Directory:Logic Museum/On the Inferno

MyWikiBiz, Author Your Legacy — Wednesday April 17, 2024
< Directory:Logic Museum
Revision as of 08:39, 24 October 2009 by Ockham (talk | contribs)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigationJump to search



The passages below (in Latin with parallel English text) are Question 97 of the supplementary part of the Aquinas' Summa Theologia. They describe in detail the nature of Hell (Latin: Infernus), and the torments that will be afflicted upon the souls (and bodies) of the damned.

Are the damned are tormented only by fire (article 1)? Not only are they afflicted by fire, but by all the elements, and their to their torment is added other torments from all the natural elements. (It is only because fire is so painful, that its name is given to intense torment of any kind).

Will the Inferno be dark (article 4)? Yes. 'Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing together of the bodies of the damned, which will so fill the place of hell with their numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid body that can be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of the damned, which will be darkened utterly.'

However, God will provide a certain amount of light - just enough for seeing those things which are capable of tormenting the souls of the damned still further.

Will the fire of the Inferno be corporeal (article 5)? Yes, because we are not aware of spiritual punishment, and it is physical punishment with which God threatens us. Aquinas rejects the theory of Avicenna, that the souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of bodies; just as in a dream. For the power of imagination depends ultimately on the power of bodily organs. 'We must admit that the fire that will torment the bodies of the damned is corporeal, since we cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless the punishment itself is a bodily one'. The pain of the Inferno has to be real not imaginary pain. Since real pain is what causes pain to our body, the fire of the inferno must be a physical, not a spiritual fire.

Is the fire of hell is of the same kind as earthly fire (article 6)? Yes, but it has certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. And is (article 7) the fire of hell is beneath the earth? Probably. After all, the Latin word for 'Hell' (Infernus) means 'the regions below'. (the connotation of intense and searing heat, it clearly acquired from the Christian idea of punishment in the afterlife).

Articulus 1 Utrum damnati in inferno sola poena ignis affliguntur
Whether in hell the damned are tormented only by the punishment of fire?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod damnati in inferno sola poena ignis affligantur. Quia Mt. 25, ubi eorum damnatio exprimitur, fir mentio solum de igne, cum dicitur (v.41) Ite, maledicte, in ignem aeternum. Objection 1. It would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire; because Mt. 25:41, where their condemnation is declared, mention is made of fire only, in the words: 'Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.'
Praeterea, sicut poena purgartorii debetur peccato veniali, ita poena inferni debetur mortali. Sed in purgatorio non dicitur esse nisi poena ignis: ut patet per hod quod dicitur I Cor. 3,13: Uniuscuiusque opus quale sit, ignis probabit. Ergo nec in inferno erit nisi poena ignis. Objection 2. Further, even as the punishment of purgatory is due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no other punishment but that of fire is stated to be in purgatory, as appears from the words of 1 Cor. 3:13: 'The fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is.' Therefore neither in hell will there be a punishment other than of fire.
Praeterea, poenarum varietas refrigerium praestat: sicut calido cum transfertur ad frigidum. Sed nullum refrigerium est ponere in damnatis. Ergo non erunt diversae poenae, sed sola poena ignis. Objection 3. Further, variety of punishment affords a respite, as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the damned. Therefore there will not be various punishments, but that of fire alone.
Sed contra: 1. Est quod dicitur in Ps. 10,7: Ignis et sulphur et spiritus procellarum pars calicis eorum. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 10:7): 'Fire and brimstone and storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup.'
2. Praeterea, Iob 24,19: Transibunt ab aquis nivium ad calorem nimium. Further, it is written (Job 24:19): 'Let him pass from the snow waters to excessive heat.'
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Basilium in ultima mundi purgatione fiet separatio in elementis; ut quidquid est purum et nobile, remaneat superius ad gloriam beatorum; quidquid vero est ignobile et faeculentum, in Inferno proiiciatur ad poenam damnatorum; ut sicut omnis creatura Dei est beatis materia gaudii, ita damnatis ex omnibus creaturis tormentum accrescat, secundum illud Sap. 5, 21: Pugnabit cum illo orbis terrarum contra insensatos. I answer that, According to Basil (Homilia vi in Hexaemeron and Hom. i in Ps. 38), at the final cleansing of the world, there will be a separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being cast down for the punishment of the damned: so that just as every creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. 5:21, 'The whole world will fight with Him against the unwise.'
