Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-90-93

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS XL - XLIII

Question 90 The production of man's soul
Question 91 The production of man's body
Question 92 The production of the woman
Question 93 The end of man's production, inasmuch as he is "the image and likeness of God".

Latin	Latin
IЄ q. 90 pr. Post praemissa considerandum est de prima hominis productione. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, primo considerandum est de productione ipsius hominis; secundo, de fine productionis; tertio, de statu et conditione hominis primo producti; quarto, de loco eius. Circa productionem autem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de productione hominis quantum ad animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus viri; tertio, quantum ad productionem mulieris. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid factum, vel sit de substantia ipsius Dei. Secundo, supposito quod sit facta, utrum sit creata. Tertio, utrum sit facta mediantibus Angelis. Quarto, utrum sit facta ante corpus.	Question 90. The first production of man's soul
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia Dei. Dicitur enim Gen. II, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem. Sed ille qui spirat, aliquid a se emittit. Ergo anima qua homo vivit, est aliquid de substantia Dei.	Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's substance. For it is written (Genesis 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance.
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut supra habitum est, anima est forma simplex. Sed forma est actus. Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius Dei. Ergo anima est de substantia Dei.	Objection 2. Further, as above explained (75, 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, quaecumque sunt, et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et mens sunt, et nullo modo differunt, quia oporteret quod aliquibus differentiis differrent, et sic essent composita. Ergo Deus et mens humana idem sunt.	Objection 3. Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de origine animae, enumerat quaedam quae dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei Catholicae adversa; inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt Deum animam non de nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse.	On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut supra probatum est. Sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus antiquorum. Primi enim qui naturas rerum considerare incoeperunt, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil praeter corpora esse posuerunt. Et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum corporum iudicabant esse principium. Et quia animam ponebant esse de natura illius corporis quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur in I de anima, per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de natura Dei. Iuxta quam positionem etiam Manichaei, Deum esse quandam lucem corpoream existimantes, quandam partem illius lucis animam esse posuerunt corpori alligatam. Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc, quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a corpore separatum, sed corporis formam. Unde et Varro dixit quod Deus est anima mundum motu et ratione gubernans; ut Augustinus narrat, VII de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur illius totalis animae partem aliqui posuerunt animam hominis, sicut homo est pars totius mundi; non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium substantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones corporum. Haec autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probatum est. Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei.	I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (77 , 2; 79, 2; 84, 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence --acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (3, 1,7; 9, 1). This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.) So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (3, 1,8; and 75, 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inspirare non est accipiendum corporaliter, sed idem est Deum inspirare, quod spiritum facere. Quamvis et homo corporaliter spirans non emittat aliquid de sua substantia, sed de natura extranea.	Reply to Objection 1. The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing.
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod anima, etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per participationem; ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo non est actus purus, sicut Deus.	Reply to Objection 2. Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained (75, 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.
IЄ q. 90 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod differens, proprie acceptum, aliquo differt, unde ibi quaeritur differentia, ubi est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet differentia esse composita quodammodo, cum in aliquo differant, et in aliquo conveniant. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens; ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Nam simplicia diversa sunt seipsis, non autem differunt aliquibus differentiis, ex quibus componantur. Sicut homo et asinus differunt rationali et irrationali differentia, de quibus non est dicere quod ulterius aliis differentiis differant.	Reply to Objection 3. That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale, fit ex materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus purus. Ergo anima est facta ex materia. Non ergo est creata.	Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis actus materiae alicuius videtur educi de potentia materiae, cum enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet praeexistit in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiae corporalis, ut ex eius definitione apparet. Ergo anima educitur de potentia materiae.	Objection 2. Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, anima est forma quaedam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione omnes aliae formae. Et sic nulla forma exibit in esse per generationem. Quod est inconveniens.	Objection 3. Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit in esse per creationem.	On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:27): "God created man to His own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, quod non est verum de aliis formis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente, neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae; neque spirituali, quia sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.	I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (75, 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum, quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia praeiacente.	Reply to Objection 1. The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est; propterea non educitur de potentia materiae.	Reply to Objection 2. The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (75, 2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.
IЄ q. 90 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de anima rationali, et de aliis formis, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms.
IЄ q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis non sit producta a Deo immediate, sed mediantibus Angelis. Maior enim ordo est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Sed corpora inferiora producuntur per corpora superiora, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo et inferiores spiritus, qui sunt animae rationales, producuntur per spiritus superiores, qui sunt Angeli.	Objection 1. It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.
IЄ q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, finis rerum respondet principio, Deus enim est principium et finis rerum. Ergo et exitus rerum a principio respondet reductioni rerum in finem. Sed infima reducuntur per prima, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo et infima procedunt in esse per prima, scilicet animae per Angelos.	Objection 2. Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the higher," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels.
IЄ q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed spirituales substantiae sunt multo magis perfectae quam corporales. Cum ergo corpora faciant sibi similia secundum speciem, multo magis Angeli poterunt facere aliquid infra se secundum speciem naturae, scilicet animam rationalem.	Objection 3. Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.
IЄ q. 90 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, quod Deus ipse inspiravit in faciem hominis spiraculum vitae.	On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:7) that God Himself "breathed into the face of man the breath of life."
IЄ q. 90 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod Angeli, secundum quod operantur in virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem. Solus autem Deus potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando. Et quia anima rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.	I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (75, 3): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God.
IЄ q. 90 a. 3 ad 1 Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. Nam quod corpora causant vel sibi similia vel inferiora, et quod superiora reducunt inferiora, totum hoc provenit per quandam transmutationem.	Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior--all these things are effected through a certain transmutation.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. Opus enim creationis praecessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut supra habitum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem; corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis producta est ante corpus.	Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (66, 1; 70, 1). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima rationalis magis convenit cum Angelis quam cum animalibus brutis. Sed Angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, quando et bruta animalia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit creata ante corpus.	Objection 2. Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus.	Objection 3. Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod actus proprius fit in potentia propria. Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore.	On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum Angelis creatas; propter hoc quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam Angelos, aequales esse secundum suae naturae conditionem, sed solum merito distare; sic ut quaedam earum corporibus alligarentur, quae sunt animae hominum vel caelestium corporum; quaedam vero in sui puritate, secundum diversos ordines, remanerent. De qua opinione supra iam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad praesens. Augustinus vero, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod anima primi hominis ante corpus cum Angelis est creata, propter aliam rationem. Quia scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes, quod non potest de anima dici; quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut spirituali praeexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata produci potuit. Et ideo videtur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum Angelis fuerit creata; et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus administrandum. Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut eius verba demonstrant. Dicit enim, credatur, si nulla Scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi, anima vero iam ipsa crearetur. Posset autem hoc utique tolerari secundum eos qui ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et naturam completam, et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed solum ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur corpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanae naturae, hoc omnino esse non potest. Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto statu suae naturae, secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei species exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Sustinendo ergo opinionem Augustini de operibus sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima humana praecessit in operibus sex dierum secundum quandam similitudinem generis, prout convenit cum Angelis in intellectuali natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secundum alios vero sanctos, tam anima quam corpus primi hominis in operibus sex dierum sunt producta.	I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them--namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies--are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (47, 2); and so we need say nothing about it here. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created." Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days (74, 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si natura animae haberet integram speciem, ita quod secundum se crearetur, ratio illa procederet, ut per se in principio crearetur. Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore.	Reply to Objection 1. If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 ad 2 Et similiter est dicendum ad secundum. Nam anima si per se speciem haberet, magis conveniret cum Angelis. Sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet ad genus animalium, ut formale principium.	Reply to Objection 2. The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.
