Changes

<p>Thus when mothers have chidren suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly in their arms;  and instead of silence, they use a kind of crooning noise;  and thus they literally cast a spell upon the children (like the victims of a Bacchic frenzy) by employing the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy.</p>

<p>Thus when mothers have chidren suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly in their arms;  and instead of silence, they use a kind of crooning noise;  and thus they literally cast a spell upon the children (like the victims of a Bacchic frenzy) by employing the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy.</p>

<p>(Plato, Laws, VII, 790D).</p>

<p>(Plato, ''Laws'', VII, 790D).</p>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

Try as I might, I do not see a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing:  To take for granted nothing more than is already given, to set out from nothing but absolutely certain beginnings, or to move forward with nothing but absolutely certain means of proceeding.  In particular, the present inquiry into inquiry, <math>y_0 = y \cdot y,</math> ought not to be misconstrued as a device for magically generating a theory of inquiry from nothing.  Like any other inquiry, it requires an agent to invest in a conjecture, to make a guess about the relevant features of the subject of interest, and to choose the actions, the aspects, and the attitudes with regard to the subject that are critical to achieving the objectives of the study.

Try as I might, I do not see a way to develop a theory of inquiry from nothing:  To take for granted nothing more than is already given, to set out from nothing but absolutely certain beginnings, or to move forward with nothing but absolutely certain means of proceeding.  In particular, the present inquiry into inquiry, y0 = y.y, ought not to be misconstrued as a device for magically generating a theory of inquiry from nothing.  Like any other inquiry, it requires an agent to invest in a conjecture, to make a guess about the relevant features of the subject of interest, and to choose the actions, the aspects, and the attitudes with regard to the subject that are critical to achieving the objectives of the study.

I can sum all this up by saying that an inquiry requires an inquirer to suggest a hypothesis about the subject of interest and then to put that particular model of the subject to the test.  This in turn requires one to devote a modicum of personal effort to the task of testing the chosen hypothesis, to put a quantum of personal interest at stake for the sake of finding out whether the model fits the subject, and, overall, to take the risk of being wrong.  Any model that is feasible is also defeasible, at least, where it concerns a contingent subject of inquiry.

I can sum all this up by saying that an inquiry requires an inquirer to suggest a hypothesis about the subject of interest and then to put that particular model of the subject to the test.  This in turn requires one to devote a modicum of personal effort to the task of testing the chosen hypothesis, to put a quantum of personal interest at stake for the sake of finding out whether the model fits the subject, and, overall, to take the risk of being wrong.  Any model that is feasible is also defeasible, at least, where it concerns a contingent subject of inquiry.

Leaving behind the mythical conditions of pure experience and naive observation, and at least by the time that one comes to give a name to the subject of investigation, one's trek through the data is already half-shod, half-fettered by the connotations of the name, and in turn by all of the concepts that it invokes in its train.  The name, the concepts that it suggests, and the tacit but vague definition of the subject that this complex of associations is already beginning to constellate, attract certain experiences to the complex and filter out other observations from having any bearing on the subject matter.  By this point, one is already busy translating one's empirical acquaintance with the subject into an arrangement of concepts that is intended to define its essential nature.

Leaving behind the mythical conditions of pure experience and naive observation, and at least by the time that one comes to give a name to the subject of investigation, one's trek through the data is already half-shod, half-fettered by the connotations of the name, and in turn by all of the concepts that it invokes in its train.  The name, the concepts that it suggests, and the tacit but vague definition of the subject that this complex of associations is already beginning to constellate, attract certain experiences to the complex and filter out other observations from having any bearing on the subject matter.  By this point, one is already busy translating one's empirical acquaintance with the subject into an arrangement of concepts that is intended to define its essential nature.

An array of concepts that is set up to capture the essence of a subject is a provisional definition of it, an implicit model of the subject that contains the makings of an explicit theory.  It amounts to a selection from the phenomenal aspects of the subject, expresses a guess about its relevant features, and constitutes a hypothesis in explanation of its experienced characteristics.  This incipient order of model or theory is tantamount to a definition because it sets bounds on the "stretches" and the "holds" of a term - its extension, intension, and intention - but this is not the kind of definition that has to be taken on faith, or that constitutes the first and the last word on the subject.  In other words, it is an empirical definition, one that is subject to being falsified in reference to its intended subject, by failing to indicate the necessary, the pertinent, or the relevant features that account for the presence of its phenomena or the persistence of its process.