Hoc etiam divinae justitiae competit, ut sicut ab uno recedentes per peccatum, in rebus materialibus (quae sunt multa et varia) finem suum constituerunt; ita etiam multipliciter, et ex multis affligantur. This is also becoming to Divine justice, that whereas they departed from one by sin, and placed their end in material things which are many and various, so should they be tormented in many ways and from many sources.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia ignis est maxime afflictivus propter hoc quod abundat virtute activa; ideo nomine ignis omnis afflictio designatur si sit vehemens. Reply to Objection 1. It is because fire is most painful, through its abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given to any torment if it be intense.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod poena purgatorii non est principaliter ad affligendum, sed ad purgandum; unde per solum ignem fieri debet, qui habet maximam vim purgativam. Sed damnatorum poena non ordinatur ad purgandum; unde non est simile. Reply to Objection 2. The punishment of purgatory is not intended chiefly to torment but to cleanse: wherefore it should be inflicted by fire alone which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of the damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the comparison fails.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod damnati transibunt ex vehementissimo calore ad vehementissimum frigus, sine hoc quod in eis sit aliquod refrigerium. Quia passio ab exterioribus non erit per transmutationem corporis a sua pristina naturali dispositione, ut contraria passio ad aequalitatem vel temperiem reducendo refrigerium causet, sicut nunc accidit; sed erit per actionem spiritualem, secundum quod sensibilia agunt in sensum prout sentiuntur, imprimendo formas illas secundum esse spirituale in organum, et non secundum esse materiale. Reply to Objection 3. The damned will pass from the most intense heat to the most intense cold without this giving them any respite: because they will suffer from external agencies, not by the transmutation of their body from its original natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way as sensible objects act on the senses being perceived by impressing the organ with their forms according to their spiritual and not their material being.
Articulus 2. Utrum vermis quo affliguntur damnati, sit vermis corporalis.
Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vermis quo affliguntur damnati, sit vermis corporalis.Quia caro non potest affligi per vermem spiritualem. Sed caro damnatorum affligetur per vermem. Judith 16, 21: Dabit ignem et vermes in carnes eorum; et Eccli. 7, 19: vindicta carnis impii ignis et vermis. Ergo vermis ille erit corporalis. Objection 1. It would seem that the worm by which the damned are tormented is corporeal. Because flesh cannot be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the damned will be tormented by a worm: 'He will give fire and worms into their flesh' (Judith 16:21), and: 'The vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms' (Sirach 7:19). Therefore that worm will be corporeal.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit 21 de Civ. Dei: Utrumque, idest ignis et vermis, poena erunt carnis; et sic idem quod prius. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 9): . . . 'Both, namely fire and worm, will be the punishment of the body.' Therefore, etc.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, 20 de civitate Dei: In poenis malorum inextinguibilis ignis et vivacissimus vermis ab aliis aliter atque aliter est expositus. Alii utrumque ad corpus, alii utrumque ad animam retulerunt; alii proprie ad corpus ignem, topice ad animam vermem; quod esse credibilius videtur. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 22): 'The unquenchable fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are explained in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some, both to the soul: others refer the fire, in the literal sense, to the body, the worm to the soul metaphorically: and this seems the more probable.'
Respondeo dicendum quod post diem judicii in mundo innovato non remanebit aliquod animal vel aliquod corpus mixtum, nisi corpus hominis tantum, eo quod non habeat aliquem ordinem ad corruptionem, nec post illud tempus sit futura generatio et corruptio. Unde vermis qui in damnatis ponitur, non debet intelligi esse materialis, sed spiritualis, qui est conscientiae remorsus: qui dicitur vermis, inquantum oritur ex putredine peccati, et animam affligit, sicut corporalis vermis ex putredine ortus affligit pungendo. I answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will remain in the renewed world except only the body of man, because the former are not directed to incorruption [Cf, 91, 5], nor after that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by gnawing.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ipsae animae damnatorum dicuntur carnes eorum pro eo quod carni subjectae fuerunt. Vel potest dici quod etiam per vermem spiritualem caro affligetur, secundum quod passiones animae redundant in corpus; et hoc in futuro. Reply to Objection 1. The very souls of the damned are called their flesh for as much as they were subject to the flesh. Or we may reply that the flesh will be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur sub quadam comparatione: non enim vult simpliciter asserere quod ille vermis sit materialis; sed quod potius esset asserendum, ignem et vermem materialiter intelligi, quam quod utrumque spiritualiter tantum intelligatur; quia sic damnati nullam poenam corporalem sustinerent; ut patet seriem verborum ejus ibidem inspicienti. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that it is better to say that both are to be understood materially, than that both should be understood only in a spiritual sense: for then the damned would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the context of his words in this passage.
Articulus 3 Utrum fletus qui erit in damnatis, futurus sit corporalis
Whether the weeping of the damned will be corporeal?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fletus qui est in damnatis, erit corporalis. Quia Luc. 13, dicit quaedam Glossa, quod per fletum quem dominus reprobis comminatur, potest probari vera corporum resurrectio; quod non esset, si fletus ille esset tantum spiritualis. Ergo et cetera. Objection 1. It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be corporeal. For a gloss on Lk. 13:28, 'There will be weeping,' says that 'the weeping with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection of the body.' But this would not be the case if that weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc.
Praeterea, tristitia quae est in poena, respondet delectationi quae fuit in culpa, secundum illud Apocal. 18, 7: Quantum glorificavit se, et in deliciis fuit, tantum date illi tormentum et luctum. Sed peccatores in culpa habuerunt delectationem et interiorem et exteriorem. Ergo habebunt fletum etiam exteriorem. Objection 2. Further, the pain of the punishment corresponds to the pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. 18:7: 'As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.' Now sinners had internal and external pleasure in their sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping.
Sed contra, fletus corporalis fit per quamdam resolutionem lacrymarum. Sed a corporibus damnatorum non potest fieri perpetua resolutio, cum nihil in eis per cibum restauretur: omne enim finitum consumitur, si aliquid ab eo continue abstrahatur. Ergo in damnatis non erit corporalis fletus. On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears. Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything finite is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.
Respondeo dicendum quod in fletu corporali duo inveniuntur: quorum unum est lacrymarum resolutio; et quantum ad hoc fletus corporalis in damnatis esse non potest: quia post diem judicii quiescente motu primi mobilis non erit aliqua generatio et corruptio, vel corporalis alteratio; in lacrymarum autem resolutione oportet esse illius humoris generationem qui per lacrymas distillat; unde quantum ad hoc corporalis fletus in damnatis esse non poterit. I answer that, two things are to be observed in corporeal weeping. One is the resolution of tears: and as to this corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the first movable being being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor corruption, nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of tears that humor needs to be generated which is shed forth in the shape of tears.
Aliud quod invenitur in corporali fletu, est quaedam commotio et perturbatio capitis et oculorum; et quantum ad hoc fletus in damnatis esse poterit post resurrectionem. Corpora enim damnatorum non solum ex exteriori affligentur, sed etiam ab interiori, secundum quod corpus immutatur ad passionem animae in bonum vel malum; et quantum ad hoc fletus carnis resurrectionem indicat, et respondet delectationi culpae quae fuit in anima et in corpore. Wherefore in this respect it will be impossible for corporeal weeping to be in the damned. The other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is a certain commotion and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this respect weeping will be possible in the damned after the resurrection: for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only from without, but also from within, according as the body is affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof of the body's resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and body.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad objiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Articulus 4 Utrum damnati futuri sint in tenebris corporalibus
Whether the damned are in material darkness?
Videtur quod damnati non sint in tenebris corporalibus. Quia, ut dicit Gregorius in 9 Lib. Moral., super illud Job 10, 22 Sempiternus horror inhabitat, quamvis ignis illic ad consolationem non luceat, tamen ut magis torqueat ad aliquid lucet: nam sequaces quos secum traxerunt de mundo reprobi, flamma illustrante visuri sunt. Ergo non erunt ibi tenebrae corporales. Objection 1. It would seem that the damned are not in material darkness. For commenting on Job 10:22, 'But everlasting horror dwelleth,' Gregory says (Moral. ix): 'Although that fire will give no light for comfort, yet, that it may torment the more it does give light for a purpose, for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their followers whom they have drawn thither from the world.' Therefore the darkness there is not material.
Praeterea, damnati vident poenam suam: hoc enim est eis augmentum poenae. Sed nihil videtur sine lumine. Ergo non sunt tenebrae corporales. Objection 2. Further, the damned see their own punishment, for this increases their punishment. But nothing is seen without light. Therefore there is no material darkness there.
Praeterea, damnati habebunt ibi potentiam visivam post corporum resumptionem. Sed frustra in eis esset, nisi viderent aliquid. Ergo cum nihil videatur nisi in lumine, videtur quod non sint omnino in tenebris. Objection 3. Further, there the damned will have the power of sight after being reunited to their bodies. But this power would be useless to them unless they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. 22, 13: ligatis pedibus et manibus projicite eum in tenebras exteriores; super quo dicit Gregorius Lib. 9 Mor.: Si ignis ille lucem haberet, in tenebras exteriores nequaquam mitti diceretur. On the contrary, It is written (Matthew 22:13): 'Bind his hands and his feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness.' Commenting on these words Gregory says (Moral. ix): If this fire gave any light, 'he would by no means be described as cast into exterior darkness.'
Praeterea, Basilius dicit super illud Psalm. 28: Vox domini intercidentis flammam ignis, quod virtute Dei separabitur claritas ignis ab ejus virtute adustiva: ita quod claritas cedet in gaudium sanctorum, et ustivum ignis in tormentum damnatorum. Ergo damnati habebunt tenebras corporales. Further, Basil says (Hom. i in Ps. 28:7, 'The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire') that 'by God's might the brightness of the fire will be separated from its power of burning, so that its brightness will conduce to the joy of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the torment of the damned.' Therefore the damned will be in material darkness.
Quaedam vero alia quae ad poenam damnatorum pertinent, determinata sunt supra (Q86 a3). Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided above (Q86 a3).
Respondeo dicendum, quod dispositio Inferni talis erit quod maxime miseriae damnatorum competet; unde secundum hoc sunt ibi lux et tenebra, prout maxime spectant ad miseriam damnatorum. Ipsa autem visio secundum se est delectabilis; ut enim dicitur in 1 Metaph., sensus oculorum est maxime diligibilis, eo quod per ipsum plura cognoscimus. I answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Wherefore accordingly both light and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness of the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as stated in Metaph. i, 'the sense of sight is most esteemed, because thereby many things are known.'
Sed per accidens contingit visionem esse afflictivam, inquantum videmus aliqua nobis nociva, vel nostrae voluntati repugnantia. Ideo et in Inferno hoc modo debet esse locus dispositus ad videndum secundum lucem et tenebras, quod nihil ibi perspicue videatur, sed solummodo sub quadam umbrositate videantur illa quae afflictionem cordi ingerere possunt. Yet it happens accidentally that seeing is painful, when we see things that are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell the place must be so disposed for seeing as regards light and darkness, that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish to the heart.