IЄ q. 90 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod animam remanere post corpus, accidit per defectum corporis, qui est mors. Qui quidem defectus in principio creationis animae, esse non debuit.	Reply to Objection 3. That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created.
IЄ q. 91 pr. Deinde considerandum est de productione corporis primi hominis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de materia ex qua productum est. Secundo, de auctore a quo productum est. Tertio, de dispositione quae ei per productionem est attributa. Quarto, de modo et ordine productionis ipsius.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus primi hominis non sit factum de limo terrae. Maioris enim virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex aliquo, quia plus distat ab actu non ens quam ens in potentia. Sed cum homo sit dignissima creaturarum inferiorum, decuit ut virtus Dei maxime ostenderetur in productione corporis eius. Ergo non debuit fieri ex limo terrae, sed ex nihilo.	Objection 1. It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, corpora caelestia sunt nobiliora terrenis. Sed corpus humanum habet maximam nobilitatem, cum perficiatur a nobilissima forma, quae est anima rationalis. Ergo non debuit fieri de corpore terrestri, sed magis de corpore caelesti.	Objection 2. Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ignis et aer sunt nobiliora corpora quam terra et aqua, quod ex eorum subtilitate apparet. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit dignissimum, magis debuit fieri ex igne et ex aere quam ex limo terrae.	Objection 3. Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, corpus humanum est compositum ex quatuor elementis. Non ergo est factum ex limo terrae, sed ex omnibus elementis.	Objection 4. Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae.	On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God made man of the slime of the earth."
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod omnia in se praehabet, non per modum compositionis, sed simpliciter et unite, ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam. Ista autem perfectio ad Angelos quidem derivatur, secundum quod omnia sunt in eorum cognitione quae sunt a Deo in natura producta, per formas diversas. Ad hominem vero derivatur inferiori modo huiusmodi perfectio. Non enim in sua cognitione naturali habet omnium naturalium notitiam; sed est ex rebus omnibus quodammodo compositus, dum de genere spiritualium substantiarum habet in se animam rationalem, de similitudine vero caelestium corporum habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis, elementa vero secundum substantiam. Ita tamen quod superiora elementa praedominantur in eo secundum virtutem, scilicet ignis et aer, quia vita praecipue consistit in calido, quod est ignis, et humido, quod est aeris. Inferiora vero elementa abundant in eo secundum substantiam, aliter enim non posset esse mixtionis aequalitas, nisi inferiora elementa, quae sunt minoris virtutis, secundum quantitatem in homine abundarent. Et ideo dicitur corpus hominis de limo terrae formatum, quia limus dicitur terra aquae permixta. Et propter hoc homo dicitur minor mundus, quia omnes creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo.	I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" (Deuteronomy 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus Dei creantis manifestata est in corpore hominis, dum eius materia est per creationem producta. Oportuit autem ut ex materia quatuor elementorum fieret corpus humanum, ut homo haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus, quasi medium quoddam existens inter spirituales et corporales substantias.	Reply to Objection 1. The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis corpus caeleste sit simpliciter nobilius terrestri corpore, tamen quantum ad actus animae rationalis, est minus conveniens. Nam anima rationalis accipit notitiam veritatis quodammodo per sensus; quorum organa formari non possunt ex corpore caelesti, cum sit impassibile. Nec est verum quod quidam dicunt aliquid de quinta essentia materialiter ad compositionem humani corporis advenire, ponentes animam uniri corpori mediante quadam luce. Primo enim, falsum est quod dicunt, lucem esse corpus. Secundo vero, impossibile est aliquid de quinta essentia vel a corpore caelesti dividi, vel elementis permisceri, propter caelestis corporis impassibilitatem. Unde non venit in compositionem mixtorum corporum, nisi secundum suae virtutis effectum.	Reply to Objection 2. Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false--that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si ignis et aer, quae sunt maioris virtutis in agendo, etiam secundum quantitatem in compositione humani corporis abundarent, omnino ad se traherent alia, et non posset fieri aequalitas commixtionis, quae est necessaria in compositione hominis ad bonitatem sensus tactus, qui est fundamentum sensuum aliorum. Oportet enim organum cuiuslibet sensus non habere in actu contraria quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed in potentia tantum. Vel ita quod omnino careat toto genere contrariorum, sicut pupilla caret colore, ut sit in potentia ad omnes colores, quod in organo tactus non erat possibile, cum sit compositum ex elementis, quorum qualitates percipit tactus. Vel ita quod organum sit medium inter contraria, ut necesse est in tactu accidere, medium enim est quodammodo in potentia ad extrema.	Reply to Objection 3. If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such contraries--thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense--or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes.
IЄ q. 91 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in limo terrae est terra, et aqua conglutinans partes terrae. De aliis autem elementis Scriptura mentionem non fecit, tum quia minus abundant secundum quantitatem in corpore hominis, ut dictum est; tum etiam quia in tota rerum productione, de igne et aere, quae sensu non percipiuntur a rudibus mentionem non fecit Scriptura, quae rudi populo tradebatur.	Reply to Objection 4. In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus humanum non sit immediate a Deo productum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod corporalia disponuntur a Deo per angelicam creaturam. Sed corpus humanum formatum fuit ex materia corporali, ut dictum est. Ergo debuit produci mediantibus Angelis, et non immediate a Deo.	Objection 1. It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above (1). Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quod fieri potest virtute creata, non est necessarium quod immediate producatur a Deo. Sed corpus humanum produci potest per virtutem creatam caelestis corporis, nam et quaedam animalia ex putrefactione generantur per virtutem activam corporis caelestis; et Albumasar dicit quod in locis in quibus nimis abundat calor aut frigus, homines non generantur, sed in locis temperatis tantum. Ergo non oportuit quod immediate corpus humanum formaretur a Deo.	Objection 2. Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil fit ex materia corporali nisi per aliquam materiae transmutationem. Sed omnis transmutatio corporalis causatur ex motu caelestis corporis, qui est primus motuum. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit productum ex materia corporali, videtur quod ad eius formationem aliquid operatum fuerit corpus caeleste.	Objection 3. Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod homo factus est secundum corpus, in operibus sex dierum, secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae corporali; postmodum vero fuit formatum in actu. Sed quod praeexistit in corporali creatura secundum causales rationes, per aliquam virtutem corpoream produci potest. Ergo corpus humanum productum est aliqua virtute creata, et non immediate a Deo.	Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, Deus de terra creavit hominem.	On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 17:1): "God created man out of the earth."
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prima formatio humani corporis non potuit esse per aliquam virtutem creatam, sed immediate a Deo. Posuerunt siquidem aliqui formas quae sunt in materia corporali, a quibusdam formis immaterialibus derivari. Sed hanc opinionem repellit philosophus, in VII Metaphys., per hoc quod formis non competit per se fieri, sed composito, ut supra expositum est; et quia oportet agens esse simile facto non convenit quod forma pura, quae est sine materia, producat formam quae est in materia, quae non fit nisi per hoc quod compositum fit. Et ideo oportet quod forma quae est in materia, sit causa formae quae est in materia, secundum quod compositum a composito generatur. Deus autem, quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque adminiculo praecedentis formae materialis. Et propter hoc, Angeli non possunt transmutare corpora ad formam aliquam, nisi adhibitis seminibus quibusdam, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Quia igitur corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cuius virtute per viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur, necesse fuit quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo.	I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (65, 4); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi Angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his quae circa corpora operatur; aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea facit, quae nullo modo Angeli facere possunt; sicut quod suscitat mortuos, et illuminat caecos. Secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus primi hominis de limo terrae formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis Angeli exhiberent; sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres colligendo.	Reply to Objection 1. Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod animalia perfecta, quae generantur ex semine, non possunt generari per solam virtutem caelestis corporis, ut Avicenna fingit; licet ad eorum generationem naturalem cooperetur virtus caelestis corporis, prout philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod homo generat hominem ex materia, et sol. Et exinde est quod exigitur locus temperatus ad generationem hominum et aliorum animalium perfectorum. Sufficit autem virtus caelestium corporum ad generandum quaedam animalia imperfectiora ex materia disposita, manifestum est enim quod plura requiruntur ad productionem rei perfectae, quam ad productionem rei imperfectae.	Reply to Objection 2. Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), "man and the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod motus caeli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non tamen transmutationum quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, et sola virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod caeci illuminantur. Quibus est simile quod homo ex limo terrae formatur.	Reply to Objection 3. The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.
