I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the | | I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the |
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| term "scientific method". Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from | | term "scientific method". Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from |
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| being the shorter term, because of the following advantages: | | being the shorter term, because of the following advantages: |
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| 1. It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation | | 1. It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation |
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| to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge | | to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge |
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| that merely aims at such a method. | | that merely aims at such a method. |
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| 2. It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being, | | 2. It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being, |
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| of how much "method" there is in science. | | of how much "method" there is in science. |
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| This Subdivision and the next deal with opposite aspects of inquiry. | | This Subdivision and the next deal with opposite aspects of inquiry. |
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| In many ways it might have been better to interlace the opposing points | | In many ways it might have been better to interlace the opposing points |
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| of comparison, taking them up in a parallel fashion, but this plan was | | of comparison, taking them up in a parallel fashion, but this plan was |
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| judged to be too distracting for a first approach. In other ways, the | | judged to be too distracting for a first approach. In other ways, the |
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| negative sides of each topic are prior in point of time to the positive | | negative sides of each topic are prior in point of time to the positive |
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| sides of the issue, but sensible people like to see the light at the end | | sides of the issue, but sensible people like to see the light at the end |
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| of the tunnel before they trouble themselves with the obscurities of the | | of the tunnel before they trouble themselves with the obscurities of the |
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| intervening journey. Thus, this subdivison of the text emphasizes the | | intervening journey. Thus, this subdivison of the text emphasizes the |
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| positive features of inquiry and the positive qualities of its objective, | | positive features of inquiry and the positive qualities of its objective, |
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| while the next Subdivision is reserved to examine the negative aspects | | while the next Subdivision is reserved to examine the negative aspects |
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| of each question. | | of each question. |
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| In the order of nature, the absence of a feature naturally precedes the | | In the order of nature, the absence of a feature naturally precedes the |
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| full development of its presence. In the order of discussion, however, | | full development of its presence. In the order of discussion, however, |
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| positive terms must be proposed if it is desired to say anything at all. | | positive terms must be proposed if it is desired to say anything at all. |
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| The discussion in this Subdivision is placed to serve a primer, declaring | | The discussion in this Subdivision is placed to serve a primer, declaring |
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| at least the names of enough positive concepts to propose addressing the | | at least the names of enough positive concepts to propose addressing the |
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| negative conditions of knowledge in which inquiry necessarily starts. | | negative conditions of knowledge in which inquiry necessarily starts. |
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| In this Subdivision I stand back once again from the problem of inquiry | | In this Subdivision I stand back once again from the problem of inquiry |
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| and allow myself take a more distant view of the subject, settling into | | and allow myself take a more distant view of the subject, settling into |
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| what I think is a comfortable and a natural account of inquiry, the best | | what I think is a comfortable and a natural account of inquiry, the best |
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| that I have at my command, and attending to the task of describing its | | that I have at my command, and attending to the task of describing its |
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| positive features in a positive light. I present my personal view of | | positive features in a positive light. I present my personal view of |
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| inquiry as I currently understand it, without stopping to justify every | | inquiry as I currently understand it, without stopping to justify every |
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| concept in detail or to examine every objection that might be made to | | concept in detail or to examine every objection that might be made to |
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| this view. In the next Subdivision I discuss a few of the more obvious | | this view. In the next Subdivision I discuss a few of the more obvious |
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| problems that stand in the way of this view and I try to remove a few | | problems that stand in the way of this view and I try to remove a few |
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| of the more tractable obscurities that appear ready to be cleared up. | | of the more tractable obscurities that appear ready to be cleared up. |
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| The fact that I treat them as my "personal insights" does not mean that | | The fact that I treat them as my "personal insights" does not mean that |
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| all of these ideas about inquiry originate with me, but only that I have | | all of these ideas about inquiry originate with me, but only that I have |
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| come to adopt them for my personal use. There will be many occasions, | | come to adopt them for my personal use. There will be many occasions, |
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| the next time that I go over this ground, to point out the sources of | | the next time that I go over this ground, to point out the sources of |
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| these ideas, so far as I know them. | | these ideas, so far as I know them. |
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| The reader may take my apology for this style of presentation to be | | The reader may take my apology for this style of presentation to be |
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| implicit in its dogmatic character. It is done this way in a first | | implicit in its dogmatic character. It is done this way in a first |
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| approach for the sake of avoiding an immense number of distractions, | | approach for the sake of avoiding an immense number of distractions, |
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| each of which is not being slighted but demands to be addressed in | | each of which is not being slighted but demands to be addressed in |
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| its own good time. I want to convey the general drift of my current | | its own good time. I want to convey the general drift of my current |
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| model, however conjectural, naive, uncritical, and unreflective it | | model, however conjectural, naive, uncritical, and unreflective it |
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| may seem. | | may seem. |
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| Try as I may, I've never seen a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing: | | Try as I may, I've never seen a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing: |
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| To take for granted nothing more than is already given, to set out from nothing | | To take for granted nothing more than is already given, to set out from nothing |
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| but absolutely certain beginnings, to move forward with nothing but absolutely | | but absolutely certain beginnings, to move forward with nothing but absolutely |
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| certain means of proceeding. In particular, the present inquiry into inquiry, | | certain means of proceeding. In particular, the present inquiry into inquiry, |
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| foreshadowed in the form y_0 = y·y, ought not to be misconstrued as a device | | foreshadowed in the form y_0 = y·y, ought not to be misconstrued as a device |
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| for magically generating a theory of inquiry from nothing. Like any other | | for magically generating a theory of inquiry from nothing. Like any other |
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| inquiry, it requires an agent to invest in a conjecture, to make a guess | | inquiry, it requires an agent to invest in a conjecture, to make a guess |
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| about the pertinent features of the subject of interest, and to choose | | about the pertinent features of the subject of interest, and to choose |
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| the actions, the aspects, and the attitudes with regard to the subject | | the actions, the aspects, and the attitudes with regard to the subject |
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| that are critical to achieving the intended objectives of the study. | | that are critical to achieving the intended objectives of the study. |
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| I can sum all this up by saying that an inquiry requires an inquirer to | | I can sum all this up by saying that an inquiry requires an inquirer to |
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| suggest a hypothesis about the subject of interest and then to put that | | suggest a hypothesis about the subject of interest and then to put that |
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| particular model of the subject to the test. This in turn requires one | | particular model of the subject to the test. This in turn requires one |
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| to devote a modicum of personal effort to the task of testing the chosen | | to devote a modicum of personal effort to the task of testing the chosen |
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| hypothesis, to put a quantum of personal interest at stake for the sake | | hypothesis, to put a quantum of personal interest at stake for the sake |
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| of finding out whether the model fits the subject, and, overall, to take | | of finding out whether the model fits the subject, and, overall, to take |
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| the risk of being wrong. Any model that is feasible is also defeasible, | | the risk of being wrong. Any model that is feasible is also defeasible, |
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| at least, where it concerns a contingent subject of contingent inquiry. | | at least, where it concerns a contingent subject of contingent inquiry. |
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| The first step, then, of an inquiry into inquiry, is to put forth a tentative | | The first step, then, of an inquiry into inquiry, is to put forth a tentative |
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| model of inquiry, to make a hypothesis about the features of inquiry that are | | model of inquiry, to make a hypothesis about the features of inquiry that are |
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| essential to explaining its experienced characteristics, and thus, in a sense, | | essential to explaining its experienced characteristics, and thus, in a sense, |
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| to make a guess at the very definition of inquiry. This requirement seems both | | to make a guess at the very definition of inquiry. This requirement seems both |
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| obvious and outrageous at the same time. One is perfectly justified in objecting | | obvious and outrageous at the same time. One is perfectly justified in objecting |
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| that there is much that precedes this so-called "first step", namely, the body of | | that there is much that precedes this so-called "first step", namely, the body of |
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| experience that prepares one to see it and the mass of observation that prompts one | | experience that prepares one to see it and the mass of observation that prompts one |
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| to take it. I can deal with this objection by making a distinction between mundane | | to take it. I can deal with this objection by making a distinction between mundane |
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| experience and olympian theory, and then by saying that the making of a conjecture | | experience and olympian theory, and then by saying that the making of a conjecture |
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| is really the first "theoretical" step, but this is a hedge that covers the tracks | | is really the first "theoretical" step, but this is a hedge that covers the tracks |
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| of theory in a very deceptive way, hiding how early in the empirical process the | | of theory in a very deceptive way, hiding how early in the empirical process the |
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| "cloven hoof" of theory actually enters. | | "cloven hoof" of theory actually enters. |
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| Leaving behind the mythical states of "pure" experience and "naive" observation, | | Leaving behind the mythical states of "pure" experience and "naive" observation, |
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| and at least by the time that one has come to give a name to the subject of the | | and at least by the time that one has come to give a name to the subject of the |
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| investigation, one's trek through the data is already half-shod, half-fettered | | investigation, one's trek through the data is already half-shod, half-fettered |
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| by the connotations of the name, and in their turn by all of the concepts that | | by the connotations of the name, and in their turn by all of the concepts that |
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| it invokes in its train. That name, the concepts that it suggests, and the | | it invokes in its train. That name, the concepts that it suggests, and the |
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| tacit but vague definition of the subject that this complex of associations | | tacit but vague definition of the subject that this complex of associations |
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| is already beginning to constellate, to attract certain experiences to the | | is already beginning to constellate, to attract certain experiences to the |
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| complex, and to filter out other observations from having any bearing on | | complex, and to filter out other observations from having any bearing on |
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| the subject matter. By this time, one is already busy translating one's | | the subject matter. By this time, one is already busy translating one's |
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| empirical acquaintance with the subject into an arrangement of concepts | | empirical acquaintance with the subject into an arrangement of concepts |
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| that is intended to define its essential nature. | | that is intended to define its essential nature. |
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| An array of concepts that is set up in order to capture the essence | | An array of concepts that is set up in order to capture the essence |
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| of a subject is a provisional definition of it, an implicit model | | of a subject is a provisional definition of it, an implicit model |
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| of the subject that contains the makings of an explicit theory. | | of the subject that contains the makings of an explicit theory. |
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| It amounts to a selection from the phenomenal aspects of the | | It amounts to a selection from the phenomenal aspects of the |
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| subject, expresses a guess about its relevant features, and | | subject, expresses a guess about its relevant features, and |
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| constitutes a hypothesis in explanation of its experienced | | constitutes a hypothesis in explanation of its experienced |
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| characteristics. This incipient order of model or theory | | characteristics. This incipient order of model or theory |
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| is tantamount to a definition because it sets bounds on | | is tantamount to a definition because it sets bounds on |
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| the "stretches" and the "holds" of a term -- that is, | | the "stretches" and the "holds" of a term -- that is, |
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| the extension, intension, and intention of the term -- | | the extension, intension, and intention of the term -- |
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| but this is not the kind of definition that has to | | but this is not the kind of definition that has to |
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| be taken on faith, that constitutes the first and | | be taken on faith, that constitutes the first and |
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| the last word on the subject. In other words, | | the last word on the subject. In other words, |
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| it is an empirical definition, one that is | | it is an empirical definition, one that is |
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| subject to being falsified in reference | | subject to being falsified in reference |
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| to its intended subject, by failing to | | to its intended subject, by failing to |
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| indicate the necessary, the pertinent, | | indicate the necessary, the pertinent, |
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| or the relevant features that account | | or the relevant features that account |
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| for the presence of its phenomena or | | for the presence of its phenomena or |
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| the persistence of its process. | | the persistence of its process. |
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| If I reflect on the conduct of inquiry, | | If I reflect on the conduct of inquiry, |
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| seeking to fix it in a fitting image | | seeking to fix it in a fitting image |
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| and trying to cast it in a positive | | and trying to cast it in a positive |
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| light, the best I can do is this: | | light, the best I can do is this: |
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| Inquiry is a process that aims at achieving belief or knowledge. | | Inquiry is a process that aims at achieving belief or knowledge. |
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| But even this simple a description already plunges the discussion deep into | | But even this simple a description already plunges the discussion deep into |
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| a number of obscurities. Most prominently, there is the disjunction between | | a number of obscurities. Most prominently, there is the disjunction between |
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| belief and knowledge that cries out to be explained or resolved. Stirring a | | belief and knowledge that cries out to be explained or resolved. Stirring a |
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| little beneath the surface, and not quite fading into the background, many of | | little beneath the surface, and not quite fading into the background, many of |
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| the other terms that are invoked in the description are capable of hiding the | | the other terms that are invoked in the description are capable of hiding the |
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| entire contents of the original ignorance that the image as a whole is aimed | | entire contents of the original ignorance that the image as a whole is aimed |
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| to dispell. And yet there is nothing that I can do in this avowedly positive | | to dispell. And yet there is nothing that I can do in this avowedly positive |
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| context but to mark these points down as topics for future discussion. | | context but to mark these points down as topics for future discussion. |
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− | | + | There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit, |
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− | There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit, | |
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| at least partially, in the text of the above description. | | at least partially, in the text of the above description. |
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| Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions. | | Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions. |
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− | o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 20:56, 26 May 2007 (PDT)o
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| I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the term "scientific method". Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from being the shorter term, because of the following advantages: (1) It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge that merely aims at such a method. (2) It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being, of how much "method" there is in science. | | I am using the word "inquiry" in a way that is roughly synonymous with the term "scientific method". Use of "inquiry" is more convenient, aside from being the shorter term, because of the following advantages: (1) It allows one to broaden the scope of investigation to include any form of proceeding toward knowledge that merely aims at such a method. (2) It allows one to finesse the issue, for the time being, of how much "method" there is in science. |
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| Example 6. | | Example 6. |
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| Example 7. | | Example 7. |
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| In order to improve the character of the discussion on this score ... | | In order to improve the character of the discussion on this score ... |
| + | |
| + | ==References== |
| | | |
| <pre> | | <pre> |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | Aristotle, "On The Soul", in 'Aristotle, Volume 8', |
| + | W.S. Hett (trans.), Heinemann, London, UK, 1936, 1986. |
| | | |
− | IDS. Additional Notes
| + | Charniak, E. & McDermott, D.V., |
| + | 'Introduction to Artificial Intelligence', |
| + | Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1985. |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | 2. Charniak, E., Riesbeck, C.K., & McDermott, D.V. Artificial Intelligence Programming. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1980. |
| | | |
− | CFR. Note 78
| + | 3. Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E., & Thagard, P.R. Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986. |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | 4. O'Rorke, P. Review of AAAI 1990 Spring Symposium on Automated Abduction. SIGART Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 3. ACM Press, October 1990, p. 12-17. |
| | | |
− | MW = Matthew West:
| + | 5. Pearl, J. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference. Revised 2nd printing. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991. |
| | | |
− | MW: Do you have a Cactus Manual all in one place please?
| + | 6. Peng, Y. & Reggia, J.A. Abductive Inference Models for Diagnostic Problem-Solving. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1990. |
| | | |
− | the documentation for my 'theme one' program
| + | 7. Sowa, J.F. Conceptual Structures: Information Processing in Mind and Machine. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1984. |
− | that I wrote up for my quant psy master's
| |
− | contains the last thing like an official
| |
− | manual that I wrote, also an expository
| |
− | introduction to the cactus language and
| |
− | its application to prop calc examples.
| |
− | may still have an ancient ascii version,
| |
− | or else the medieval 'word' doc, or i can
| |
− | send the mac belle version by snail express
| |
− | if you can vouchsafe me your postal address.
| |
| | | |
− | in the mean time, i append a few of the expositions that | + | 8. Sowa, J.F. (ed.) Principles of Semantic Networks: Explorations in the Representation of Knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991. |
− | i have outlined here/elsewhere over the last year on-line.
| |
| | | |
− | pre-scanning this whole mess'o'messages for you,
| + | Dewey, J. (1991). How We Think. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Originally published 1910. |
− | I find one that looks to me shortest & sweetest:
| |
| | | |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg05694.html
| + | Shakespeare, Wm. (1988). William Shakespeare: The Complete Works. Compact Edition. S. Wells & G. Taylor (eds.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. |
| + | </pre> |
| | | |
− | since this particular synopsis is mercifully short, i will copy it out here
| + | ==Notes== |
− | and use it to explain surcatenation, along with a few other thing that i am
| |
− | guessing might be puzzling at first sight about what in hey's going on here.
| |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~ARCHIVE~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | + | <pre> |
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | Reflective Extension of Logical Graphs (Ref Log)
| + | IDS. Email Format |
| + | |
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | Here is a formal introduction to the RefLog Syntax.
| + | | Document History |
| + | | |
| + | | Subject: Inquiry Driven Systems: An Inquiry Into Inquiry |
| + | | Contact: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu> |
| + | | Version: Draft 10.00 |
| + | | Created: 23 Jun 1996 |
| + | | Revised: 02 Mar 2003 |
| + | | Advisor: M.A. Zohdy |
| + | | Setting: Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA |
| | | |
− | Formally speaking, we have the following set-up:
| + | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm |
| | | |
− | Set out the "alphabet of punctuation marks" $M$ = {" ", ",", "(", ")"}.
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
− | The elements of $M$ are vocalized as "blank, "comma", "links", "right".
| |
| | | |
− | 1. There is a parametric family of formal languages of character strings
| + | IDS. Additional Notes |
− | such that, for each set $X$ of variable names $X$ = {"x_1", ..., "x_k"},
| |
− | there is a formal language L($X$) over the alphabet A($X$) = $M$ |_| $X$.
| |
− | The grammar can be given in gory detail, but most folks know it already.
| |
| | | |
− | | Examples. If $X$ = {"x", "y"}, then these are typical strings in L($X$):
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
− | |
| |
− | | " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ...
| |
| | | |
− | 2. There is a parallel family of formal languages of graphical structures,
| + | CFR. Note 78 |
− | generically known as "painted and rooted cacti" (PARC's), that exist in
| |
− | a one-to-one correspondence with these string expressions, being more or
| |
− | less roughly, at a suitable level of abstraction, their parse graphs as
| |
− | data structures in the computer. The PARC's for the above formulas are:
| |
| | | |
− | | Examples.
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
− | | x y x y
| |
− | | o o o---o
| |
− | | x y x y x y \ / \ /
| |
− | | o o o o o---o o o
| |
− | | | x y | | x y | \ / | |
| |
− | | @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ...
| |
− | |
| |
− | | " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ...
| |
| | | |
− | Together, these two families of formal languages constitute a system
| + | MW = Matthew West: |
− | that is called the "reflective extension of logical graphs" (Ref Log).
| |
| | | |
− | Strictly speaking, Ref Log is an abstract or "uninterpreted" formal system,
| + | MW: Do you have a Cactus Manual all in one place please? |
− | but its expressions enjoy, as a rule, two dual interpretations that assign
| |
− | them the meanings of propositions or sentences in "zeroth order logic" (ZOL),
| |
− | to wit, what Peirce called the "alpha level" of his systems of logical graphs.
| |
| | | |
− | For example, the string expression "(x (y))" parses into the following graph:
| + | the documentation for my 'theme one' program |
− | | + | that I wrote up for my quant psy master's |
− | | x y
| + | contains the last thing like an official |
− | | o---o
| + | manual that I wrote, also an expository |
− | | |
| + | introduction to the cactus language and |
− | | @
| + | its application to prop calc examples. |
| + | may still have an ancient ascii version, |
| + | or else the medieval 'word' doc, or i can |
| + | send the mac belle version by snail express |
| + | if you can vouchsafe me your postal address. |
| + | |
| + | in the mean time, i append a few of the expositions that |
| + | i have outlined here/elsewhere over the last year on-line. |
| | | |
− | You can "deparse" the string off the graph by traversing
| + | pre-scanning this whole mess'o'messages for you, |
− | it like so, reading off the marks and varnames as you go.
| + | I find one that looks to me shortest & sweetest: |
| | | |
− | | o---x->(--y---o
| + | http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg05694.html |
− | | ^ |
| |
− | | | x ( y |
| |
− | | | o-----o v
| |
− | | | | ) )
| |
− | | ( (|) )
| |
− | | ^ | |
| |
− | | | @ v
| |
| | | |
− | In the "existential" interpretation of RefLog,
| + | since this particular synopsis is mercifully short, i will copy it out here |
− | in which I do my own thinking most of the time,
| + | and use it to explain surcatenation, along with a few other thing that i am |
− | concatenation of expressions has the meaning of
| + | guessing might be puzzling at first sight about what in hey's going on here. |
− | logical conjunction, while "(x)" has the meaning
| + | |
− | of "not x", and so the above string and graph have
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~ARCHIVE~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
− | a meaning of "x => y", "x implies y", "if x then y", | |
− | "not x without y", or anything else that's equivalent.
| |
− | The blank expression is assigned the value of "true".
| |
− | Hence, the expression "()" takes the value of "false".
| |
− | The bracket expression "(x_1, x_2, ..., x_k)" is given
| |
− | the meaning "Exactly one of the x_j is false, j=1..k".
| |
− | Therefore, "((x_1),(x_2), ...,(x_k))" partitions the
| |
− | universe of discourse, saying "Just one x_j is true".
| |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | Reflective Extension of Logical Graphs (Ref Log) |
| | | |
− | CFR. Note 83
| + | Here is a formal introduction to the RefLog Syntax. |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | Formally speaking, we have the following set-up: |
| | | |
− | | Tantum ergo sacramentum
| + | Set out the "alphabet of punctuation marks" $M$ = {" ", ",", "(", ")"}. |
− | | veneremur cernui,
| + | The elements of $M$ are vocalized as "blank, "comma", "links", "right". |
− | | et antiquum documentum | + | |
− | | novo cedat ritui,
| + | 1. There is a parametric family of formal languages of character strings |
− | | praestet fides supplementum
| + | such that, for each set $X$ of variable names $X$ = {"x_1", ..., "x_k"}, |
− | | sensuum defectui. | + | there is a formal language L($X$) over the alphabet A($X$) = $M$ |_| $X$. |
| + | The grammar can be given in gory detail, but most folks know it already. |
| + | |
| + | | Examples. If $X$ = {"x", "y"}, then these are typical strings in L($X$): |
| | | | | |
− | | So great therefore a sacrifice | + | | " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ... |
− | | let us humbly adore
| |
− | | and let the old law yield
| |
− | | to the new rite;
| |
− | | let faith supplement
| |
− | | the shortcoming of the senses.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | Lyric by Thomas Aquinas,
| |
− | | Music by Amadeus Mozart, KV 142 & 197.
| |
| | | |
− | The increasing ossification of asciification
| + | 2. There is a parallel family of formal languages of graphical structures, |
− | is heaping up way too many old bones to bear. | + | generically known as "painted and rooted cacti" (PARC's), that exist in |
− | So I am going to shift my anklage a bit, and
| + | a one-to-one correspondence with these string expressions, being more or |
− | try out a new set of conventions for a while,
| + | less roughly, at a suitable level of abstraction, their parse graphs as |
− | to see if I can lighten the overloading obit.
| + | data structures in the computer. The PARC's for the above formulas are: |
− | | |
− | Let us try to reserve script and singly-underscored fake-fonts or formats
| |
− | for the names of sets, as in the notations !O!, !S!, !I! that I will now
| |
− | set aside and use from now on for the Object, Sign, Interpretant domains,
| |
− | respectively, of an arbitrary sign relation !L! c !O! x !S! x !I!.
| |
| | | |
− | Among other benefits, this will serve to liberate the plain faced characters
| + | | Examples. |
− | for employment as the non-terminal symbols of our formal grammars, rendering
| + | | x y x y |
− | our formal grammatical productions far less $Capitalistic$, !Exclamatory!,
| + | | o o o---o |
− | and overbearingly prescriptive than they be otherwise hell-bent to become.
| + | | x y x y x y \ / \ / |
| + | | o o o o o---o o o |
| + | | | x y | | x y | \ / | | |
| + | | @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ... |
| + | | |
| + | | " ", "( )", "x", "y", "(x)", "(y)", "x y", "(x y)", "(x, y)", "((x)(y))", "((x, y))", ... |
| | | |
− | So let me try out this new rite to see how it works out,
| + | Together, these two families of formal languages constitute a system |
− | And I will not pause to rewrite the old law in its font,
| + | that is called the "reflective extension of logical graphs" (Ref Log). |
− | But advise you solely of its transformed instantiations,
| |
− | And fix my faith on imagination to sense the supplement.
| |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | Strictly speaking, Ref Log is an abstract or "uninterpreted" formal system, |
| + | but its expressions enjoy, as a rule, two dual interpretations that assign |
| + | them the meanings of propositions or sentences in "zeroth order logic" (ZOL), |
| + | to wit, what Peirce called the "alpha level" of his systems of logical graphs. |
| | | |
− | CFR. Note 92
| + | For example, the string expression "(x (y))" parses into the following graph: |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | + | | x y |
| + | | o---o |
| + | | | |
| + | | @ |
| | | |
− | I need to try and say some things at his point about
| + | You can "deparse" the string off the graph by traversing |
− | why formal language theory is interesting and useful,
| + | it like so, reading off the marks and varnames as you go. |
− | but all I have at the moment are random remembrances
| |
− | and reflections that enter my mind from time to time. | |
| | | |
− | In many ways, the study of formal languages and grammars
| + | | o---x->(--y---o |
− | is a paradigm, more, a paragon, of the situation that we
| + | | ^ | |
− | face whenever we inquire into a complex reality, that is,
| + | | | x ( y | |
− | all of the ever-renewed sources of puzzling phenomena or
| + | | | o-----o v |
− | pressing problems that we call a world.
| + | | | | ) ) |
− | | + | | ( (|) ) |
− | The archtypical place of formal language theory is well
| + | | ^ | | |
− | understood in many quarters, and has been from the very
| + | | | @ v |
− | outset of its constellation as an independent viewpoint.
| |
| | | |
− | In this paradigmatic (analogical or exemplary) way of | + | In the "existential" interpretation of RefLog, |
− | understanding it, a formal language is the "data" and
| + | in which I do my own thinking most of the time, |
− | a formal grammar is the "theory", and the question is, | + | concatenation of expressions has the meaning of |
− | as always, whether a theory accounts for and explains
| + | logical conjunction, while "(x)" has the meaning |
− | the data, a "fitting" relationship that may be viewed | + | of "not x", and so the above string and graph have |
− | in many ways, for one, the way that a theory might be
| + | a meaning of "x => y", "x implies y", "if x then y", |
− | said to "generate" the data, or perhaps better stated,
| + | "not x without y", or anything else that's equivalent. |
− | not just to "cook" in a precociously specious fashion
| + | The blank expression is assigned the value of "true". |
− | but more like to "regenerate" the form after the fact.
| + | Hence, the expression "()" takes the value of "false". |
| + | The bracket expression "(x_1, x_2, ..., x_k)" is given |
| + | the meaning "Exactly one of the x_j is false, j=1..k". |
| + | Therefore, "((x_1),(x_2), ...,(x_k))" partitions the |
| + | universe of discourse, saying "Just one x_j is true". |
| | | |
− | That's all that I can manage to express at the moment,
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
− | but maybe it will supply a grub-stake of motivational
| |
− | victuals for the grueling labors of exploration ahead.
| |
| | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| + | CFR. Note 83 |
− | | |
− | IDS. Outline
| |
| | | |
| o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | Inquiry Driven Systems
| + | | Tantum ergo sacramentum |
| + | | veneremur cernui, |
| + | | et antiquum documentum |
| + | | novo cedat ritui, |
| + | | praestet fides supplementum |
| + | | sensuum defectui. |
| + | | |
| + | | So great therefore a sacrifice |
| + | | let us humbly adore |
| + | | and let the old law yield |
| + | | to the new rite; |
| + | | let faith supplement |
| + | | the shortcoming of the senses. |
| + | | |
| + | | Lyric by Thomas Aquinas, |
| + | | Music by Amadeus Mozart, KV 142 & 197. |
| | | |
− | 1. Research Proposal
| + | The increasing ossification of asciification |
| + | is heaping up way too many old bones to bear. |
| + | So I am going to shift my anklage a bit, and |
| + | try out a new set of conventions for a while, |
| + | to see if I can lighten the overloading obit. |
| | | |
− | 1.1. Outline of the Project: Inquiry Into Inquiry
| + | Let us try to reserve script and singly-underscored fake-fonts or formats |
| + | for the names of sets, as in the notations !O!, !S!, !I! that I will now |
| + | set aside and use from now on for the Object, Sign, Interpretant domains, |
| + | respectively, of an arbitrary sign relation !L! c !O! x !S! x !I!. |
| | | |
− | 1.1.1. Problem
| + | Among other benefits, this will serve to liberate the plain faced characters |
| + | for employment as the non-terminal symbols of our formal grammars, rendering |
| + | our formal grammatical productions far less $Capitalistic$, !Exclamatory!, |
| + | and overbearingly prescriptive than they be otherwise hell-bent to become. |
| | | |
− | 1.1.2. Method
| + | So let me try out this new rite to see how it works out, |
| + | And I will not pause to rewrite the old law in its font, |
| + | But advise you solely of its transformed instantiations, |
| + | And fix my faith on imagination to sense the supplement. |
| | | |
− | 1.1.2.1. The Paradigmatic & Process-Analytic Phase
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.1.2.2. The Paraphrastic & Faculty-Synthetic Phase
| + | CFR. Note 92 |
| | | |
− | 1.1.2.3. Reprise of Methods
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.1.3. Criterion
| + | I need to try and say some things at his point about |
| + | why formal language theory is interesting and useful, |
| + | but all I have at the moment are random remembrances |
| + | and reflections that enter my mind from time to time. |
| | | |
− | 1.1.4. Application
| + | In many ways, the study of formal languages and grammars |
| + | is a paradigm, more, a paragon, of the situation that we |
| + | face whenever we inquire into a complex reality, that is, |
| + | all of the ever-renewed sources of puzzling phenomena or |
| + | pressing problems that we call a world. |
| | | |
− | 1.2. Onus of the Project: No Way But Inquiry
| + | The archtypical place of formal language theory is well |
| + | understood in many quarters, and has been from the very |
| + | outset of its constellation as an independent viewpoint. |
| | | |
− | 1.2.1. A Modulating Prelude
| + | In this paradigmatic (analogical or exemplary) way of |
− | | + | understanding it, a formal language is the "data" and |
− | 1.2.2. A Fugitive Canon
| + | a formal grammar is the "theory", and the question is, |
| + | as always, whether a theory accounts for and explains |
| + | the data, a "fitting" relationship that may be viewed |
| + | in many ways, for one, the way that a theory might be |
| + | said to "generate" the data, or perhaps better stated, |
| + | not just to "cook" in a precociously specious fashion |
| + | but more like to "regenerate" the form after the fact. |
| | | |
| + | That's all that I can manage to express at the moment, |
| + | but maybe it will supply a grub-stake of motivational |
| + | victuals for the grueling labors of exploration ahead. |
| | | |
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3. Option of the Project: A Way Up To Inquiry
| + | IDS. Incitatory Note 1 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.1. Initial Analysis of Inquiry Allegro Aperto
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.2. Discussion of Discussion
| + | | Each ground-principle must be proved entirely |
− | | + | | by that same kind of inference which it supports. |
− | 1.3.3. Discussion of Formalization: General Topics
| + | | |
− | | + | | But we cannot arrive at any conclusion |
− | 1.3.3.1. A Formal Charge
| + | | by mere deduction except about symbols. |
− | | + | | |
− | 1.3.3.2. A Formalization of Formalization?
| + | | We cannot arrive at any conclusion |
− | | + | | by mere induction except about things. |
− | 1.3.3.3. A Formalization of Discussion?
| + | | |
− | | + | | And we cannot arrive at any conclusion |
− | 1.3.3.4. A Concept of Formalization
| + | | by mere hypothesis except about forms. |
− | | + | | |
− | 1.3.3.5. A Formal Approach
| + | | C.S. Peirce, CE 1, page 290. |
− | | + | | |
− | 1.3.3.6. A Formal Development
| + | | Charles Sanders Peirce, "On the Logic of Science", |
| + | | Harvard University Lectures (1865), pages 161-302 in: |
| + | |'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition', |
| + | |'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project, |
| + | | Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.3.7. A Formal Perasion
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4. Discussion of Formalization: Concrete Examples
| + | IDS. Meditative Note 1 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.1. Formal Models: A Sketch
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.2. Sign Relations: A Primer
| + | I would like to start from a "common sense practical" (CSP) point of view, |
| + | and, indeed, never to lose sight of what appears evident from that station, |
| + | no matter how many levels of abstract remove and abstruse mention it might |
| + | become necessary to interpose along the way. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.3. Semiotic Equivalence Relations
| + | So let's examine this initial caltrop |
| + | "descriptive/normative/prescriptive" |
| + | from the CSP POV, if you will. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.4. Graphical Representations
| + | Reading "Descriptive" to mean "What it is", |
| + | while "Normative" means "What it oughta be", |
| + | and "Prescriptive" says "Make it so, or else", |
| + | I will have very little to say about the last, |
| + | and only be able to focus on the distinctions |
| + | that may exist among the first two dimensions. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.5. Taking Stock
| + | From the beginning, from this point of view, difficult words, |
| + | like "inquiry", "logic", "truth", and so on, must be taken |
| + | as initially indexical, inchoately succeeding at little |
| + | more than pointing to a realm of experience that may |
| + | or may not be common to the e-mitter and re-mitter. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.6. The "Meta" Question
| + | I suspect that this stanza is likely to be controversial, |
| + | so I'll pause at this point for the countrapunctal verse. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.7. Iconic Signs
| + | Or for a rest ... |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.8. The Conflict of Interpretations
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.9. Indexical Signs
| + | IDS. Meditative Note 2 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.10. Sundry Problems
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.11. Review & Prospect
| + | So I may begin with an object and a sign in a tenuous relation, |
| + | with the subject matter indexed under the topic name "inquiry", |
| + | where the sign originates from a "just noticeable differential" |
| + | of information about the object, and not a single "figit" more. |
| + | Few would call this a foundation -- I only call it a beginning. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.12. Objective Plans & Levels
| + | Yet another of many ... |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.13. Formalization of OF: Objective Levels
| + | But it does provide us with a clue to a signficant difference, |
| + | however much this difference is bound by this origin to raise |
| + | itself from egg, germ, seed, spore, or whatever it is that is |
| + | infinitesimal in its initial condition. In this disjointness |
| + | of an archetype where what begins, what leads, and what rules |
| + | are not so trivially identical to one another, one encounters |
| + | the brand of beginning that begins in the middle of the story, |
| + | and has no need of any other foundation but the medium itself. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.14. Application of OF: Generic Level
| + | ["sign-ficant" [stet]] |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.15. Application of OF: Motive Level
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.16. The Integration of Frameworks
| + | IDS. Obligatory Note 1 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.17. Recapitulation: A Brush with Symbols
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.18. C'est Moi
| + | While I remain compelled to remain silent on the status of the absolute fiat, |
| + | the irrelative notion of the unmotivated motion and the disinterested stance, |
| + | let me then turn to the other axes of description, descriptive vs. normative. |
| + | Axes of description, indeed, you can almost hear one branch of the recursion |
| + | already beginning to wind up its whine to the verge of a howl, but toss it a |
| + | sop and try to persevere in the quest. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.4.19. Entr'acte
| + | In this view, I regard the very idea of a norm as invoking its due pragma -- |
| + | aim, business, concern, desire, end, function, goal, intention, interest, |
| + | objective, purpose, its names are legion -- and the good sense of the |
| + | norm is simply to suggest what one ought to do, contingent, of course, |
| + | on one's motive to achieve that pragma. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5. Discussion of Formalization: Specific Objects
| + | If we keep in mind the kinds of "applied research task" (ART) that your |
| + | everyday artist, designer, engineer, mathematician, scientist, or other |
| + | type of technical worker has to carry out on an everyday basis, we note |
| + | how these axes of description can be used to frame their activities and |
| + | to depict their forms of conduct, without mistaking either the frame or |
| + | the picture for the object of the picture so framed. Nor does any body |
| + | imagine that the observer must flatten out into a single plane or align |
| + | with a single axis, in order to make a vantage of the frame so pictured. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.1. The Will to Form
| + | Common sense practical wit tells us that effective action toward the |
| + | achievement of a desirable result will naturally depend on acquiring |
| + | good descriptions of the lay of the land in which we hope to advance. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.2. The Forms of Reasoning
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.3. A Fork in the Road
| + | IDS. Projective Note 1 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.4. A Forged Bond
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.5. A Formal Account
| + | Good morning. Thanks. I had a bad night. |
| + | I blame Bernard Morand, who wrote me this: |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.6. Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
| + | BM: But this looks as some God's view. |
| + | What about us, finite humans, occupied |
| + | in counting the instants of our lives? |
| + | And thus condemned to try to improve |
| + | the fate of our successors? |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.7. Steps & Tests of Formalization
| + | When you think of this in the future, and of course you may never, |
| + | you may blame him too, for in writing this he has "erged" me on |
| + | to return to my deserted dissertation work, into which I have |
| + | poured my life for lo! these too many years to count, truly, |
| + | if you stop to contemplate the fact that time is relative. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.8. Puck, the Ref | + | In that time I have come to the view that we really need |
| + | a good "theory of inquiry" (TOI), for all sorts of very |
| + | practical and crucial reasons, also, that we cannot get |
| + | a good TOI without its being, at one and the same time, |
| + | a good "theory of information" (TOI too), and also that |
| + | an integral constituent of TOI 1 and TOI 2 would have to |
| + | be a good "theory of representation and semiosis" (TORAS) -- |
| + | "Bull!?", you say, well, so be it. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.9. Partial Formalizations
| + | Further, I think that it is abundantly evident by now that |
| + | we will get no such good theories of signs or science from |
| + | the "establishment philosophy of science" (EPOS?) -- which |
| + | has managed to mince and to trash the best available tries |
| + | at such theories for over a hundred years now. But Hey! -- |
| + | don't take my word for it -- waste a century of your own. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.10. A Formal Utility
| + | We just got our regular email back, |
| + | so I think that I can now get going -- |
| + | Yes, I have lost the ability to think |
| + | if not literally writing 'to' somebody. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.11. A Formal Aesthetic
| + | When it begins, it begins like this: |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.12. A Formal Apology
| + | Why am I asking this question? |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.13. A Formal Suspicion
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.14. The Double Aspect of Concepts
| + | IDS. Projective Note 2 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.15. A Formal Permission
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.5.16. A Formal Invention
| + | So we may rest assured that we do have a "subject matter", an empirical domain, |
| + | or a realm of experience that is indexed, however dimly, generally, or vaguely, |
| + | by the word "inquiry", and only the question how best to describe it remains |
| + | in doubt at this stage of the play. If we wanted to cast our net as widely |
| + | as possible, at the risk of anticipating a bounding hypothesis, we could |
| + | think of all the world's creatures bright and beautiful and of how they |
| + | conduct themselves when faced with some moment of uncertainty, where |
| + | their aim is to cope with a surprising phenomenon or to deal with |
| + | a problematic situation that meets them in the course of their |
| + | ever-ongoing struggles to live, to revive, and to thrive. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.6. Recursion in Perpetuity
| + | Now, neither the fact that we begin with a descriptive task, |
| + | nor the fact that it remains of interest for its own sake, |
| + | necessarily means that we must end there, for it is also |
| + | the means to a further end, of learning how to better |
| + | our own skill at inquiry, which means in our time |
| + | the building of tools that help with the task. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.7. Processus, Regressus, Progressus
| + | I hope I have made this sound as truly and |
| + | as trivially obvious as it ought to be. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.8. Rondeau Tempo di Menuetto
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.9. Reconnaissance
| + | IDS. Reflective Note 1 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.9.1. The Informal Context
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.9.2. The Epitext
| + | In reflecting on what in the world a "Theory of Inquiry" (TOI) might be, |
− | | + | it occurs to me that there are many different things that one might mean |
− | 1.3.9.3. The Formative Tension
| + | by such a theory. It could just be any number of things that one asserts |
| + | or has a mind to assert about the ostensible subject matter. But it has |
| + | been my experience that one can assert pretty much whatever one chooses, |
| + | and others will choose to heed it or ignore it on many different grounds, |
| + | the grounds themselves being a matter of choice, conditioning, or custom. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10. Recurring Themes
| + | But I am looking for theories that work, that is to say, theories that |
| + | are subject to probation through proof, probability, and programming. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.1. Preliminary Notions
| + | Astute readers will have noticed that I've already attempted to finesse |
| + | a very important, and most likely "infinessible" issue, to wit, that of |
| + | the scruples dividing descriptive, normative, and prescriptive theories. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.2. Intermediary Notions
| + | I will think about that, and get back to you. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.3. Propositions & Sentences
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.4. Empirical Types & Rational Types
