Changes

Unless the HO answer that is revealed by dint of the cartesian step has an application to the LO question that instigated the original inquiry, one that reduces the LO uncertainty that initially justified the effort, then it does not have a genuine bearing on the LO juncture that led to putting this inquiry in gear and setting its proceedings into motion, and it cannot bring to bear on the ensuing activity or the ongoing process the modicum of traction that is needed to put a brake on its continuing.  But a partition of a level of uncertainty into the very same amount plus a quantity of zero is hardly a sum, however much it seems on the level, that inspires much confidence in either the practical sincerity or the ergo nomic utility of the putative sum.

Unless the HO answer that is revealed by dint of the cartesian step has an application to the LO question that instigated the original inquiry, one that reduces the LO uncertainty that initially justified the effort, then it does not have a genuine bearing on the LO juncture that led to putting this inquiry in gear and setting its proceedings into motion, and it cannot bring to bear on the ensuing activity or the ongoing process the modicum of traction that is needed to put a brake on its continuing.  But a partition of a level of uncertainty into the very same amount plus a quantity of zero is hardly a sum, however much it seems on the level, that inspires much confidence in either the practical sincerity or the ergo nomic utility of the putative sum.

When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit scepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth.  That done, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human mind;  …

<p>When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit scepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth.  That done, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human mind;  &hellip;</p>

<pre>

<p>Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason.  But since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of infallibility, that they must be clear.  The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, never occurred to him.</p>

Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason.  But since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of infallibility, that they must be clear.  The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, never occurred to him.

(Peirce, CP 5.391).

| align="right" | (Peirce, CP 5.391).

In the discussion that follows, I am going to use the letters "C", "L", and "M" to stand for three generic features or classes of properties, yet to be fully analyzed or completely specified, that are commonly appreciated, desired, or valued as virtues of signs and expressions.  For now, a list of adjectives appropriate to each class can give a sufficient indication of their intended characters, even though it is easily possible and eventually necessary to find important distinctions that exist among the items in each given list of exemplary properties.

In the discussion that follows, I am going to use the letters <math>C, L, M</math> to stand for three generic features or classes of properties, yet to be fully analyzed or completely specified, that are commonly appreciated, desired, or valued as virtues of signs and expressions.  For now, a list of adjectives appropriate to each class can give a sufficient indication of their intended characters, even though it is easily possible and eventually necessary to find important distinctions that exist among the items in each given list of exemplary properties.

1. The class "C" is suggested by the adjectives:  "certain", "cogent", "compelling", or "convincing", and, in some of their senses, by:  "apparent", "evident", "obvious", or "patent".

# The class <math>C</math> is suggested by the adjectives ''certain'', ''cogent'', ''compelling'', or ''convincing'', and, in some of their senses, by ''apparent'', ''evident'', ''obvious'', or ''patent''.

 

# The class <math>L</math> is suggested by the adjectives ''clear'', ''lucid'', ''perspicuous'', ''plain'', ''relevant'', or ''vivid''.  To the geometric imagination, these terms suggest a ''bluntness'' (of surfaces) or a ''sharpness'' (of edges).

2. The class "L" is suggested by the adjectives:  "clear", "lucid", "perspicuous", "plain", "relevant", or "vivid".  To the geometric imagination, these terms suggest a "bluntness" (of surfaces) or a "sharpness" (of edges).

# The class <math>M</math> is suggested by the adjectives ''distinct'', ''decided'', ''defined'', ''definite'', ''determinate'', ''different'', ''differentiated'', or ''discrete'', and, within a stretch of the imagination, by ''acute'', ''conspicuous'', ''eminent'', ''manifest'', ''poignant'', ''salient'', or ''striking''.  To the geometric imagination, these terms suggest a ''pointedness''.

 

3. The class "M" is suggested by the adjectives:  "distinct", "decided", "defined", "definite", "determinate", "different", "differentiated", or "discrete", and, within a stretch of the imagination, by:  "acute", "conspicuous", "eminent", "manifest", "poignant", "salient", or "striking".  To the geometric imagination, these terms suggest a "pointedness".

In this frame of thought, it needs to be understood that the intended sense of these last two classes excludes the common usage of words like "clear", "clearly", and so on, or "distinct", "distinctly", and so on, as elliptic figures of speech that are intended to be taken in a more literal way to mean "clearly true", and so on, or "distinctly true", and so on.

In this frame of thought, it needs to be understood that the intended sense of these last two classes excludes the common usage of words like "clear", "clearly", and so on, or "distinct", "distinctly", and so on, as elliptic figures of speech that are intended to be taken in a more literal way to mean "clearly true", and so on, or "distinctly true", and so on.