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The soul, then, is the actuality of the kind of body we have just described.  But actuality has two senses, analogous to the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.

<p>The soul, then, is the actuality of the kind of body we have just described.  But actuality has two senses, analogous to the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.</p>

Clearly actuality in our present sense is analogous to the possession of knowledge;  for both sleep and waking depend upon the presence of soul, and waking is analogous to the exercise of knowledge, sleep to its possession but not its exercise.

<p>Clearly actuality in our present sense is analogous to the possession of knowledge;  for both sleep and waking depend upon the presence of soul, and waking is analogous to the exercise of knowledge, sleep to its possession but not its exercise.</p>

Now in one and the same person the possession of knowledge comes first.  The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life; ...

<p>Now in one and the same person the possession of knowledge comes first.  The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life; &hellip;</p>

So one need no more ask whether body and soul are one than whether the wax and the impression it receives are one, or in general whether the matter of each thing is the same as that of which it is the matter;  for admitting that the terms unity and being are used in many senses, the paramount sense is that of actuality.

<p>So one need no more ask whether body and soul are one than whether the wax and the impression it receives are one, or in general whether the matter of each thing is the same as that of which it is the matter;  for admitting that the terms unity and being are used in many senses, the paramount sense is that of actuality.</p>

We have, then, given a general definition of what the soul is:  it is substance in the sense of a formula;  i.e., the essence of such and such a body [a natural body potentially possessing life].

<p>We have, then, given a general definition of what the soul is:  it is substance in the sense of a formula;  i.e., the essence of such and such a body [a natural body potentially possessing life].</p>

Suppose that an implement, e.g., an axe, were a natural body;  the substance of the axe would be that which makes it an axe, and this would be its soul;  suppose this removed, and it would no longer be an axe, except equivocally. ...

<p>Suppose that an implement, e.g., an axe, were a natural body;  the substance of the axe would be that which makes it an axe, and this would be its soul;  suppose this removed, and it would no longer be an axe, except equivocally. &hellip;</p>

If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be its vision;  for this is the substance in the sense of formula of the eye.  But the eye is the matter of vision, and if vision fails there is no eye, except in an equivocal sense, as for instance a stone or painted eye. ...

<p>If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be its vision;  for this is the substance in the sense of formula of the eye.  But the eye is the matter of vision, and if vision fails there is no eye, except in an equivocal sense, as for instance a stone or painted eye. &hellip;</p>

The waking state is actuality in the same sense as the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye, while the soul is actuality in the same sense as the faculty of the eye for seeing, or of the implement for doing its work. ...

<p>The waking state is actuality in the same sense as the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye, while the soul is actuality in the same sense as the faculty of the eye for seeing, or of the implement for doing its work. &hellip;</p>

It is also uncertain whether the soul as an actuality bears the same relation to the body as the sailor to the ship.

<p>It is also uncertain whether the soul as an actuality bears the same relation to the body as the sailor to the ship.</p>

Aristotle, De Anima, II.i.412a22-413a9

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| align="right" | Aristotle, ''De Anima'', II.i.412^a22&ndash;413^a9

The second text illustrates the use of an analogous distinction between form and matter within the context of a logical investigation.

The second text illustrates the use of an analogous distinction between form and matter within the context of a logical investigation.