Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-59-60

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE – QUESTIONS LIX - LX

Index

Latin English
Iª q. 59 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad voluntatem Angelorum. Et primo considerabimus de ipsa voluntate secundo, de motu eius, qui est amor sive dilectio. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum in Angelis sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum voluntas Angeli sit ipsa natura eorum, vel etiam ipse intellectus eorum. Tertio, utrum in Angelis sit liberum arbitrium. Quarto, utrum in eis sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sit voluntas. Quia, ut dicit philosophus, in III de anima, voluntas in ratione est. Sed in Angelis non est ratio, sed aliquid superius ratione. Ergo in Angelis non est voluntas, sed aliquid superius voluntate.
 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the will.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, voluntas sub appetitu continetur, ut patet per philosophum, in III de anima. Sed appetitus est imperfecti, est enim eius quod nondum habetur. Cum igitur in Angelis, maxime in beatis, non sit aliqua imperfectio, videtur quod non sit in eis voluntas. Objection 2. Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod voluntas est movens motum, movetur enim ab appetibili intellecto. Sed Angeli sunt immobiles; cum sint incorporei. Ergo in Angelis non est voluntas. Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X Lib. de Trin., quod imago Trinitatis invenitur in mente secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Imago autem Dei invenitur non solum in mente humana, sed etiam in mente angelica; cum etiam mens angelica sit capax Dei. Ergo in Angelis est voluntas. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in Angelis voluntatem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum omnia procedant ex voluntate divina, omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum, per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis. Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare; sicut sensus, qui cognoscit dulce et album et aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens, dicitur appetitus sensitivus. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinantur in bonum; non quidem quasi ab alio solummodo directa in bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent; neque in bonum particulariter tantum, sicut ea in quibus est sola sensitiva cognitio; sed quasi inclinata in ipsum universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas. Unde cum Angeli per intellectum cognoscant ipsam universalem rationem boni, manifestum est quod in eis sit voluntas. I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter ratio transcendit sensum, et aliter intellectus rationem. Ratio enim transcendit sensum, secundum diversitatem cognitorum, nam sensus est particularium, ratio vero universalium. Et ideo oportet quod sit alius appetitus tendens in bonum universale, qui debetur rationi; et alius tendens in bonum particulare, qui debetur sensui. Sed intellectus et ratio differunt quantum ad modum cognoscendi, quia scilicet intellectus cognoscit simplici intuitu, ratio vero discurrendo de uno in aliud. Sed tamen ratio per discursum pervenit ad cognoscendum illud, quod intellectus sine discursu cognoscit, scilicet universale. Idem est ergo obiectum quod appetitivae proponitur et ex parte rationis, et ex parte intellectus. Unde in Angelis, qui sunt intellectuales tantum, non est appetitus superior voluntate. Reply to Objection 1. Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet nomen appetitivae partis sit sumptum ab appetendo ea quae non habentur, tamen appetitiva pars non solum ad haec se extendit, sed etiam ad multa alia. Sicut et nomen lapidis sumptum est a laesione pedis, cum tamen lapidi non hoc solum conveniat. Similiter irascibilis potentia denominatur ab ira; cum tamen in ea sint plures aliae passiones, ut spes et audacia et huiusmodi. Reply to Objection 2. Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.
Iª q. 59 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas dicitur movens motum, secundum quod velle est motus quidam, et intelligere; cuiusmodi motum nihil prohibet in Angelis esse, quia talis motus est actus perfecti, ut dicitur in III de anima. Reply to Objection 3. The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non differat voluntas ab intellectu et natura. Angelus enim est simplicior quam corpus naturale. Sed corpus naturale per suam formam inclinatur in suum finem, qui est eius bonum. Ergo multo magis Angelus. Forma autem Angeli est vel natura ipsa in qua subsistit, vel species quae est in intellectu eius. Ergo Angelus inclinatur in bonum per naturam suam, et per speciem intelligibilem. Haec autem inclinatio ad bonum pertinet ad voluntatem. Voluntas igitur Angeli non est aliud quam eius natura vel intellectus.
 Objection 1. It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, obiectum intellectus est verum, voluntatis autem bonum. Bonum autem et verum non differunt realiter, sed secundum rationem tantum. Ergo voluntas et intellectus non differunt realiter. Objection 2. Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, not really but only logically [Cf. 16, 4]. Therefore will and intellect are not really different.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, distinctio communis et proprii non diversificat potentias, eadem enim potentia visiva est coloris et albedinis. Sed bonum et verum videntur se habere sicut commune et proprium, nam verum est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo voluntas, cuius obiectum est bonum, non differt ab intellectu, cuius obiectum est verum. Objection 3. Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, voluntas in Angelis est bonorum tantum. Intellectus autem est bonorum et malorum, cognoscunt enim utrumque. Ergo voluntas in Angelis est aliud quam eius intellectus. On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas in Angelis est quaedam virtus vel potentia, quae nec est ipsa eorum natura, nec eorum intellectus. Et quod non sit eorum natura, apparet ex hoc, quod natura vel essentia alicuius rei intra ipsam rem comprehenditur, quidquid ergo se extendit ad id quod est extra rem, non est rei essentia. Unde videmus in corporibus naturalibus, quod inclinatio quae est ad esse rei, non est per aliquid superadditum essentiae; sed per materiam, quae appetit esse antequam illud habeat, et per formam, quae tenet rem in esse postquam fuerit. Sed inclinatio ad aliquid extrinsecum, est per aliquid essentiae superadditum, sicut inclinatio ad locum est per gravitatem vel levitatem, inclinatio autem ad faciendum sibi simile est per qualitates activas. Voluntas autem habet inclinationem in bonum naturaliter. Unde ibi solum est idem essentia et voluntas, ubi totaliter bonum continetur in essentia volentis; scilicet in Deo, qui nihil vult extra se nisi ratione suae bonitatis. Quod de nulla creatura potest dici; cum bonum infinitum sit extra essentiam cuiuslibet creati. Unde nec voluntas Angeli, nec alterius creaturae, potest esse idem quod eius essentia. Similiter nec potest esse idem quod intellectus Angeli vel hominis. Nam cognitio fit per hoc quod cognitum est in cognoscente, unde ea ratione se extendit eius intellectus in id quod est extra se, secundum quod illud quod extra ipsum est per essentiam, natum est aliquo modo in eo esse. Voluntas vero se extendit in id quod extra se est, secundum quod quadam inclinatione quodammodo tendit in rem exteriorem. Alterius autem virtutis est, quod aliquid habeat in se quod est extra se, et quod ipsum tendat in rem exteriorem. Et ideo oportet quod in qualibet creatura sit aliud intellectus et voluntas. Non autem in Deo, qui habet et ens universale et bonum universale in seipso. Unde tam voluntas quam intellectus est eius essentia. I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities. Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence. In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus naturale per formam substantialem inclinatur in esse suum, sed in exterius inclinatur per aliquid additum, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by something additional, as has been said.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod potentiae non diversificantur secundum materialem distinctionem obiectorum, sed secundum formalem distinctionem, quae attenditur secundum rationem obiecti. Et ideo diversitas secundum rationem boni et veri, sufficit ad diversitatem intellectus et voluntatis. Reply to Objection 2. Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will.
Iª q. 59 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia bonum et verum convertuntur secundum rem, inde est quod et bonum ab intellectu intelligitur sub ratione veri, et verum a voluntate appetitur sub ratione boni. Sed tamen diversitas rationum ad diversificandum potentias sufficit, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
Iª q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sit liberum arbitrium. Actus enim liberi arbitrii est eligere. Sed electio non potest esse in Angelis, cum electio sit appetitus praeconsiliati, consilium autem est inquisitio quaedam ut dicitur in III Ethic.; Angeli autem non cognoscunt inquirendo, quia hoc pertinet ad discursum rationis. Ergo videtur quod in Angelis non sit liberum arbitrium.
 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, liberum arbitrium se habet ad utrumlibet. Sed ex parte intellectus non est aliquid se habens ad utrumlibet in Angelis, quia intellectus eorum non fallitur in naturalibus intelligibilibus, ut dictum est. Ergo nec ex parte appetitus liberum arbitrium in eis esse potest. Objection 2. Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference; because, as was observed already (58, 5), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
Iª q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae sunt naturalia in Angelis, conveniunt eis secundum magis et minus, quia in superioribus Angelis natura intellectualis est perfectior quam in inferioribus. Liberum autem arbitrium non recipit magis et minus. Ergo in Angelis non est liberum arbitrium. Objection 3. Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.
Iª q. 59 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, libertas arbitrii ad dignitatem hominis pertinet. Sed Angeli digniores sunt hominibus. Ergo libertas arbitrii, cum sit in hominibus, multo magis est in Angelis. On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam sunt quae non agunt ex aliquo arbitrio, sed quasi ab aliis acta et mota, sicut sagitta a sagittante movetur ad finem. Quaedam vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia, ovis enim fugit lupum ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc iudicium non est sibi liberum, sed a natura inditum. Sed solum id quod habet intellectum, potest agere iudicio libero, inquantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, ex qua potest iudicare hoc vel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium. Et sic patet liberum arbitrium esse in Angelis etiam excellentius quam in hominibus, sicut et intellectum. I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
Iª q. 59 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de electione secundum quod est hominis. Sicut autem aestimatio hominis in speculativis differt ab aestimatione Angeli in hoc, quod una est absque inquisitione, alia vero per inquisitionem; ita et in operativis. Unde in Angelis est electio; non tamen cum inquisitiva deliberatione consilii, sed per subitam acceptionem veritatis. Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.
Iª q. 59 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cognitio fit per hoc quod cognita sunt in cognoscente. Ad imperfectionem autem alicuius rei pertinet, si non sit in ea id quod natum est in ea esse. Unde Angelus non esset perfectus in sua natura, si intellectus eius non esset determinatus ad omnem veritatem quam naturaliter cognoscere potest. Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est per hoc quod affectus inclinatur ad rem exteriorem. Non autem dependet perfectio rei ex omni re ad quam inclinatur, sed solum ex superiori. Et ideo non pertinet ad imperfectionem Angeli, si non habet voluntatem determinatam respectu eorum quae infra ipsum sunt. Pertineret autem ad imperfectionem eius, si indeterminate se haberet ad illud quod supra ipsum est. Reply to Objection 2. As was observed already (2), knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
Iª q. 59 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium nobiliori modo est in superioribus Angelis, quam in inferioribus, sicut et iudicium intellectus. Tamen verum est quod ipsa libertas, secundum quod in ea consideratur quaedam remotio coactionis, non suscipit magis et minus, quia privationes et negationes non remittuntur nec intenduntur per se, sed solum per suam causam, vel secundum aliquam affirmationem adiunctam. Reply to Objection 3. Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some qualification.
Iª q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod in Daemonibus est furor irrationabilis et concupiscentia amens. Sed Daemones eiusdem naturae sunt cum Angelis, quia peccatum non mutavit in eis naturam. Ergo in Angelis est irascibilis et concupiscibilis.
 Objection 1. It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor et gaudium in concupiscibili sunt; ira vero, spes et timor in irascibili. Sed haec attribuuntur Angelis bonis et malis in Scripturis. Ergo in Angelis est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Objection 2. Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtutes quaedam dicuntur esse in irascibili et concupiscibili; sicut caritas et temperantia videntur esse in concupiscibili, spes autem et fortitudo in irascibili. Sed virtutes hae sunt in Angelis. Ergo in Angelis est concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Objection 3. Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in parte sensitiva; quae non est in Angelis. Ergo in eis non est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels.
Iª q. 59 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectivus appetitus non dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sed solum appetitus sensitivus. Cuius ratio est quia cum potentiae non distinguantur secundum distinctionem materialem obiectorum, sed solum secundum rationem formalem obiecti; si alicui potentiae respondeat aliquod obiectum secundum rationem communem, non erit distinctio potentiarum secundum diversitatem propriorum quae sub illo communi continentur. Sicut si proprium obiectum potentiae visivae est color secundum rationem coloris, non distinguuntur plures potentiae visivae secundum differentiam albi et nigri, sed si proprium obiectum alicuius potentiae esset album inquantum album, distingueretur potentia visiva albi a potentia visiva nigri. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod obiectum appetitus intellectivi, qui voluntas dicitur, est bonum secundum communem boni rationem, nec potest esse aliquis appetitus nisi boni. Unde in parte intellectiva appetitus non dividitur secundum distinctionem aliquorum particularium bonorum; sicut dividitur appetitus sensitivus, qui non respicit bonum secundum communem rationem, sed quoddam particulare bonum. Unde, cum in Angelis non sit nisi appetitus intellectivus, eorum appetitus non distinguitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sed remanet indivisus; et vocatur voluntas. I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black. Now it is quite evident from what has been said (1; 16, 1), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the will.
Iª q. 59 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod furor et concupiscentia metaphorice dicuntur esse in Daemonibus, sicut et ira quandoque Deo attribuitur, propter similitudinem effectus. Reply to Objection 1. Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;--on account of the resemblance in the effect.
Iª q. 59 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod amor et gaudium, secundum quod sunt passiones, sunt in concupiscibili, sed secundum quod nominant simplicem voluntatis actum, sic sunt in intellectiva parte; prout amare est velle bonum alicui, et gaudere est quiescere voluntatem in aliquo bono habito. Et universaliter nihil horum dicitur de Angelis secundum passionem, ut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Reply to Objection 2. Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).
Iª q. 59 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas, secundum quod est virtus, non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate. Nam obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum delectabile secundum sensum, huiusmodi autem non est bonum divinum, quod est obiectum caritatis. Et eadem ratione dicendum est quod spes non est in irascibili, quia obiectum irascibilis est quoddam arduum quod est sensibile, circa quod non est spes quae est virtus, sed circa arduum divinum. Temperantia autem, secundum quod est virtus humana, est circa concupiscentias delectabilium sensibilium, quae pertinent ad vim concupiscibilem. Et similiter fortitudo est circa audacias et timores quae sunt in irascibili. Et ideo temperantia, secundum quod est virtus humana, est in concupiscibili, et fortitudo in irascibili. Sed hoc modo non sunt in Angelis. Non enim in eis sunt passiones concupiscentiarum, vel timoris et audaciae, quas oporteat per temperantiam et fortitudinem regulare. Sed temperantia in eis dicitur, secundum quod moderate suam voluntatem exhibent secundum regulam divinae voluntatis. Et fortitudo in eis dicitur, secundum quod voluntatem divinam firmiter exequuntur. Quod totum fit per voluntatem; et non per irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Reply to Objection 3. Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible appetite.
Iª q. 60 pr. Deinde considerandum est de actu voluntatis, qui est amor sive dilectio, nam omnis actus appetitivae virtutis ex amore seu dilectione derivatur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum in Angelis sit dilectio naturalis. Secundo, utrum in eis sit dilectio electiva. Tertio, utrum Angelus diligat seipsum dilectione naturali an electiva. Quarto, utrum unus Angelus diligat alium dilectione naturali sicut seipsum. Quinto, utrum Angelus naturali dilectione diligat Deum plus quam seipsum.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sit amor vel dilectio naturalis. Amor enim naturalis dividitur contra intellectualem; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed amor Angeli est intellectualis. Ergo non est naturalis.
 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae amant amore naturali, magis aguntur quam agant, nihil enim habet dominium suae naturae. Sed Angeli non aguntur, sed agunt; cum sint liberi arbitrii, ut ostensum est. Ergo in Angelis non est amor seu dilectio naturalis. Objection 2. Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above (59, 3). Consequently there is no natural love in them.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis dilectio aut est recta, aut non recta. Dilectio autem recta pertinet ad caritatem, dilectio autem non recta pertinet ad iniquitatem. Neutrum autem horum pertinet ad naturam, quia caritas est supra naturam, iniquitas autem est contra naturam. Ergo nulla dilectio naturalis est in Angelis. Objection 3. Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no natural love in the angels.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dilectio sequitur cognitionem, nihil enim amatur nisi cognitum, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sed in Angelis est cognitio naturalis. Ergo et dilectio naturalis. On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est in Angelis ponere dilectionem naturalem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod semper prius salvatur in posteriori. Natura autem prior est quam intellectus, quia natura cuiuscumque rei est essentia eius. Unde id quod est naturae, oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum. Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem, quae est appetitus naturalis vel amor. Quae tamen inclinatio diversimode invenitur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura intellectuali invenitur inclinatio naturalis secundum voluntatem; in natura autem sensitiva, secundum appetitum sensitivum, in natura vero carente cognitione, secundum solum ordinem naturae in aliquid. Unde cum Angelus sit natura intellectualis, oportet quod in voluntate eius sit naturalis dilectio. I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectualis amor dividitur contra naturalem qui est solum naturalis, inquantum est naturae quae non addit supra rationem naturae perfectionem sensus aut intellectus. Reply to Objection 1. Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia quae sunt in toto mundo, aguntur ab aliquo, praeter primum agens, quod ita agit quod nullo modo ab alio agitur, in quo est idem natura et voluntas. Et ideo non est inconveniens si Angelus agatur, inquantum inclinatio naturalis est sibi indita ab auctore suae naturae. Non tamen sic agitur quod non agat; cum habeat liberam voluntatem. Reply to Objection 2. All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will.
Iª q. 60 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera ita dilectio naturalis semper est recta, cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit quam inclinatio naturae indita ab auctore naturae. Dicere ergo quod inclinatio naturalis non sit recta, est derogare auctori naturae. Alia tamen est rectitudo naturalis dilectionis, et alia est rectitudo caritatis et virtutis, quia una rectitudo est perfectiva alterius. Sicut etiam alia est veritas naturalis cognitionis; et alia est veritas cognitionis infusae vel acquisitae. Reply to Objection 3. As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
Iª q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sit dilectio electiva. Dilectio enim electiva videtur esse amor rationalis, cum electio sequatur consilium, quod in inquisitione consistit, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed rationalis amor dividitur contra intellectualem (qui est proprius Angelorum); ut dicitur IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo in Angelis non est dilectio electiva.
 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.
Iª q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, in Angelis non est nisi cognitio naturalis, praeter cognitionem infusam, quia non discurrunt de principiis ad acquirendum conclusiones. Et sic ad omnia quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt, sic se habent sicut intellectus noster ad prima principia quae naturaliter cognoscere potest. Sed dilectio sequitur cognitionem, ut dictum est. Ergo in Angelis, praeter dilectionem gratuitam, non est nisi dilectio naturalis. Non ergo electiva. Objection 2. Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated (1; 16, 1). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them.
Iª q. 60 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, naturalibus neque meremur neque demeremur. Sed Angeli sua dilectione aliqua merentur, vel demerentur. Ergo in eis est aliqua dilectio electiva. On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them.
Iª q. 60 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in Angelis est quaedam dilectio naturalis et quaedam electiva. Et naturalis dilectio in eis est principium electivae, quia semper id quod pertinet ad prius, habet rationem principii; unde, cum natura sit primum quod est in unoquoque, oportet quod id quod ad naturam pertinet, sit principium in quolibet. Et hoc apparet in homine et quantum ad intellectum, et quantum ad voluntatem. Intellectus enim cognoscit principia naturaliter, et ex hac cognitione causatur in homine scientia conclusionum, quae non cognoscuntur naturaliter ab homine, sed per inventionem vel doctrinam. Similiter in voluntate finis hoc modo se habet, sicut principium in intellectu, ut dicitur in II Physic. Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum, omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates, cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter finem. Dilectio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis, dilectio autem ab hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio electiva. Hoc tamen differenter se habet ex parte intellectus, et voluntatis. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio intellectus fit secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Est autem ex imperfectione intellectualis naturae in homine, quod non statim eius intellectus naturaliter habet omnia intelligibilia, sed quaedam, a quibus in alia quodammodo movetur. Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est, e converso, secundum ordinem appetentis ad res. Quarum quaedam sunt secundum se bona, et ideo secundum se appetibilia, quaedam vero habent rationem bonitatis ex ordine ad aliud, et sunt appetibilia propter aliud. Unde non est ex imperfectione appetentis, quod aliquid appetat naturaliter ut finem, et aliquid per electionem, ut ordinatur in finem. Quia igitur natura intellectualis in Angelis perfecta est, invenitur in eis sola cognitio naturalis, non autem ratiocinativa, sed invenitur in eis dilectio et naturalis et electiva. Haec autem dicta sunt, praetermissis his quae supra naturam sunt, horum enim natura non est principium sufficiens. De his autem infra dicetur. I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything. This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice. There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated already (59, 2), the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on account of something else. Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice. In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (62).
Iª q. 60 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis dilectio electiva est amor rationalis, secundum quod rationalis amor dividitur contra intellectualem. Dicitur enim sic amor rationalis, qui sequitur cognitionem ratiocinativam, non omnis autem electio consequitur discursum rationis, ut supra dictum est, cum de libero arbitrio ageretur; sed solum electio hominis. Unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to Objection 1. Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (59, 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
Iª q. 60 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
Iª q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non diligat seipsum dilectione naturali et electiva. Dilectio enim naturalis est ipsius finis, sicut dictum est; dilectio autem electiva, eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed idem non potest esse finis et ad finem, respectu eiusdem. Ergo non potest esse eiusdem dilectio naturalis et electiva.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (2), natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object.
Iª q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor est virtus unitiva et concretiva, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed unitio et concretio est diversorum in unum reductorum. Ergo non potest Angelus diligere seipsum. Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
Iª q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, dilectio est quidam motus. Sed omnis motus in alterum tendit. Ergo videtur quod Angelus non possit amare seipsum dilectione naturali, nec electiva. Objection 3. Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural or elective love.
Iª q. 60 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum, veniunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others comes of love for oneself."
Iª q. 60 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum amor sit boni, bonum autem sit et in substantia et in accidente, ut patet I Ethic., dupliciter aliquid amatur, uno modo, ut bonum subsistens; alio modo, ut bonum accidentale sive inhaerens. Illud quidem amatur ut bonum subsistens, quod sic amatur ut ei aliquis velit bonum. Ut bonum vero accidentale seu inhaerens amatur id quod desideratur alteri, sicut amatur scientia, non ut ipsa sit bona, sed ut habeatur. Et hunc modum amoris quidam nominaverunt concupiscentiam, primum vero amicitiam. Manifestum est autem quod in rebus cognitione carentibus, unumquodque naturaliter appetit consequi id quod est sibi bonum; sicut ignis locum sursum. Unde et Angelus et homo naturaliter appetunt suum bonum et suam perfectionem. Et hoc est amare seipsum. Unde naturaliter tam Angelus quam homo diligit seipsum, inquantum aliquod bonum naturali appetitu sibi desiderat. Inquantum vero sibi desiderat aliquod bonum per electionem, intantum amat seipsum dilectione electiva. I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name "concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship." Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself.
Iª q. 60 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angelus aut homo non diligit se dilectione naturali et electiva secundum idem; sed secundum diversa, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. It is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective love, as was observed above.
Iª q. 60 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut plus est esse unum quam uniri, ita amor magis est unus ad seipsum, quam ad diversa quae ei uniuntur. Sed ideo Dionysius usus fuit nomine unitionis et concretionis, ut ostenderet derivationem amoris a se in alia, sicut ab uno derivatur unitio. Reply to Objection 2. As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and "binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.
Iª q. 60 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut amor est actio manens in agente, ita est motus manens in amante, non autem tendens in aliquid aliud ex necessitate; sed potest reflecti super amantem, ut amet seipsum, sicut et cognitio reflectitur in cognoscentem, ut cognoscat seipsum. Reply to Objection 3. As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus non diligat naturali dilectione alium sicut seipsum. Dilectio enim sequitur cognitionem. Sed unus Angelus non cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia seipsum cognoscit per suam essentiam, alium vero per eius similitudinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod unus Angelus non diligat alium sicut seipsum.
 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as was said above (56, 1,2). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, causa est potior causato, et principium eo quod ex principio derivatur. Sed dilectio quae est ad alium, derivatur ab ea quae est ad seipsum; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic. Ergo Angelus non diligit alium sicut seipsum, sed seipsum magis. Objection 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, dilectio naturalis est alicuius tanquam finis; et non potest removeri. Sed unus Angelus non est finis alterius; et iterum haec dilectio potest removeri, ut patet in Daemonibus, qui non diligunt bonos Angelos. Ergo unus Angelus non diligit alium naturali dilectione sicut seipsum. Objection 3. Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est, quia illud quod invenitur in omnibus, etiam ratione carentibus, videtur esse naturale. Sed sicut dicitur Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit sibi simile. Ergo Angelus diligit naturaliter alium sicut seipsum. On the contrary, That seems to be a natural property which is found in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its like," as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Angelus et homo naturaliter seipsum diligit. Illud autem quod est unum cum aliquo, est ipsummet, unde unumquodque diligit id quod est unum sibi. Et si quidem sit unum sibi unione naturali, diligit illud dilectione naturali, si vero sit unum secum unione non naturali, diligit ipsum dilectione non naturali. Sicut homo diligit civem suum dilectione politicae virtutis; consanguineum autem suum dilectione naturali, inquantum est unum cum eo in principio generationis naturalis. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est unum cum aliquo, genere vel specie, est unum per naturam. Et ideo dilectione naturali quaelibet res diligit id quod est secum unum secundum speciem, inquantum diligit speciem suam. Et hoc etiam apparet in his quae cognitione carent, nam ignis naturalem inclinationem habet ut communicet alteri suam formam, quod est bonum eius; sicut naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod quaerat bonum suum, ut esse sursum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod unus Angelus diligit alium naturali dilectione, inquantum convenit cum eo in natura. Sed inquantum convenit cum eo in aliquibus aliis vel etiam inquantum differt ab eo secundum quaedam alia, non diligit eum naturali dilectione. I answer that, As was observed (3), both angel and man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation. Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne upwards. So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dico sicut seipsum, potest uno modo determinare cognitionem seu dilectionem ex parte cogniti et dilecti. Et sic cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia cognoscit alium esse, sicut cognoscit seipsum esse. Alio modo potest determinare cognitionem et dilectionem ex parte diligentis et cognoscentis. Et sic non cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia se cognoscit per suam essentiam, alium autem non per eius essentiam. Et similiter non diligit alium sicut seipsum, quia seipsum diligit per suam voluntatem, alium autem non diligit per eius voluntatem. Reply to Objection 1. The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love another by the other's will.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ly sicut non designat aequalitatem, sed similitudinem. Cum enim dilectio naturalis super unitatem naturalem fundetur, illud quod est minus unum cum eo, naturaliter minus diligit. Unde naturaliter plus diligit quod est unum numero, quam quod est unum specie vel genere. Sed naturale est quod similem dilectionem habeat ad alium sicut ad seipsum, quantum ad hoc, quod sicut seipsum diligit inquantum vult sibi bonum, ita alium diligat inquantum vult eius bonum. Reply to Objection 2. The expression "as" does not denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.
Iª q. 60 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dilectio naturalis dicitur esse ipsius finis, non tanquam cui aliquis velit bonum; sed tanquam bonum quod quis vult sibi, et per consequens alii, inquantum est unum sibi. Nec ista dilectio naturalis removeri potest etiam ab Angelis malis, quin dilectionem naturalem habeant ad alios Angelos, inquantum cum eis communicant in natura. Sed odiunt eos, inquantum diversificantur secundum iustitiam et iniustitiam. Reply to Objection 3. Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus naturali dilectione non diligat Deum plus quam seipsum. Quia, ut dictum est, dilectio naturalis fundatur super unione naturali. Sed natura divina maxime distat a natura Angeli. Ergo naturali dilectione Angelus minus diligit Deum quam se, vel etiam alium Angelum.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (4), natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed naturali dilectione quilibet diligit alium propter se, unumquodque enim diligit aliquid inquantum est bonum sibi. Ergo dilectione naturali Angelus non diligit Deum plus quam seipsum. Objection 2. Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so." But every one loves another with natural love for his own sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural love.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura reflectitur in seipsam, videmus enim quod omne agens naturaliter agit ad conservationem sui. Non autem reflecteretur in seipsam natura, si tenderet in aliud plus quam in seipsam. Non ergo naturali dilectione diligit Angelus Deum plus quam se. Objection 3. Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, hoc videtur esse proprium caritatis, ut aliquis Deum plus quam seipsum diligat. Sed dilectio caritatis non est naturalis in Angelis, sed diffunditur in cordibus eorum per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est eis, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo non diligunt Deum Angeli dilectione naturali plus quam seipsos. Objection 4. Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, dilectio naturalis semper manet, manente natura. Sed diligere Deum plus quam seipsum non manet in peccante Angelo vel homine, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, fecerunt civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad Dei contemptum, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Ergo diligere Deum supra seipsum non est naturale. Objection 5. Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city." Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, omnia moralia legis praecepta sunt de lege naturae. Sed praeceptum de diligendo Deum supra seipsum, est praeceptum morale legis. Ergo est de lege naturae. Ergo dilectione naturali Angelus diligit Deum supra seipsum. On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod Angelus naturali dilectione diligit Deum plus quam se, amore concupiscentiae, quia scilicet plus appetit sibi bonum divinum quam bonum suum. Et quodammodo amore amicitiae, inquantum scilicet Deo vult naturaliter Angelus maius bonum quam sibi, vult enim naturaliter Deum esse Deum, se autem vult habere naturam propriam. Sed simpliciter loquendo, naturali dilectione plus diligit se quam Deum, quia intensius et principalius naturaliter diligit se quam Deum. Sed falsitas huius opinionis manifeste apparet, si quis in rebus naturalibus consideret ad quid res naturaliter moveatur, inclinatio enim naturalis in his quae sunt sine ratione, demonstrat inclinationem naturalem in voluntate intellectualis naturae. Unumquodque autem in rebus naturalibus, quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cuius est, quam in seipsum. Et haec inclinatio naturalis demonstratur ex his quae naturaliter aguntur, quia unumquodque, sicut agitur naturaliter, sic aptum natum est agi, ut dicitur in II Physic. Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit, ad conservationem totius, sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, huiusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis, est enim virtuosi civis, ut se exponat mortis periculo pro totius reipublicae conservatione; et si homo esset naturalis pars huius civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei naturalis. Quia igitur bonum universale est ipse Deus, et sub hoc bono continetur etiam Angelus et homo et omnis creatura, quia omnis creatura naturaliter, secundum id quod est, Dei est; sequitur quod naturali dilectione etiam Angelus et homo plus et principalius diligat Deum quam seipsum. Alioquin, si naturaliter plus seipsum diligeret quam Deum, sequeretur quod naturalis dilectio esset perversa; et quod non perficeretur per caritatem, sed destrueretur. I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity. The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because "according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him. Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit in his quae ex aequo dividuntur, quorum unum non est alteri ratio existendi et bonitatis, in talibus enim unumquodque diligit naturaliter magis seipsum quam alterum, inquantum est magis sibi ipsi unum quam alteri. Sed in illis quorum unum est tota ratio existendi et bonitatis alii, magis diligitur naturaliter tale alterum quam ipsum; sicut dictum est quod unaquaeque pars diligit naturaliter totum plus quam se. Et quodlibet singulare naturaliter diligit plus bonum suae speciei, quam bonum suum singulare. Deus autem non solum est bonum unius speciei, sed est ipsum universale bonum simpliciter. Unde unumquodque suo modo naturaliter diligit Deum plus quam seipsum. Reply to Objection 1. Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self; because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod Deus diligitur ab Angelo inquantum est ei bonus, si ly inquantum dicat finem, sic falsum est, non enim diligit naturaliter Deum propter bonum suum, sed propter ipsum Deum. Si vero dicat rationem amoris ex parte amantis, sic verum est, non enim esset in natura alicuius quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus. Reply to Objection 2. When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far" denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God, except from this--that everything is dependent on that good which is God.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod natura reflectitur in seipsam non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, sed multo magis quantum ad commune, inclinatur enim unumquodque ad conservandum non solum suum individuum, sed etiam suam speciem. Et multo magis habet naturalem inclinationem unumquodque in id quod est bonum universale simpliciter. Reply to Objection 3. Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus, secundum quod est universale bonum, a quo dependet omne bonum naturale, diligitur naturali dilectione ab unoquoque. Inquantum vero est bonum beatificans naturaliter omnes supernaturali beatitudine, sic diligitur dilectione caritatis. Reply to Objection 4. God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
Iª q. 60 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum in Deo sit unum et idem eius substantia et bonum commune, omnes qui vident ipsam Dei essentiam, eodem motu dilectionis moventur in ipsam Dei essentiam prout est ab aliis distincta, et secundum quod est quoddam bonum commune. Et quia inquantum est bonum commune, naturaliter amatur ab omnibus; quicumque videt eum per essentiam, impossibile est quin diligat ipsum. Sed illi qui non vident essentiam eius, cognoscunt eum per aliquos particulares effectus, qui interdum eorum voluntati contrariantur. Et sic hoc modo dicuntur odio habere Deum, cum tamen, inquantum est bonum commune omnium, unumquodque naturaliter diligat plus Deum quam seipsum. Reply to Objection 5. Since God's substance and universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him. But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
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