Changes

Take once again the distinction between form and matter, and allow me to say that this distinction is ''interpretive'' in character or nature.  This gives me the option of saying that it is formal in some cases but material in other cases.  It can all depend on choice and circumstance.  If I interpret it as formal then certain things follow.  If I interpret it as material then other things follow.  But I can rest with calling it interpretive, leaving it to the moment to actualize what is most fitting.  If I interpret it as interpretive, which amounts to a way of holding any further decision in suspense, then I am choosing to remain all the while constantly aware of the circumstances and the conditions that affect the actualization of this distinction as either form or matter, or else to experience the consequences of failing to do so.

Take once again the distinction between form and matter, and allow me to say that this distinction is ''interpretive'' in character or nature.  This gives me the option of saying that it is formal in some cases but material in other cases.  It can all depend on choice and circumstance.  If I interpret it as formal then certain things follow.  If I interpret it as material then other things follow.  But I can rest with calling it interpretive, leaving it to the moment to actualize what is most fitting.  If I interpret it as interpretive, which amounts to a way of holding any further decision in suspense, then I am choosing to remain all the while constantly aware of the circumstances and the conditions that affect the actualization of this distinction as either form or matter, or else to experience the consequences of failing to do so.

But then, on marking any distinction, a moment's reflection brings me to ask:  "Who or what makes this distinction that I mark?" And whether I say that it is I, or you, or whoever else agrees in marking it with us, whose activity constitutes the making of this distinction, or whether I think it is someone other or something else that makes this distinction that all of us merely mark and remark, and whether it is decided in the end that the maker is always coincident or sometimes distinct in regard to the marker, then I find myself still having to ask:  "How and why is this distinction being marked, in particular, what side or sides, with respect to each other, are its maker and its marker on?

But then, on marking any distinction, a moment's reflection brings me to ask:  “Who or what makes this distinction that I mark?” And whether I say that it is I, or you, or whoever else agrees in marking it with us, whose activity constitutes the making of this distinction, or whether I think it is someone other or something else that makes this distinction that all of us merely mark and remark, and whether it is decided in the end that the maker is always coincident or sometimes distinct in regard to the marker, then I find myself still having to ask:  “How and why is this distinction being marked, in particular, what side or sides, with respect to each other, are its maker and its marker on?”

For these reasons, it is necessary to use an indirect strategy in order to approach the questions of these distinctions that I want to consider.  The ostensible distinctions are first described in very rough terms and introduced in the ways that they are naturally and usually thought of.  Thus, without taking for granted the clarity, fidelity, sensibility, or validity of their formulations, the distinctions are initially presented in the terms by which they are commonly indicated, intended, suggested, or regarded as being established.  This manner of approach is demanded in order to keep from assuming, if at all possible, the prior worth of the very formulations that are being examined and tested, and it tries to make it a separate question whether these intentions to distinguish can continue to be maintained in the very same terms and formulations.  Once this preliminary investigation is carried through to a conclusion, positive or negative, I can then return to analyze more carefully and more generally the whole process of making such distinctions.

For these reasons, it is necessary to use an indirect strategy in order to approach the questions of these distinctions that I want to consider.  The ostensible distinctions are first described in very rough terms and introduced in the ways that they are naturally and usually thought of.  Thus, without taking for granted the clarity, fidelity, sensibility, or validity of their formulations, the distinctions are initially presented in the terms by which they are commonly indicated, intended, suggested, or regarded as being established.  This manner of approach is demanded in order to keep from assuming, if at all possible, the prior worth of the very formulations that are being examined and tested, and it tries to make it a separate question whether these intentions to distinguish can continue to be maintained in the very same terms and formulations.  Once this preliminary investigation is carried through to a conclusion, positive or negative, I can then return to analyze more carefully and more generally the whole process of making such distinctions.

# The rough idea of one distinction is to sort the properties of things into two categories:  the "properties that things have" versus the "properties that things are given".  More specifically, and in reference to a "typical" agent, the former class is intended to include the properties that things have, in and of themselves, independently of any agent, whereas the latter class is intended to include the properties that things are given by an agent.  Now, it is clear that the common usage of words like "have" and "give" leaves a wide range of ambiguity yet remaining that needs to be resolved by the right interpretation.  (essential vs imputed prop)

# The rough idea of one distinction is to sort the properties of things into two categories:  the “properties that things have” versus the “properties that things are given”.  More specifically, and in reference to a typical agent, the former class is intended to include the properties that things have, in and of themselves, independently of any agent, whereas the latter class is intended to include the properties that things are given by an agent.  Now, it is clear that the common usage of words like ''have'' and ''give'' leaves a wide range of ambiguity still remaining that needs to be resolved by the right interpretation.  (essential vs imputed properties)