| + | IDS. Reflective Note 2 |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.5. Articulate Sentences
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.6. Stretching Principles
| + | | How will I approach this problem about the nature of inquiry? |
| + | | |
| + | | The simplest answer is this: |
| + | | |
| + | | I will apply the method of inquiry to the problem of inquiry's nature. |
| + | | |
| + | | This is the most concise and comprehensive answer that I know, but |
| + | | it is likely to sound facetious at this point. On the other hand, |
| + | | if I did not actually use the method of inquiry that I describe |
| + | | as inquiry, how could the results possibly be taken seriously? |
| + | | Accordingly, the questions of methodological self-application |
| + | | and self-referential consistency will be found at the center |
| + | | of this research. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.7. Stretching Operations
| + | These lines image in compact form the crux of the problem, |
| + | the crucible of the method, and the character that marks |
| + | relation between the two, if indeed they really are two, |
| + | in a form whose extended development will wind its way |
| + | through many a later page of the present exposition. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.8. The Cactus Patch
| + | But let me just point out at this point some of |
| + | the reasons why I have found the prerequisite |
| + | of an inquiry into inquiry to be inescapable. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.9. The Cactus Language: Syntax
| + | Let us entertain the idea, for the sake of getting the inquiry started, |
| + | if nothing else, that it is admissible to use a word like "inquiry" as |
| + | an initially indefinite indicator of an ostensible object of inquiry. |
| + | If we ever again find ourselves being puzzled how our reasoning can |
| + | chastize its own entailments this way, we may remind ourselves of |
| + | that fine old line between our "logica docens' (logic as taught) |
| + | and our "logica utens" (logic as used). With this distinction |
| + | in mind, we can dispell the initial puzzlement by saying that |
| + | we are using a capacity for inquiry that we do not know how |
| + | to formalize yet in order to examine the forms of inquiry |
| + | that various thinkers have been able, at least partially, |
| + | to formalize. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.10. The Cactus Language: Stylistics
| + | The dilemma that we face has the following structure: |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.11. The Cactus Language: Mechanics
| + | If we recommend to all a method of inquiry that |
| + | we ourselves do not use in a pinch, precisely |
| + | in a pinch where we need to study an issue |
| + | as important as the nature of inquiry, |
| + | then who would take our advice? |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.12. The Cactus Language: Semantics
| + | So it seems that there is no choice |
− | | + | but to study inquiry, the pragma, |
− | 1.3.10.13. Stretching Exercises
| + | by way of inquiry, the praxis, |
| + | that is to say, recursively. |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.14. Syntactic Transformations
| + | Incidentally, many variations on this theme are |
| + | thoroughly developed in Peirce's "Lectures" of |
| + | 1865 and 1866 and recapitulated in his early |
| + | study "On a New List of Categories" (1867). |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.15. Derived Equivalence Relations
| + | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-main.htm |
| | | |
− | 1.3.10.16. Digression on Derived Relations
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
| + | IDS. Work Area |
| | | |
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
| | | |
− | 1.4. Outlook of the Project: All Ways Lead to Inquiry
| + | From this point of view, inquiry is form of conduct, |
| + | an applied research task, like many others that we |
| + | have to carry out, and that can be done either |
| + | better or worse. |
| | | |
− | 1.4.1. The Matrix of Inquiry
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o |
− | | |
− | 1.4.1.1. Inquiry as Conduct
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.1.2. Types of Conduct
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.1.3. Perils of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.1.4. Forms of Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.1.5. Models of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.2. The Moment of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.3. The Modes of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.3.1. Deductive Reasoning
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.3.2. Inductive Reasoning
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.3.3. Abductive Reasoning
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4.3.4. Analogical Reasoning
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 1.5.Obstacles to the Project: In the Way of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.1. The Initial Unpleasantness
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.2. The Justification Trap
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.3. A Formal Apology
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.3.1. Category Double-Takes
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.3.2. Conceptual Extensions
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.3.3. Explosional Recombinations
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.3.4. Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.4. A Material Exigency
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.5. A Reconciliation of Accounts
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.6. Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.7. Empirical Considerations
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.8. Computational Considerations
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.8.1. A Form of Recursion
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5.8.2. A Power of Abstraction
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 1.6. Orientation of the Project: A Way Into Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.1. Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.2. Terms of Analysis
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.2.1. Digression on Signs
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.2.2. Empirical Status of ID
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.3. Expansion of Terms
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.3.1. Agency
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.3.2. Abstraction
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.3.3. Analogy
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.3.4. Accuracy
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.3.5. Authenticity
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.4. Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.4.1. A Mistaken ID
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.4.2. Phenomenology of Doubt
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.4.3. Modalities of Knowledge
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.5. Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.6. Interpretive Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.6.1. Syntactic Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.6.2. Semantic Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.6.3. Pragmatic Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.7. Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.7.1. A Definition of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.7.2. The Faculty of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.7.3. A Definition of Determination
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6.7.4. A Definition of Definition
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 1.7. Organization of the Project: A Way Through Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.1. The Problem: Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.2. The Method: Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.2.1. Conditions for the Possibility of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.2.2. Conditions for the Success of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.3. The Criterion: Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.3.1. The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test.
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.3.2. Enabling Provision 1: The Scenes & Context of Inquiry.
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7.3.3. Enabling Provision 2: The Stages & Content of Inquiry.
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8. Objectives of the Project: Inquiry All the Way
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8.1. Substantial Objective
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8.1.1. Objective 1a: The Propositions as Types Analogy.
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8.1.2. Objective 1b: The Styles of Proof Development.
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8.1.3. Objective 1c: The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority.
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8.2. Instrumental Objective
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8.3. Coordination of Objectives
| |
− | | |
− | 1.8.4. Recapitulation: Da Capo, Al Segno
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 2. Discussion of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 2.1. Approaches to Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 2.1.1. The Classical Framework: Syllogistic Approaches
| |
− | | |
− | 2.1.2. The Pragmatic Framework: Sign-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | | |
− | 2.1.3. The Dynamical Framework: System-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | | |
− | 2.1.3.1. Inquiry & Computation
| |
− | | |
− | 2.1.3.2. Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 2.2. The Context of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 2.2.1. The Field of Observation
| |
− | | |
− | 2.2.2. The Problem of Reflection
| |
− | | |
− | 2.2.3. The Problem of Reconstruction
| |
− | | |
− | 2.2.4. The Trivializing of Integration
| |
− | | |
− | 2.2.5. Tensions in the Field of Observation
| |
− | | |
− | 2.2.6. Problems of Representation & Communication
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 2.3. The Conduct of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.1. Introduction
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.2. The Types of Reasoning
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.2.1. Deduction
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.2.2. Induction
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.2.3. Abduction
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.3. Hybrid Types of Inference
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.3.1. Analogy
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.3.2. Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.4. Details of Induction
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.4.1. Learning
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.4.2. Transfer
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.4.3. Testing
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3.5. The Stages of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 3. The Medium & Its Message
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1. Reflective Expression
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.1. Casual Reflection
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.1.1. Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.1.2. Analogical Recursion
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2. Conscious Reflection
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.1. The Signal Moment
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.2. The Symbolic Object
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.3. The Endeavor to Communicate
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.4. The Medium of Communication
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.5. The Ark of Types: The Order of Things to Come.
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.6. The Epitext
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.7. The Context of Interpretation
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.8. The Formative Tension
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.9. The Vehicle of Communication: Reflection on the Scene, Reflection on the Self.
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.10. (7)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.11. (6)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.12. Recursions: Possible, Actual, Necessary
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.13. Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.14. (3)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.15. The Freedom of Interpretation
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.16. The Eternal Return
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.17. (1)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.18. Information in Formation
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.19. Reflectively Indexical Texts
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.20. (4)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.21. (5)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.22. (6)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.23. (7)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.24. (8)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.25. The Discursive Universe
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.26. (7)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.27. (6)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.28. (5)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.29. (4)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.30. (3)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.31. (2)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.1.2.32. (1)
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 3.2. Reflective Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.1. Integrity & Unity of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.2. Apparitions & Allegations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.3. A Reflective Heuristic
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.4. Either/Or: A Sense of Absence
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.5. Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.6. Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.7. Synthetic A Priori Truths
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.8. Priorisms of Normative Sciences
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.9. Principle of Rational Action
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11. Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.1. Principals Versus Principles
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.2. The Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.3. An Early Description of Interpretation
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.4. Descriptions of the Mind
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.5. Of Signs & the Mind
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.6. Questions of Justification
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.7. The Experience of Satisfaction
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.8. An Organizational Difficulty
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.9. Pragmatic Certainties
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2.11.10. Problems & Methods
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 3.3. Reflection on Reflection
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4. Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.1. The Phenomenology of Reflection
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.2. A Candid Point of View
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.3. A Projective Point of View
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.4. A Formal Point of View
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.5. Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.6. Basic Notions of Group Theory
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.7. Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.8. A Perspective on Computation
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.9. Higher Order Sign Relations: Introduction
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.10. Higher Order Sign Relations: Examples
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.11. Higher Order Sign Relations: Application
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.12. Issue 1: The Status of Signs
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.13. Issue 2: The Status of Sets
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.14. Issue 3: The Status of Variables
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.15. Propositional Calculus
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.16. Recursive Aspects
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.17. Patterns of Self-Reference
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.18. Practical Intuitions
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.19. Examples of Self-Reference
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.20. Three Views of Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.21. Building Bridges Between Representations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.22. Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.23. Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.24. Literal Intensional Representations
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 3.4.25. Analytic Intensional Representations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.26. Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.27. Differential Logic & Group Operations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.28. The Bridge: From Obstruction to Opportunity
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.29. Projects of Representation
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.30. Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.31. Generic Orders of Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.32. Partiality: Selective Operations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.33. Sign Relational Complexes
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.34. Set-Theoretic Constructions
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.35. Reducibility of Sign Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.36. Irreducibly Triadic Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.37. Propositional Types
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.38. Considering the Source
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.39. Prospective Indices: Pointers to Future Work
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.40. Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.41. Elective & Motive Forces
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.42. Sign Processes: A Start
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.43. Reflective Extensions
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.44. Reflections on Closure
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.45. Intelligence => Critical Reflection
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.46. Looking Ahead
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.47. Mutually Intelligible Codes
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.48. Discourse Analysis: Ways & Means
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.49. Combinations of Sign Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.4.50. Revisiting the Source
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 3.5. Divertimento: Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.1. Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.2. Searching for Parameters
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.3. Defect Analysis
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.4. The Pragmatic Critique
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.5. Pragmatic Operating Notions
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.6. Defects of Presentation
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.7. Dues to Process
| |
− | | |
− | 3.5.8. Duties to Purpose
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 3.6. Computational Design Philosophy
| |
− | | |
− | 3.6.1. Intentional Objects & Attitudes
| |
− | | |
− | 3.6.2. Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
| |
− | | |
− | 3.6.3. Propositional Reasoning About Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 3.6.4. Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | | |
− | 3.6.5. Discussion of Examples
| |
− | | |
− | 3.6.6. Information & Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 4. Overview of the Domain: Interpretive Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 4.1. Interpretive Bearings: Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
| |
− | | |
− | 4.1.1. Catwalks: Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
| |
− | | |
− | 4.1.1.1. Eponymous Ancestors: The Precursors of Abstraction?
| |
− | | |
− | 4.1.1.2 Reticles: Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue
| |
− | | |
− | 4.1.2. Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2. Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2.1. The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2.1.1. Sign Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2.1.2. Types of Signs
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2.2. The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2.2.1. Abduction
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2.2.2. Deduction
| |
− | | |
− | 4.2.2.3. Induction
| |
− | | |
− | 4.3. Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 4.3.1. "Index": A Program for Learning Formal Languages
| |
− | | |
− | 4.3.2. "Study": A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
| |
− | | |
− | 5. Discussion & Development of Objectives
| |
− | | |
− | 5.1. Objective 1a: Propositions as Types
| |
− | | |
− | 5.2. Objective 1b: Proof Styles & Developments
| |
− | | |
− | 5.3. Objective 1c: Interpretation & Authority
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | |
− | | |
− | IDS. References
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | Aristotle, "On The Soul", in 'Aristotle, Volume 8',
| |
− | W.S. Hett (trans.), Heinemann, London, UK, 1936, 1986.
| |
− | | |
− | Charniak, E. & McDermott, D.V.,
| |
− | 'Introduction to Artificial Intelligence',
| |
− | Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1985.
| |
− | | |
− | 2. Charniak, E., Riesbeck, C.K., & McDermott, D.V. Artificial Intelligence Programming. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1980.
| |
− | | |
− | 3. Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E., & Thagard, P.R. Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986.
| |
− | | |
− | 4. O'Rorke, P. Review of AAAI 1990 Spring Symposium on Automated Abduction. SIGART Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 3. ACM Press, October 1990, p. 12-17.
| |
− | | |
− | 5. Pearl, J. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference. Revised 2nd printing. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991.
| |
− | | |
− | 6. Peng, Y. & Reggia, J.A. Abductive Inference Models for Diagnostic Problem-Solving. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1990.
| |
− | | |
− | 7. Sowa, J.F. Conceptual Structures: Information Processing in Mind and Machine. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1984.
| |
− | | |
− | 8. Sowa, J.F. (ed.) Principles of Semantic Networks: Explorations in the Representation of Knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991.
| |
− | | |
− | Dewey, J. (1991). How We Think. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Originally published 1910.
| |
− | | |
− | Shakespeare, Wm. (1988). William Shakespeare: The Complete Works. Compact Edition. S. Wells & G. Taylor (eds.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Email Format
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | Document History
| |
− | |
| |
− | | Subject: Inquiry Driven Systems: An Inquiry Into Inquiry
| |
− | | Contact: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
| |
− | | Version: Draft 10.00
| |
− | | Created: 23 Jun 1996
| |
− | | Revised: 02 Mar 2003
| |
− | | Advisor: M.A. Zohdy
| |
− | | Setting: Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
| |
− | | |
− | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Incitatory Note 1
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | Each ground-principle must be proved entirely
| |
− | | by that same kind of inference which it supports.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | But we cannot arrive at any conclusion
| |
− | | by mere deduction except about symbols.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | We cannot arrive at any conclusion
| |
− | | by mere induction except about things.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | And we cannot arrive at any conclusion
| |
− | | by mere hypothesis except about forms.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | C.S. Peirce, CE 1, page 290.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | Charles Sanders Peirce, "On the Logic of Science",
| |
− | | Harvard University Lectures (1865), pages 161-302 in:
| |
− | |'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition',
| |
− | |'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
| |
− | | Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Incitatory Note 2
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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− | | |
− | IDS. Meditative Note 1
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | I would like to start from a "common sense practical" (CSP) point of view,
| |
− | and, indeed, never to lose sight of what appears evident from that station,
| |
− | no matter how many levels of abstract remove and abstruse mention it might
| |
− | become necessary to interpose along the way.
| |
− | | |
− | So let's examine this initial caltrop
| |
− | "descriptive/normative/prescriptive"
| |
− | from the CSP POV, if you will.
| |
− | | |
− | Reading "Descriptive" to mean "What it is",
| |
− | while "Normative" means "What it oughta be",
| |
− | and "Prescriptive" says "Make it so, or else",
| |
− | I will have very little to say about the last,
| |
− | and only be able to focus on the distinctions
| |
− | that may exist among the first two dimensions.
| |
− | | |
− | From the beginning, from this point of view, difficult words,
| |
− | like "inquiry", "logic", "truth", and so on, must be taken
| |
− | as initially indexical, inchoately succeeding at little
| |
− | more than pointing to a realm of experience that may
| |
− | or may not be common to the e-mitter and re-mitter.
| |
− | | |
− | I suspect that this stanza is likely to be controversial,
| |
− | so I'll pause at this point for the countrapunctal verse.
| |
− | | |
− | Or for a rest ...
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Meditative Note 2
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | So I may begin with an object and a sign in a tenuous relation,
| |
− | with the subject matter indexed under the topic name "inquiry",
| |
− | where the sign originates from a "just noticeable differential"
| |
− | of information about the object, and not a single "figit" more.
| |
− | Few would call this a foundation -- I only call it a beginning.
| |
− | | |
− | Yet another of many ...
| |
− | | |
− | But it does provide us with a clue to a signficant difference,
| |
− | however much this difference is bound by this origin to raise
| |
− | itself from egg, germ, seed, spore, or whatever it is that is
| |
− | infinitesimal in its initial condition. In this disjointness
| |
− | of an archetype where what begins, what leads, and what rules
| |
− | are not so trivially identical to one another, one encounters
| |
− | the brand of beginning that begins in the middle of the story,
| |
− | and has no need of any other foundation but the medium itself.
| |
− | | |
− | ["sign-ficant" [stet]]
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Meditative Note 3
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Obligatory Note 1
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | While I remain compelled to remain silent on the status of the absolute fiat,
| |
− | the irrelative notion of the unmotivated motion and the disinterested stance,
| |
− | let me then turn to the other axes of description, descriptive vs. normative.
| |
− | Axes of description, indeed, you can almost hear one branch of the recursion
| |
− | already beginning to wind up its whine to the verge of a howl, but toss it a
| |
− | sop and try to persevere in the quest.
| |
− | | |
− | In this view, I regard the very idea of a norm as invoking its due pragma --
| |
− | aim, business, concern, desire, end, function, goal, intention, interest,
| |
− | objective, purpose, its names are legion -- and the good sense of the
| |
− | norm is simply to suggest what one ought to do, contingent, of course,
| |
− | on one's motive to achieve that pragma.
| |
− | | |
− | If we keep in mind the kinds of "applied research task" (ART) that your
| |
− | everyday artist, designer, engineer, mathematician, scientist, or other
| |
− | type of technical worker has to carry out on an everyday basis, we note
| |
− | how these axes of description can be used to frame their activities and
| |
− | to depict their forms of conduct, without mistaking either the frame or
| |
− | the picture for the object of the picture so framed. Nor does any body
| |
− | imagine that the observer must flatten out into a single plane or align
| |
− | with a single axis, in order to make a vantage of the frame so pictured.
| |
− | | |
− | Common sense practical wit tells us that effective action toward the
| |
− | achievement of a desirable result will naturally depend on acquiring
| |
− | good descriptions of the lay of the land in which we hope to advance.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Obligatory Note 2
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Projective Note 1
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | Good morning. Thanks. I had a bad night.
| |
− | I blame Bernard Morand, who wrote me this:
| |
− | | |
− | BM: But this looks as some God's view.
| |
− | What about us, finite humans, occupied
| |
− | in counting the instants of our lives?
| |
− | And thus condemned to try to improve
| |
− | the fate of our successors?
| |
− | | |
− | When you think of this in the future, and of course you may never,
| |
− | you may blame him too, for in writing this he has "erged" me on
| |
− | to return to my deserted dissertation work, into which I have
| |
− | poured my life for lo! these too many years to count, truly,
| |
− | if you stop to contemplate the fact that time is relative.
| |
− | | |
− | In that time I have come to the view that we really need
| |
− | a good "theory of inquiry" (TOI), for all sorts of very
| |
− | practical and crucial reasons, also, that we cannot get
| |
− | a good TOI without its being, at one and the same time,
| |
− | a good "theory of information" (TOI too), and also that
| |
− | an integral constituent of TOI 1 and TOI 2 would have to
| |
− | be a good "theory of representation and semiosis" (TORAS) --
| |
− | "Bull!?", you say, well, so be it.
| |
− | | |
− | Further, I think that it is abundantly evident by now that
| |
− | we will get no such good theories of signs or science from
| |
− | the "establishment philosophy of science" (EPOS?) -- which
| |
− | has managed to mince and to trash the best available tries
| |
− | at such theories for over a hundred years now. But Hey! --
| |
− | don't take my word for it -- waste a century of your own.
| |
− | | |
− | We just got our regular email back,
| |
− | so I think that I can now get going --
| |
− | Yes, I have lost the ability to think
| |
− | if not literally writing 'to' somebody.
| |
− | | |
− | When it begins, it begins like this:
| |
− | | |
− | Why am I asking this question?
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Projective Note 2
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | So we may rest assured that we do have a "subject matter", an empirical domain,
| |
− | or a realm of experience that is indexed, however dimly, generally, or vaguely,
| |
− | by the word "inquiry", and only the question how best to describe it remains
| |
− | in doubt at this stage of the play. If we wanted to cast our net as widely
| |
− | as possible, at the risk of anticipating a bounding hypothesis, we could
| |
− | think of all the world's creatures bright and beautiful and of how they
| |
− | conduct themselves when faced with some moment of uncertainty, where
| |
− | their aim is to cope with a surprising phenomenon or to deal with
| |
− | a problematic situation that meets them in the course of their
| |
− | ever-ongoing struggles to live, to revive, and to thrive.
| |
− | | |
− | Now, neither the fact that we begin with a descriptive task,
| |
− | nor the fact that it remains of interest for its own sake,
| |
− | necessarily means that we must end there, for it is also
| |
− | the means to a further end, of learning how to better
| |
− | our own skill at inquiry, which means in our time
| |
− | the building of tools that help with the task.
| |
− | | |
− | I hope I have made this sound as truly and
| |
− | as trivially obvious as it ought to be.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Reflective Note 1
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | In reflecting on what in the world a "Theory of Inquiry" (TOI) might be,
| |
− | it occurs to me that there are many different things that one might mean
| |
− | by such a theory. It could just be any number of things that one asserts
| |
− | or has a mind to assert about the ostensible subject matter. But it has
| |
− | been my experience that one can assert pretty much whatever one chooses,
| |
− | and others will choose to heed it or ignore it on many different grounds,
| |
− | the grounds themselves being a matter of choice, conditioning, or custom.
| |
− | | |
− | But I am looking for theories that work, that is to say, theories that
| |
− | are subject to probation through proof, probability, and programming.
| |
− | | |
− | Astute readers will have noticed that I've already attempted to finesse
| |
− | a very important, and most likely "infinessible" issue, to wit, that of
| |
− | the scruples dividing descriptive, normative, and prescriptive theories.
| |
− | | |
− | I will think about that, and get back to you.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Reflective Note 2
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | How will I approach this problem about the nature of inquiry?
| |
− | |
| |
− | | The simplest answer is this:
| |
− | |
| |
− | | I will apply the method of inquiry to the problem of inquiry's nature.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | This is the most concise and comprehensive answer that I know, but
| |
− | | it is likely to sound facetious at this point. On the other hand,
| |
− | | if I did not actually use the method of inquiry that I describe
| |
− | | as inquiry, how could the results possibly be taken seriously?
| |
− | | Accordingly, the questions of methodological self-application
| |
− | | and self-referential consistency will be found at the center
| |
− | | of this research.
| |
− | | |
− | These lines image in compact form the crux of the problem,
| |
− | the crucible of the method, and the character that marks
| |
− | relation between the two, if indeed they really are two,
| |
− | in a form whose extended development will wind its way
| |
− | through many a later page of the present exposition.
| |
− | | |
− | But let me just point out at this point some of
| |
− | the reasons why I have found the prerequisite
| |
− | of an inquiry into inquiry to be inescapable.
| |
− | | |
− | Let us entertain the idea, for the sake of getting the inquiry started,
| |
− | if nothing else, that it is admissible to use a word like "inquiry" as
| |
− | an initially indefinite indicator of an ostensible object of inquiry.
| |
− | If we ever again find ourselves being puzzled how our reasoning can
| |
− | chastize its own entailments this way, we may remind ourselves of
| |
− | that fine old line between our "logica docens' (logic as taught)
| |
− | and our "logica utens" (logic as used). With this distinction
| |
− | in mind, we can dispell the initial puzzlement by saying that
| |
− | we are using a capacity for inquiry that we do not know how
| |
− | to formalize yet in order to examine the forms of inquiry
| |
− | that various thinkers have been able, at least partially,
| |
− | to formalize.
| |
− | | |
− | The dilemma that we face has the following structure:
| |
− | | |
− | If we recommend to all a method of inquiry that
| |
− | we ourselves do not use in a pinch, precisely
| |
− | in a pinch where we need to study an issue
| |
− | as important as the nature of inquiry,
| |
− | then who would take our advice?
| |
− | | |
− | So it seems that there is no choice
| |
− | but to study inquiry, the pragma,
| |
− | by way of inquiry, the praxis,
| |
− | that is to say, recursively.
| |
− | | |
− | Incidentally, many variations on this theme are
| |
− | thoroughly developed in Peirce's "Lectures" of
| |
− | 1865 and 1866 and recapitulated in his early
| |
− | study "On a New List of Categories" (1867).
| |
− | | |
− | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-main.htm
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Reflective Note 3
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Work Area
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | From this point of view, inquiry is form of conduct,
| |
− | an applied research task, like may others that we
| |
− | have to carry out, and that can be done either
| |
− | better or worse.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Outline
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 1. Introduction
| |
− | 1.1. Outline of the Project: Inquiry Into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.1.1. Problem
| |
− | 1.1.2. Method
| |
− | 1.1.2.1. The Paradigmatic and Process-Analytic Phase
| |
− | 1.1.2.2. The Paraphrastic and Faculty-Synthetic Phase
| |
− | 1.1.2.3. Reprise of Methods
| |
− | 1.1.3. Criterion
| |
− | 1.1.4. Application
| |
− | | |
− | 1.2. Onus of the Project: No Way But Inquiry
| |
− | 1.2.1. A Modulating Prelude
| |
− | 1.2.2. A Fugitive Canon
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3. Opening of the Project: A Way Up To Inquiry
| |
− | 1.3.1. Initial Analysis of Inquiry Allegro Aperto
| |
− | 1.3.2. Discussion of Discussion
| |
− | 1.3.3. Discussion of Formalization: General Topics
| |
− | 1.3.3.1. A Formal Charge
| |
− | 1.3.3.2. A Formalization of Formalization?
| |
− | 1.3.3.3. A Formalization of Discussion?
| |
− | 1.3.3.4. A Concept of Formalization
| |
− | 1.3.3.5. A Formal Approach
| |
− | 1.3.3.6. A Formal Development
| |
− | 1.3.3.7 A Formal Persuasion
| |
− | 1.3.4. Discussion of Formalization: Concrete Examples
| |
− | 1.3.4.1. Formal Models: A Sketch
| |
− | 1.3.4.2. Sign Relations: A Primer
| |
− | 1.3.4.3. Semiotic Equivalence Relations
| |
− | 1.3.4.4. Graphical Representations
| |
− | 1.3.4.5. Taking Stock
| |
− | 1.3.4.6. The "Meta" Question
| |
− | 1.3.4.7. Iconic Signs
| |
− | 1.3.4.8. The Conflict of Interpretations
| |
− | 1.3.4.9. Indexical Signs
| |
− | 1.3.4.10. Sundry Problems
| |
− | 1.3.4.11. Review and Prospect
| |
− | 1.3.4.12. Objective Plans & Levels
| |
− | 1.3.4.13. Formalization of OF: Objective Levels
| |
− | 1.3.4.14. Application of OF: Generic Level
| |
− | 1.3.4.15. Application of OF: Motive Level
| |
− | 1.3.4.16. The Integration of Frameworks
| |
− | 1.3.4.17. Recapitulation: A Brush with Symbols
| |
− | 1.3.4.18. C'est Moi
| |
− | 1.3.4.19. Entr'acte
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.5 Discussion of Formalization: Specific Objects
| |
− | 1.3.5.1 The Will to Form
| |
− | 1.3.5.2 The Forms of Reasoning
| |
− | 1.3.5.3 A Fork in the Road
| |
− | 1.3.5.4 A Forged Bond
| |
− | 1.3.5.5 A Formal Account
| |
− | 1.3.5.6 Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
| |
− | 1.3.5.7 Steps and Tests of Formalization
| |
− | 1.3.5.8 Puck, the Ref
| |
− | 1.3.5.9 Partial Formalizations
| |
− | 1.3.5.10 A Formal Utility
| |
− | 1.3.5.11 A Formal Aesthetic
| |
− | 1.3.5.12 A Formal Apology
| |
− | 1.3.5.13 A Formal Suspicion
| |
− | 1.3.5.14 The Double Aspect of Concepts
| |
− | 1.3.5.15 A Formal Permission
| |
− | 1.3.5.16 A Formal Invention
| |
− | 1.3.6 Recursion in Perpetuity
| |
− | 1.3.7 Processus, Regressus, Progressus
| |
− | 1.3.8 Rondeau Tempo di Menuetto
| |
− | 1.3.9 Reconnaissance
| |
− | 1.3.9.1 The Informal Context
| |
− | 1.3.9.2 The Epitext
| |
− | 1.3.9.3 The Formative Tension
| |
− | 1.3.10 Recurring Themes
| |
− | 1.3.10.1 Preliminary Notions
| |
− | 1.3.10.2 Intermediary Notions
| |
− | 1.3.10.3 Propositions and Sentences
| |
− | 1.3.10.4 Empirical Types and Rational Types
| |
− | 1.3.10.5 Articulate Sentences
| |
− | 1.3.10.6 Stretching Principles
| |
− | 1.3.10.7 Stretching Operations
| |
− | 1.3.10.8 The Cactus Patch
| |
− | 1.3.10.9 The Cactus Language: Syntax
| |
− | 1.3.10.10 The Cactus Language: Stylistics
| |
− | 1.3.10.11 The Cactus Language: Mechanics
| |
− | 1.3.10.12 The Cactus Language: Semantics
| |
− | 1.3.10.13 Stretching Exercises
| |
− | 1.3.10.14 Syntactic Transformations
| |
− | 1.3.10.15 Derived Equivalence Relations
| |
− | 1.3.10.16 Digression on Derived Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4 Outlook of the Project: All Ways Lead to Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1 The Matrix of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1.1 Inquiry as Conduct
| |
− | 1.4.1.2 Types of Conduct
| |
− | 1.4.1.3 Perils of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1.4 Forms of Relations
| |
− | 1.4.1.5 Models of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.2 The Moment of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.3 The Modes of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.3.1 Deductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.2 Inductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.3 Abductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.4 Analogical Reasoning
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5 Obstacles to the Project: In the Way of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.5.1 The Initial Unpleasantness
| |
− | 1.5.2 The Justification Trap
| |
− | 1.5.3 A Formal Apology
| |
− | 1.5.3.1 Category Double-Takes
| |
− | 1.5.3.2 Conceptual Extensions
| |
− | 1.5.3.3 Explosional Recombinations
| |
− | 1.5.3.4 Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 1.5.4 A Material Exigency
| |
− | 1.5.5 A Reconciliation of Accounts
| |
− | 1.5.6 Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
| |
− | 1.5.7 Empirical Considerations
| |
− | 1.5.8 Computational Considerations
| |
− | 1.5.8.1 A Form of Recursion
| |
− | 1.5.8.2 A Power of Abstraction
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6 Orientation of the Project: A Way Into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.1 Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.2 Terms of Analysis
| |
− | 1.6.2.1 Digression on Signs
| |
− | 1.6.2.2 Empirical Status of ID
| |
− | 1.6.3 Expansion of Terms
| |
− | 1.6.3.1 Agency
| |
− | 1.6.3.2 Abstraction
| |
− | 1.6.3.3 Analogy
| |
− | 1.6.3.4 Accuracy
| |
− | 1.6.3.5 Authenticity
| |
− | 1.6.4 Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
| |
− | 1.6.4.1 A Mistaken ID
| |
− | 1.6.4.2 Phenomenology of Doubt
| |
− | 1.6.4.3 Modalities of Knowledge
| |
− | 1.6.5 Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
| |
− | 1.6.6 Interpretive Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.1 Syntactic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.2 Semantic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.3 Pragmatic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.7 Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 1.6.7.1 A Definition of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.7.2 The Faculty of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.7.3 A Definition of Determination
| |
− | 1.6.7.4 A Definition of Definition
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7 Organization of the Project: A Way Through Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.1 The Problem: Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
| |
− | 1.7.2 The Method: Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
| |
− | 1.7.2.1 Conditions for the Possibility
| |
− | of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.2.2 Conditions for the Success of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.3 The Criterion: Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
| |
− | 1.7.3.1 The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test
| |
− | 1.7.3.2 Enabling Provision 1: The Scenes & Context of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.3.3 Enabling Provision 2: The Stages & Content of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.8 Objectives of the Project: Inquiry All the Way
| |
− | 1.8.1 Substantial Objective
| |
− | 1.8.1.1 Objective 1a: The Propositions as Types Analogy
| |
− | 1.8.1.2 Objective 1b: The Styles of Proof Development
| |
− | 1.8.1.3 Objective 1c: The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority
| |
− | 1.8.2 Instrumental Objective
| |
− | 1.8.3 Coordination of Objectives
| |
− | 1.8.4 Recapitulation -- Da Capo, Al Segno
| |
− | | |
− | 2. Discussion of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.1 Approaches to Inquiry
| |
− | 2.1.1 The Classical Framework: Syllogistic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.2 The Pragmatic Framework: Sign-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.3 The Dynamical Framework: System-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.3.1 Inquiry & Computation
| |
− | 2.1.3.2 Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 2.2 The Context of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.2.1 The Field of Observation
| |
− | 2.2.2 The Problem of Reflection
| |
− | 2.2.3 The Problem of Reconstruction
| |
− | 2.2.4 The Trivializing of Integration
| |
− | 2.2.5 Tensions in the Field of Observation
| |
− | 2.2.6 Problems of Representation & Communication
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3 The Conduct of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.3.1 Introduction
| |
− | 2.3.2 The Types of Reasoning
| |
− | 2.3.2.1 Deduction
| |
− | 2.3.2.2 Induction
| |
− | 2.3.2.3 Abduction
| |
− | 2.3.3 Hybrid Types of Inference
| |
− | 2.3.3.1 Analogy
| |
− | 2.3.3.2 Inquiry
| |
− | 2.3.4 Details of Induction
| |
− | 2.3.4.1 Learning
| |
− | 2.3.4.2 Transfer
| |
− | 2.3.4.3 Testing
| |
− | 2.3.5 The Stages of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 3. The Medium & Its Message
| |
− | 3.1 Reflective Expression
| |
− | 3.1.1 Casual Reflection
| |
− | 3.1.1.1 Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | 3.1.1.2 Analogical Recursion
| |
− | 3.1.2 Conscious Reflection
| |
− | 3.1.2.1 The Signal Moment
| |
− | 3.1.2.2 The Symbolic Object
| |
− | 3.1.2.3 The Endeavor to Communicate
| |
− | 3.1.2.4 The Medium of Communication
| |
− | 3.1.2.5 The Ark of Types:
| |
− | The Order of Things to Come.
| |
− | 3.1.2.6 The Epitext
| |
− | 3.1.2.7 The Context of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.1.2.8 The Formative Tension
| |
− | 3.1.2.9 The Vehicle of Communication:
| |
− | Reflection on the Scene,
| |
− | Reflection on the Self.