IЄ q. 91 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur aliquid praeexistere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum potentiam activam et passivam, ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere possit. Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo. Et hoc modo, secundum Augustinum, corpus hominis praeextitit in operibus productis secundum causales rationes.	Reply to Objection 4. An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their causal virtues.
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus hominis non habuerit convenientem dispositionem. Cum enim homo sit nobilissimum animalium, corpus hominis debuit esse dispositum optime ad ea quae sunt propria animalis, scilicet ad sensum et motum. Sed quaedam animalia inveniuntur acutioris sensus quam homo, et velocioris motus; sicut canes melius odorant, et aves velocius moventur. Ergo corpus hominis non est convenienter dispositum.	Objection 1. It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, perfectum est cui nihil deest. Sed plura desunt humano corpori quam corporibus aliorum animalium, quae habent tegumenta et arma naturalia ad sui protectionem, quae homini desunt. Ergo corpus humanum est imperfectissime dispositum.	Objection 2. Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, homo plus distat a plantis quam ab animalibus brutis. Sed plantae habent staturam rectam; animalia autem bruta pronam. Ergo homo non debuit habere staturam rectam.	Objection 3. Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum.	On the contrary, It is written (Ecclesiastes 7:30): "God made man right."
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina, unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad finem. Et si talis dispositio habet secum adiunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui facit serram ad secandum, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad secandum; nec curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior materia, quia talis pulchritudo esset impedimentum finis. Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., et quia dignius est sic, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscuiusque substantiam. Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius, materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agentis. Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes. Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea quae requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes.	I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance." Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tactus, qui est fundamentum aliorum sensuum, est perfectior in homine quam in aliquo alio animali, et propter hoc oportuit quod homo haberet temperatissimam complexionem inter omnia animalia. Praecedit etiam homo omnia alia animalia, quantum ad vires sensitivas interiores; sicut ex supra dictis apparet. Ex quadam autem necessitate contingit quod, quantum ad aliquos exteriores sensus, homo ab aliis animalibus deficiat. Sicut homo, inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum. Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum, tum ut liberius in eo perficerentur operationes interiorum virium sensitivarum, quae sunt necessariae ad intellectus operationem, ut supra dictum est; tum etiam ut frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, quem necesse est in homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit rectae staturae. Magnitudo autem cerebri, propter eius humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, qui requirit siccitatem. Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare quaedam animalia sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam homo, propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est consequi in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et eadem etiam ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam animalia sunt homine velociora, cui excellentiae velocitatis repugnat aequalitas humanae complexionis.	Reply to Objection 1. The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (78, 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (84, 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum, quae sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiae terrestris elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et teneritudini complexionis humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis. Unde et manus, in III de anima, dicitur organum organorum. Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi.	Reply to Objection 2. Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ of organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.
IЄ q. 91 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad cognoscendum. Unde, cum cetera animalia non delectentur in sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram, quasi ad cibum quaerendum et providendum sibi de victu, homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et praecipue per visum, qui est subtilior et plures differentias rerum ostendit, libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat veritatem. Secundo, ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes habeant, dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis elevatum. Tertio, quia oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret. Quarto, quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum caperet ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis. Et tamen homo staturam rectam habens, maxime distat a plantis. Nam homo habet superius sui, idest caput, versus superius mundi, et inferius sui versus inferius mundi, et ideo est optime dispositus secundum dispositionem totius. Plantae vero habent superius sui versus inferius mundi (nam radices sunt ori proportionales), inferius autem sui versus superius mundi. Animalia vero bruta medio modo, nam superius animalis est pars qua accipit alimentum, inferius autem est pars qua emittit superfluum.	Reply to Objection 3. An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation. Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter corporis humani productio in Scriptura describatur. Sicut enim corpus humanum est factum a Deo, ita et alia opera sex dierum. Sed in aliis operibus dicitur, dixit Deus, fiat, et factum est. Ergo similiter dici debuit de hominis productione.	Objection 1. It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made." Therefore the same should have been said of man.
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, corpus humanum a Deo immediate est factum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, faciamus hominem.	Objection 2. Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above (2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us make man."
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, forma humani corporis est ipsa anima, quae est spiraculum vitae. Inconvenienter ergo, postquam dixerat, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, subiunxit, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae.	Objection 3. Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into him the breath of life."
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, anima, quae est spiraculum vitae, est in toto corpore, et principaliter in corde. Non ergo debuit dicere, quod inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae.	Objection 4. Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life."
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, sexus masculinus et femininus pertinent ad corpus, imago vero Dei ad animam. Sed anima, secundum Augustinum, fuit facta ante corpus. Inconvenienter ergo cum dixisset, ad imaginem suam fecit illum, addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos.	Objection 5. Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added, "male and female He created them."
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 s. c. In contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae.	On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 ad 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in VI super Gen. ad Litt., non in hoc praeeminet homo aliis rebus, quod Deus ipse fecit hominem, quasi alia ipse non fecerit; cum scriptum sit, opera manuum tuarum sunt caeli, et alibi, aridam fundaverunt manus eius, sed in hoc quod ad imaginem Dei factus est homo. Utitur tamen Scriptura in productione hominis speciali modo loquendi, ad ostendendum quod alia propter hominem facta sunt. Ea enim quae principaliter intendimus, cum maiori deliberatione et studio consuevimus facere.	Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did not make other things; since it is written (Psalm 101:26), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Psalm 94:5), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind.
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non est intelligendum Deum Angelis dixisse, faciamus hominem; ut quidam perverse intellexerunt. Sed hoc dicitur ad significandum pluralitatem divinarum personarum, quarum imago expressius invenitur in homine.	Reply to Objection 2. We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt corpus hominis prius tempore formatum, et postmodum Deum formato iam corpori animam infudisse. Sed contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel animam sine corpore fecerit, cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae. Et hoc etiam est magis inconveniens de corpore, quod dependet ex anima, et non e converso. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum, quidam posuerunt quod, cum dicitur, formavit Deus hominem, intelligitur productio corporis simul cum anima; quod autem additur, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, intelligitur de spiritu sancto; sicut et dominus insufflavit in apostolos, dicens, accipite spiritum sanctum, Ioan. XX. Sed haec expositio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civ. Dei, excluditur per verba Scripturae. Nam subditur ad praedicta, et factus est homo in animam viventem, quod apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, non ad vitam spiritualem, sed ad vitam animalem refert. Per spiraculum ergo vitae intelligitur anima, ut sic quod dicitur, inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, sit quasi expositio eius quod praemiserat; nam anima est corporis forma.	Reply to Objection 3. Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man," must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (John 20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Corinthians 15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, "He breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body.
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia operationes vitae magis manifestantur in facie hominis, propter sensus ibi existentes; ideo dicit in faciem hominis inspiratum esse spiraculum vitae.	Reply to Objection 4. Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.
IЄ q. 91 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, omnia opera sex dierum simul sunt facta. Unde animam primi hominis, quam ponit simul factam cum Angelis, non ponit factam ante sextum diem; sed in ipso sexto die ponit esse factam et animam primi hominis in actu, et corpus eius secundum rationes causales. Alii vero doctores ponunt et animam et corpus hominis factum sexto die in actu.	Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made.
IЄ q. 92 pr. Deinde considerandum est de productione mulieris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum in illa rerum productione debuerit mulier produci. Secundo, utrum debuerit fieri de viro. Tertio, utrum de costa viri. Quarto, utrum facta fuerit immediate a Deo.	Article 1. Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit produci in prima rerum productione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod femina est mas occasionatus. Sed nihil occasionatum et deficiens debuit esse in prima rerum institutione. Ergo in illa prima rerum institutione mulier producenda non fuit.	Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production.
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, subiectio et minoratio ex peccato est subsecuta, nam, ad mulierem dictum est post peccatum, Gen. III, sub viri potestate eris; et Gregorius dicit quod, ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus. Sed mulier naturaliter est minoris virtutis et dignitatis quam vir, semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non debuit mulier produci in prima rerum productione ante peccatum.	Objection 2. Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Genesis 3:16): "Thou shalt be under the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin.
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, occasiones peccatorum sunt amputandae. Sed Deus praescivit quod mulier esset futura viro in occasionem peccati. Ergo non debuit mulierem producere.	Objection 3. Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman.
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi.	On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:18): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adiutorium viri, non quidem in adiutorium alicuius alterius operis, ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius iuvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in adiutorium generationis. Quod manifestius videri potest, si in viventibus modus generationis consideretur. Sunt enim quaedam viventia, quae in seipsis non habent virtutem activam generationis, sed ab agente alterius speciei generantur; sicut plantae et animalia quae generantur sine semine ex materia convenienti per virtutem activam caelestium corporum. Quaedam vero habent virtutem generationis activam et passivam coniunctam; sicut accidit in plantis quae generantur ex semine. Non enim est in plantis aliquod nobilius opus vitae quam generatio, unde convenienter omni tempore in eis virtuti passivae coniungitur virtus activa generationis. Animalibus vero perfectis competit virtus activa generationis secundum sexum masculinum, virtus vero passiva secundum sexum femininum. Et quia est aliquod opus vitae nobilius in animalibus quam generatio, ad quod eorum vita principaliter ordinatur; ideo non omni tempore sexus masculinus feminino coniungitur in animalibus perfectis, sed solum tempore coitus; ut imaginemur per coitum sic fieri unum ex mare et femina, sicut in planta omni tempore coniunguntur vis masculina et feminina, etsi in quibusdam plus abundet una harum, in quibusdam plus altera. Homo autem adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere. Et ideo adhuc in homine debuit esse maiori ratione distinctio utriusque virtutis, ut seorsum produceretur femina a mare, et tamen carnaliter coniungerentur in unum ad generationis opus. Et ideo statim post formationem mulieris, dicitur Gen. II, erunt duo in carne una.	I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be two in one flesh" (Genesis 2:24).
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum. Quia virtus activa quae est in semine maris, intendit producere sibi simile perfectum, secundum masculinum sexum, sed quod femina generetur, hoc est propter virtutis activae debilitatem, vel propter aliquam materiae indispositionem, vel etiam propter aliquam transmutationem ab extrinseco, puta a ventis Australibus, qui sunt humidi, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed per comparationem ad naturam universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata. Intentio autem naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor naturae. Et ideo instituendo naturam, non solum marem, sed etiam feminam produxit.	Reply to Objection 1. As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female.
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est subiectio. Una servilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiecto ad sui ipsius utilitatem et talis subiectio introducta est post peccatum. Est autem alia subiectio oeconomica vel civilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiectis ad eorum utilitatem et bonum. Et ista subiectio fuisset etiam ante peccatum, defuisset enim bonum ordinis in humana multitudine, si quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent. Et sic ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis. Nec inaequalitas hominum excluditur per innocentiae statum, ut infra dicetur.	Reply to Objection 2. Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove (96, 3).
IЄ q. 92 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, Deus subtraxisset a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum, praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit ordinare in bonum.	Reply to Objection 3. If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit fieri ex viro. Sexus enim communis est homini et aliis animalibus. Sed in aliis animalibus feminae non sunt factae ex maribus. Ergo nec in homine fieri debuit.	Objection 1. It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man.
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, eorum quae sunt eiusdem speciei, eadem est materia. Sed mas et femina sunt eiusdem speciei. Cum igitur vir fuerit factus ex limo terrae, ex eodem debuit fieri femina, et non ex viro.	Objection 2. Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man.
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, mulier facta est in adiutorium viro ad generationem. Sed nimia propinquitas reddit personam ad hoc ineptam, unde personae propinquae a matrimonio excluduntur, ut patet Levit. XVIII. Ergo mulier non debuit fieri ex viro.	Objection 3. Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Leviticus 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from man.
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, creavit ex ipso, scilicet viro, adiutorium sibi simile, idest mulierem.	On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 17:5): "He created of him," that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem, in prima rerum institutione, ex viro formari, magis quam in aliis animalibus. Primo quidem, ut in hoc quaedam dignitas primo homini servaretur, ut, secundum Dei similitudinem, esset ipse principium totius suae speciei, sicut Deus est principium totius universi. Unde et Paulus dicit, Act. XVII, quod Deus fecit ex uno omne genus hominum. Secundo, ut vir magis diligeret mulierem, et ei inseparabilius inhaereret, dum cognosceret eam ex se esse productam. Unde dicitur Gen. II, de viro sumpta est, quamobrem relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae. Et hoc maxime necessarium fuit in specie humana, in qua mas et femina commanent per totam vitam, quod non contingit in aliis animalibus. Tertio quia, ut philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., mas et femina coniunguntur in hominibus non solum propter necessitatem generationis, ut in aliis animalibus; sed etiam propter domesticam vitam, in qua sunt alia opera viri et feminae, et in qua vir est caput mulieris. Unde convenienter ex viro formata est femina, sicut ex suo principio. Quarto est ratio sacramentalis; figuratur enim per hoc quod Ecclesia a Christo sumit principium. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia.	I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that "God made the whole human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Genesis 2:23-24): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:32): "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.	Reply to Objection 1 is clear from the foregoing.
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod materia est ex qua aliquid fit. Natura autem creata habet determinatum principium; et, cum sit determinata ad unum, etiam habet determinatum processum, unde ex determinata materia producit aliquid in determinata specie. Sed virtus divina, cum sit infinita, potest idem secundum speciem ex quacumque materia facere; sicut virum ex limo terrae, et mulierem ex viro.	Reply to Objection 2. Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man.
IЄ q. 92 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex naturali generatione contrahitur quaedam propinquitas quae matrimonium impedit. Sed mulier non est producta a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina, unde Eva non dicitur filia Adae. Et propter hoc, ratio non sequitur.	Reply to Objection 3. A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this argument does not prove.