# The rough idea of another distinction is to sort signs and ideas, no matter whether they are considered severally or together, into two categories:  "signs and ideas as they actually occur" versus "signs and ideas in an abstract vacuum".  More specifically, and with reference to a particular class, community, or population of interpretive agents, the former category is intended to include signs and ideas as they actually occur among these agents, for example, as actualized, embodied, implemented, operationalized, or realized, whether consciously or not, among human beings, whereas the latter category leaves unanswered the question of embodiment and is therefore open to any suggestion as to how these signs and these ideas are intended to be conceived.  (empirical and material vs theoretical and formal signs and ideas)

# The rough idea of another distinction is to sort signs and ideas, no matter whether they are considered severally or together, into two categories:  “signs and ideas as they actually occur” versus “signs and ideas in an abstract vacuum”.  More specifically, and with reference to a particular class, community, or population of interpretive agents, the former category is intended to include signs and ideas as they actually occur among these agents, for example, as actualized, embodied, implemented, operationalized, or realized, whether consciously or not, among human beings, whereas the latter category leaves unanswered the question of embodiment and is therefore open to any suggestion as to how these signs and these ideas are intended to be conceived.  (empirical and material vs theoretical and formal signs and ideas)

[Alternative text?] The form of distinction that I need at this point tagging “signs and ideas as they actually occur”, for example, as actualized, embodied, and realized, whether consciously or not, in human beings, and leaving “signs and ideas in a vacuum” untagged by any special mark.

The form of distinction that I need at this point tagging "signs and ideas as they actually occur", for instance, as actualized, embodied, and realized, whether consciously or not, in human beings, and leaving "signs and ideas in a vacuum" untagged by any special mark.

Suppose I need to draw a distinction, that marks out a special dominion from its more general domain, but I want to be careful to emphasize the inclusion of the species within the genus, as much as their separation.  So let me paint the distinction this way, that it overlays a distinctive tincture on the species but not on the genus, and thus it highlights the special dominion as it resides within the grounds of its generic domain.  Given this special form of distinction, it deserves to be given a name.  It is fitting to describe it as a "partial functional distinction" (PFD), by way of recognizing the partial function that assigns a special value to the species, but not necessarily any value to the rest of the genus.  A better nickname, more compact than the verbose description and more mnemonic than the acronym, is served by coining the term "distincture".  In this context, let the species that is distinguished by a particular distincture be referred to as the "content" of that distincture, and let the remains of the genus be referred to as the "discontent" or even as the "distent" of that distincture.  Notice that a distinction, as it is ordinarily understood, has at least two distinctures associated with it, where each especially values what the other does not necessarily value, and where the content of either one is the discontent of the other one.  It should also be noted that I have not said anything yet about these partial functions being computable, only that they are conceivable.

Suppose I need to draw a distinction, that marks out a special dominion from its more general domain, but I want to be careful to emphasize the inclusion of the species within the genus, as much as their separation.  So let me paint the distinction this way, that it overlays a distinctive tincture on the species but not on the genus, and thus it highlights the special dominion as it resides within the grounds of its generic domain.  Given this special form of distinction, it deserves to be given a name.  It is fitting to describe it as a ''partial functional distinction'' (PFD), by way of recognizing the partial function that assigns a special value to the species, but not necessarily any value to the rest of the genus.  A better nickname, more compact than the verbose description and more mnemonic than the acronym, is served by coining the term ''distincture''.  In this context, let the species that is distinguished by a particular distincture be referred to as the ''content'' of that distincture, and let the remains of the genus be referred to as the ''discontent'' or even as the ''distent'' of that distincture.  Notice that a distinction, as it is ordinarily understood, has at least two distinctures associated with it, where each especially values what the other does not necessarily value, and where the content of either one is the discontent of the other one.  It should also be noted that I have not said anything yet about these partial functions being computable, only that they are conceivable.

I use the terms "figure", "ground", and ? to indicate the "species", the "remains", and the "genus", respectively, of a PFD or "distincture".  Notice that the "figure" and the "ground" are not treated symmetrically, but that each element of the figure is given an extra feature, a mark of attention or a tincture of distinction, that it does not have before the distinction is made, even if it is nothing more than a recognition or a representation, explicitly given by an agent to an element, of a feature that the element already posseses.  Notice the asymmetry that occurs between the treatment of the figure and the treatment of the ground.  Given this special form of distinction, and appreciating this asymmetry, ...

