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Directory:Jon Awbrey/Essays/Prospects For Inquiry Driven Systems (view source)
Revision as of 14:20, 10 January 2008
, 14:20, 10 January 2008→1.2.2.1. Papyrus, Parchment, Palimpsest: fix flub
=====1.2.2.1. Papyrus, Parchment, Palimpsest=====
=====1.2.2.1. Papyrus, Parchment, Palimpsest=====
Starting from the standpoint of systems theory a sizable handicap must be overcome in the quest to figure out: "What's in the brain that ink may character?" and "Where is fancy bred?" (McCulloch, 1965). If localized deposits of historical records and promissory notes are all that can be found, a considerable amount of reconstruction may be necessary to grasp the living reality of experience and purpose that underlies them still. A distinction must be made between the analytic or functional structure of the phase space of a system and the anatomical structure of a hypothetical agent to whom these states are attributed. The separation of a system into environment and organism and the further detection of anatomical structure within the organism depend on a direct product decomposition of the space into relatively independent components whose interactions can be treated secondarily. But the direct product is a comparatively advanced stage of decomposition and not to be expected in every case.
Starting from the standpoint of systems theory a sizable handicap must be overcome in the quest to figure out: "What's in the brain that ink may character?" and "Where is fancy bred?" (McCulloch, 1965). If localized deposits of historical records and promissory notes are all that can be found, a considerable amount of reconstruction may be necessary to grasp the living reality of experience and purpose that underlies them still. A distinction must be made between the analytic or functional structure of the phase space of a system and the anatomical structure of a hypothetical agent to whom these states are attributed. The separation of a system into environment and organism and the further detection of anatomical structure within the organism depend on a direct product decomposition of the space into relatively independent components whose interactions can be treated secondarily. But the direct product is a comparatively advanced stage of decomposition and not to be expected in every case.
This point draws the chase back through the briar patch of that earlier complexity theory, the prime decomposition or group complexity theory of finite automata and their associated formal languages or transformation semigroups (Lallement, ch. 4). This more general study requires the use of semi-direct products (Rotman, 1984) and their ultimate extension into wreath products or cascade products, along with the corresponding notions of divisibility, factorization, or decomposition (Barr & Wells, 1990, ch. 11). This theory seems to have reached a baroque stage of development, either too difficult to pursue with vigor, too lacking in applications, or falling short of some essential insight. It looks like another one of those problem areas that will need to be revisited on the way to integrating AI and systems theory.
This point draws the chase back through the briar patch of that earlier complexity theory, the prime decomposition or group complexity theory of finite automata and their associated formal languages or transformation semigroups (Lallement, ch. 4). This more general study requires the use of semi-direct products (Rotman, 1984) and their ultimate extension into wreath products or cascade products, along with the corresponding notions of divisibility, factorization, or decomposition (Barr & Wells, 1990, ch. 11). This theory seems to have reached a baroque stage of development, either too difficult to pursue with vigor, too lacking in applications, or falling short of some essential insight. It looks like another one of those problem areas that will need to be revisited on the way to integrating AI and systems theory.
=====1.2.2.2. Statements, Questions, Commands=====
<pre>
When signs are created that can be placed in reliable association with the
results of observations and the onsets of actions, these signs are said to
denote or evoke the corresponding events and actions. This is the beginning of
declarative, imperative, and interrogative uses of symbolic expressions. The
interrogative mode is associated with residual properties of the state occupied
by a system. The question marks a difference between states denoted by
declarative expressions, a divergence between expectation and actuality. The
inquisitive use of a sign notes a surprise to be explained, usually by adducing
the signs of less obvious facts to the account. A surprise incites the system
to an effort whose end is to bring the system's habits of expectation in line
with what actually happens on a recurring basis.
The imperative mode is associated with convergent possibilities of the states in
which a system may come to reside. The command calls attention to a discrepancy
between actuality and intention, a difference between the states independently
declared to be observed and desired. The injunctive use of a sign sets a
problem to be resolved, usually by executing the actions enjoined by a series of
signs. A problem incites the system to an effort whose end is to bring what
actually happens on a recurring basis in line with the system's hopeful
anticipations. If this problem turns out to be intractable, then the
expectation that these intentions can be fulfilled may have to be changed. In
this way the different modes of inquiry are often embroiled in intricate
patterns of interaction.
In proceeding from surprise and problem states to arrive at explanations and
plans of action that are suited to resolving these states, the system's aim is
expedited by certain resources, all of which involve massive and complex systems
of signs and symbolic expressions. It helps to have a library, an access to the
records of individual and collective past efforts and experiences. To be used
for clear and present indications this library must have a ready index of its
contents, a form of afterthought that is not too thoughtless in design. It
helps to a have laboratory, a workshop or a study, any facility where
imagination reigns for composing and testing improvised programs and theories,
for prototyping on-the-spot inventions. To be used for free and unbiased
evaluation this factory of imagination must be a mechanism of forethought
without malice, where symbolic expressions extempore are not confused with
actions and do not exact the same price in energy spent and pain risked.
But how can all this information and flexibility, constraint vying with freedom
of interpretation, be accorded a place in the present state of a system? Can
Epimetheus and Prometheus find a way to "get along" in the current state of
things? Is the phase space of a system really big enough for both of them?
If signs and symbols are to receive a place in systems theory it must be
possible to construct them from materials available on that site. But the only
thing a system has to work with is its own present state. How do states of a
system come to serve the role of signs? How can it make sense to say that
system regards one of its own states as a sign of something else? How do
certain states of a system come to be taken by that system, as evidenced by its
interpretive behavior, as signs of something else, some object or objective? A
good start toward answering these questions would be made by defining the words
used in asking them. In looking at the concepts that remain to be given
system-theoretic definitions it appears that all of these questions boil down to
one: What character in the dynamics of a system would cause it to be called a
sign-using system, one that acts as an interpreter in a non-trivial sense?
</pre>
=====1.2.2.2. Statements, Questions, Commands=====
=====1.2.2.2. Statements, Questions, Commands=====