Unde simpliciter loquendo, locus est tenebrosus, sed tamen ex divina dispositione est ibi aliquid luminis, quantum sufficit ad videndum illa quae animam torquere possunt: et ad hoc satis facit naturalis situs loci: quia in terrae medio, ubi Infernus ponitur, non potest esse ignis nisi faeculentus et turbidus, et quasi fumosus. Wherefore, simply speaking, the place is dark. Yet by Divine disposition, there is a certain amount of light, as much as suffices for seeing those things which are capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for this, since in the centre of the earth, where hell is said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky as it were.
Quidam tamen tenebrarum harum causam assignant ex commassatione et compressione corporum damnatorum, quae propter multitudinem ita replebunt locum Inferni, quod nihil ibi de aere remanebit; et sic non erit ibi aliquid de diaphano quod possit esse subjectum lucis et tenebrae, nisi oculi damnatorum, qui erunt obtenebrati. Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing together of the bodies of the damned, which will so fill the place of hell with their numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid body that can be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of the damned, which will be darkened utterly.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Articulus 5 Utrum ignis inferni, quo cruciabuntur corpora damnatorum, sit corporeus
Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignis Inferni, quo corpora damnatorum cruciabuntur, non sit corporeus. Dicit enim Damascenus in 4 Lib., in fine: Tradetur Diabolus, et Daemones ejus, et homo ejus, scilicet Antichristus, et impii et peccatores, in ignem aeternum, non materialem, qualis est qui apud nos est, sed qualem utique novit Deus. Sed omne corporeum est materiale. Ergo ignis Inferni non erit corporeus. Objection 1. It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies of the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): The devil, and 'demons, and his men' [Cf. 2 Thess. 2:3: 'And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition.'], namely Antichrist, 'together with the ungodly and sinners will be cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which we have, but such as God knoweth.' Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore the fire of hell will not be corporeal.
Praeterea, animae damnatorum a corpore separatae, ad ignem Inferni deferuntur. Sed Augustinus dicit, 12 super Gen. ad litteram: Spiritualem arbitror esse, locum scilicet ad quem anima defertur post mortem, non corporalem. Ergo ignis ille non est corporeus. Objection 2. Further, the souls of the damned when severed from their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): 'In my opinion the place to which the soul is committed after death is spiritual and not corporeal.' Therefore, etc.
Praeterea, ignis corporeus in modo suae actionis non sequitur modum culpae in eo qui igne crematur, sed magis modum humidi vel sicci: in eodem enim igne corporeo videmus affligi justum et impium. Objection 3. Further, corporeal fire in the mode of its action does not follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burned at the stake, rather does it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer.
Sed ignis Inferni in modo suae actionis sequitur modum culpae in eo qui punitur; unde Gregorius in 4 Dial.: Unus quidem est Gehennae ignis, sed non uno modo omnes cruciat peccatores: uniuscujusque enim quantum exigit culpa, tantum sentietur poena. Ergo non est corporeus. But the fire of hell, in its mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in the person punished; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63): 'There is indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture all sinners equally. For each one will suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves.' Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in 4 Dial.: Ignem gehennae corporeum esse non ambigo, in quo certum est corpora cruciari. On the contrary, He says (Dial. iv, 29): 'I doubt not that the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are tortured there.'
Praeterea, Sap. 5, 21, dicitur: Pugnabit orbis terrarum contra insensatos. Sed non totus orbis contra insensatos pugnaret, si solummodo spirituali poena, et non corporali, punirentur. Ergo punientur igne corporeo. Further, it is written (Wisdom 5:21): 'The . . . world shall fight . . . against the unwise.' But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a corporeal fire.
Respondeo dicendum quod de igne inferni multiplex fuit positio. Quidam enim philosophi, ut Avicenna, resurrectionem non credentes, solius animae post mortem poenam esse crediderunt; et quia eis inconveniens videbatur ut anima, cum sit incorporea, igne corporeo puniretur, negaverunt ignem corporeum esse quo mali punirentur; volentes quod quidquid dicitur de poena animarum post mortem futura per aliqua corporalia, metaphorice dicatur. I answer that, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they considered it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically.
Sicut enim bonarum animarum delectatio et jucunditas non erit in aliqua re corporali, sed spirituali tantum, quod erit in consecutione sui finis; ita afflictio malorum spiritualis erit tantum, in hoc scilicet quod tristabuntur de hoc quod separantur a fine, cujus inest eis desiderium naturale. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire whereof is in them by nature.
Unde sicut omnia quae de delectatione animarum post mortem dicuntur, quae videntur ad delectationem corporalem pertinere, sicut quod reficiantur, quod rideant, et hujusmodi; ita etiam quidquid de harum afflictione dicitur quod in corporalem punitionem sonare videtur, per similitudinem debet intelligi; sicut quod in igne ardeant, vel foetoribus affligantur, et cetera hujusmodi. Wherefore, just as all descriptions of the soul's delight after death that seem to denote bodily pleasure--for instance, that they are refreshed, that they smile, and so forth--must be taken metaphorically, so also are all such descriptions of the soul's suffering as seem to imply bodily punishment--for instance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth.
Spiritualis enim delectatio et tristitia, cum sit ignota multitudini, oportet quod per delectationes et tristitias corporales figuraliter manifestentur, ut homines magis moveantur ad desiderium vel timorem. For as spiritual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority, these things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved the more to the desire or fear thereof.
Sed quia in poena damnatorum non solum erit poena damni, quae respondet aversioni quae fuit in culpa, sed etiam poena sensus, quae respondet conversioni; ideo non sufficit praedictum modum punitionis ponere; et ideo etiam ipse Avicenna, alterum modum superaddit, dicens, quod animae malorum post mortem non per corpora, sed per corporum similitudines punientur, sicut in somnis propter similitudines praedictas in imaginatione existentes videtur homini quod torqueatur poenis diversis; et hunc etiam modum punitionis videtur ponere Augustinus in 12 super Gen. ad Lit., sicut ibidem manifeste patet. Since, however, in the punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows that it is not enough to hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself (Met. ix) added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is suffering various pains on account of such like images being in his imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32), as is clear from the text.
Sed hoc videtur inconvenienter dictum esse. Imaginatio enim potentia quaedam est utens organo corporali; unde non potest esse quod visiones imaginativae fiant in anima separata a corpore, sicut in anima somniantis; unde etiam Avicenna, ut hoc inconveniens evaderet, dixit, quod animae separatae a corpore utebantur, quasi pro organo, aliqua parte caelestis corporis, cui corpus humanum oportet esse conforme ad hoc quod perficiatur anima rationali, quae est similis motoribus caelestis corporis: in hoc secutus quodammodo opinionem antiquorum philosophorum, qui posuerunt animas redire ad compares stellas. But this would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily organ: so that it is impossible for such visions of the imagination to occur in the soul separated from the body, as in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also that he might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul separated from the body uses as an organ some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body--thus following somewhat the opinion of certain philosophers of old, who maintained that souls return to the stars that are their compeers.
Sed hoc est omnino absurdum secundum doctrinam philosophi; quia anima utitur determinato organo corporali, sicut ars determinatis instrumentis; unde non potest transire de corpore in corpus, quod Pythagoras posuit, ut dicitur in 1 de anima. Qualiter autem ad dictum Augustini sit respondendum, infra dicetur. But this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one body to another, as Pythagoras is stated (De Anima i, text. 53) to have maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to be answered (ad 2).
Quidquid autem dicatur de igne qui animas separatas cruciat, de igne tamen quo cruciabuntur corpora damnatorum post resurrectionem, oportet dicere quod sit corporeus; quia corpori non potest convenienter poena aptari nisi corporea. However, whatever we may say of the fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily.
Unde Gregorius in 4 Dial., ex hoc ipso probat Inferni ignem esse corporeum, quod reprobi post resurrectionem in eum detrudentur. Augustinus etiam, ut habetur in littera, manifeste confitetur ignem illum quo corpora cruciabuntur, esse corporeum. Et de hoc ad praesens est quaestio. Sed hoc supra dictum est (70, 3), qualiter autem animae damnatorum ab igne isto corporeo puniantur. Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) proves the fire of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that the fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at issue for the present. We have said elsewhere (70, 3) how the souls of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Damascenus non negat simpliciter ignem illum materialem esse, sed quod non est materialis talis qualis apud nos est, eo quod quibusdam proprietatibus ad hoc igne distinguitur. Vel dicendum est, quod quia ignis ille non materialiter alterat corpora, sed quadam spirituali actione agit in ea ad punitionem, ut ex dictis patet, ideo non dicitur materialis, non quantum ad substantiam, sed quantum ad punitionis effectum in corporibus, et multo amplius in animabus. Reply to Objection 1. Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that it is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, but as to its punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod dictum Augustini potest hoc modo accipi, ut pro tanto dicatur locus ille ad quem animae deferentur post mortem, non esse corporeus, quia anima in eo corporaliter non existit, per modum scilicet quo corpora existunt in loco, sed alio modo spirituali, sicut Angeli in loco sunt. Vel dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur opinando, et non determinando, sicut frequenter facit in libro illo. Reply to Objection 2. The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death be described as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not corporeally, i.e. as bodies are in a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in those books.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ignis ille erit instrumentum divinae justitiae punientis. Instrumentum autem non solum agit in virtute propria, et per proprium modum, sed etiam in virtute principalis agentis, et secundum quod est regulatum ab eo; unde quamvis ignis secundum propriam virtutem non habeat quod aliquos cruciet magis vel minus secundum modum peccati; habet tamen hoc secundum quod ejus actio modificatur ex ordine divinae justitiae; sicut etiam ignis fornacis modificatur ex industria fabri in sua actione secundum quod competit ad effectum artis. Reply to Objection 3. That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal agent, and as directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of its own power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice: even so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his art requires.
Articulus 6 Utrum ignis ille sit eiusdem speciei cum igne isto corporeo quem videmus
Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?
Videtur quod ignis ille non sit ejusdem speciei cum igne isto corporeo quem videmus. Augustinus enim dicit, et habetur in littera: Ignis aeternus cujusmodi sit, arbitror scire neminem, nisi forte cui spiritus divinus ostendit. Sed naturam istius ignis omnes, vel fere omnes, sciunt. Ergo ille ignis non est ejusdem naturae vel speciei cum isto. Objection 1. It would seem that this fire is not of the same species as the corporeal fire which we see. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): 'In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone.' But all or nearly all know the nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of the same species as this.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit 15 Lib. Moral., exponens illud Job 20: Devorabit eum ignis, qui non succenditur: ignis corporeus ut esse valeat, corporeis indiget fomentis; nec valet, nisi succensus esset, et nisi refotus, subsistere. At contra Gehennae ignis, cum sit corporeus, et in se missos reprobos corporaliter exurat, nec studio humano succenditur, nec lignis nutritur, sed creatus semel durat inextinguibilis; et successione non indiget, et ardore non caret. Ergo non est ejusdem naturae cum corporeo igne quem videmus. Objection 2. Further, Gregory commenting on Job 10:26, 'A fire that is not kindled shall devour him,' says (Moral. xv): 'Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way the wicked cast therein, is neither kindled by human endeavor, nor kept alive with fuel, but once created endures unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no kindling, and lacks not heat.' Therefore it is not of the same nature as the fire that we see.
Praeterea, aeternum et corruptibile non sunt unius rationis, cum nec etiam in genere conveniant, secundum philosophum in 10 Metaph. Sed ignis iste est corruptibilis, ille autem aeternus; Matth. 25, 41: Ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum. Ergo non sunt ejusdem speciei. Objection 3. Further, the everlasting and the corruptible differ essentially, since they agree not even in genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x). But this fire of ours is corruptible, whereas the other is everlasting: 'Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire' (Matthew 25:41). Therefore they are not of the same nature.
Praeterea, de natura hujus ignis qui apud nos est, est ut luceat. Sed ignis Inferni non lucet; unde dicitur Job 18, 5: Nonne lux impii extinguetur? Ergo non est ejusdem naturae cum isto igne. Objection 4. Further, it belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give light. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence the saying of Job 18:5: 'Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished?' Therefore . . . as above.
Sed contra, secundum philosophum in 1 Topic., omnis aqua omni aquae est idem specie. Ergo eadem ratione omnis ignis omni igni idem est in specie. On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 6), 'every water is of the same species as every other water.' Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.
Praeterea, Sap. 11, 17, dicitur: Per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur. Sed omnes homines peccant per res sensibiles hujus mundi. Ergo justum est ut per easdem puniantur. Further, it is written (Wisdom 11:17): 'By what things a man sinneth by the same also he is tormented.' Now men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just that they should be punished by those same things.
Respondeo dicendum, quod ignis propter hoc quod est maximae virtutis in agendo inter reliqua elementa, alia corpora pro materia habet, ut dicitur in 2 Meteor.; unde et ignis dupliciter invenitur; scilicet in propria materia, prout est in sphaera sua; vel in materia aliena, sive terrestri, ut patet in carbone; sive aerea, sicut patet in flamma. I answer that, As stated in Meteor. iv, 1 fire has other bodies for its matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has the greatest power of action. Hence fire is found under two conditions: in its own matter, as existing in its own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth, as in burning coal, or of air as in the flame.
Quocumque autem modo ignis inveniatur, semper idem est in specie quantum ad naturam ignis pertinet. Potest autem esse diversitas in specie quantum ad corpora quae sunt materia ignis; unde flamma et carbo differunt specie, et similiter lignum ignitum et ferrum ignitum. Nec differt quantum ad hoc sive ignita sint per violentiam, ut in ferro apparet, sive ex principio intrinseco naturali, ut accidit in sulphure. Under whatever conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same species, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there may be a difference of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning coal differ specifically, and likewise burning wood and red-hot iron; nor does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur.
Quod ergo ignis Inferni quantum ad hoc quod habet de natura ignis, sit ejusdem speciei cum igne qui apud nos est, manifestum est; utrum autem ille ignis sit in propria materia existens, aut in aliena, et si in aliena, in qua materia sit, nobis ignotum est; et secundum hoc potest ab igne qui apud nos est, specie differre materialiter consideratus. Quasdam tamen proprietates differentes habet ab igne isto, ut quod succensione non indiget, nec lignis nutritur. Sed istae differentiae non ostendunt diversitatem in specie quantum ad id quod pertinet ad naturam ignis. Accordingly it is clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as the fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we know not. And in this way it may differ specifically from the fire we have, considered materially. It has, however, certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do not argue a difference of species as regards the nature of the fire.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur quantum ad id quod est materiale in illo igne, non autem quantum ad ignis naturam. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of that fire with regard to its matter, and not with regard to its nature.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ignis iste qui apud nos est, lignis nutritur, et ab homine succenditur, quia est artificialiter et per violentiam in alienam materiam introductus; sed ignis ille lignis non indiget quibus foveatur, quia vel est in propria materia existens, vel est in materia aliena non per violentiam, sed per naturam a principio intrinseco; unde non est ab homine accensus, sed a Deo, qui naturam illam instituit; et hoc est quod dicitur Isai. 30, 33: Flatus domini sicut torrens sulphuris succendens eam. Reply to Objection 2. This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel, and is kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (30:33): 'The breath of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone kindling it.'