I use the terms ''figure'', ''ground'', and [?] to indicate the ''species'', the ''remains'', and the ''genus'', respectively, of a PFD or ''distincture''.  Notice that the figure and the ground are not treated symmetrically, but that each element of the figure is given an extra feature, a mark of attention or a tincture of distinction, that it does not have before the distinction is made, even if it is nothing more than a recognition or a representation, explicitly given by an agent to an element, of a feature that the element already possesses.  Notice the asymmetry that occurs between the treatment of the figure and the treatment of the ground.  Given this special form of distinction, and appreciating this asymmetry, …

There are several ways of studying sign relations that avoid the realm of affects and motives, at least, they seem to get around it for a while, thereby obviating the problems of delving into this refractory material.  A purely combinatorial approach ...

There are several ways of studying sign relations that avoid the realm of affects and motives, at least, they seem to get around it for a while, thereby obviating the problems of delving into this refractory material.  A purely combinatorial approach …

It seems to me that every "impression" has something in the way of an "impulse" about it, in other words, that every affective condition is analogous, equivalent, or identical in some sense to a motive disposition.  For this reason, I comprehend the category of pathemata to comprise a generic class of "double duty ideas" that one is free to interpret in either a passive or an active sense, in short, as "affects" or "motives", respectively.  To sum up the understanding of these terms that I reach at this point:  The category of pathemata, encompassing both affective impressions and motive impulses, can be treated as a species of ideas.  Ideas constitute a genus of mental conditions, dispositions, or entities that are theoretically tantamount to "mental signs".  Whereas ideas can be understood as "signs in the mind", it is perhaps best to regard them as "signs of the mind", or even as "the mind in signs", that is, as all the ways that the mind conducts itself and continues to live in signs.

It seems to me that every ''impression'' has something in the way of an ''impulse'' about it, in other words, that every affective condition is analogous, equivalent, or identical in some sense to a motive disposition.  For this reason, I comprehend the category of pathemata to comprise a generic class of ''double duty ideas'' that one is free to interpret in either a passive or an active sense, in short, as ''affects'' or ''motives'', respectively.  To sum up the understanding of these terms that I reach at this point:  The category of pathemata, encompassing both affective impressions and motive impulses, can be treated as a species of ideas.  Ideas constitute a genus of mental conditions, dispositions, or entities that are theoretically tantamount to ''mental signs''.  Whereas ideas can be understood as ''signs in the mind'', it is perhaps best to regard them as ''signs of the mind'', or even as ''the mind in signs'', that is, as all the ways that the mind conducts itself and continues to live in signs.

Affects and motives, by way of giving them a conventional placement in the larger class of ideas that inhabit the "mind" of a particular agent, can be seen as belonging somewhat closer to the "body" of their agent, since they are especially concerned with maintaining the health and the life of that body, and they preserve an interest in the viability, the vitality, and the overall well being of the particular agent concerned.  Accordingly, whatever else the signs called "pathemata" are about, they are partly about the body of functions and structures that are required to maintain their agent in a viable form.  No matter what other objects their signals of conditions and their suggestions of actions may have, they are partially intended to serve a particular form of materially constituted agent and to help it preserve its own accustomed nature.

Affects and motives, by way of giving them a conventional placement in the larger class of ideas that inhabit the ''mind'' of a particular agent, can be seen as belonging somewhat closer to the ''body'' of their agent, since they are especially concerned with maintaining the health and the life of that body, and they preserve an interest in the viability, the vitality, and the overall well being of the particular agent concerned.  Accordingly, whatever else the signs called ''pathemata'' are about, they are partly about the body of functions and structures that are required to maintain their agent in a viable form.  No matter what other objects their signals of conditions and their suggestions of actions may have, they are partially intended to serve a particular form of materially constituted agent and to help it preserve its own accustomed nature.

To form a better sense of how affects and motives fit within the category of ideas, or mental signs, and of how they can be located within a suitable domain of interpretant signs, I give these pathemata the somewhat arbitrary collective name of "motives or themes" (MOT's), intended to suggest little more than the common coin of emotions and motivations, and then I quickly divide this overly bulky, burdensome, and burgeoning class of meanings into three subdomains:

To form a better sense of how affects and motives fit within the category of ideas, or mental signs, and of how they can be located within a suitable domain of interpretant signs, I give these pathemata the somewhat arbitrary collective name of "motives or themes" (MOT's), intended to suggest little more than the common coin of emotions and motivations, and then I quickly divide this overly bulky, burdensome, and burgeoning class of meanings into three subdomains: