Changes

No matter how carefully the terms are qualified, allowing the equations to apply in purely formal and wholly potential senses, the argument for the soundness of this joint identification is by no means easy, presents the danger of leading this discussion far afield, if not astray, and is, in any case, not really needed to achieve the aims of the present work.  Fortunately, while the full strength of the identity is not required for the present application, it can continue to serve as a useful analogy.

No matter how carefully the terms are qualified, allowing the equations to apply in purely formal and wholly potential senses, the argument for the soundness of this joint identification is by no means easy, presents the danger of leading this discussion far afield, if not astray, and is, in any case, not really needed to achieve the aims of the present work.  Fortunately, while the full strength of the identity is not required for the present application, it can continue to serve as a useful analogy.

A bonie, westlin weaver lad

| colspan="2" | A bonie, westlin weaver lad

Sat working at his loom;

He took my heart, as wi a net,

| width="5%"  |   || Sat working at his loom;

In every knot and thrum.

Robert Burns, To the Weaver's Gin You Go, [CPW, 307]

| colspan="2" | He took my heart, as wi a net,

| width="5%"  |   || In every knot and thrum.

| colspan="2" align="right" | — Robert Burns, ''To the Weaver's Gin You Go'', [CPW, 307]

This is not the place to argue for my particular way of seeing things, whose rationale ultimately depends on the integral relationship between the pragmatic style of phenomenology and the pragmatic theory of signs.  There is still too much potential for misunderstanding between the writer that is due merely to possible differences in the uses of words, and not to any matters of substance.  Until these ideas can be fully developed, the relation between signs and contents of consciousness, or the relation between texts and streams of consciousness, can still be treated as a useful analogy.

This is not the place to argue for my particular way of seeing things, whose rationale ultimately depends on the integral relationship between the pragmatic style of phenomenology and the pragmatic theory of signs.  There is still too much potential for misunderstanding between the writer that is due merely to possible differences in the uses of words, and not to any matters of substance.  Until these ideas can be fully developed, the relation between signs and contents of consciousness, or the relation between texts and streams of consciousness, can still be treated as a useful analogy.

The style of phenomenology that is needed for this work is the subject of a later discussion.  Here, I make only the remarks that are needed for orientation.

The style of phenomenology that is needed for this work is the subject of a later discussion.  Here, I make only the remarks that are needed for orientation.

The pragmatic idea about phenomena is that all phenomena are signs of significant objects, except for the ones that are not.  In effect, all phenomena are meant to appear before the court of significance and are deemed by their very nature to be judged as signs of potential objects.  Depending on how one chooses to say it, the results of this evaluation can be rendered in one of the following ways:

The pragmatic idea about phenomena is that all phenomena are signs of significant objects, except for the ones that are not.  In effect, all phenomena are meant to appear before the court of significance and are deemed by their very nature to be judged as signs of potential objects.  Depending on how one chooses to say it, the results of this evaluation can be rendered in one of the following ways: