Changes

=====5.1.2.7. The Context of Interpretation=====

=====5.1.2.7. The Context of Interpretation=====

To the weaver's gin ye go, fair maids,

| colspan="2" | To the weaver's gin ye go, fair maids,

To the weaver's gin ye go,

I rede you right, gang ne'er at night,

| width="5%"  |   || To the weaver's gin ye go,

To the weaver's gin ye go.

Robert Burns, To the Weaver's Gin You Go, [CPW, 306]

| colspan="2" | I rede you right, gang ne'er at night,

| width="5%"  |   || To the weaver's gin ye go.

| colspan="2" align="right" | — Robert Burns, ''To the Weaver's Gin You Go'', [CPW, 306]

As this discussion proceeds, it is designed to expand the scope of what it can analyze successfully from simple signs to complex expressions to extended texts.  In this progression, the pragmatic theory of signs is used as a unifying thread to connect the different levels of complexity.  Accordingly, it needs to be kept in mind throughout the discussion that references to "signs", unless specified otherwise, can generally be taken in a maximally inclusive sense, referring also to expressions and texts.

As this discussion proceeds, it is designed to expand the scope of what it can analyze successfully from simple signs to complex expressions to extended texts.  In this progression, the pragmatic theory of signs is used as a unifying thread to connect the different levels of complexity.  Accordingly, it needs to be kept in mind throughout the discussion that references to ''signs'', unless specified otherwise, can generally be taken in a maximally inclusive sense, referring also to expressions and texts.

The more complex and more extended a sign, expression, or text becomes the more occasion it has for referring to many other objects on its way to achieving its ultimate denotation.  Some of these implicit, incidental, and intermediate objects can be components, properties, and relations of the sign, expression, or text itself, perhaps amounting to its accidental connotations and its intended interpretants.  When it comes to a highly involved sign, expression, or text, some of its subsidiary effects and ulterior objects can even be aspects or elements of those very agents and those very media that are actually, imagined, or intended to be involved in its production, transmission, or reception.

The more complex and more extended a sign, expression, or text becomes the more occasion it has for referring to many other objects on its way to achieving its ultimate denotation.  Some of these implicit, incidental, and intermediate objects can be components, properties, and relations of the sign, expression, or text itself, perhaps amounting to its accidental connotations and its intended interpretants.  When it comes to a highly involved sign, expression, or text, some of its subsidiary effects and ulterior objects can even be aspects or elements of those very agents and those very media that are actually, imagined, or intended to be involved in its production, transmission, or reception.

In many respects, these "side effects" are actually more important from a practical standpoint than the "token objects" of denotation, that is, the nominal results and the ostensible values that merely serve to mark the successful outcome of the interpretation process.  Anything that an agent strives toward achieving or that a system moves toward attaining can be called its "object", and so there arises the possibility that a "global object" (GO) or a "derivative object" (DO), a thing constructed or reconstructed from various bits and pieces of extraneous references, is that which primarily or effectively calls or drives the greater action.  If it strikes one as strange that an object construed from epiphenomenal marks and tangential signs should be the main motive and real object of the process of interpretation, it ought to be remembered that a special case of this already appears in the form of the semantic partitions that reconstruct the forms of their object domains.  Accordingly, the types of GO's and DO's that emerge from the present considerations are just the ultimate generalizations of SEC's.

In many respects, these ''side effects'' are actually more important from a practical standpoint than the ''token objects'' of denotation, that is, the nominal results and the ostensible values that merely serve to mark the successful outcome of the interpretation process.  Anything that an agent strives toward achieving or that a system moves toward attaining can be called its ''object'', and so there arises the possibility that a ''global object'' or a ''derivative object'', a thing constructed or reconstructed from various bits and pieces of extraneous references, is that which primarily or effectively calls or drives the greater action.  If it strikes one as strange that an object construed from epiphenomenal marks and tangential signs should be the main motive and real object of the process of interpretation, it ought to be remembered that a special case of this already appears in the form of the semantic partitions that reconstruct the forms of their object domains.  Accordingly, the types of global objects and derivative objects that emerge from the present considerations are just the ultimate generalizations of SECs.

 

My heart was ance as blythe and free

As simmer days were lang;

| colspan="2" | My heart was ance as blythe and free

But a bonie, westlin weaver lad

Has gart me change my sang.

| width="5%"  |   || As simmer days were lang;

Robert Burns, To the Weaver's Gin You Go, [CPW, 306]

| colspan="2" | But a bonie, westlin weaver lad

| width="5%"  |   || Has gart me change my sang.

| colspan="2" align="right" | — Robert Burns, ''To the Weaver's Gin You Go'', [CPW, 306]

Signs are typical of the contents of consciousness.  Indeed, from the standpoint of the pragmatic theory of signs, where a maximally general definition of signs holds sway, signs are considered to be all inclusive, generically identical, or simply co extensive with the class of phenomena that are commonly known as the contents of consciousness.  In this view of the matter, a complex expression is analogous to a complex concept, of an order that is typically but not exclusively constructed in deliberate and purposeful thinking processes, while an extended text is analogous to an ongoing stream of consciousness or a long drawn out process of reasoning, whatever its character may be.

Signs are typical of the contents of consciousness.  Indeed, from the standpoint of the pragmatic theory of signs, where a maximally general definition of signs holds sway, signs are considered to be all inclusive, generically identical, or simply co extensive with the class of phenomena that are commonly known as the contents of consciousness.  In this view of the matter, a complex expression is analogous to a complex concept, of an order that is typically but not exclusively constructed in deliberate and purposeful thinking processes, while an extended text is analogous to an ongoing stream of consciousness or a long drawn out process of reasoning, whatever its character may be.

One benefit of this openness is that it permits the exploration of the thinking mind's connection with information.

One benefit of this openness is that it permits the exploration of the thinking mind's connection with information.

 

My mither sent me to the town,

To warp a plaiden wab;

| colspan="2" | My mither sent me to the town,

But the weary, weary warpin o't

Has gart me sigh and sab.

| width="5%"  |   || To warp a plaiden wab;

Robert Burns, To the Weaver's Gin You Go, [CPW, 307]

| colspan="2" | But the weary, weary warpin o't

| width="5%"  |   || Has gart me sigh and sab.

| colspan="2" align="right" | — Robert Burns, ''To the Weaver's Gin You Go'', [CPW, 307]

The reason for my interest in signs, a reason that accounts for their part in inquiry and helps to explain their role in AIR, is that I take signs to be identical with all that is able to appear in awareness, or all that can be a content of consciousness.  This amounts to saying that the ostensible analogy between signs and contents of consciousness, and thus between texts and streams of consciousness, is a potential identity.  Speaking with respect to their potentiality, I would like to suggest that signs are identical with the possible contents of consciousness, and that the contents of consciousness all have the characters of potential signs.  The broadest conceivable definition of what constitutes a "sign" leads to the broadest conceivable definition of what constitutes a "text", and so one is led to the idea that the whole stream of consciousness belonging to a person or a community, not just the miniscule fraction of it that happens to get written down in the conventional arrays of characters, can literally be regarded as a text.

The reason for my interest in signs, a reason that accounts for their part in inquiry and helps to explain their role in AIR, is that I take signs to be identical with all that is able to appear in awareness, or all that can be a content of consciousness.  This amounts to saying that the ostensible analogy between signs and contents of consciousness, and thus between texts and streams of consciousness, is a potential identity.  Speaking with respect to their potentiality, I would like to suggest that signs are identical with the possible contents of consciousness, and that the contents of consciousness all have the characters of potential signs.  The broadest conceivable definition of what constitutes a "sign" leads to the broadest conceivable definition of what constitutes a "text", and so one is led to the idea that the whole stream of consciousness belonging to a person or a community, not just the miniscule fraction of it that happens to get written down in the conventional arrays of characters, can literally be regarded as a text.

This is not the place to argue for the full strength of the proposed identity:

This is not the place to argue for the full strength of the proposed identity:

Phenomena = Appearances in Awareness

Phenomena = Appearances in Awareness

= Contents of Consciousness

= Contents of Consciousness

= Signs.

= Signs.

Indeed, if one conceives consciousness to be a continuum, more exactly, if one considers every connected field (and stream) of consciousness to be a continuous manifold, as it very likely is, then this argument would depart from the realm of discrete signs and finite texts that is proper to computational models.

Indeed, if one conceives consciousness to be a continuum, more exactly, if one considers every connected field (and stream) of consciousness to be a continuous manifold, as it very likely is, then this argument would depart from the realm of discrete signs and finite texts that is proper to computational models.

No matter how carefully the terms are qualified, allowing the equations to apply in purely formal and wholly potential senses, the argument for the soundness of this joint identification is by no means easy, presents the danger of leading this discussion far afield, if not astray, and is, in any case, not really needed to achieve the aims of the present work.  Fortunately, while the full strength of the identity is not required for the present application, it can continue to serve as a useful analogy.

No matter how carefully the terms are qualified, allowing the equations to apply in purely formal and wholly potential senses, the argument for the soundness of this joint identification is by no means easy, presents the danger of leading this discussion far afield, if not astray, and is, in any case, not really needed to achieve the aims of the present work.  Fortunately, while the full strength of the identity is not required for the present application, it can continue to serve as a useful analogy.

 

A bonie, westlin weaver lad

A bonie, westlin weaver lad

Sat working at his loom;

Sat working at his loom;