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut corpora damnatorum erunt ejusdem speciei cujus et modo sunt, quamvis nunc sint corruptibilia, tunc autem incorruptibilia ex ordine divinae justitiae, et propter quietem motus caeli; ita est etiam de igne Inferni, quo corpora illa punientur. Reply to Objection 3. Even as the bodies of the damned will be of the same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is it with the fire of hell whereby those bodies will be punished.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod lucere non convenit igni secundum quemlibet modum existendi, quia in propria materia existens non lucet; unde non lucet in propria sphaera, ut philosophi dicunt. Similiter etiam in aliqua materia aliena ignis existens non lucet, sicut cum est in materia opaca terrestri, ut in sulphure. Similiter est etiam quando ex aliquo grosso fumo ejus claritas obscuratur. Unde quod ignis Inferni non lucet, non est sufficiens argumentum ad hoc quod non sit ejusdem speciei. Reply to Objection 4. To give light does not belong to fire according to any mode of existence, since in its own matter it gives no light; wherefore it does not shine in its own sphere according to the philosophers: and in like manner in certain foreign matters it does not shine, as when it is in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur. The same happens also when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke. Wherefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a different species.
Articulus 7 Utrum ignis ille sit sub terra
Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth?
Videtur quod ignis ille non sit sub terra. Quia Job 18, 18, de homine damnato dicitur: Et de orbe transferet eum Deus. Ergo ille ignis quo damnati punientur, non est sub terra, sed extra orbem. Objection 1. It would seem that this fire is not beneath the earth. For it is said of the damned (Job 18:18), 'And God shall remove him out of the globe.' Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be punished is not beneath the earth but outside the globe.
Praeterea, nullum violentum et per accidens potest esse sempiternum. Sed ignis ille erit in Inferno in sempiternum. Ergo non erit ibi per violentiam, sed naturaliter. Sed sub terra non potest esse ignis nisi per violentiam. Ergo ignis Inferni non est sub terra. Objection 2. Further, nothing violent or accidental can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there, not by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the fire of hell is not beneath the earth.
Praeterea, in igne Inferni omnia corpora damnatorum post diem judicii cruciabuntur. Sed illa corpora locum replebunt. Ergo cum futura sit maxima multitudo damnatorum, quia stultorum infinitus est numerus, Eccle. 1, 15, oportet maximum esse spatium in quo ignis ille continetur. Sed inconveniens videtur infra terram esse tantam concavitatem, cum partes terrae naturaliter ferantur ad medium. Ergo ignis ille non erit sub terra. Objection 3. Further, after the day of judgment the bodies of all the damned will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies will fill a place. Consequently, since the multitude of the damned will be exceeding great, for 'the number of fools is infinite' (Ecclesiastes 1:15), the space containing that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the center. Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth.
Praeterea, Sap. 11, 17, dicitur: Per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur. Sed mali super terram peccaverunt. Ergo ignis eos puniens non oportet esse sub terra. Objection 4. Further, 'By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented' (Wisdom 11:17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Isai. 14, 9: Infernus subtus conturbatus est in occursum tui. Ergo ignis Inferni sub nobis est. On the contrary, It is written (Isaiah 14:9): 'Hell below was in an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming.' Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit in 4 Dialog.: Quid obstet non video, ut Infernus sub terra esse credatur. Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv): 'I see not what hinders us from believing that hell is beneath the earth.'
Praeterea, Jonae 2, super illud: Projecisti me in corde maris; Glossa interlinealis: Idest, in Inferno; pro quo dicitur in Evangelio Matth. 12, 40: in corde terrae; quia sicut cor est in medio animalis, ita Infernus in medio perhibetur terrae esse. Further, a gloss on Jonas 2:4, 'Thou hast cast me forth . . . into the heart of the sea,' says, 'i.e. into hell,' and in the Gospel (Matthew 12:40) the words 'in the heart of the earth' have the same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.
Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera, in qua parte mundi Infernus sit, scire neminem arbitror, nisi cui divinus spiritus revelavit; unde et Gregorius in 4 Dialog., super hac quaestione interrogatus respondet: Hac de re temere definire non audeo. Nonnulli namque in quadam terrarum parte Infernum esse putaverunt; alii vero hunc sub terra esse existimant. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), 'I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of God has revealed this to some one.' Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) having been questioned on this point answers: 'About this matter I dare not give a rash decision. For some have deemed hell to be in some part of the earth's surface; others think it to be beneath the earth.'
Et hanc opinionem probabiliorem esse ostendit dupliciter. Primo ex ipsa nominis ratione, sic dicens: Si idcirco Infernum dicimus, quia inferius jacet; quod terra ad caelum est, hoc esse Infernus debet ad terram'. Secundo autem ex hoc quod dicitur Apoc. 5, 3: Nemo poterat neque in caelo neque in terra neque subtus terram aperire librum: ut hoc quod dicitur in caelo, referatur ad Angelos; hoc quod dicitur in terra, referatur ad homines viventes in corpore; hoc quod dicitur sub terra referatur ad animas existentes in Inferno. He shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two reasons. First from the very meaning of the word. These are his words: 'If we call it the 'nether' (infernum) regions, for the reason that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is in relation to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth.' Secondly, from the words of Apoc. 5:3: 'No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to open the book': where the words 'in heaven' refer to the angels, 'on earth' to men living in the body, and 'under the earth' to souls in hell.
Augustinus etiam in 12 super Genes. ad litteram, duas rationes tangere videtur, quare congruum sit quod Infernus sit sub terra. Una est, ut quoniam defunctorum animae amore carnis peccaverunt, hoc eis exhibeatur quod ipsi carni mortuae solet exhiberi, ut scilicet sub terra recondantur. Augustine too (Gen. ad lit. xii, 34) seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that 'whereas the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth.'
Alia est quod sicut est gravitas in corporibus, ita tristitia in spiritibus; et laetitia sicut levitas: unde sicut secundum corpus, si ponderis sui ordinem teneant, inferiora sunt omnia graviora; ita secundum spiritum inferiora sunt omnia tristiora: et sic sicut conveniens locus gaudio electorum est caelum Empyreum; ita conveniens locus tristitiae damnatorum est infimum terrae. The other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of body). Wherefore 'just as in reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, if they be placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower place is occupied by whatever is more sorrowful'; and thus even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for the sorrow of the damned.
Nec movere debet quod Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod Inferi sub terris esse dicuntur vel creduntur: quia in Lib. Retractationum, hoc retractans dicit: Mihi videor dicere debuisse magis quod sub terris sunt Inferi, quam rationem reddere cur sub terris esse dicantur sive credantur. Nor does it signify that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) says that 'hell is stated or believed to be under the earth,' because he withdraws this (Retract. ii, 29) where he says: 'Methinks I should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth.'
Quidam tamen philosophi posuerunt quod locus Inferni erit sub orbe terrestri, tamen supra terrae superficiem, ex parte opposita nobis; et hoc videtur Isidorus sensisse, cum dixit, quod sol et luna in ordine quo creati sunt, stabunt, ne impii in tormentis positi fruantur luce eorum: quae ratio nulla esset, si Infernus infra terram esse dicatur. Qualiter tamen haec verba possint exponi, patuit supra (Q91 a2). However, some philosophers have maintained that hell is situated beneath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that 'the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they were created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments.' But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be explained (91 , 2).
Pythagoras vero posuit locum poenarum in sphaera ignis, quam in medio totius orbis esse dixit, ut patet per philosophum in 2 Cael. et Mund. Sed tamen convenientius his quae in Scriptura dicuntur, est ut sub terra esse dicatur. Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world: and he called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle relates (De Coelo et Mundo ii). It is, however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that it is beneath the earth.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum illud Job, De orbe transferet eum Deus, intelligendum est de orbe terrarum, idest de hoc mundo; et hoc modo exponit Gregorius dicens: De orbe quippe transfertur, cum superno apparente judice de hoc mundo tollitur, in quo perverse gloriatur. Nec est intelligendum quod orbis hic accipiatur pro universo, quasi extra totum universum sit locus poenarum. Reply to Objection 1. The words of Job, 'God shall remove him out of the globe,' refer to the surface of the earth ['De orbe terrarum,' which might be rendered 'from the land of the living.'], i.e. from this world. This is how Gregory expounds it (Moral. xiv) where he says: 'He is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away from this world wherein he now prides himself in his wickedness.' Nor does globe here signify the universe, as though the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in loco illo conservatur ignis in aeternum ex ordine divinae justitiae, quamvis secundum naturam suam non possit extra locum suum aliquod elementum durare in aeternum, praecipue statu generationis et corruptionis manente in rebus. Ignis autem ibi erit fortissimae caliditatis: quia calor ejus erit undique congregatus propter frigus terrae undique ipsum circumstans. Reply to Objection 2. Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice although according to its nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things were to remain in this state of generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of the earth.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Infernus nunquam deficiet in amplitudine, quin sufficiat ad damnatorum corpora capienda: Infernus enim Prov. 30, inter tria insatiabilia ponitur. Nec est inconveniens quod intra viscera terrae tanta concavitas conservetur divina virtute, quae damnatorum omnium corpora possit capere. Reply to Objection 3. Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things that 'never are satisfied' (Proverbs 30:15-16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc quod dicitur: Per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur, non est necessarium nisi in principalibus instrumentis peccandi. Quia enim homo in anima peccat et corpore, in utroque punitur; non autem oportet quod in quo loco quis peccat, in eodem puniatur, cum alius sit locus qui viatoribus et damnatis debetur. Vel dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de poenis quibus homo punitur in via, secundum quod quaelibet culpa suam poenam habet annexam, prout quisque inordinatus animus sibi ipsi est poena, ut dicit Augustinus. Reply to Objection 4. It does not follow of necessity that 'by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented,' except as regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since 'inordinate love is its own punishment,' as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).