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuerit formari de costa viri. Costa enim viri fuit multo minor quam corpus mulieris. Sed ex minori non potest fieri maius, nisi vel per additionem, quod si fuisset, magis ex illo addito mulier formata diceretur quam de costa; vel etiam per rarefactionem, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt., non est possibile ut aliquod corpus crescat, nisi rarescat. Non autem invenitur corpus mulieris rarius quam viri, ad minus in ea proportione quam habet costa ad corpus Evae. Ergo Eva non fuit formata de costa Adae.	Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only--either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)--or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's--at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, in operibus primo creatis non fuit aliquid superfluum. Costa ergo Adae fuit de perfectione corporis eius. Ergo, ea subtracta, remansit imperfectum. Quod videtur inconveniens.	Objection 2. Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, costa non potest separari ab homine sine dolore. Sed dolor non fuit ante peccatum. Ergo costa non debuit separari a viro, ut ex ea mulier formaretur.	Objection 3. Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, aedificavit dominus Deus costam quam tulerat de Adam, in mulierem.	On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:22): "God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman."
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri. Primo quidem, ad significandum quod inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis coniunctio. Neque enim mulier debet dominari in virum, et ideo non est formata de capite. Neque debet a viro despici, tanquam serviliter subiecta, et ideo non est formata de pedibus. Secundo, propter sacramentum, quia de latere Christi dormientis in cruce fluxerunt sacramenta, idest sanguis et aqua, quibus est Ecclesia instituta.	I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed--namely, blood and water--on which the Church was established.
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam dicunt per multiplicationem materiae absque alterius additione, formatum fuisse corpus mulieris; ad modum quo dominus quinque panes multiplicavit. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile. Multiplicatio enim praedicta aut accidit secundum transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae; aut secundum transmutationem dimensionum eius. Non autem secundum transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae, tum quia materia in se considerata, est omnino intransmutabilis, utpote existens in potentia, et habens solum rationem subiecti; tum etiam quia multitudo et magnitudo sunt praeter essentiam ipsius materiae. Et ideo nullo modo potest multiplicatio materiae intelligi, eadem materia manente absque additione, nisi per hoc quod maiores dimensiones accipiat. Hoc autem est rarefieri, scilicet materiam eandem accipere maiores dimensiones, ut philosophus dicit in IV Physic. Dicere ergo materiam multiplicari absque rarefactione, est ponere contradictoria simul, scilicet definitionem absque definito. Unde, cum non appareat rarefactio in talibus multiplicationibus, necesse est ponere additionem materiae, vel per creationem; vel, quod probabilius est, per conversionem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod hoc modo Christus ex quinque panibus satiavit quinque millia hominum, quomodo ex paucis granis producit multitudinem segetum; quod fit per conversionem alimenti. Dicitur tamen vel ex quinque panibus turbas pavisse, vel ex costa mulierem formasse, quia additio facta est ad materiam praeexistentem costae vel panum.	Reply to Objection 1. Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories --viz. the definition with the absence of the thing defined. Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn"--that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod costa illa fuit de perfectione Adae, non prout erat individuum quoddam, sed prout erat principium speciei, sicut semen est de perfectione generantis, quod operatione naturali cum delectatione resolvitur. Unde multo magis virtute divina corpus mulieris potuit de costa viri formari absque dolore.	Reply to Objection 2. The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's rib.
IЄ q. 92 a. 3 ad 3 Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium.	From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non fuerit immediate formata a Deo. Nullum enim individuum ex simili secundum speciem productum, fit immediate a Deo. Sed mulier facta est de viro, qui est eiusdem speciei cum ipsa. Ergo non est facta immediate a Deo.	Objection 1. It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corporalia dispensantur a Deo per Angelos. Sed corpus mulieris ex materia corporali est formatum. Ergo est factum per ministerium Angelorum, et non immediate a Deo.	Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae praeextiterunt in creaturis secundum rationes causales, producuntur virtute alicuius creaturae, et non immediate a Deo. Sed secundum causales rationes corpus mulieris in primis operibus productum fuit, ut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non fuit producta mulier immediate a Deo.	Objection 3. Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, formare vel aedificare costam ut mulier esset, non potuit nisi Deus, a quo universa natura subsistit.	On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the man's rib."
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, uniuscuiusque speciei generatio naturalis est ex determinata materia. Materia autem ex qua naturaliter generatur homo, est semen humanum viri vel feminae. Unde ex alia quacumque materia individuum humanae speciei generari non potest naturaliter. Solus autem Deus, qui est naturae institutor, potest praeter naturae ordinem res in esse producere. Et ideo solus Deus potuit vel virum de limo terrae, vel mulierem de costa viri formare.	I answer that, As was said above (2, ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quando individuum generatur ex simili secundum speciem, generatione naturali.	Reply to Objection 1. This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species.
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., an ministerium Angeli exhibuerint Deo in formatione mulieris, nescimus, certum tamen est quod, sicut corpus viri de limo non fuit formatum per Angelos, ita nec corpus mulieris de costa viri.	Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib.
IЄ q. 92 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit, non habuit prima rerum conditio ut femina omnino sic fieret; sed tantum hoc habuit, ut sic fieri posset. Et ideo secundum causales rationes praeextitit corpus mulieris in primis operibus, non secundum potentiam activam, sed secundum potentiam passivam tantum, in ordine ad potentiam activam creatoris.	Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator.
IЄ q. 93 pr. Deinde considerandum est de fine sive termino productionis hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. Primo, utrum in homine sit imago Dei. Secundo, utrum imago Dei sit in irrationalibus creaturis. Tertio, utrum imago Dei sit magis in Angelo quam in homine. Quarto, utrum imago Dei sit in omni homine. Quinto, utrum in homine sit imago Dei per comparationem ad essentiam, vel ad personas divinas omnes, aut unam earum. Sexto, utrum imago Dei inveniatur in homine solum secundum mentem. Septimo, utrum imago Dei sit in homine secundum potentias, aut secundum habitus, aut actus. Octavo, utrum per comparationem ad omnia obiecta. Nono, de differentia imaginis et similitudinis.	Question 93. The end or term of the production of man
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine. Dicitur enim Isaiae XL, cui similem fecistis Deum; aut quam imaginem ponetis ei?	Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Isaiah 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?"
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, esse Dei imaginem est proprium primogeniti, de quo dicit apostolus, ad Colos. I, qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae. Non ergo in homine invenitur Dei imago.	Objection 2. Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Colossians 1:15): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., quod imago est eius rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens; et iterum dicit quod imago est rei ad rem coaequandam indiscreta et unita similitudo. Sed non est species indifferens Dei et hominis; nec potest esse aequalitas hominis ad Deum. Ergo in homine non potest esse imago Dei.	Objection 3. Further, Hilary says (De Synod [Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.	On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness."
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est imago. Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et quod imago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum, imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius. Unde ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et aequale, quia tamen non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago eius. Aequalitas autem non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, ubi est imago, non continuo est aequalitas; ut patet in imagine alicuius in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est. Manifestum est autem quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplari, non tamen est similitudo secundum aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatum. Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta, sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, praepositio enim ad accessum quendam significat, qui competit rei distanti.	I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod propheta loquitur de corporalibus imaginibus ab homine fabricatis, et ideo signanter dicit, quam imaginem ponetis ei? Sed Deus ipse sibi in homine posuit spiritualem imaginem.	Reply to Objection 1. The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod primogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cuius imago est, et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago; et propter imperfectionem similitudinis, dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in identitate naturae, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo; ut patet per Augustinum in libro de decem chordis.	Reply to Objection 2. The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).
IЄ q. 93 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero aut specie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quandam, et sic est unitas vel convenientia creaturae ad Deum. Quod autem dicit rei ad rem coaequandam, pertinet ad rationem perfectae imaginis.	Reply to Objection 3. As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect image.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei inveniatur in irrationalibus creaturis. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., habent causata causarum suarum contingentes imagines. Sed Deus est causa non solum rationalium creaturarum, sed etiam irrationalium. Ergo imago Dei invenitur in irrationalibus creaturis.	Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quanto est expressior similitudo in aliquo, tanto magis accedit ad rationem imaginis. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod radius solaris maxime habet similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Ergo est ad imaginem Dei.	Objection 2. Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis perfectum in bonitate, tanto magis est Deo simile. Sed totum universum est perfectius in bonitate quam homo, quia etsi bona sint singula, tamen simul omnia dicuntur valde bona, Gen. I. Ergo totum universum est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum homo.	Objection 3. Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" (Genesis 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, Boetius in libro de Consol., dicit de Deo, mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans. Ergo totus mundus est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum rationalis creatura.	Objection 4. Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI super Gen. ad Litt., hoc excellit in homine, quia Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod dedit ei mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus. Ea ergo quae non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei.	On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's image.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod non quaelibet similitudo, etiam si sit expressa ex altero, sufficit ad rationem imaginis. Si enim similitudo sit secundum genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter hoc dicetur aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius, non enim posset dici quod vermis qui oritur ex homine, sit imago hominis propter similitudinem generis; neque iterum potest dici quod, si aliquid fiat album ad similitudinem alterius, quod propter hoc sit ad eius imaginem, quia album est accidens commune pluribus speciebus. Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo, vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit quod imago est species indifferens. Manifestum est autem quod similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Sic ergo patet quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei.	I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species." Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne imperfectum est quaedam participatio perfecti. Et ideo etiam ea quae deficiunt a ratione imaginis, inquantum tamen aliqualem Dei similitudinem habent, participant aliquid de ratione imaginis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod causata habent causarum contingentes imagines, idest quantum contingit ea habere, et non simpliciter.	Reply to Objection 1. Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Dionysius assimilat radium solarem divinae bonitati quantum ad causalitatem; non secundum dignitatem naturae, quae requiritur ad rationem imaginis.	Reply to Objection 2. Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni. Vel dicendum quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, non excluditur quin universum, secundum aliquam sui partem, sit ad imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi.	Reply to Objection 3. The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded.
IЄ q. 93 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod imago accipitur a Boetio secundum rationem similitudinis qua artificiatum imitatur speciem artis quae est in mente artificis, sic autem quaelibet creatura est imago rationis exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum sunt entia; et primae vitae inquantum sunt viventia; et summae sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia.	Reply to Objection 4. Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de imagine, quod Deus nulli alii creaturae dedit quod sit ad imaginem suam, nisi homini. Non ergo verum est quod Angelus magis dicatur ad imaginem Dei quam homo.	Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God.
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in libro octoginta trium quaest., homo ita est ad imaginem Dei, ut, nulla interposita creatura, formetur a Deo. Et ideo nihil est illi coniunctius. Sed imago Dei dicitur aliqua creatura, inquantum Deo coniungitur. Ergo Angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.	Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, creatura dicitur ad imaginem Dei, inquantum est intellectualis naturae. Sed intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur, non enim est de genere accidentis, cum sit in genere substantiae. Ergo Angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.	Objection 3. Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, in quadam homilia, quod Angelus dicitur signaculum similitudinis, quia in eo similitudo divinae imaginis magis insinuatur expressa.	On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" [Ezekiel 28:12 because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression."
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de imagine Dei loqui dupliciter possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad id in quo primo consideratur ratio imaginis, quod est intellectualis natura. Et sic imago Dei est magis in Angelis quam sit in hominibus, quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Secundo potest considerari imago Dei in homine, quantum ad id in quo secundario consideratur, prout scilicet in homine invenitur quaedam Dei imitatio, inquantum scilicet homo est de homine, sicut Deus de Deo; et inquantum anima hominis est tota in toto corpore eius, et iterum tota in qualibet parte ipsius, sicut Deus se habet ad mundum. Et secundum haec et similia, magis invenitur Dei imago in homine quam in Angelo. Sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in homine, nisi praesupposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum intellectualem naturam, alioquin etiam animalia bruta essent ad imaginem Dei. Et ideo, cum quantum ad intellectualem naturam Angelus sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo, simpliciter concedendum est Angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei; hominem autem secundum quid.	I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (58, 3; 79, 8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God.
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus excludit a Dei imagine alias inferiores creaturas intellectu carentes, non autem Angelos.	Reply to Objection 1. Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels.
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ignis dicitur esse subtilissimum corporum secundum suam speciem, cum tamen unus ignis sit alio subtilior; ita dicitur quod nihil est coniunctius Deo quam mens humana, secundum genus intellectualis naturae; quia, sicut ipse supra praemiserat, quae sapiunt, ita sunt illi similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Unde per hoc non excluditur quin Angelus sit magis ad Dei imaginem.	Reply to Objection 2. As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.
IЄ q. 93 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod substantia non recipit magis et minus, non intelligitur quod una species substantiae non sit perfectior quam alia, sed quod unum et idem individuum non participet suam speciem quandoque magis, quandoque minus. Nec etiam a diversis individuis participatur species substantiae secundum magis et minus.	Reply to Objection 3. When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
IЄ q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in quolibet homine. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei, mulier autem est imago viri. Cum ergo mulier sit individuum humanae speciei, non cuilibet individuo convenit esse imaginem Dei.	Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is the image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Corinthians 11:7). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God.
IЄ q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, quod illos quos Deus praescivit conformes fieri imagini filii sui, hos praedestinavit. Sed non omnes homines praedestinati sunt. Ergo non omnes homines habent conformitatem imaginis.	Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Romans 8:29): "Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image.
IЄ q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, similitudo est de ratione imaginis, ut supra dictum est. Sed per peccatum fit homo Deo dissimilis. Ergo amittit Dei imaginem.	Objection 3. Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained (1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God.
IЄ q. 93 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXVIII, veruntamen in imagine pertransit homo.	On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 38:7): "Surely man passeth as an image."
IЄ q. 93 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae. Unde super illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, Glossa distinguit triplicem imaginem, scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis.	I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us" (Psalm 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.
IЄ q. 93 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tam in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam. Unde Gen. I, cum dixisset, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, scilicet hominem, subdidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, et dixit pluraliter eos, ut Augustinus dicit, ne intelligatur in uno individuo uterque sexus fuisse coniunctus. Sed quantum ad aliquid secundario imago Dei invenitur in viro, secundum quod non invenitur in muliere, nam vir est principium mulieris et finis, sicut Deus est principium et finis totius creaturae. Unde cum apostolus dixisset quod vir imago et gloria est Dei, mulier autem est gloria viri; ostendit quare hoc dixerit, subdens, non enim vir est ex muliere, sed mulier ex viro; et vir non est creatus propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum.	Reply to Objection 1. The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is added, "Male and female He created them" (Genesis 1:27). Moreover it is said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man," he adds his reason for saying this: "For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man."
IЄ q. 93 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum et tertium dicendum quod illae rationes procedunt de imagine quae est secundum conformitatem gratiae et gloriae.	Reply to Objections 2 and 3. These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in homine non sit imago Dei quantum ad Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter divinitas, et imago ad quam factus est homo. Et Hilarius, in V de Trin., dicit quod homo fit ad communem Trinitatis imaginem. Est ergo in homine imago Dei quantum ad essentiam, et non quantum ad Trinitatem personarum.	Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: "Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity." Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons.
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, in libro de Eccles. Dogmat. dicitur quod imago Dei attenditur in homine secundum aeternitatem. Damascenus etiam dicit quod hominem esse ad imaginem Dei, significat intellectuale, et arbitrio liberum, et per se potestativum. Gregorius etiam Nyssenus dicit quod, cum Scriptura dixit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, aequale est ac si diceret humanam naturam omnis boni factam esse participem; bonitatis enim plenitudo divinitas est. Haec autem omnia non pertinent ad distinctionem personarum, sed magis ad essentiae unitatem. Ergo in homine est imago Dei, non secundum Trinitatem personarum, sed secundum essentiae unitatem.	Objection 2. Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that "man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence.
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, imago ducit in cognitionem eius cuius est imago. Si igitur in homine est imago Dei secundum Trinitatem personarum, cum homo per naturalem rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est.	Objection 3. Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above (32, 1).
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, nomen imaginis non cuilibet trium personarum convenit, sed soli filio, dicit enim Augustinus, in VI de Trin., quod solus filius est imago patris. Si igitur in homine attenderetur Dei imago secundum personam, non esset in homine imago totius Trinitatis, sed filii tantum.	Objection 4. Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Hilarius, in IV de Trin., per hoc quod homo dicitur ad imaginem Dei factus, ostendit pluralitatem divinarum personarum.	On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God."
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, distinctio divinarum personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae, aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, atque aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium personarum; sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur. Sic igitur dicendum est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad Trinitatem personarum, nam et in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura.	I answer that, as we have seen (40, 2), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima.	Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine perfecte repraesentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trin., maxima est differentia huius Trinitatis quae est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, Trinitatem quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus.	Reply to Objection 3. This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity."
IЄ q. 93 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dixerunt in homine esse solum imaginem filii. Sed hoc improbat Augustinus, in XII de Trin. Primo quidem, per hoc quod, cum secundum aequalitatem essentiae filius sit patri similis, necesse est, si homo sit factus ad similitudinem filii, quod sit factus ad similitudinem patris. Secundo quia, si homo esset factus solum ad imaginem filii, non diceret pater, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, sed tuam. Cum ergo dicitur, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, non est intelligendum quod pater fecerit hominem solum ad imaginem filii, qui est Deus, ut quidam exposuerunt, sed intelligendum est quod Deus Trinitas fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, idest totius Trinitatis. Cum autem dicitur quod Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod haec praepositio ad designet terminum factionis, ut sit sensus, faciamus hominem taliter, ut sit in eo imago. Alio modo, haec praepositio ad potest designare causam exemplarem; sicut cum dicitur, iste liber est factus ad illum. Et sic imago Dei est ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur, secundum quod imago ponitur pro exemplari. Vel, secundum quod quidam dicunt, divina essentia dicitur imago, quia secundum eam una persona aliam imitatur.	Reply to Objection 4. Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but "to Thy image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of God," the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition "to" points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made (like) to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum mentem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei. Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum secundum mentem.	Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 11:7) that "the man is the image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gen. I, creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos. Sed distinctio masculi et feminae est secundum corpus. Ergo etiam secundum corpus attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum.	Objection 2. Further, it is written (Genesis 1:27): "God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, imago praecipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum.	Objection 3. Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., triplex visio invenitur in nobis, scilicet corporalis, spiritualis sive imaginaria, et intellectualis. Si ergo secundum visionem intellectualem, quae ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei; pari ratione et in aliis visionibus.	Objection 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Eph. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, ex quo datur intelligi quod renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad mentem pertinet. Sed ad Col. III, dicit, induentes novum hominem, qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, ubi renovationem quae est secundum novi hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem.	On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephesians 4:23-24): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Colossians 3:10): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur. Cuius ratio manifeste cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis exercitus. Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur. Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum vestigii.	I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above (1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (28, 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, inquantum habet Caesaris imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis accipiatur Dei imago.	Reply to Objection 1. Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin., quidam imaginem Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed secundum plura; dicentes quod vir patris personam intimat; filii vero personam, quod de viro ita processit ut de illo nasceretur; atque ita tertiam personam, velut spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse mulierem, quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut filia. Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus esset principium filii, sicut mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personae. Tertio, quia secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere non debuisset, nisi producta iam prole. Et ideo dicendum est quod Scriptura, postquam dixerat, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum distinctiones sexuum attendatur; sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio sexuum. Unde apostolus, ad Col. III, postquam dixerat, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum, subdit, ubi non est masculus et femina.	Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Colossians 3:10), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [these words are in reality from Galatians 3:28 (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew").
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream, tamen corpus hominis, quia solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum caelum sit aptius, magis in hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cetera corpora animalium, factum iure videri potest; ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei, sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum vestigii.	Reply to Objection 3. Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.
IЄ q. 93 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod tam in visione corporali quam in visione imaginaria invenitur quaedam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trin. In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris corporis; secundo vero ipsa visio, quae fit per impressionem cuiusdam similitudinis praedictae speciei in visum; tertio est ibi intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa detinens. Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo quidem species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque. Sed utraque Trinitas deficit a ratione divinae imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris corporis est extra naturam animae, species autem quae est in memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animae, et ita utrobique deficit repraesentatio connaturalitatis et coaeternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a sensu videntis, et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute imaginativa, et ita per hoc non repraesentatur convenienter processio filii a solo patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quae coniungit duo praedicta, non ex eis procedit, neque in visione corporea neque in spirituali, unde non convenienter repraesentatur processio spiritus sancti a patre et filio.	Reply to Objection 4. Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in anima secundum actus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id esse ac nosse diligimus. Sed esse non significat actum. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.	Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus, in IX de Trin., assignat imaginem Dei in anima secundum haec tria, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Mens autem non significat actum; sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam intellectivae animae. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur secundum actus.	Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus, X de Trin., assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Sed haec tria sunt vires naturales animae, ut Magister dicit, III distinctione I libri Sent. Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum actus.	Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, imago Trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.	Objection 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XI de Trin., assignat Trinitatem in inferioribus animae partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam. Ergo et Trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem.	On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repraesentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt.	I answer that, As above explained (2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse nostrum ad imaginem Dei pertinet, quod est nobis proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis inquantum mentem habemus. Et ideo eadem est haec Trinitas cum illa quam Augustinus ponit in IX de Trin., quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore.	Reply to Objection 1. Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus hanc Trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. Sed quia mens, etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta; et sic etiam se quaerit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat in X de Trin., ideo, quasi notitia non totaliter menti coaequetur, accipit in anima tria quaedam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae nullus ignorat se habere, et in istis tribus potius imaginem Trinitatis assignat, quasi prima assignatio sit quodammodo deficiens.	Reply to Objection 2. Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves--De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat XIV de Trin., intelligere dicimur et velle seu amare aliqua, et quando de his cogitamus, et quando de his non cogitamus. Sed quando sine cogitatione sunt, ad solam memoriam pertinent; quae nihil est aliud, secundum ipsum, quam habitualis retentio notitiae et amoris. Sed quia, ut ipse dicit, verbum ibi esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiori verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit. Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinae Trinitatis potius ponit in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoriae, licet etiam quantum ad hoc, aliquo modo sit imago Trinitatis in anima, ut ibidem dicitur. Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas non sunt tres vires, ut in sententiis dicitur.	Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [Cf. 79, 7, ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.
IЄ q. 93 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquis respondere posset per hoc quod Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin., quod mens semper sui meminit, semper se intelligit et amat. Quod quidam sic intelligunt, quasi animae adsit actualis intelligentia et amor sui ipsius. Sed hunc intellectum excludit per hoc quod subdit, quod non semper se cogitat discretam ab his quae non sunt quod ipsa. Et sic patet quod anima semper intelligit et amat se, non actualiter, sed habitualiter. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod, percipiendo actum suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit. Sed quia non semper est actu intelligens, ut patet in dormiente, ideo oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non semper maneant in seipsis, manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et habitibus. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei anima rationalis, quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, ab initio quo esse coepit, fuit in ea Dei imago.	Reply to Objection 4. Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence."
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago divinae Trinitatis sit in anima non solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus. Imago enim divinae Trinitatis invenitur in anima, sicut dictum est, secundum quod verbum in nobis procedit a dicente et amor ab utroque. Sed hoc invenitur in nobis secundum quodcumque obiectum. Ergo secundum quodcumque obiectum invenitur in mente nostra imago divinae Trinitatis.	Objection 1. It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object.
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., quod cum quaerimus in anima Trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum. Ergo etiam secundum temporalia obiecta invenitur imago Trinitatis in anima.	Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, quod Deum intelligamus et amemus, convenit nobis secundum gratiae donum. Si igitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem seu dilectionem Dei, attendatur imago Trinitatis in anima, non erit imago Dei in homine secundum naturam, sed secundum gratiam. Et sic non erit omnibus communis.	Objection 3. Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 arg. 4 Praeterea, sancti qui sunt in patria, maxime conformantur imagini Dei secundum gloriae visionem, unde dicitur, II ad Cor. III, in eandem imaginem transformamur, a claritate in claritatem. Sed secundum visionem gloriae temporalia cognoscuntur. Ergo etiam per comparationem ad temporalia, Dei imago attenditur in nobis.	Objection 4. Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 Corinthians 3:18): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things.
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod non propterea est Dei imago in mente, quia sui meminit, et intelligit et diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse, intelligere et amare Deum, a quo facta est. Multo igitur minus secundum alia obiecta attenditur imago Dei in mente.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, imago importat similitudinem utcumque pertingentem ad speciei repraesentationem. Unde oportet quod imago divinae Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum aliquid quod repraesentat divinas personas repraesentatione speciei, sicut est possibile creaturae. Distinguuntur autem divinae personae, ut dictum est, secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque. Verbum autem Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum amat. Manifestum est autem quod diversitas obiectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris, non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et de equo, nec idem specie amor. Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum. Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum. Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter, uno modo, directe et immediate; alio modo, indirecte et mediate, sicut cum aliquis, videndo imaginem hominis in speculo, dicitur ferri in ipsum hominem. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod mens meminit sui, intelligit se, et diligit se, hoc si cernimus, cernimus Trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei. Sed hoc est, non quia fertur mens in seipsam absolute, sed prout per hoc ulterius potest ferri in Deum; ut patet per auctoritatem supra inductam.	I answer that, As above explained (2,7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (6,7), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad rationem imaginis, non solum oportet attendere quod aliquid procedat ab aliquo; sed etiam quid a quo procedat, scilicet quod verbum Dei procedit a notitia de Deo.	Reply to Objection 1. For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God.
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in tota quidem anima invenitur aliqua Trinitas, non quidem ita quod praeter actionem temporalium et contemplationem aeternorum, quaeratur aliquod tertium quo Trinitas impleatur, prout ibidem subditur. Sed in illa parte rationis quae derivatur a parte temporalium, etsi Trinitas inveniri possit, non tamen imago Dei potest inveniri, ut postea dicitur, quia huiusmodi temporalium notitia adventitia est animae. Et habitus etiam ipsi quibus temporalia cognoscuntur, non semper adsunt; sed quandoque quidem praesentialiter adsunt, quandoque autem secundum memoriam tantum, etiam postquam adesse incipiunt. Sicut patet de fide, quae temporaliter nobis advenit in praesenti, in statu autem futurae beatitudinis iam non erit fides, sed memoria fidei.	Reply to Objection 2. In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there," as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod meritoria Dei cognitio et dilectio non est nisi per gratiam. Est tamen aliqua Dei cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut supra habitum est. Et hoc etiam ipsum naturale est, quod mens ad intelligendum Deum ratione uti potest, secundum quod imaginem Dei semper diximus permanere in mente, sive haec imago Dei ita sit obsoleta, quasi obumbrata, ut pene nulla sit, ut in his qui non habent usum rationis; sive sit obscura atque deformis, ut in peccatoribus; sive sit clara et pulchra, ut in iustis, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin.	Reply to Objection 3. The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (12, 12; 56, 3; 60, 5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6).
IЄ q. 93 a. 8 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum visionem gloriae, temporalia videbuntur in ipso Deo; et ideo huiusmodi temporalium visio ad Dei imaginem pertinebit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod in illa natura cui mens feliciter adhaerebit, immutabile videbit omne quod viderit. Nam et in ipso verbo increato sunt rationes omnium creaturarum.	Reply to Objection 4. By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur. Genus enim non convenienter distinguitur a specie. Sed similitudo comparatur ad imaginem, ut genus ad speciem, quia ubi est imago, ibi est continuo similitudo, sed non convertitur, ut dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo inconvenienter similitudo ab imagine distinguitur.	Objection 1. It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished from "species." Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is not properly to be distinguished from "image."
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, ratio imaginis attenditur non solum secundum repraesentationem divinarum personarum, sed etiam secundum repraesentationem divinae essentiae, ad quam repraesentationem pertinet immortalitas et indivisibilitas. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod similitudo est in essentia, quia est immortalis et indivisibilis; imago autem in aliis.	Objection 2. Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, imago Dei in homine est triplex, scilicet naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut supra habitum est. Sed innocentia et iustitia ad gratiam pertinent. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod imago accipitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; similitudo autem secundum innocentiam et iustitiam.	Objection 3. Further, the image of God in man is threefold--the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness."
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 arg. 4 Praeterea, cognitio veritatis ad intelligentiam pertinet, amor autem virtutis ad voluntatem, quae sunt duae partes imaginis. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod imago sit in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in dilectione virtutis.	Objection 4. Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue."
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., sunt qui non frustra intelligunt duo dicta esse ad imaginem et similitudinem; cum, si una res esset, unum nomen sufficere potuisset.	On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unum autem, cum sit de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus, et ad singula potest aptari; sicut et bonum et verum. Unde, sicut bonum alicui rei particulari potest comparari ut praeambulum ad ipsam, et ut subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem. Est enim bonum praeambulum ad hominem, secundum quod homo est quoddam particulare bonum, et rursus bonum subsequitur ad hominem, inquantum aliquem hominem specialiter dicimus esse bonum, propter perfectionem virtutis. Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut praeambulum ad imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago, ut supra dictum est, consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte repraesentat ipsum. Sic ergo similitudo potest ab imagine distingui dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est praeambula ad ipsam, et in pluribus existens. Et sic similitudo attenditur secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturae intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago. Et secundum hoc dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod spiritus, idest mens, ad imaginem Dei, nullo dubitante, factus est, cetera autem hominis, scilicet quae pertinent ad inferiores partes animae, vel etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. Secundum hoc etiam in libro de quantitate animae dicitur quod similitudo Dei attenditur in anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis, nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiae entis communis. Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod id quod est secundum imaginem, intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum per se potestativum, quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem. Et ad idem refertur quod similitudo dicitur ad dilectionem virtutis pertinere, non enim est virtus sine dilectione virtutis.	I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue.
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum communem rationem similitudinis (sic enim includitur in ratione ipsius imaginis), sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva.	Reply to Objection 1. "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image."
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad imaginem, prout repraesentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quae sunt propria intellectualis naturae, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indissolubilem.	Reply to Objection 2. The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad minus secundum quaedam earum semina, et secundum has posset attendi similitudo naturalis. Quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur similitudo.	Reply to Objection 3. Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."
IЄ q. 93 a. 9 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad rationem imaginis, sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, sicut et virtus.	Reply to Objection 4. Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness.

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