| |
− | 3.1.2.10 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.11 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.12 Recursions: Possible, Actual, Necessary
| |
− | 3.1.2.13 Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | 3.1.2.14 (3)
| |
− | 3.1.2.15 The Freedom of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.1.2.16 The Eternal Return
| |
− | 3.1.2.17 (1)
| |
− | 3.1.2.18 Information in Formation
| |
− | 3.1.2.19 Reflectively Indexical Texts
| |
− | 3.1.2.20 (4)
| |
− | 3.1.2.21 (5)
| |
− | 3.1.2.22 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.23 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.24 (8)
| |
− | 3.1.2.25 The Discursive Universe
| |
− | 3.1.2.26 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.27 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.28 (5)
| |
− | 3.1.2.29 (4)
| |
− | 3.1.2.30 (3)
| |
− | 3.1.2.31 (2)
| |
− | 3.1.2.32 (1)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2 Reflective Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.1 Integrity and Unity of Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.2 Apparitions & Allegations
| |
− | 3.2.3 A Reflective Heuristic
| |
− | 3.2.4 Either/Or: A Sense of Absence
| |
− | 3.2.5 Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
| |
− | 3.2.6 Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
| |
− | 3.2.7 Synthetic A Priori Truths
| |
− | 3.2.8 Priorisms of Normative Sciences
| |
− | 3.2.9 Principle of Rational Action
| |
− | 3.2.10 The Pragmatic Cosmos
| |
− | 3.2.11 Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 3.2.11.1 Principals Versus Principles
| |
− | 3.2.11.2 The Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.11.3 An Early Description of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.2.11.4 Descriptions of the Mind
| |
− | 3.2.11.5 Of Signs & the Mind
| |
− | 3.2.11.6 Questions of Justification
| |
− | 3.2.11.7 The Experience of Satisfaction
| |
− | 3.2.11.8 An Organizational Difficulty
| |
− | 3.2.11.9 Pragmatic Certainties
| |
− | 3.2.11.10 Problems & Methods
| |
− | | |
− | 3.3 Reflection on Reflection
| |
− | 3.4 Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 3.4.1 The Phenomenology of Reflection
| |
− | 3.4.2 A Candid Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.3 A Projective Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.4 A Formal Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.5 Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
| |
− | 3.4.6 Basic Notions of Group Theory
| |
− | 3.4.7 Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
| |
− | 3.4.8 A Perspective on Computation
| |
− | 3.4.9 Higher Order Sign Relations: Introduction
| |
− | 3.4.10 Higher Order Sign Relations: Examples
| |
− | 3.4.11 Higher Order Sign Relations: Application
| |
− | 3.4.12 Issue 1: The Status of Signs
| |
− | 3.4.13 Issue 2: The Status of Sets
| |
− | 3.4.14 Issue 3: The Status of Variables
| |
− | 3.4.15 Propositional Calculus
| |
− | 3.4.16 Recursive Aspects
| |
− | 3.4.17 Patterns of Self-Reference
| |
− | 3.4.18 Practical Intuitions
| |
− | 3.4.19 Examples of Self-Reference
| |
− | 3.4.20 Three Views of Systems
| |
− | 3.4.21 Building Bridges Between Representations
| |
− | 3.4.22 Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.23 Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.24 Literal Intensional Representations
| |
− | 3.4.25 Analytic Intensional Representations
| |
− | 3.4.26 Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
| |
− | 3.4.27 Differential Logic & Group Operations
| |
− | 3.4.28 The Bridge: From Obstruction to Opportunity
| |
− | 3.4.29 Projects of Representation
| |
− | 3.4.30 Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
| |
− | 3.4.31 Generic Orders of Relations
| |
− | 3.4.32 Partiality: Selective Operations
| |
− | 3.4.33 Sign Relational Complexes
| |
− | 3.4.34 Set-Theoretic Constructions
| |
− | 3.4.35 Reducibility of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.36 Irreducibly Triadic Relations
| |
− | 3.4.37 Propositional Types
| |
− | 3.4.38 Considering the Source
| |
− | 3.4.39 Prospective Indices: Pointers to Future Work
| |
− | 3.4.40 Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | 3.4.41 Elective & Motive Forces
| |
− | 3.4.42 Sign Processes: A Start
| |
− | 3.4.43 Reflective Extensions
| |
− | 3.4.44 Reflections on Closure
| |
− | 3.4.45 Intelligence => Critical Reflection
| |
− | 3.4.46 Looking Ahead
| |
− | 3.4.47 Mutually Intelligible Codes
| |
− | 3.4.48 Discourse Analysis: Ways & Means
| |
− | 3.4.49 Combinations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.50 Revisiting the Source
| |
− | 3.5 Divertimento:
| |
− | Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
| |
− | 3.5.1 Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
| |
− | 3.5.2 Searching for Parameters
| |
− | 3.5.3 Defect Analysis
| |
− | 3.5.4 The Pragmatic Critique
| |
− | 3.5.5 Pragmatic Operating Notions
| |
− | 3.5.6 Defects of Presentation
| |
− | 3.5.7 Dues to Process
| |
− | 3.5.8 Duties to Purpose
| |
− | 3.6 Computational Design Philosophy
| |
− | 3.6.1 Intentional Objects & Attitudes
| |
− | 3.6.2 Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
| |
− | 3.6.3 Propositional Reasoning About Relations
| |
− | 3.6.4 Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | 3.6.5 Discussion of Examples
| |
− | 3.6.6 Information & Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 4. Overview of the Domain: Interpretive Inquiry
| |
− | 4.1 Interpretive Bearings: Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
| |
− | 4.1.1 Catwalks: Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
| |
− | 4.1.1.1 Eponymous Ancestors:
| |
− | The Precursors of Abstraction?
| |
− | 4.1.1.2 Reticles:
| |
− | Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue.
| |
− | 4.1.2 Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
| |
− | 4.2 Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 4.2.1 The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
| |
− | 4.2.1.1 Sign Relations
| |
− | 4.2.1.2 Types of Signs
| |
− | 4.2.2 The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
| |
− | 4.2.2.1 Abduction
| |
− | 4.2.2.2 Deduction
| |
− | 4.2.2.3 Induction
| |
− | 4.3 Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 4.3.1 "Index": A Program for Learning Formal Languages
| |
− | 4.3.2 "Study": A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
| |
− | 5. Discussion & Development of Objectives
| |
− | 5.1 Objective 1a: Propositions as Types
| |
− | 5.2 Objective 1b: Proof Styles & Developments
| |
− | 5.3 Objective 1c: Interpretation & Authority
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Ontology List
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04618.html
| |
− | 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04621.html
| |
− | 03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04626.html
| |
− | 04.
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Incitatory Notes
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04637.html
| |
− | 02.
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Meditative Notes
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04622.html
| |
− | 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04636.html
| |
− | 03.
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Obligatory Notes
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04623.html
| |
− | 02.
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Projective Notes
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04619.html
| |
− | 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04625.html
| |
− | 03.
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Reflective Notes
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04620.html
| |
− | 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04631.html
| |
− | 03.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Inquiry List
| |
− | | |
− | 01.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Email Label
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | Title: Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | Author: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
| |
− | | Version: Draft 10.01
| |
− | | Created: 23 Jun 1996
| |
− | | Revised: 07 Apr 2003
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | SUO List -- 04 Jan 2001
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02678.html
| |
− | 02. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02679.html
| |
− | 03. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02682.html
| |
− | 04. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02685.html
| |
− | 05. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02695.html
| |
− | 06. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02697.html
| |
− | 07. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg02720.html
| |
− | 08. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg03943.html
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | Ontology List -- Jan-Aug 2001
| |
− | | |
− | Systems Engineering Interest Statement
| |
− | | |
− | 00. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd103.html#00272
| |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00272.html
| |
− | 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00273.html
| |
− | 03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00276.html
| |
− | 04. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00279.html
| |
− | 05. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00289.html
| |
− | 06. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00291.html
| |
− | 07. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg00314.html
| |
− | | |
− | Inquiry Driven Systems Essay 1
| |
− | | |
− | 08. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg01535.html
| |
− | | |
− | Systems Engineering Dissertation
| |
− | | |
− | 00. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd103.html#03071
| |
− | 09. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03071.html
| |
− | 10. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03136.html
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | Arisbe List -- Jan 2002
| |
− | | |
− | http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2002-January/thread.html#1247
| |
− | | |
− | Ontology List -- Jan 2002
| |
− | | |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd36.html#03604
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03604.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.5. Taking Stock
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03605.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.6. The "Meta" Question
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03607.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.7. Iconic Signs
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03608.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.8. The Conflict of Interpretations
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03609.html
| |
− | | |
− | Comment
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03613.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.9. Indexical Signs
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03610.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.10. Sundry Problems
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03611.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.11. Review and Prospect
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03614.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.12. Objective Plans and Levels
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03615.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03616.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.13. Formalization of OF: Objective Levels
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03617.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03618.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03619.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.14. Application of OF: Generic Level
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03620.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03621.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03622.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03623.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.15. Application of OF: Motive Level
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03624.html
| |
− | | |
− | Comment
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03625.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03626.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.16. Integration of Frameworks
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03627.html
| |
− | | |
− | Comment
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03629.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.17 Recapitulation: A Brush with Symbols
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03630.html
| |
− | | |
− | Comment
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03631.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03634.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03636.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03638.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03639.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.18. C'est Moi
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03640.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.19 Entr'acte
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03642.html
| |
− | | |
− | Comment
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03645.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03647.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03648.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03649.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03650.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03652.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03657.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03659.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03660.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03661.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03662.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03663.html
| |
− | http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03664.html
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | Inquiry Into Inquiry (I^3)
| |
− | | |
− | 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02959.html
| |
− | 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02961.html
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | JA: 1.3.10.3 Propositions & Sentences
| |
− | 01: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07444.html
| |
− | 02: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07409.html
| |
− | 03: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07416.html
| |
− | 04: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07435.html
| |
− | 05: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07443.html
| |
− | 06: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07449.html
| |
− | | |
− | JA: 1.3.10.4 Empirical Types & Rational Types
| |
− | 07: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07455.html
| |
− | | |
− | JA: 1.3.10.5 Articulate Sentences
| |
− | 08: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07459.html
| |
− | 09: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07461.html
| |
− | | |
− | JA: 1.3.10.6 Stretching Principles
| |
− | 10: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07466.html
| |
− | 11: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07469.html
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Notes
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Note 0
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | JA = Jon Awbrey
| |
− | SZ = Steven Ericsson-Zenith
| |
− | | |
− | SZ: You generate a seemingly endless stream of "inquiry" -- some
| |
− | of which seems to ramble and some of which is quite facinating.
| |
− | | |
− | SZ: Now you have started to torture me with Nietzsche :)
| |
− | | |
− | SZ: I catch just enough of the stream to want to keep watching but
| |
− | I find I need a statement of systematic intent. I know it is
| |
− | inquiry into inquiry but can you summarise for me in brief
| |
− | where you want to go and how you intend to get there.
| |
− | | |
− | SZ: Are these the endless streets of Eurpoean cities in which we can
| |
− | occassionally find ourself lost, or do we wander a US city that
| |
− | has had the luxury of laying down a grid first?
| |
− | | |
− | This is the document formerly known as my dissertation proposal --
| |
− | in a system engineering program that I returned to school to do
| |
− | as a kind of capstone / 2nd childhood / unfinished symphony,
| |
− | mostly from '91 to '99. The formal beginning of it can be
| |
− | found starting here:
| |
− | | |
− | http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
| |
− | | |
− | But I think most folks on the SemioCom List had seen the earlier parts
| |
− | a couple of years ago, so I started at a point where I was starting
| |
− | to re-write some things slghtly clearer than the last time, I hope.
| |
− | | |
− | The immediate excuse/occasion of my thinking on this stuff again was
| |
− | the intermittent/interminable discussion that Bernard and I have been
| |
− | having on the nature of the "formalization arrow", plus many questions
| |
− | about what would constitute non-trivial examples of sign relations or
| |
− | truly significant applications of the pragmatic theory of signs, and
| |
− | what kind of conceptual/software architecture it would take to support
| |
− | thinking about this level of complexity. So I was trying to bring folks
| |
− | up to date with the "state of my art" (SOMA) circa 1996 before I ventured
| |
− | to return to those issues.
| |
− | | |
− | Don't worry overmuch about the Nietzsche -- the stuff that I put in epigraphs
| |
− | is called the "epitext", and it is often intended to serve more as an exercise
| |
− | in counterpoint, if not fugue, than as a statement of the main theme. Still,
| |
− | Freddy Nightmare was being remarkably Apollonian in these passages, I think.
| |
− | | |
− | Back to N'Orleans ...
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Note 1
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | JA = Jon Awbrey
| |
− | BM = Bernard Morand
| |
− | | |
− | Re: IDS 118. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001557.html
| |
− | In: IDS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
| |
− | | |
− | I will go ahead and start a reply but I have to be on the road
| |
− | to memorial day visits with out of town family in a little while,
| |
− | so I will continue later tonight.
| |
− | | |
− | I should explain that this document arose out of the communication
| |
− | situation with my advisor, committee, and other professors over the
| |
− | better part of a decade. These people had very good backgrounds in
| |
− | computer science, (control and optimal) systems engineering, and also
| |
− | mathematics. So they already had a sense of how scientific method and
| |
− | the formal sciences work, a sense of how they are applied in practical
| |
− | settings, and a sense of how one uses empirical and statistical methods
| |
− | to test the fitness of these applications on a recurring, incrementally
| |
− | self-correcting basis. So the train of inquiry is already in motion,
| |
− | and does not wait at the station for a good theory of how it works.
| |
− | No one is going to stop the train and fire up the boilers again
| |
− | from scratch. If I think that C.S. Peirce would make a better
| |
− | conductor or engineer for the locomotion of inquiry, and not
| |
− | just another "featherbedder" philosophy of science, I have
| |
− | to show what he contributes to what is already under way.
| |
− | That is to be contrasted with the epi-cartesian method
| |
− | of flagging down the train, tearing up the rails, and
| |
− | trying to justify its existence and motivation from
| |
− | a standstill.
| |
− | | |
− | At any rate, this is the problem that I continually faced
| |
− | in trying to write this erstwhile dissertation proposal,
| |
− | and it forced me to work in a very different way from
| |
− | anything that I had ever tried before, for instance,
| |
− | where I could pretend to begin by just writing down
| |
− | a bunch of axiomatic definitions as if it were the
| |
− | first day of creation, and then following up their
| |
− | consequences as best I could. Instead of doing
| |
− | that, I had to write my opera 'in medias res'.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Note 2
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | JA = Jon Awbrey
| |
− | BM = Bernard Morand
| |
− | | |
− | Re: IDS 118. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001557.html
| |
− | In: IDS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
| |
− | | |
− | JA: It is important to realize that a "sampling relation", to express it
| |
− | roughly, is a special case of a sign relation. Aside from acting on
| |
− | sign relations and creating an association between sign relations, a
| |
− | sampling relation is also involved in a larger sign relation, at least,
| |
− | it can be subsumed within a general order of sign relations that allows
| |
− | sign relations themselves to be taken as the objects, the signs, and the
| |
− | interpretants of what can be called a "higher order" (HO) sign relation.
| |
− | Considered with respect to its full potential, its use, and its purpose,
| |
− | a sampling relation does not fall outside the closure of sign relations.
| |
− | To be precise, a sampling relation falls within the denotative component
| |
− | of a higher order sign relation, since the sign relation sampled is the
| |
− | object of study and the sample is taken as a sign of it.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: I was away for the last whole week and I could not read your previous notes.
| |
− | This paragraph of what seems to be some prolegomena for further explanations
| |
− | caught my attention. A "sampling relation" can be subsumed within a general
| |
− | order of sign relations: well, you seem to define the sampling case as some
| |
− | kind of reverted hypostatic abstraction.
| |
− | | |
− | I may have to wait for you to explain what you mean by
| |
− | this "reverted hypostatic abstraction". In the meantime,
| |
− | what I am trying to say is this: If we approach "inquiry"
| |
− | as an empirical domain or a quasi-natural phenomenon, taking
| |
− | the word "inquiry" as a pointer to a certain field of activity
| |
− | going on in the world, then whatever theory of inquiry we may
| |
− | form will be based on our local sample of experience with this
| |
− | domain of practice. At least, this would be the starting gate
| |
− | in any other empirical domain. So the object is "all inquiry"
| |
− | and the sign is "our sample of experience with all inquiry".
| |
− | Indeed, we will ask whether the sample is "representative"
| |
− | of the object domain, and a sensible method will try to
| |
− | take steps to ensure that it is. Recall that the
| |
− | root "sem-" in Hippocrates, from whom Aristotle
| |
− | learned to appreciate abductive or diagnostic
| |
− | reasoning, connotes "sample" or "specimen".
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Or to refer to the replica device between a legisign and its
| |
− | sinsigns. If this is really your intend, you are missing a
| |
− | third, I think. Namely the fact that sampling involves to
| |
− | my sense particularizing much more than singularizing a
| |
− | general type.
| |
− | | |
− | Yes, we know that the sample is more particular than the object domain
| |
− | of interest, and thus gives us partial information. Indeed, since the
| |
− | notion of "inquiry" is a rational concept, the domain "inquiry" is not
| |
− | bounded by any finite experience or by all human experience together.
| |
− | Thus we have to take measures that give us confidence of collecting a
| |
− | "fair", "representative", or "typical" sample. This is only possible
| |
− | in the long run, of course. Our initial sample is likely to be wholly
| |
− | opportunistic and thus full of biases and "partialities".
| |
− | | |
− | This was partly the point of reverting to Aristotle's 'Peri Psyche' --
| |
− | we possess and exercise an aptitude for inquiry long before we have
| |
− | reflected on it sufficiently to formalize or objectify the smallest
| |
− | sample of it.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Note 3
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | JA = Jon Awbrey
| |
− | BM = Bernard Morand
| |
− | | |
− | Re: IDS 118. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001557.html
| |
− | In: IDS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Doing so, you surely get the benefit of applying the signhood properties
| |
− | to sample relations because you assume from the beginning the idea that
| |
− | they don't fall outside the closure of sign relations. This is the great
| |
− | deductive machinery used in inquiry. But aren't you dismissing from the
| |
− | start his other friends, induction and abduction? As your text appears
| |
− | to be a basic framework in order to inquire into inquiry, this would be
| |
− | a too severe restriction.
| |
− | | |
− | I am merely saying that we can learn about X in general
| |
− | by looking at examples of X, whether X is "inquiries" or
| |
− | "sign relations" or anything else. Reasoning by way of
| |
− | examples, analogies, or "paradigms" was classified by
| |
− | Aristotle as a mixed form of reasoning that combined
| |
− | induction of a rule and deduction of a similar fact,
| |
− | while Peirce gave a couple of different analyses of
| |
− | analogy that involved all three types of reasoning.
| |
− | So I do not know why you say it is all deductive.
| |
− | If one took the definition of a sign relation on
| |
− | the basis of an a priori dictate, or authority,
| |
− | then it might be so, but all sorts of abstract
| |
− | definitions turn out to be useless for a given
| |
− | purpose, and so Peirce's definition of a sign
| |
− | has to prove its usefulness in the effort to
| |
− | understand the object phenomena in question.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: From another side, it would throw tychism out of the picture:
| |
− | you know, these samples which have absolutely not any subsumers.
| |
− | | |
− | I did not understand this comment fully. But choosing
| |
− | random samples is a favorite way of getting fair ones.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Your precision in the last sentence of the paragraph doesn't make
| |
− | it more convenient in restricting sample relation to fall into the
| |
− | denotative component of HO. The term "component" would deserve to
| |
− | be itself defined: a restriction onto the !O! x !S! columns in L?
| |
− | | |
− | I made what seems like a simple observation, and hardly a novel one
| |
− | if one considers the etymology and a host of classical discussions.
| |
− | What use we make of the observation is another thing. I agree that
| |
− | the word "component" is very multi-purpose -- here I conformed to
| |
− | the usage that refers to factors of a product as "components",
| |
− | as distinct from the sense used in relational "composition".
| |
− | I plead the poverty of language.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: While I think that the component idea is at work in
| |
− | sign relations, splitting them into a denotative part
| |
− | and into another (?) connotative part would amount to
| |
− | presume the problem at hand already solved. Reference to
| |
− | components opens the difficult question (at least for me)
| |
− | of the effective properties of composition relationship.
| |
− | | |
− | I don't understand this. We are operating in a situation of
| |
− | partial information. We have focal sign relations that we can
| |
− | objectify enough to study in detail, learning at least something
| |
− | about the properties and variety of sign relations, at least some
| |
− | of which learning will apply to classes of sign relations beyond
| |
− | our immediate focus, perhaps even a little to the sign relation
| |
− | in which we are embedded when we consider the relation of these
| |
− | focal sign relations to the general class. Some people would
| |
− | call this a "hermeneutic circle", I think.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: In short, the sign relation sampled is not the object of study
| |
− | if it is not at the same time its interpretant, I think (and
| |
− | then the concept of model is just newly born!)
| |
− | | |
− | The objective class of interest is "all" sign relations.
| |
− | The sample that we have under the microscope is taken to
| |
− | provide us with information about the object domain of
| |
− | all sign relations, which it can do by virtue of the
| |
− | fact that it "represents" the object domain more or
| |
− | less well. If we transform the sample in some way,
| |
− | or act on the information that it provides, then
| |
− | we generate an interpretant sign of the sample.
| |
− | Yes, I agree with that. I will have to ask
| |
− | what sense of the word "model" you mean in
| |
− | this context, though.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Finally, what does it mean for a sample to be TAKEN AS a sign of
| |
− | some study? The difficulty seems to me that the answer presupposes
| |
− | the whole semiosis theory itself. I am not arguing here against the
| |
− | possibility of this method, I am just trying to say that it would be
| |
− | inaccurate to pretend escaping its complexity as a starting point.
| |
− | On the contrary, I think that to begin with the assumption of
| |
− | complexity will end (perhaps) into simplicity.
| |
− | | |
− | Yes, there is a shade of difference between passive experience,
| |
− | where we take the samples that come our way, willy nilly, and
| |
− | active experimentation, where we contrive to gather samples
| |
− | under more contrived or controlled conditions, but none of
| |
− | these variations are unique to the theory of signs or the
| |
− | theory of inquiry. I do not know how I can presuppose
| |
− | something that I am still in the middle of supposing.
| |
− | That is, I do not view the theory of sign relations
| |
− | or the theory of inquiry as finished products that
| |
− | I might presuppose, or what would be the point of
| |
− | an inquiry into their nature? I do have my pet
| |
− | hypotheses, of course, but they are uncertain.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Note 4
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | JA = Jon Awbrey
| |
− | BM = Bernard Morand
| |
− | | |
− | Re: IDS Discuss 1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001560.html
| |
− | In: IDS Discuss. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1560
| |
− | | |
− | JA: I should explain that this document arose out of the communication
| |
− | situation with my advisor, committee, and other professors over the
| |
− | better part of a decade. These people had very good backgrounds in
| |
− | computer science, (control and optimal) systems engineering, and also
| |
− | mathematics. So they already had a sense of how scientific method and
| |
− | the formal sciences work, a sense of how they are applied in practical
| |
− | settings, and a sense of how one uses empirical and statistical methods
| |
− | to test the fitness of these applications on a recurring, incrementally
| |
− | self-correcting basis. So the train of inquiry is already in motion,
| |
− | and does not wait at the station for a good theory of how it works.
| |
− | No one is going to stop the train and fire up the boilers again
| |
− | from scratch. If I think that C.S. Peirce would make a better
| |
− | conductor or engineer for the locomotion of inquiry, and not
| |
− | just another "featherbedder" philosophy of science, I have
| |
− | to show what he contributes to what is already under way.
| |
− | That is to be contrasted with the epi-cartesian method
| |
− | of flagging down the train, tearing up the rails, and
| |
− | trying to justify its existence and motivation from
| |
− | a standstill.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Agreed on the whole and the details, Jon. Except my suspicion
| |
− | for "empirical method" for which I prefer "experimental" but
| |
− | we already discussed that.
| |
− | | |
− | Okay. Those are basically synonyms to me. But I make no
| |
− | inference from "empirical" to "radically naive empiricism",
| |
− | or anything like that. Indeed, one of the principal jobs of
| |
− | this whole project, that began long before I started trying to
| |
− | document what I had been doing all along, was to integrate the
| |
− | empirical data-driven and rational concept-driven modes of work.
| |
− | Perhaps we could agree just between us -- I have already given up
| |
− | trying to convert the masses (= effete minds) -- that "empiricism"
| |
− | and "rationalism" are the names of heuristic attitudes, angles of
| |
− | approach to be adopted on alternate weekdays, not the brands of
| |
− | jealous religions that demand a fear and trembling either-or.
| |
− | | |
− | But I admit that I still see a residue of difference
| |
− | between passive and active experience that comes up
| |
− | all the time in the actual practice of research.
| |
− | It is why we have consent forms, for example.
| |
− | I had been meaning for a while now to take
| |
− | it up under a separate thread, entitled
| |
− | the "Lessons Of Play" (LOP), but I am
| |
− | not ready to say what I think yet.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Note 5
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | JA = Jon Awbrey
| |
− | BM = Bernard Morand
| |
− | | |
− | Re: IDS Discuss 3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001562.html
| |
− | In: IDS Discuss. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1560
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Doing so, you surely get the benefit of applying the signhood properties
| |
− | to sample relations because you assume from the beginning the idea that
| |
− | they don't fall outside the closure of sign relations. This is the great
| |
− | deductive machinery used in inquiry. But aren't you dismissing from the
| |
− | start his other friends, induction and abduction? As your text appears
| |
− | to be a basic framework in order to inquire into inquiry, this would be
| |
− | a too severe restriction.
| |
− | | |
− | JA: I am merely saying that we can learn about X in general
| |
− | by looking at examples of X, whether X is "inquiries" or
| |
− | "sign relations" or anything else.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: All the difficulty resides in the meaning of "example" I think.
| |
− | From which place can we judge that x is an example of some
| |
− | (partially determined) X? This will become even more
| |
− | difficult when we will have to make a selection
| |
− | between several candidates x_i for learning X.
| |
− | | |
− | That is why we begin with easy examples.
| |
− | | |
− | It looks like some kind of Zenoesque "impossibility
| |
− | of getting out of the starting blocks" difficulty here --
| |
− | before Achilles can take a step he has to take a semi-step,
| |
− | before he can take a semi-step he has to take a demi-semi-step,
| |
− | before he can take a demi-semi-step he has to take a hemi-demi-semi-step, ...
| |
− | | |
− | This is the influence of epi-cartesion thinking again,
| |
− | and I used to be sorely afflicted with it, so I know,
| |
− | but Peirce, and already Aristotle before him, gave us
| |
− | the way out with the abductive step of making a guess.
| |
− | We want to minimize our risk, of course, but there is
| |
− | an irreducible minimum of uncertainty that has to be
| |
− | tolerated if thought and action are not to remain in
| |
− | a state of utter paralysis.
| |
− | | |
− | So, can we read Peirce's definition of a sign relation and
| |
− | use it to pick out some concrete and simple examples of
| |
− | sign relations, or not? It's not much use if we can't.
| |
− | Can I point to some examples of "inquiry" that are so
| |
− | clearly examples of what we want to talk about that
| |
− | both I and my committee will agree that they fit
| |
− | the general description? Yes, though I might
| |
− | have to defer to their language to do so,
| |
− | calling it "research" or "applications
| |
− | of scientific method" just by way of
| |
− | getting out of the starting blocks.
| |
− | | |
− | If we get good at thinking about the simple examples,
| |
− | then it may be worth the trouble to try and tackle the
| |
− | harder cases. From my experience, 3-adic relations are
| |
− | so difficult to think about that it will take some help
| |
− | from software e-virons before we get much better at it.
| |
− | | |
− | JA: Reasoning by way of examples, analogies, or "paradigms" was classified by
| |
− | Aristotle as a mixed form of reasoning that combined induction of a rule
| |
− | and deduction of a similar fact, while Peirce gave a couple of different
| |
− | analyses of analogy that involved all three types of reasoning. So I do
| |
− | not know why you say it is all deductive. If one took the definition of
| |
− | a sign relation on the basis of an a priori dictate, or authority, then it
| |
− | might be so, but all sorts of abstract definitions turn out to be useless
| |
− | for a given purpose, and so Peirce's definition of a sign has to prove its
| |
− | usefulness in the effort to understand the object phenomena in question.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Agreed
| |
− | | |
− | BM: From another side, it would throw tychism out of the picture:
| |
− | you know, these samples which have absolutely not any subsumers.
| |
− | | |
− | JA: I did not understand this comment fully. But choosing
| |
− | random samples is a favorite way of getting fair ones.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: This is a very complex problem but it is at the heart of the question of
| |
− | induction. You certainly know that we can't elaborate true (absolute)
| |
− | random samples. It seems that we have to admit in consequence that
| |
− | probabilities fall into the domain of mathematics. The sampling
| |
− | procedures of statisticians fall into the domain of experimental
| |
− | sciences and both have to be not confused.
| |
− | | |
− | Yes, there is no reason to expect that inquiry into inquiry
| |
− | will be any less complex than inquiry into anything else,
| |
− | but I sense that I may have misunderstood your comment.
| |
− | | |
− | There are, of course, complications arising here over the difference
| |
− | between descriptive sciences and normative sciences and what mix of
| |
− | the two a particular person wants to focus on. But later, maybe.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Your precision in the last sentence of the paragraph doesn't make
| |
− | it more convenient in restricting sample relation to fall into the
| |
− | denotative component of HO. The term "component" would deserve to
| |
− | be itself defined: a restriction onto the !O! x !S! columns in L?
| |
− | | |
− | JA: I made what seems like a simple observation, and hardly a novel one
| |
− | if one considers the etymology and a host of classical discussions.
| |
− | What use we make of the observation is another thing. I agree that
| |
− | the word "component" is very multi-purpose -- here I conformed to
| |
− | the usage that refers to factors of a product as "components",
| |
− | as distinct from the sense used in relational "composition".
| |
− | I plead the poverty of language.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Hum. Could you expand a little bit? This is not very familiar to me.
| |
− | In relational composition, why does the relations couldn't be seen as
| |
− | the factors of a product?
| |
− | | |
− | All I can do here is note the variety of usage. People will often
| |
− | call the domains in a cartesian product or a direct product by the
| |
− | name of "components" and they will speak of the "decomposition" of
| |
− | a space X into the form of a product X = X_1 x ... x X_k, but not
| |
− | be thinking of functional composition or relational composition
| |
− | when they say this. I don't know any way around this, except
| |
− | to use adjectives in front of the ambiguous words whenever
| |
− | there's a chance of confusion.
| |
− | | |
− | If I have a 2-adic relation L that happens to be a composite of
| |
− | two other 2-adic relations, L = M o N, then I'd tend to say that
| |
− | L factors into M and N, or that M o N is "a" decomposition of L,
| |
− | but M and N are not "the" factors of L or "the" components of L,
| |
− | because we have no "unique factorization" theorem for relations
| |
− | in general. So maybe that explains the nuance of usage. Maybe.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: While I think that the component idea is at work in
| |
− | sign relations, splitting them into a denotative part
| |
− | and into another (?) connotative part would amount to
| |
− | presume the problem at hand already solved. Reference to
| |
− | components opens the difficult question (at least for me)
| |
− | of the effective properties of composition relationship.
| |
− | | |
− | JA: I don't understand this. We are operating in a situation of
| |
− | partial information. We have focal sign relations that we can
| |
− | objectify enough to study in detail, learning at least something
| |
− | about the properties and variety of sign relations, at least some
| |
− | of which learning will apply to classes of sign relations beyond
| |
− | our immediate focus, perhaps even a little to the sign relation
| |
− | in which we are embedded when we consider the relation of these
| |
− | focal sign relations to the general class. Some people would
| |
− | call this a "hermeneutic circle", I think.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Yes, this is the strategy of learning which amounts for me to what
| |
− | I poorly call synthesis. But there is its opposite too, analysis
| |
− | that goes backward and allows to explain facts. The whole secret
| |
− | of the method is articulating both of them together. Proceeding
| |
− | this way, there is no more circle but something like a spiral.
| |
− | | |
− | Yes, not all circles are vicious. I understand all these things
| |
− | on the model of recursive descent down to some basis that is so
| |
− | simple as to be immediate -- what we do in top-down programming
| |
− | or stepwise refinement -- and a spiral is a good image of that.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: On this point I am actually reading a book from K-O Apel
| |
− | "Expliquer-Comprendre: La controverse centrale des sciences
| |
− | humaines". It is a very fine book the first chapters of which
| |
− | are difficult to read but it's a very great illumination when
| |
− | arriving at the middle of the book. It is a French translation
| |
− | from German. I don't know if there is an English one.
| |
− | | |
− | I will see if I can find it.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: In short, the sign relation sampled is not the object of study
| |
− | if it is not at the same time its interpretant, I think (and then
| |
− | the concept of model is just newly born!)
| |
− | | |
− | JA: The objective class of interest is "all" sign relations.
| |
− | The sample that we have under the microscope is taken to
| |
− | provide us with information about the object domain of
| |
− | all sign relations, which it can do by virtue of the
| |
− | fact that it "represents" the object domain more or
| |
− | less well. If we transform the sample in some way,
| |
− | or act on the information that it provides, then
| |
− | we generate an interpretant sign of the sample.
| |
− | Yes, I agree with that. I will have to ask
| |
− | what sense of the word "model" you mean in
| |
− | this context, though.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: I think of it as a pure synonym for sign, in all contexts.
| |
− | And as for the case of signs there are 10 or 66 cases of
| |
− | models. This is just an intuition of mine, not a theorem :-)
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Finally, what does it mean for a sample to be TAKEN AS a sign of
| |
− | some study? The difficulty seems to me that the answer presupposes
| |
− | the whole semiosis theory itself. I am not arguing here against the
| |
− | possibility of this method, I am just trying to say that it would be
| |
− | inaccurate to pretend escaping its complexity as a starting point.
| |
− | On the contrary, I think that to begin with the assumption of
| |
− | complexity will end (perhaps) into simplicity.
| |
− | | |
− | JA: Yes, there is a shade of difference between passive experience,
| |
− | where we take the samples that come our way, willy nilly, and
| |
− | active experimentation, where we contrive to gather samples
| |
− | under more contrived or controlled conditions, but none of
| |
− | these variations are unique to the theory of signs or the
| |
− | theory of inquiry. I do not know how I can presuppose
| |
− | something that I am still in the middle of supposing.
| |
− | That is, I do not view the theory of sign relations
| |
− | or the theory of inquiry as finished products that
| |
− | I might presuppose, or what would be the point of
| |
− | an inquiry into their nature? I do have my pet
| |
− | hypotheses, of course, but they are uncertain.
| |
− | | |
− | BM: Yes. However I would add the following amendment. What any individual
| |
− | inquirer (you, me or him) necessarily presupposes is the totality of
| |
− | the previous inquiries. As such they aren't personal hypotheses,
| |
− | and they have to be rendered explicit. If it was not the case
| |
− | inquiry couldn't grow. We need them in order to be able to
| |
− | experiment with samples. Perhaps it is there that we are
| |
− | quite departing the one from the other.
| |
− | | |
− | That's kind of what I mean by 'in medias res'. But now the distinction
| |
− | between "consciously presuppose" and "unconsciously presuppose" raises
| |
− | its head. I recently had to invoke the term "quasi-belief" to discuss
| |
− | this issue. It can take a considerable effort of critical reflection
| |
− | to recognize that we are acting just as if certain propositions hold.
| |
− | Again, consider Aristotle's 3-fold:
| |
− | | |
− | | Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is
| |
− | | realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the
| |
− | | word actuality is used in two senses, illustrated
| |
− | | by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the
| |
− | | exercise of it (theorein).
| |
− | | |
− | I think that his reputation as dichotomous thinker is greatly exaggerated.
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Discussion Note 6
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | | |
− | 1. Introduction
| |
− | 1.1. Outline of the Project: Inquiry Into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.1.1. Problem
| |
− | 1.1.2. Method
| |
− | 1.1.2.1. The Paradigmatic and Process-Analytic Phase
| |
− | 1.1.2.2. The Paraphrastic and Faculty-Synthetic Phase
| |
− | 1.1.2.3. Reprise of Methods
| |
− | 1.1.3. Criterion
| |
− | 1.1.4. Application
| |
− | | |
− | 1.2. Onus of the Project: No Way But Inquiry
| |
− | 1.2.1. A Modulating Prelude
| |
− | 1.2.2. A Fugitive Canon
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3. Opening of the Project: A Way Up To Inquiry
| |
− | 1.3.1. Initial Analysis of Inquiry Allegro Aperto
| |
− | 1.3.2. Discussion of Discussion
| |
− | 1.3.3. Discussion of Formalization: General Topics
| |
− | 1.3.3.1. A Formal Charge
| |
− | 1.3.3.2. A Formalization of Formalization?
| |
− | 1.3.3.3. A Formalization of Discussion?
| |
− | 1.3.3.4. A Concept of Formalization
| |
− | 1.3.3.5. A Formal Approach
| |
− | 1.3.3.6. A Formal Development
| |
− | 1.3.3.7 A Formal Persuasion
| |
− | 1.3.4. Discussion of Formalization: Concrete Examples
| |
− | 1.3.4.1. Formal Models: A Sketch
| |
− | 1.3.4.2. Sign Relations: A Primer
| |
− | 1.3.4.3. Semiotic Equivalence Relations
| |
− | 1.3.4.4. Graphical Representations
| |
− | 1.3.4.5. Taking Stock
| |
− | 1.3.4.6. The "Meta" Question
| |
− | 1.3.4.7. Iconic Signs
| |
− | 1.3.4.8. The Conflict of Interpretations
| |
− | 1.3.4.9. Indexical Signs
| |
− | 1.3.4.10. Sundry Problems
| |
− | 1.3.4.11. Review and Prospect
| |
− | 1.3.4.12. Objective Plans & Levels
| |
− | 1.3.4.13. Formalization of OF: Objective Levels
| |
− | 1.3.4.14. Application of OF: Generic Level
| |
− | 1.3.4.15. Application of OF: Motive Level
| |
− | 1.3.4.16. The Integration of Frameworks
| |
− | 1.3.4.17. Recapitulation: A Brush with Symbols
| |
− | 1.3.4.18. C'est Moi
| |
− | 1.3.4.19. Entr'acte
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.5 Discussion of Formalization: Specific Objects
| |
− | 1.3.5.1 The Will to Form
| |
− | 1.3.5.2 The Forms of Reasoning
| |
− | 1.3.5.3 A Fork in the Road
| |
− | 1.3.5.4 A Forged Bond
| |
− | 1.3.5.5 A Formal Account
| |
− | 1.3.5.6 Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
| |
− | 1.3.5.7 Steps and Tests of Formalization
| |
− | 1.3.5.8 Puck, the Ref
| |
− | 1.3.5.9 Partial Formalizations
| |
− | 1.3.5.10 A Formal Utility
| |
− | 1.3.5.11 A Formal Aesthetic
| |
− | 1.3.5.12 A Formal Apology
| |
− | 1.3.5.13 A Formal Suspicion
| |
− | 1.3.5.14 The Double Aspect of Concepts
| |
− | 1.3.5.15 A Formal Permission
| |
− | 1.3.5.16 A Formal Invention
| |
− | 1.3.6 Recursion in Perpetuity
| |
− | 1.3.7 Processus, Regressus, Progressus
| |
− | 1.3.8 Rondeau Tempo di Menuetto
| |
− | 1.3.9 Reconnaissance
| |
− | 1.3.9.1 The Informal Context
| |
− | 1.3.9.2 The Epitext
| |
− | 1.3.9.3 The Formative Tension
| |
− | 1.3.10 Recurring Themes
| |
− | 1.3.10.1 Preliminary Notions
| |
− | 1.3.10.2 Intermediary Notions
| |
− | 1.3.10.3 Propositions and Sentences
| |
− | 1.3.10.4 Empirical Types and Rational Types
| |
− | 1.3.10.5 Articulate Sentences
| |
− | 1.3.10.6 Stretching Principles
| |
− | 1.3.10.7 Stretching Operations
| |
− | 1.3.10.8 The Cactus Patch
| |
− | 1.3.10.9 The Cactus Language: Syntax
| |
− | 1.3.10.10 The Cactus Language: Stylistics
| |
− | 1.3.10.11 The Cactus Language: Mechanics
| |
− | 1.3.10.12 The Cactus Language: Semantics
| |
− | 1.3.10.13 Stretching Exercises
| |
− | 1.3.10.14 Syntactic Transformations
| |
− | 1.3.10.15 Derived Equivalence Relations
| |
− | 1.3.10.16 Digression on Derived Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4 Outlook of the Project: All Ways Lead to Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1 The Matrix of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1.1 Inquiry as Conduct
| |
− | 1.4.1.2 Types of Conduct
| |
− | 1.4.1.3 Perils of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1.4 Forms of Relations
| |
− | 1.4.1.5 Models of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.2 The Moment of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.3 The Modes of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.3.1 Deductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.2 Inductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.3 Abductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.4 Analogical Reasoning
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5 Obstacles to the Project: In the Way of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.5.1 The Initial Unpleasantness
| |
− | 1.5.2 The Justification Trap
| |
− | 1.5.3 A Formal Apology
| |
− | 1.5.3.1 Category Double-Takes
| |
− | 1.5.3.2 Conceptual Extensions
| |
− | 1.5.3.3 Explosional Recombinations
| |
− | 1.5.3.4 Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 1.5.4 A Material Exigency
| |
− | 1.5.5 A Reconciliation of Accounts
| |
− | 1.5.6 Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
| |
− | 1.5.7 Empirical Considerations
| |
− | 1.5.8 Computational Considerations
| |
− | 1.5.8.1 A Form of Recursion
| |
− | 1.5.8.2 A Power of Abstraction
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6 Orientation of the Project: A Way Into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.1 Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.2 Terms of Analysis
| |
− | 1.6.2.1 Digression on Signs
| |
− | 1.6.2.2 Empirical Status of ID
| |
− | 1.6.3 Expansion of Terms
| |
− | 1.6.3.1 Agency
| |
− | 1.6.3.2 Abstraction
| |
− | 1.6.3.3 Analogy
| |
− | 1.6.3.4 Accuracy
| |
− | 1.6.3.5 Authenticity
| |
− | 1.6.4 Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
| |
− | 1.6.4.1 A Mistaken ID
| |
− | 1.6.4.2 Phenomenology of Doubt
| |
− | 1.6.4.3 Modalities of Knowledge
| |
− | 1.6.5 Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
| |
− | 1.6.6 Interpretive Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.1 Syntactic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.2 Semantic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.3 Pragmatic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.7 Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 1.6.7.1 A Definition of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.7.2 The Faculty of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.7.3 A Definition of Determination
| |
− | 1.6.7.4 A Definition of Definition
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7 Organization of the Project: A Way Through Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.1 The Problem: Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
| |
− | 1.7.2 The Method: Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
| |
− | 1.7.2.1 Conditions for the Possibility
| |
− | of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.2.2 Conditions for the Success of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.3 The Criterion: Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
| |
− | 1.7.3.1 The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test
| |
− | 1.7.3.2 Enabling Provision 1: The Scenes & Context of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.3.3 Enabling Provision 2: The Stages & Content of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.8 Objectives of the Project: Inquiry All the Way
| |
− | 1.8.1 Substantial Objective
| |
− | 1.8.1.1 Objective 1a: The Propositions as Types Analogy
| |
− | 1.8.1.2 Objective 1b: The Styles of Proof Development
| |
− | 1.8.1.3 Objective 1c: The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority
| |
− | 1.8.2 Instrumental Objective
| |
− | 1.8.3 Coordination of Objectives
| |
− | 1.8.4 Recapitulation -- Da Capo, Al Segno
| |
− | | |
− | 2. Discussion of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.1 Approaches to Inquiry
| |
− | 2.1.1 The Classical Framework: Syllogistic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.2 The Pragmatic Framework: Sign-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.3 The Dynamical Framework: System-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.3.1 Inquiry & Computation
| |
− | 2.1.3.2 Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 2.2 The Context of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.2.1 The Field of Observation
| |
− | 2.2.2 The Problem of Reflection
| |
− | 2.2.3 The Problem of Reconstruction
| |
− | 2.2.4 The Trivializing of Integration
| |
− | 2.2.5 Tensions in the Field of Observation
| |
− | 2.2.6 Problems of Representation & Communication
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3 The Conduct of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.3.1 Introduction
| |
− | 2.3.2 The Types of Reasoning
| |
− | 2.3.2.1 Deduction
| |
− | 2.3.2.2 Induction
| |
− | 2.3.2.3 Abduction
| |
− | 2.3.3 Hybrid Types of Inference
| |
− | 2.3.3.1 Analogy
| |
− | 2.3.3.2 Inquiry
| |
− | 2.3.4 Details of Induction
| |
− | 2.3.4.1 Learning
| |
− | 2.3.4.2 Transfer
| |
− | 2.3.4.3 Testing
| |
− | 2.3.5 The Stages of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 3. The Medium & Its Message
| |
− | 3.1 Reflective Expression
| |
− | 3.1.1 Casual Reflection
| |
− | 3.1.1.1 Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | 3.1.1.2 Analogical Recursion
| |
− | 3.1.2 Conscious Reflection
| |
− | 3.1.2.1 The Signal Moment
| |
− | 3.1.2.2 The Symbolic Object
| |
− | 3.1.2.3 The Endeavor to Communicate
| |
− | 3.1.2.4 The Medium of Communication
| |
− | 3.1.2.5 The Ark of Types:
| |
− | The Order of Things to Come.
| |
− | 3.1.2.6 The Epitext
| |
− | 3.1.2.7 The Context of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.1.2.8 The Formative Tension
| |
− | 3.1.2.9 The Vehicle of Communication:
| |
− | Reflection on the Scene,
| |
− | Reflection on the Self.
| |
− | 3.1.2.10 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.11 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.12 Recursions: Possible, Actual, Necessary
| |
− | 3.1.2.13 Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | 3.1.2.14 (3)
| |
− | 3.1.2.15 The Freedom of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.1.2.16 The Eternal Return
| |
− | 3.1.2.17 (1)
| |
− | 3.1.2.18 Information in Formation
| |
− | 3.1.2.19 Reflectively Indexical Texts
| |
− | 3.1.2.20 (4)
| |
− | 3.1.2.21 (5)
| |
− | 3.1.2.22 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.23 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.24 (8)
| |
− | 3.1.2.25 The Discursive Universe
| |
− | 3.1.2.26 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.27 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.28 (5)
| |
− | 3.1.2.29 (4)
| |
− | 3.1.2.30 (3)
| |
− | 3.1.2.31 (2)
| |
− | 3.1.2.32 (1)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2 Reflective Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.1 Integrity and Unity of Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.2 Apparitions & Allegations
| |
− | 3.2.3 A Reflective Heuristic
| |
− | 3.2.4 Either/Or: A Sense of Absence
| |
− | 3.2.5 Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
| |
− | 3.2.6 Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
| |
− | 3.2.7 Synthetic A Priori Truths
| |
− | 3.2.8 Priorisms of Normative Sciences
| |
− | 3.2.9 Principle of Rational Action
| |
− | 3.2.10 The Pragmatic Cosmos
| |
− | 3.2.11 Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 3.2.11.1 Principals Versus Principles
| |
− | 3.2.11.2 The Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.11.3 An Early Description of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.2.11.4 Descriptions of the Mind
| |
− | 3.2.11.5 Of Signs & the Mind
| |
− | 3.2.11.6 Questions of Justification
| |
− | 3.2.11.7 The Experience of Satisfaction
| |
− | 3.2.11.8 An Organizational Difficulty
| |
− | 3.2.11.9 Pragmatic Certainties
| |
− | 3.2.11.10 Problems & Methods
| |
− | | |
− | 3.3 Reflection on Reflection
| |
− | 3.4 Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 3.4.1 The Phenomenology of Reflection
| |
− | 3.4.2 A Candid Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.3 A Projective Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.4 A Formal Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.5 Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
| |
− | 3.4.6 Basic Notions of Group Theory
| |
− | 3.4.7 Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
| |
− | 3.4.8 A Perspective on Computation
| |
− | 3.4.9 Higher Order Sign Relations: Introduction
| |
− | 3.4.10 Higher Order Sign Relations: Examples
| |
− | 3.4.11 Higher Order Sign Relations: Application
| |
− | 3.4.12 Issue 1: The Status of Signs
| |
− | 3.4.13 Issue 2: The Status of Sets
| |
− | 3.4.14 Issue 3: The Status of Variables
| |
− | 3.4.15 Propositional Calculus
| |
− | 3.4.16 Recursive Aspects
| |
− | 3.4.17 Patterns of Self-Reference
| |
− | 3.4.18 Practical Intuitions
| |
− | 3.4.19 Examples of Self-Reference
| |
− | 3.4.20 Three Views of Systems
| |
− | 3.4.21 Building Bridges Between Representations
| |
− | 3.4.22 Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.23 Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.24 Literal Intensional Representations
| |
− | 3.4.25 Analytic Intensional Representations
| |
− | 3.4.26 Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
| |
− | 3.4.27 Differential Logic & Group Operations
| |
− | 3.4.28 The Bridge: From Obstruction to Opportunity
| |
− | 3.4.29 Projects of Representation
| |
− | 3.4.30 Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
| |
− | 3.4.31 Generic Orders of Relations
| |
− | 3.4.32 Partiality: Selective Operations
| |
− | 3.4.33 Sign Relational Complexes
| |
− | 3.4.34 Set-Theoretic Constructions
| |
− | 3.4.35 Reducibility of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.36 Irreducibly Triadic Relations
| |
− | 3.4.37 Propositional Types
| |
− | 3.4.38 Considering the Source
| |
− | 3.4.39 Prospective Indices: Pointers to Future Work
| |
− | 3.4.40 Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | 3.4.41 Elective & Motive Forces
| |
− | 3.4.42 Sign Processes: A Start
| |
− | 3.4.43 Reflective Extensions
| |
− | 3.4.44 Reflections on Closure
| |
− | 3.4.45 Intelligence => Critical Reflection
| |
− | 3.4.46 Looking Ahead
| |
− | 3.4.47 Mutually Intelligible Codes
| |
− | 3.4.48 Discourse Analysis: Ways & Means
| |
− | 3.4.49 Combinations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.50 Revisiting the Source
| |
− | 3.5 Divertimento:
| |
− | Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
| |
− | 3.5.1 Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
| |
− | 3.5.2 Searching for Parameters
| |
− | 3.5.3 Defect Analysis
| |
− | 3.5.4 The Pragmatic Critique
| |
− | 3.5.5 Pragmatic Operating Notions
| |
− | 3.5.6 Defects of Presentation
| |
− | 3.5.7 Dues to Process
| |
− | 3.5.8 Duties to Purpose
| |
− | 3.6 Computational Design Philosophy
| |
− | 3.6.1 Intentional Objects & Attitudes
| |
− | 3.6.2 Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
| |
− | 3.6.3 Propositional Reasoning About Relations
| |
− | 3.6.4 Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | 3.6.5 Discussion of Examples
| |
− | 3.6.6 Information & Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 4. Overview of the Domain: Interpretive Inquiry
| |
− | 4.1 Interpretive Bearings: Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
| |
− | 4.1.1 Catwalks: Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
| |
− | 4.1.1.1 Eponymous Ancestors:
| |
− | The Precursors of Abstraction?
| |
− | 4.1.1.2 Reticles:
| |
− | Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue.
| |
− | 4.1.2 Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
| |
− | 4.2 Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 4.2.1 The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
| |
− | 4.2.1.1 Sign Relations
| |
− | 4.2.1.2 Types of Signs
| |
− | 4.2.2 The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
| |
− | 4.2.2.1 Abduction
| |
− | 4.2.2.2 Deduction
| |
− | 4.2.2.3 Induction
| |
− | 4.3 Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 4.3.1 "Index": A Program for Learning Formal Languages
| |
− | 4.3.2 "Study": A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
| |
− | 5. Discussion & Development of Objectives
| |
− | 5.1 Objective 1a: Propositions as Types
| |
− | 5.2 Objective 1b: Proof Styles & Developments
| |
− | 5.3 Objective 1c: Interpretation & Authority
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | Jon Awbrey, "Inquiry Driven Systems: Inquiry Into Inquiry"
| |
− | IDS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
| |
− | IDS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1564
| |
− | IDS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/thread.html#1574
| |
− | IDS. http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.12. Objective Plans and Levels
| |
− | IDS 46. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001485.html
| |
− | IDS 47. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001486.html
| |
− | IDS 48. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001487.html
| |
− | IDS 49. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001488.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.13. Formalization of OF: Objective Levels
| |
− | IDS 50. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001489.html
| |
− | IDS 51. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001490.html
| |
− | IDS 52. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001491.html
| |
− | IDS 53. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001492.html
| |
− | IDS 54. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001493.html
| |
− | IDS 55. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001494.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.14. Application of OF: Generic Level
| |
− | IDS 56. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001495.html
| |
− | IDS 57. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001496.html
| |
− | IDS 58. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001497.html
| |
− | IDS 59. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001498.html
| |
− | IDS 60. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001499.html
| |
− | IDS 61. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001500.html
| |
− | IDS 62. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001501.html
| |
− | IDS 63. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001502.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.15. Application of OF: Motive Level
| |
− | IDS 64. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001503.html
| |
− | IDS 65. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001504.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.16. The Integration of Frameworks
| |
− | IDS 66. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001505.html
| |
− | IDS 67. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001506.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.17. Recapitulation: A Brush with Symbols
| |
− | IDS 68. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001507.html
| |
− | IDS 69. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001508.html
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3.4.18. C'est Moi
| |
− | IDS 70. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001509.html
| |
− | IDS 71. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001510.html
| |
− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- 2004
| |
− | | |
− | 000. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1434
| |
− | 000. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1564
| |
− | 000. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/thread.html#1574
| |
− | | |
− | 001. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001434.html
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− | 002. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001435.html
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− | 003. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001436.html
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− | 004. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001437.html
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− | 005. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001438.html
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− | 006. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001439.html
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− | 007. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001440.html
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− | 008. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001441.html
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− | 009. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001442.html
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− | 010. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001443.html
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− | 011. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001444.html
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− | 012. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001448.html
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− | 013. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001449.html
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− | 014. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001450.html
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− | 015. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001451.html
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− | 016. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001452.html
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− | 017. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001453.html
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− | 018. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001454.html
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− | 019. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001455.html
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− | 020. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001457.html
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− | 021. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001458.html
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− | 022. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001459.html
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− | 023. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001460.html
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− | 024. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001461.html
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− | 025. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001462.html
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− | 026. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001463.html
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− | 027. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001464.html
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− | 028. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001465.html
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− | 029. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001466.html
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− | 030. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001467.html
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− | 031. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001468.html
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− | 032. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001469.html
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− | 033. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001470.html
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− | 034. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001471.html
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− | 035. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001472.html
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− | 036. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001473.html
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− | 037. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001474.html
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− | 038. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001475.html
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− | 039. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001478.html
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− | 040. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001479.html
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− | 041. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001480.html
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− | 042. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001481.html
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− | 043. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001482.html
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− | 044. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001483.html
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− | 045. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001484.html
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− | 046. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001485.html
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− | 047. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001486.html
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− | 048. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001487.html
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− | 049. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001488.html
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− | 050. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001489.html
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− | 051. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001490.html
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− | 052. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001491.html
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− | 053. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001492.html
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− | 054. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001493.html
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− | 055. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001494.html
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− | 056. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001495.html
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− | 057. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001496.html
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− | 058. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001497.html
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− | 059. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001498.html
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− | 060. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001499.html
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− | 061. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001500.html
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− | 062. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001501.html
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− | 063. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001502.html
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− | 064. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001503.html
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− | 065. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001504.html
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− | 066. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001505.html
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− | 067. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001506.html
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− | 068. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001507.html
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− | 069. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001508.html
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− | 070. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001509.html
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− | 071. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001510.html
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− | 072. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001511.html
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− | 073. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001512.html
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− | 074. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001513.html
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− | 075. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001514.html
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− | 076. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001515.html
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− | 077. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001516.html
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− | 078. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001517.html
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− | 079. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001518.html
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− | 080. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001519.html
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− | 081. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001520.html
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− | 082. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001521.html
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− | 083. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001522.html
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− | 084. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001523.html
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− | 085. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001524.html
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− | 086. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001525.html
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− | 087. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001526.html
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− | 088. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001527.html
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− | 089. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001528.html
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− | 090. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001529.html
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− | 091. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001530.html
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− | 092. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001531.html
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− | 093. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001532.html
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− | 094. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001533.html
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− | 095. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001534.html
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− | 096. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001535.html
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− | 097. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001536.html
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− | 098. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001537.html
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− | 099. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001538.html
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− | 100. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001539.html
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− | 101. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001540.html
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− | 102. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001541.html
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− | 103. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001542.html
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− | 127. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001571.html
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− | 128. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001572.html
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− | 129. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001573.html
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− | 130. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001574.html
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− | 131. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001575.html
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− | 132. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001577.html
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− | 133. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001578.html
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− | 134. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001579.html
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− | 135. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001580.html
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− | 136. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001581.html
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− | 137. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001582.html
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− | 138. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001583.html
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− | 139. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001584.html
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− | 140. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001585.html
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− | 141. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001586.html
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− | 142. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001587.html
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− | 143. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001588.html
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− | 144. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001589.html
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− | 145. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001590.html
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− | 146. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001591.html
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− | 147. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001592.html
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− | 148. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001593.html
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− | 149. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001594.html
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− | 150. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001595.html
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− | 151. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001596.html
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− | 152. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001597.html
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− | 153. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001598.html
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− | 154. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001599.html
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− | 155. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001600.html
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− | 156. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001601.html
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− | 157. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001602.html
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− | 158. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001603.html
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− | 159. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001604.html
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− | 160. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001605.html
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− | 161. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001606.html
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− | 162. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001607.html
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− | 163. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001608.html
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− | 164. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001609.html
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− | 165. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001610.html
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− | 166. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001611.html
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− | 167. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001612.html
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− | 168. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001613.html
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− | 169. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001614.html
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− | 170. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001615.html
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− | 171. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001616.html
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− | 172. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001617.html
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− | 173. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001618.html
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− | 174. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001623.html
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− | 175. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001629.html
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− | 176.
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− | | |
− | IDS. Inquiry Driven Systems -- Discussion
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− | | |
− | 00. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/thread.html#1560
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− | 00. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/thread.html#1576
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− | | |
− | 01. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001560.html
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− | 02. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001561.html
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− | 03. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001562.html
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− | 04. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-May/001563.html
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− | 05. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-June/001576.html
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− | 06.
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− | | |
− | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| |
− | </pre>
| |
− | | |
− | ==Outline==
| |
− | | |
− | <pre>
| |
− | Inquiry Driven Systems (07 Apr 2003)
| |
− | 1. Research Proposal
| |
− | 1.1 Outline of the Project : Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 1.1.1 Problem
| |
− | 1.1.2 Method
| |
− | 1.1.2.1 The Paradigmatic & Process-Analytic Phase.
| |
− | 1.1.2.2 The Paraphrastic & Faculty-Synthetic Phase.
| |
− | 1.1.2.3 Reprise of Methods
| |
− | 1.1.3 Criterion
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− | 1.1.4 Application
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− | 1.2 Onus of the Project : No Way But Inquiry
| |
− | 1.2.1 A Modulating Prelude
| |
− | 1.2.2 A Fugitive Canon
| |
− | | |
− | 1.3 Option of the Project : A Way Up To Inquiry
| |
− | 1.3.1 Initial Analysis of Inquiry : Allegro Aperto
| |
− | 1.3.2 Discussion of Discussion
| |
− | 1.3.3 Discussion of Formalization : General Topics
| |
− | 1.3.3.1 A Formal Charge
| |
− | 1.3.3.2 A Formalization of Formalization?
| |
− | 1.3.3.3 A Formalization of Discussion?
| |
− | 1.3.3.4 A Concept of Formalization
| |
− | 1.3.3.5 A Formal Approach
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− | 1.3.3.6 A Formal Development
| |
− | 1.3.3.7 A Formal Persuasion
| |
− | 1.3.4 Discussion of Formalization : Concrete Examples
| |
− | 1.3.4.1 Formal Models : A Sketch
| |
− | 1.3.4.2 Sign Relations : A Primer
| |
− | 1.3.4.3 Semiotic Equivalence Relations
| |
− | 1.3.4.4 Graphical Representations
| |
− | 1.3.4.5 Taking Stock
| |
− | 1.3.4.6 The "Meta" Question
| |
− | 1.3.4.7 Iconic Signs
| |
− | 1.3.4.8 The Conflict of Interpretations
| |
− | 1.3.4.9 Indexical Signs
| |
− | 1.3.4.10 Sundry Problems
| |
− | 1.3.4.11 Review & Prospect
| |
− | 1.3.4.12 Objective Plans & Levels
| |
− | 1.3.4.13 Formalization of OF : Objective Levels
| |
− | 1.3.4.14 Application of OF : Generic Level
| |
− | 1.3.4.15 Application of OF : Motive Level
| |
− | 1.3.4.16 The Integration of Frameworks
| |
− | 1.3.4.17 Recapitulation : A Brush with Symbols
| |
− | 1.3.4.18 C'est Moi
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− | 1.3.4.19 Entr'acte
| |
− | 1.3.5 Discussion of Formalization : Specific Objects
| |
− | 1.3.5.1 The Will to Form
| |
− | 1.3.5.2 The Forms of Reasoning
| |
− | 1.3.5.3 A Fork in the Road
| |
− | 1.3.5.4 A Forged Bond
| |
− | 1.3.5.5 A Formal Account
| |
− | 1.3.5.6 Analogs, Icons, Models, Surrogates
| |
− | 1.3.5.7 Steps & Tests of Formalization
| |
− | 1.3.5.8 Puck, the Ref
| |
− | 1.3.5.9 Partial Formalizations
| |
− | 1.3.5.10 A Formal Utility
| |
− | 1.3.5.11 A Formal Aesthetic
| |
− | 1.3.5.12 A Formal Apology
| |
− | 1.3.5.13 A Formal Suspicion
| |
− | 1.3.5.14 The Double Aspect of Concepts
| |
− | 1.3.5.15 A Formal Permission
| |
− | 1.3.5.16 A Formal Invention
| |
− | 1.3.6 Recursion in Perpetuity
| |
− | 1.3.7 Processus, Regressus, Progressus
| |
− | 1.3.8 Rondeau : Tempo di Menuetto
| |
− | 1.3.9 Reconnaissance
| |
− | 1.3.9.1 The Informal Context
| |
− | 1.3.9.2 The Epitext
| |
− | 1.3.9.3 The Formative Tension
| |
− | 1.3.10 Recurring Themes
| |
− | 1.3.10.1 Preliminary Notions
| |
− | 1.3.10.2 Intermediary Notions
| |
− | 1.3.10.3 Propositions & Sentences
| |
− | 1.3.10.4 Empirical Types & Rational Types
| |
− | 1.3.10.5 Articulate Sentences
| |
− | 1.3.10.6 Stretching Principles
| |
− | 1.3.10.7 Stretching Operations
| |
− | 1.3.10.8 The Cactus Patch
| |
− | 1.3.10.9 The Cactus Language : Syntax
| |
− | 1.3.10.10 The Cactus Language : Stylistics
| |
− | 1.3.10.11 The Cactus Language : Mechanics
| |
− | 1.3.10.12 The Cactus Language : Semantics
| |
− | 1.3.10.13 Stretching Exercises
| |
− | 1.3.10.14 Syntactic Transformations
| |
− | 1.3.10.15 Derived Equivalence Relations
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− | 1.3.10.16 Digression on Derived Relations
| |
− | | |
− | 1.4 Outlook of the Project : All Ways Lead to Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1 The Matrix of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1.1 Inquiry as Conduct
| |
− | 1.4.1.2 Types of Conduct
| |
− | 1.4.1.3 Perils of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.1.4 Forms of Relations
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− | 1.4.1.5 Models of Inquiry
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− | 1.4.2 The Moment of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.3 The Modes of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.4.3.1 Deductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.2 Inductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.3 Abductive Reasoning
| |
− | 1.4.3.4 Analogical Reasoning
| |
− | ...
| |
− | | |
− | 1.5 Obstacles to the Project : In the Way of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.5.1 The Initial Unpleasantness
| |
− | 1.5.2 The Justification Trap
| |
− | 1.5.3 A Formal Apology
| |
− | 1.5.3.1 Category Double-Takes
| |
− | 1.5.3.2 Conceptual Extensions
| |
− | 1.5.3.3 Explosional Recombinations
| |
− | 1.5.3.4 Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 1.5.4 A Material Exigency
| |
− | 1.5.5 A Reconciliation of Accounts
| |
− | 1.5.6 Objections to Reflexive Inquiry
| |
− | 1.5.7 Empirical Considerations
| |
− | 1.5.8 Computational Considerations
| |
− | 1.5.8.1 A Form of Recursion
| |
− | 1.5.8.2 A Power of Abstraction
| |
− | | |
− | 1.6 Orientation of the Project : A Way Into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.1 Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.2 Terms of Analysis
| |
− | 1.6.2.1 Digression on Signs
| |
− | 1.6.2.2 Empirical Status of ID
| |
− | 1.6.3 Expansion of Terms
| |
− | 1.6.3.1 Agency
| |
− | 1.6.3.2 Abstraction
| |
− | 1.6.3.3 Analogy
| |
− | 1.6.3.4 Accuracy
| |
− | 1.6.3.5 Authenticity
| |
− | 1.6.4 Anchoring Terms in Phenomena
| |
− | 1.6.4.1 A Mistaken ID
| |
− | 1.6.4.2 Phenomenology of Doubt
| |
− | 1.6.4.3 Modalities of Knowledge
| |
− | 1.6.5 Sets, Systems, & Substantive Agents
| |
− | 1.6.6 Interpretive Systems
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− | 1.6.6.1 Syntactic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.2 Semantic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.6.3 Pragmatic Systems
| |
− | 1.6.7 Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 1.6.7.1 A Definition of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.7.2 The Faculty of Inquiry
| |
− | 1.6.7.3 A Definition of Determination
| |
− | 1.6.7.4 A Definition of Definition
| |
− | | |
− | 1.7 Organization of the Project : A Way Through Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.1 The Problem : Inquiry Found as an Object of Study
| |
− | 1.7.2 The Method : Inquiry Found as a Means of Study
| |
− | 1.7.2.1 Conditions for the Possibility
| |
− | of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.2.2 Conditions for the Success
| |
− | of Inquiry into Inquiry
| |
− | 1.7.3 The Criterion : Inquiry in Search of a Sensible End
| |
− | 1.7.3.1 The Irritation of Doubt, and The Scratch Test.
| |
− | 1.7.3.2 Enabling Provision 1 : The Scenes & Context of Inquiry.
| |
− | 1.7.3.3 Enabling Provision 2 : The Stages & Content of Inquiry.
| |
− | 1.8 Objectives of the Project : Inquiry All the Way
| |
− | 1.8.1 Substantial Objective
| |
− | 1.8.1.1 Objective 1a : The Propositions as Types Analogy.
| |
− | 1.8.1.2 Objective 1b : The Styles of Proof Development.
| |
− | 1.8.1.3 Objective 1c : The Analysis of Interpreters, or A Problem with Authority.
| |
− | 1.8.2 Instrumental Objective
| |
− | 1.8.3 Coordination of Objectives
| |
− | 1.8.4 Recapitulation : Da Capo, Al Segno
| |
− | | |
− | 2. Discussion of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.1 Approaches to Inquiry
| |
− | 2.1.1 The Classical Framework : Syllogistic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.2 The Pragmatic Framework : Sign-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.3 The Dynamical Framework : System-Theoretic Approaches
| |
− | 2.1.3.1 Inquiry & Computation
| |
− | 2.1.3.2 Inquiry Driven Systems
| |
− | 2.2 The Context of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.2.1 The Field of Observation
| |
− | 2.2.2 The Problem of Reflection
| |
− | 2.2.3 The Problem of Reconstruction
| |
− | 2.2.4 The Trivializing of Integration
| |
− | 2.2.5 Tensions in the Field of Observation
| |
− | 2.2.6 Problems of Representation & Communication
| |
− | | |
− | 2.3 The Conduct of Inquiry
| |
− | 2.3.1 Introduction
| |
− | 2.3.2 The Types of Reasoning
| |
− | 2.3.2.1 Deduction
| |
− | 2.3.2.2 Induction
| |
− | 2.3.2.3 Abduction
| |
− | 2.3.3 Hybrid Types of Inference
| |
− | 2.3.3.1 Analogy
| |
− | 2.3.3.2 Inquiry
| |
− | 2.3.4 Details of Induction
| |
− | 2.3.4.1 Learning
| |
− | 2.3.4.2 Transfer
| |
− | 2.3.4.3 Testing
| |
− | 2.3.5 The Stages of Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 3. The Medium & Its Message
| |
− | 3.1 Reflective Expression
| |
− | 3.1.1 Casual Reflection
| |
− | 3.1.1.1 Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | 3.1.1.2 Analogical Recursion
| |
− | 3.1.2 Conscious Reflection
| |
− | 3.1.2.1 The Signal Moment
| |
− | 3.1.2.2 The Symbolic Object
| |
− | 3.1.2.3 The Endeavor to Communicate
| |
− | 3.1.2.4 The Medium of Communication
| |
− | 3.1.2.5 The Ark of Types : The Order of Things to Come.
| |
− | 3.1.2.6 The Epitext
| |
− | 3.1.2.7 The Context of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.1.2.8 The Formative Tension
| |
− | 3.1.2.9 The Vehicle of Communication :
| |
− | Reflection on the Scene,
| |
− | Reflection on the Self.
| |
− | 3.1.2.10 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.11 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.12 Recursions : Possible, Actual, Necessary
| |
− | 3.1.2.13 Ostensibly Recursive Texts
| |
− | 3.1.2.14 (3)
| |
− | 3.1.2.15 The Freedom of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.1.2.16 The Eternal Return
| |
− | 3.1.2.17 (1)
| |
− | 3.1.2.18 Information in Formation
| |
− | 3.1.2.19 Reflectively Indexical Texts
| |
− | 3.1.2.20 (4)
| |
− | 3.1.2.21 (5)
| |
− | 3.1.2.22 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.23 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.24 (8)
| |
− | 3.1.2.25 The Discursive Universe
| |
− | 3.1.2.26 (7)
| |
− | 3.1.2.27 (6)
| |
− | 3.1.2.28 (5)
| |
− | 3.1.2.29 (4)
| |
− | 3.1.2.30 (3)
| |
− | 3.1.2.31 (2)
| |
− | 3.1.2.32 (1)
| |
− | | |
− | 3.2 Reflective Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.1 Integrity & Unity of Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.2 Apparitions & Allegations
| |
− | 3.2.3 A Reflective Heuristic
| |
− | 3.2.4 Either/Or : A Sense of Absence
| |
− | 3.2.5 Apparent, Occasional, & Practical Necessity
| |
− | 3.2.6 Approaches, Aspects, Exposures, Fronts
| |
− | 3.2.7 Synthetic A Priori Truths
| |
− | 3.2.8 Priorisms of Normative Sciences
| |
− | 3.2.9 Principle of Rational Action
| |
− | 3.2.10 The Pragmatic Cosmos
| |
− | 3.2.11 Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 3.2.11.1 Principals Versus Principles
| |
− | 3.2.11.2 The Initial Description of Inquiry
| |
− | 3.2.11.3 An Early Description of Interpretation
| |
− | 3.2.11.4 Descriptions of the Mind
| |
− | 3.2.11.5 Of Signs & the Mind
| |
− | 3.2.11.6 Questions of Justification
| |
− | 3.2.11.7 The Experience of Satisfaction
| |
− | 3.2.11.8 An Organizational Difficulty
| |
− | 3.2.11.9 Pragmatic Certainties
| |
− | 3.2.11.10 Problems & Methods
| |
− | | |
− | 3.3 Reflection on Reflection
| |
− | 3.4 Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
| |
− | 3.4.1 The Phenomenology of Reflection
| |
− | 3.4.2 A Candid Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.3 A Projective Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.4 A Formal Point of View
| |
− | 3.4.5 Three Styles of Linguistic Usage
| |
− | 3.4.6 Basic Notions of Group Theory
| |
− | 3.4.7 Basic Notions of Formal Language Theory
| |
− | 3.4.8 A Perspective on Computation
| |
− | 3.4.9 Higher Order Sign Relations : Introduction
| |
− | 3.4.10 Higher Order Sign Relations : Examples
| |
− | 3.4.11 Higher Order Sign Relations : Application
| |
− | 3.4.12 Issue 1 : The Status of Signs
| |
− | 3.4.13 Issue 2 : The Status of Sets
| |
− | 3.4.14 Issue 3 : The Status of Variables
| |
− | 3.4.15 Propositional Calculus
| |
− | 3.4.16 Recursive Aspects
| |
− | 3.4.17 Patterns of Self-Reference
| |
− | 3.4.18 Practical Intuitions
| |
− | 3.4.19 Examples of Self-Reference
| |
− | 3.4.20 Three Views of Systems
| |
− | 3.4.21 Building Bridges Between Representations
| |
− | 3.4.22 Extensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.23 Intensional Representations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.24 Literal Intensional Representations
| |
− | 3.4.25 Analytic Intensional Representations
| |
− | 3.4.26 Differential Logic & Directed Graphs
| |
− | 3.4.27 Differential Logic & Group Operations
| |
− | 3.4.28 The Bridge : From Obstruction to Opportunity
| |
− | 3.4.29 Projects of Representation
| |
− | 3.4.30 Connected, Integrated, Reflective Symbols
| |
− | 3.4.31 Generic Orders of Relations
| |
− | 3.4.32 Partiality : Selective Operations
| |
− | 3.4.33 Sign Relational Complexes
| |
− | 3.4.34 Set-Theoretic Constructions
| |
− | 3.4.35 Reducibility of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.36 Irreducibly Triadic Relations
| |
− | 3.4.37 Propositional Types
| |
− | 3.4.38 Considering the Source
| |
− | 3.4.39 Prospective Indices : Pointers to Future Work
| |
− | 3.4.40 Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | 3.4.41 Elective & Motive Forces
| |
− | 3.4.42 Sign Processes : A Start
| |
− | 3.4.43 Reflective Extensions
| |
− | 3.4.44 Reflections on Closure
| |
− | 3.4.45 Intelligence => Critical Reflection
| |
− | 3.4.46 Looking Ahead
| |
− | 3.4.47 Mutually Intelligible Codes
| |
− | 3.4.48 Discourse Analysis : Ways & Means
| |
− | 3.4.49 Combinations of Sign Relations
| |
− | 3.4.50 Revisiting the Source
| |
− | 3.5 Divertimento : Eternity in Love with the Creatures of Time
| |
− | 3.5.1 Reflections on the Presentation of Examples
| |
− | 3.5.2 Searching for Parameters
| |
− | 3.5.3 Defect Analysis
| |
− | 3.5.4 The Pragmatic Critique
| |
− | 3.5.5 Pragmatic Operating Notions
| |
− | 3.5.6 Defects of Presentation
| |
− | 3.5.7 Dues to Process
| |
− | 3.5.8 Duties to Purpose
| |
− | 3.6 Computational Design Philosophy
| |
− | 3.6.1 Intentional Objects & Attitudes
| |
− | 3.6.2 Imperfect Design & Persistent Error
| |
− | 3.6.3 Propositional Reasoning About Relations
| |
− | 3.6.4 Dynamic & Evaluative Frameworks
| |
− | 3.6.5 Discussion of Examples
| |
− | 3.6.6 Information & Inquiry
| |
− | | |
− | 4. Overview of the Domain : Interpretive Inquiry
| |
− | 4.1 Interpretive Bearings : Conceptual & Descriptive Frameworks
| |
− | 4.1.1 Catwalks : Flexible Frameworks & Peripatetic Categories
| |
− | 4.1.1.1 Eponymous Ancestors : The Precursors of Abstraction?
| |
− | 4.1.1.2 Reticles : Interpretive Flexibility as a Design Issue.
| |
− | 4.1.2 Heuristic Inclinations & Regulative Principles
| |
− | 4.2 Features of Inquiry Driven Systems
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− | 4.2.1 The Pragmatic Theory of Signs
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− | 4.2.1.1 Sign Relations
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− | 4.2.1.2 Types of Signs
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− | 4.2.2 The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry
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− | 4.2.2.1 Abduction
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− | 4.2.2.2 Deduction
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− | 4.2.2.3 Induction
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− | 4.3 Examples of Inquiry Driven Systems
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− | 4.3.1 "Index" : A Program for Learning Formal Languages
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− | 4.3.2 "Study" : A Program for Reasoning with Propositions
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− | 5. Discussion & Development of Objectives
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− | 5.1 Objective 1a : Propositions as Types
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− | 5.2 Objective 1b : Proof Styles & Developments
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− | 5.3 Objective 1c : Interpretation & Authority
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| </pre> | | </pre> |