Changes

# If it is the aspect of a ''surprise'' that is dominant at a juncture, or the role of a spectator that is prominent for an agent, then the juncture is resolved, in its theoretical aspects, by finding an ''explanation'', a statement expressing a way of looking at the juncture that renders it less of a surprise.

# If it is the aspect of a ''surprise'' that is dominant at a juncture, or the role of a spectator that is prominent for an agent, then the juncture is resolved, in its theoretical aspects, by finding an ''explanation'', a statement expressing a way of looking at the juncture that renders it less of a surprise.

# If it is the aspect of a ''problem'' that is dominant at a juncture, or the role of an actor that is prominent for an agent, then the juncture is resolved, in its theoretical aspects, by finding a ''plan of action'', a statement expressing a way of moving from the juncture that renders it less of a problem.  Of course, it remains for the plan or theoretical resolution to be carried out in practice before the problem itself can disappear.

# If it is the aspect of a ''problem'' that is dominant at a juncture, or the role of an actor that is prominent for an agent, then the juncture is resolved, in its theoretical aspects, by finding a ''plan of action'', a statement expressing a way of moving from the juncture that renders it less of a problem.  Of course, it remains for the plan or theoretical resolution to be carried out in practice before the problem itself can disappear.

If the uncertainty that one experiences in facing a juncture reflects the complexity of the juncture that faces one there, and if these are related to the difficulty that one is likely to have in resolving the juncture, then the appropriate analysis of these complexities, difficulties, and uncertainties into several parts can serve to advance the process of their resolution.

If the uncertainty that one experiences in facing a juncture reflects the complexity of the juncture that faces one there, and if these are related to the difficulty that one is likely to have in resolving the juncture, then the appropriate analysis of these complexities, difficulties, and uncertainties into several parts can serve to advance the process of their resolution.

With this picture of an agent at a juncture, appraising the uncertainties that affect the agent in that situation, indicating the complexities and the difficulties that the situation presents for the agent to resolve, sketching the forms of analysis that are called for in the process of resolution, and suggesting the relationships that obtain among these diverse ingredients of the situation, it is feasible to return to the problem of the ''cartesian step'', the one that moves from ''dubito'' to ''ergo sum'', and that simultaneously, as if perforce its very passing, creates the distinction between the LO and the HO attitudes of certainty.  Can the cartesian step be viewed in this light, that is, can it be placed in a suitable way within this picture of junctures and resolutions, to be specific, posing a form of analysis that advances the cause of certainty?  And if so, how does it appear when regarded in this light, that is, how well does it perform with respect to its conjectural role in reducing a fundamental uncertainty of the agent concerned?

With this picture of an agent at a juncture, appraising the uncertainties that affect the agent in that situation, indicating the complexities and the difficulties that the situation presents for the agent to resolve, sketching the forms of analysis that are called for in the process of resolution, and suggesting the relationships that obtain among these diverse ingredients of the situation, it is feasible to return to the problem of the "cartesian step", the one that moves from "ego dubito" to "ergo sum", and that simultaneously, as if perforce its very passing, creates the distinction between the LO and the HO attitudes of certainty.  Can the cartesian step be viewed in this light, that is, can it be placed in a suitable way within this picture of junctures and resolutions, to be specific, posing a form of analysis that advances the cause of certainty?  And if so, how does it appear when regarded in this light, that is, how well does it perform with respect to its conjectural role in reducing a fundamental uncertainty of the agent concerned?

In a sense, the cartesian step splits the agent's initial juncture into a couple of parts, or "subjunctures".  In this attempt at resolution, there is a part identical to the initial juncture, and thus with an uncertainty of the original severity, plus a part that the agent is sure of, and thus with an uncertainty of zero.  But this sort of analysis only works if it brings to light subjunctures of the initial juncture, or subsituations of the initial situation, that are actual ingredients, proper components, or non trivial constituents of it.  When the HO certainty does not have an effective bearing on resolving the LO uncertainty, then the pretense of analysis is only a distraction, not a step toward a genuine resolution.

In a sense, the cartesian step splits the agent's initial juncture into a couple of parts, or ''subjunctures''.  In this attempt at resolution, there is a part identical to the initial juncture, and thus with an uncertainty of the original severity, plus a part that the agent is sure of, and thus with an uncertainty of zero.  But this sort of analysis only works if it brings to light subjunctures of the initial juncture, or subsituations of the initial situation, that are actual ingredients, proper components, or non trivial constituents of it.  When the HO certainty does not have an effective bearing on resolving the LO uncertainty, then the pretense of analysis is only a distraction, not a step toward a genuine resolution.

Unless the HO answer that is revealed by dint of the cartesian step has an application to the LO question that instigated the original inquiry, one that reduces the LO uncertainty that initially justified the effort, then it does not have a genuine bearing on the LO juncture that led to putting this inquiry in gear and setting its proceedings into motion, and it cannot bring to bear on the ensuing activity or the ongoing process the modicum of traction that is needed to put a brake on its continuing.  But a partition of a level of uncertainty into the very same amount plus a quantity of zero is hardly a sum, however much it seems on the level, that inspires much confidence in either the practical sincerity or the ergo nomic utility of the putative sum.

Unless the HO answer that is revealed by dint of the cartesian step has an application to the LO question that instigated the original inquiry, one that reduces the LO uncertainty that initially justified the effort, then it does not have a genuine bearing on the LO juncture that led to putting this inquiry in gear and setting its proceedings into motion, and it cannot bring to bear on the ensuing activity or the ongoing process the modicum of traction that is needed to put a brake on its continuing.  But a partition of a level of uncertainty into the very same amount plus a quantity of zero is hardly a sum, however much it seems on the level, that inspires much confidence in either the practical sincerity or the ergo nomic utility of the putative sum.

When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit scepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth.  That done, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human mind;  ...

When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit scepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth.  That done, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human mind;  …

Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason.  But since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of infallibility, that they must be clear.  The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, never occurred to him.

Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason.  But since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of infallibility, that they must be clear.  The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, never occurred to him.

(Peirce, CP 5.391).

(Peirce, CP 5.391).