An array of concepts that is set up to capture the essence of a subject is a provisional definition of it, an implicit model of the subject that contains the makings of an explicit theory.  It amounts to a selection from the phenomenal aspects of the subject, expresses a guess about its relevant features, and constitutes a hypothesis in explanation of its experienced characteristics.  This incipient order of model or theory is tantamount to a definition because it sets bounds on the "stretches" and the "holds" of a term &mdash; its extension, intension, and intention &mdash; but this is not the kind of definition that has to be taken on faith, or that constitutes the first and the last word on the subject.  In other words, it is an empirical definition, one that is subject to being falsified in reference to its intended subject, by failing to indicate the necessary, the pertinent, or the relevant features that account for the presence of its phenomena or the persistence of its process.

If I reflect on the conduct of inquiry, seeking to fix it in a fitting image and trying to cast it in a positive light, the best I can do is this:

If I reflect on the conduct of inquiry, seeking to fix it in a fitting image and trying to cast it in a positive light, the best I can do is this:

Inquiry is a process that aims at achieving belief or knowledge.

: Inquiry is a process that aims at achieving belief or knowledge.

But even this simple a description already plunges the discussion deep into a number of obscurities.  Most prominently, there is the disjunction between belief and knowledge that cries out to be explained or resolved.  Stirring beneath the surface, and not quite fading into the background, many of the other terms that are invoked in the description are capable of hiding the entire contents of the original ignorance that the image as a whole is aimed to dispell.  And yet, there is nothing that I can do in this avowedly positive context but to mark these points down as topics for future discussion.

But even this simple a description already plunges the discussion deep into a number of obscurities.  Most prominently, there is the disjunction between belief and knowledge that cries out to be explained or resolved.  Stirring beneath the surface, and not quite fading into the background, many of the other terms that are invoked in the description are capable of hiding the entire contents of the original ignorance that the image as a whole is aimed to dispel.  And yet, there is nothing that I can do in this avowedly positive context but to mark these points down as topics for future discussion.

There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit, at least partially, in the text of the above description.  Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions.

There is already a model of inquiry that is implicit, at least partially, in the text of the above description.  Let me see if I can tease out a few of its tacit assumptions.

=====1.4.1.1  Inquiry as Conduct=====

=====1.4.1.1  Inquiry as Conduct=====

First of all, inquiry is conceived to be a form of conduct. This invokes the technical term ''conduct'', referring to the species of prototypically human action that is both dynamic and deliberate, or conceived to fall under a form of purposeful control, usually conscious but possibly not.  For the sake of clarity, it helps to seek a more formal definition of conduct, one that expresses the concept in terms of abstract features rather than trying to suggest it by means of typical examples.

First of all, inquiry is conceived to be a form of conduct.

This invokes the technical term "conduct", referring to the

species of prototypically human action that is both dynamic

and deliberate, or conceived to fall under a form of purposeful

control, usually conscious but possibly not.  For the sake of

clarity, it helps to seek a more formal definition of conduct,

one that expresses the concept in terms of abstract features

rather than trying to suggest it by means of typical examples.

Conduct is action with respect to an object.  The distinction between action and conduct, reduced to the level of the most abstract formal relations that are involved, can be described in the following manner.

Conduct is action with respect to an object.  The distinction between action and conduct, reduced to the level of the most abstract formal relations that are involved, can be described in the following manner.

What does this definition of conduct say about the temporal ordering of the object with respect to the states?  The states are conceived to be ordered in time, but so far nothing has been said to pin down where in relation to these states the object must be conceived to fall in time.  Nor does the definition make any particular specification necessary.  This makes the question of relative time a secular parameter of the definition, allowing the consideration of the following options:

What does this definition of conduct say about the temporal ordering of the object with respect to the states?  The states are conceived to be ordered in time, but so far nothing has been said to pin down where in relation to these states the object must be conceived to fall in time.  Nor does the definition make any particular specification necessary.  This makes the question of relative time a secular parameter of the definition, allowing the consideration of the following options:

1.  If the object is thought to precede the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as a creative act, an initial intention, an original stimulus, a principal cause, or a prime mover.

# If the object is thought to precede the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as a creative act, an initial intention, an original stimulus, a principal cause, or a prime mover.

 

# If the object is thought to succeed the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as an end, a goal, or a purpose, in other words, a state envisioned to be fulfilled.

2.  If the object is thought to succeed the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as an end, a goal, or a purpose, in other words, a state envisioned to be fulfilled.

# If the object is thought to be concurrent, immanent, or transcendent throughout the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as falling under one of the following possibilities:  a prevailing value, a controlling parameter, a universal system of effective forces, a pervasive field of potentials, a ruling law, or a governing principle.

 

3.  If the object is thought to be concurrent, immanent, or transcendent throughout the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as falling under one of the following possibilities:  a prevailing value, a controlling parameter, a universal system of effective forces, a pervasive field of potentials, a ruling law, or a governing principle.

A prevailing value or a controlling parameter, which guides the temporal development of a system, is a term that fits into a law or a principle, which governs the system at a higher level.  The existence of a value or a law that rules a system, and the information that an agent of the system has about its parameters and its principles, are two different matters.  Indeed, a major task of development for an inquiring agent is to inform itself about the values and the laws that form its own system.  Thus, one of the objects of the conduct of inquiry is a description in terms of laws and values of the rules that govern and guide inquiry.

A prevailing value or a controlling parameter, which guides the temporal development of a system, is a term that fits into a law or a principle, which governs the system at a higher level.  The existence of a value or a law that rules a system, and the information that an agent of the system has about its parameters and its principles, are two different matters.  Indeed, a major task of development for an inquiring agent is to inform itself about the values and the laws that form its own system.  Thus, one of the objects of the conduct of inquiry is a description in terms of laws and values of the rules that govern and guide inquiry.

The elaboration of an object in terms of this rich vocabulary -- as a cause, end, field, force, goal, intention, law, parameter, principle, purpose, system, or value -- adds colorful detail and concrete sensation to the account, and it helps to establish connections with the arrays of terminology that are widely used to discuss these issues.  From a formal and relational point of view, however, all of these concepts are simply different ways of describing, at possibly different levels of generality, the object of a form of conduct.  With that in mind, I find it useful to return to the simpler form of description as often as possible.

The elaboration of an object in terms of this rich vocabulary &mdash; as a cause, end, field, force, goal, intention, law, parameter, principle, purpose, system, or value &mdash; adds colorful detail and concrete sensation to the account, and it helps to establish connections with the arrays of terminology that are widely used to discuss these issues.  From a formal and relational point of view, however, all of these concepts are simply different ways of describing, at possibly different levels of generality, the object of a form of conduct.  With that in mind, I find it useful to return to the simpler form of description as often as possible.

This account of conduct brings to the fore a number of issues, some of them new and some of them familiar, but each of them allowing itself to be approached from a fresh direction by treating it as an implication of a critical thesis just laid down.  I next examine these issues in accord with the tenets from which they stem.

This account of conduct brings to the fore a number of issues, some of them new and some of them familiar, but each of them allowing itself to be approached from a fresh direction by treating it as an implication of a critical thesis just laid down.  I next examine these issues in accord with the tenets from which they stem.

Once again, there is a distinction between (a) the properties of an action, agent, conduct, or system, as expressible by the agent that is engaged in the conduct, or as representable within the system that is undergoing the action, and (b) the properties of the same entities, as evident from an "external viewpoint", or as statable by the equivalent of an "outside observer".

Once again, there is a distinction between (a) the properties of an action, agent, conduct, or system, as expressible by the agent that is engaged in the conduct, or as representable within the system that is undergoing the action, and (b) the properties of the same entities, as evident from an "external viewpoint", or as statable by the equivalent of an "outside observer".

3.  Reflection is a part of inquiry.

3.  Reflection is a part of inquiry. Reflection is a form of conduct.

 

    Reflection is a form of conduct.

The task of reflection on conduct is to pass from a purely interior view of one's own conduct to an outlook that is, effectively, an exterior view.

The task of reflection on conduct is to pass from a purely interior view of one's own conduct to an outlook that is, effectively, an exterior view.

What does this definition of conduct say about the temporal ordering of the object with respect to the states?  The states are conceived to be ordered in time, but so far nothing has been said to pin down where in relation to these states the object must be conceived to fall in time.  Nor does the definition make any particular specification necessary.  This makes the question of relative time a secular parameter of the definition, allowing the consideration of the following options:

What does this definition of conduct say about the temporal ordering of the object with respect to the states?  The states are conceived to be ordered in time, but so far nothing has been said to pin down where in relation to these states the object must be conceived to fall in time.  Nor does the definition make any particular specification necessary.  This makes the question of relative time a secular parameter of the definition, allowing the consideration of the following options:

1. If the object is thought to precede the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as a creative act, an initial intention, an original stimulus, a principal cause, or a prime mover.

# If the object is thought to precede the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as a creative act, an initial intention, an original stimulus, a principal cause, or a prime mover.

 

# If the object is thought to succeed the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as an end, a goal, or a purpose, in other words, a state envisioned to be fulfilled.

2. If the object is thought to succeed the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as an end, a goal, or a purpose, in other words, a state envisioned to be fulfilled.

# If the object is thought to be concurrent, immanent, or transcendent throughout the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as falling under one of the following possibilities:  a prevailing value, a controlling parameter, a universal system of effective forces, a pervasive field of potentials, a ruling law, or a governing principle.

 

3. If the object is thought to be concurrent, immanent, or transcendent throughout the action of the conduct, then it tends to be regarded as falling under one of the following possibilities:  a prevailing value, a controlling parameter, a universal system of effective forces, a pervasive field of potentials, a ruling law, or a governing principle.

 

A prevailing value or a controlling parameter, which guides the temporal development of a system, is a term that fits into a law or a principle, which governs the system at a higher level.  The existence of a value or a law that rules a system, and the information that an agent of the system has about its parameters and its principles, are two different matters.  Indeed, a major task of development for an inquiring agent is to inform itself about the values and the laws that form its own system.  Thus, one of the objects of the conduct of inquiry is a description in terms of laws and values of the rules that govern and guide inquiry.

A prevailing value or a controlling parameter, which guides the temporal development of a system, is a term that fits into a law or a principle, which governs the system at a higher level.  The existence of a value or a law that rules a system, and the information that an agent of the system has about its parameters and its principles, are two different matters.  Indeed, a major task of development for an inquiring agent is to inform itself about the values and the laws that form its own system.  Thus, one of the objects of the conduct of inquiry is a description in terms of laws and values of the rules that govern and guide inquiry.

The elaboration of an object in terms of this rich vocabulary - as a cause, end, field, force, goal, intention, law, parameter, principle, purpose, system, or value - adds colorful detail and concrete sensation to the account, and it helps to establish connections with the arrays of terminology that are widely used to discuss these issues.  From a formal and relational point of view, however, all of these concepts are simply different ways of describing, at possibly different levels of generality, the object of a form of conduct.  With that in mind, I find it useful to return to the simpler form of description as often as possible.

The elaboration of an object in terms of this rich vocabulary &mdash; as a cause, end, field, force, goal, intention, law, parameter, principle, purpose, system, or value &mdash; adds colorful detail and concrete sensation to the account, and it helps to establish connections with the arrays of terminology that are widely used to discuss these issues.  From a formal and relational point of view, however, all of these concepts are simply different ways of describing, at possibly different levels of generality, the object of a form of conduct.  With that in mind, I find it useful to return to the simpler form of description as often as possible.

This account of conduct brings to the fore a number of issues, some of them new and some of them familiar, but each of them allowing itself to be approached from a fresh direction by treating it as an implication of a critical thesis just laid down.  I next examine these issues in accord with the tenets from which they stem.

This account of conduct brings to the fore a number of issues, some of them new and some of them familiar, but each of them allowing itself to be approached from a fresh direction by treating it as an implication of a critical thesis just laid down.  I next examine these issues in accord with the tenets from which they stem.

1. Inquiry is a form of conduct.

1. Inquiry is a form of conduct.

This makes inquiry into inquiry a special case of inquiry into conduct.  Certainly, it must be possible to reason about conduct in general, especially if forms of conduct need to be learned, examined, modified, and improved.

This makes inquiry into inquiry a special case of inquiry into conduct.  Certainly, it must be possible to reason about conduct in general, especially if forms of conduct need to be learned, examined, modified, and improved.

Placing the subject of inquiry within the subject of conduct and making the inquiry into inquiry a subordinate part of the inquiry into conduct does not automatically further the investigation, especially if it turns out that the general subject of conduct is more difficult to understand than the specialized subject of inquiry.  But in those realms of inquiry where it is feasible to proceed hypothetically and recursively, stretching the appropriate sort of hypothesis over a wider subject area can act to prime the pump of mathematical induction all the more generously, and actually increase the power of the recursion.  Of course, the use of a recursive strategy comes at the expense of having to establish a more extended result at the base.

Placing the subject of inquiry within the subject of conduct and making the inquiry into inquiry a subordinate part of the inquiry into conduct does not automatically further the investigation, especially if it turns out that the general subject of conduct is more difficult to understand than the specialized subject of inquiry.  But in those realms of inquiry where it is feasible to proceed hypothetically and recursively, stretching the appropriate sort of hypothesis over a wider subject area can act to prime the pump of mathematical induction all the more generously, and actually increase the power of the recursion.  Of course, the use of a recursive strategy comes at the expense of having to establish a more extended result at the base.

2. The existence of an object that rules a form of conduct and the information that an agent of the conduct has about the object are two different matters.

2. The existence of an object that rules a form of conduct and the information that an agent of the conduct has about the object are two different matters.

This means that the exact specification of the object can require an order of information that the agent does not have available, at least, not for use in reflective action, or even an amount of information that the agent lacks the capacity to store.  No matter how true it is that the actual course of the agent's conduct exactly reflects the influence of the object, and thus, in a sense, represents the object exactly, the question is whether the agent possesses the equivalent of this information in any kind of accessible, exploitable, reflective, surveyable, or usable form of representation, in effect, any mode of information that the agent can use to forsee, to modify, or to temper its own temporal course.

This means that the exact specification of the object can require an order of information that the agent does not have available, at least, not for use in reflective action, or even an amount of information that the agent lacks the capacity to store.  No matter how true it is that the actual course of the agent's conduct exactly reflects the influence of the object, and thus, in a sense, represents the object exactly, the question is whether the agent possesses the equivalent of this information in any kind of accessible, exploitable, reflective, surveyable, or usable form of representation, in effect, any mode of information that the agent can use to forsee, to modify, or to temper its own temporal course.

This issue may seem familiar as a repetition of the "meta" question.  Once again, there is a distinction between (a) the properties of an action, agent, conduct, or system, as expressible by the agent that is engaged in the conduct, or as representable within the system that is undergoing the action, and (b) the properties of the same entities, as evident from an "external viewpoint", or as statable by the equivalent of an "outside observer".

This issue may seem familiar as a repetition of the "meta" question.  Once again, there is a distinction between (a) the properties of an action, agent, conduct, or system, as expressible by the agent that is engaged in the conduct, or as representable within the system that is undergoing the action, and (b) the properties of the same entities, as evident from an "external viewpoint", or as statable by the equivalent of an "outside observer".

3. Reflection is a part of inquiry.  Reflection is a form of conduct.

3. Reflection is a part of inquiry.  Reflection is a form of conduct.

The task of reflection on conduct is to pass from a purely interior view of one's own conduct to an outlook that is, effectively, an exterior view.  What is sought is a wider perspective, one that is able to incorporate the sort of information that might be available to an outside observer, that ought to be evident from an external vantage point, or that one reasonably imagines might be obvious from an independent viewpoint.  I am tempted to refer to such a view as a "quasi-objective perspective", but only so long as it possible to keep in mind that there is no such thing as a "completely outside perspective", at least, not one that a finite and mortal agent can hope to achieve, nor one that a reasonably socialized member of a community can wish to take up as a permanent station in life.

The task of reflection on conduct is to pass from a purely interior view of one's own conduct to an outlook that is, effectively, an exterior view.  What is sought is a wider perspective, one that is able to incorporate the sort of information that might be available to an outside observer, that ought to be evident from an external vantage point, or that one reasonably imagines might be obvious from an independent viewpoint.  I am tempted to refer to such a view as a "quasi-objective perspective", but only so long as it possible to keep in mind that there is no such thing as a "completely outside perspective", at least, not one that a finite and mortal agent can hope to achieve, nor one that a reasonably socialized member of a community can wish to take up as a permanent station in life.

If it is to have the properties that it is commonly thought to have, then reflection must be capable of running in parallel, and not interfering too severely, with the conduct on which it reflects.  If this turns out to be an illusion of reflection that is not really possible in actuality, then reflection must be capable, at the very least, of reviewing the memory record of the conduct in question, in ways that appear concurrent with a replay of its action.  But these are the abilities that reflection is "pre-reflectively" thought to have, that is, before the reflection on reflection can get under way.  If reflection is truly a form of conduct, then it becomes conceivable as a project to reflect on reflection itself, and this reflection can even lead to the conclusion that reflection does not have all of the powers that it is commonly portrayed to have.

If it is to have the properties that it is commonly thought to have, then reflection must be capable of running in parallel, and not interfering too severely, with the conduct on which it reflects.  If this turns out to be an illusion of reflection that is not really possible in actuality, then reflection must be capable, at the very least, of reviewing the memory record of the conduct in question, in ways that appear concurrent with a replay of its action.  But these are the abilities that reflection is "pre-reflectively" thought to have, that is, before the reflection on reflection can get under way.  If reflection is truly a form of conduct, then it becomes conceivable as a project to reflect on reflection itself, and this reflection can even lead to the conclusion that reflection does not have all of the powers that it is commonly portrayed to have.

=====1.4.1.2.  Types of Conduct=====

=====1.4.1.2.  Types of Conduct=====