Changes

=====1.1.4.2.  Remembrance=====

=====1.1.4.2.  Remembrance=====

The purpose of memory, on the other hand, requires states that can be duly constituted in fashions that are diligently preserved by the normal functioning of the system.  The expectation must be faithfully met that such states will be maintained until deliberately reformed by due processes.  Intelligent systems cannot afford to indiscriminately confound the imperatives to forgive and forget.  Reversibility applies to exploratory operations taking place interior to the dynamic image.  An irreversible recording of events is generally the best routine strategy to keep in play between outer and inner dynamics.  But reversibility and its opposite interact in subtle ways even to maintain the stability of stored representations.  After all, when physical records are disturbed by extraneous noise without the mediation of attention's due process, the ideal system would work to immediately reverse these unintentional distortions and ungraceful degradations of its memories.  To abide their time, memories should lie in state spaces with stable equilibria, resting at the bottoms of deep enough potential wells to avoid being tossed out by minor quakes.

The purpose of memory, on the other hand, requires states that can be duly  

constituted in fashions that are diligently preserved by the normal functioning  

of the system.  The expectation must be faithfully met that such states will be  

maintained until deliberately reformed by due processes.  Intelligent systems  

cannot afford to indiscriminately confound the imperatives to forgive and  

forget.  Reversibility applies to exploratory operations taking place interior  

to the dynamic image.  An irreversible recording of events is generally the best  

routine strategy to keep in play between outer and inner dynamics.  But  

reversibility and its opposite interact in subtle ways even to maintain the  

stability of stored representations.  After all, when physical records are  

disturbed by extraneous noise without the mediation of attention's due process,  

the ideal system would work to immediately reverse these unintentional  

distortions and ungraceful degradations of its memories.  To abide their time,  

memories should lie in state spaces with stable equilibria, resting at the  

bottoms of deep enough potential wells to avoid being tossed out by minor  

quakes.

A collection of classic and recent papers on the significance of reversibility  

A collection of classic and recent papers on the significance of reversibility questions for information acquisition and computational intelligence is gathered together in (Leff & Rex, 1990).  The bearing of irreversible processes on the complex dynamics of physical systems is treated in (Prigogine, 1980).  Monographs on the physics of time asymmetry and the time direction of information are found in (Davies, 1977) and (Reichenbach, 1991).  Relationships between periodicity properties of formal languages and ultimately periodic behavior of finite automata are discussed in (Denning, Dennis, & Qualitz, sec. 6.4) and (Lallement, sec. 7.1).  Existential and cultural reflections on the themes of return, repetition, and reconstruction are presented in Kierkegaard, 1843) and (Eliade, 1954).  The topographic, potential-surface, or landscape metaphor for system memories, e.g. as elaborated in the self-organizing "memory surface" model of (de Bono, 1969), was influential in the early history of AI and continues to have periodic reincarnations, e.g. (Amit, sec. 2.3). Distributed models of information storage emphasizing sequential memory and reconstructive retrieval are investigated in (Albus, 1981) and (Kanerva, 1988).

questions for information acquisition and computational intelligence is gathered  

together in (Leff & Rex, 1990).  The bearing of irreversible processes on the  

complex dynamics of physical systems is treated in (Prigogine, 1980).   

Monographs on the physics of time asymmetry and the time direction of  

information are found in (Davies, 1977) and (Reichenbach, 1991).  Relationships  

between periodicity properties of formal languages and ultimately periodic  

behavior of finite automata are discussed in (Denning, Dennis, & Qualitz, sec.  

6.4) and (Lallement, sec. 7.1).  Existential and cultural reflections on the  

themes of return, repetition, and reconstruction are presented in (Kierkegaard,  

1843) and (Eliade, 1954).  The topographic, potential-surface, or landscape  

metaphor for system memories, e.g. as elaborated in the self-organizing "memory  

surface" model of (de Bono, 1969), was influential in the early history of AI  

and continues to have periodic reincarnations, e.g. (Amit, sec. 2.3).

Distributed models of information storage emphasizing sequential memory and  

reconstructive retrieval are investigated in (Albus, 1981) and (Kanerva, 1988).

Work in cognitive science and AI, in the history of its ongoing revolutions and  

Work in cognitive science and AI, in the history of its ongoing revolutions and partial resolutions, has shown a recurring tendency to lose sight of the breadth and power that originally drew it to examine such faculties as memory and imagination.  The fact that this form of forgetfulness happens so often is already an argument that there may be some reason for it, in the sociology and psychology of science if not in the nature of the subject matter.  No matter what the cause the pattern is seen again and again.  The spirit of the original quest that imparts a certain verve to the revolutionary stages of a field's development repeatedly devolves into a kind of volleyball game, an exercise engaged in by opposing parties to settle, by rhetorical hook or strategic crook, which side of a conceptual net the whole globe in contention shall be judged to rest.  But most of the purportedly world-shattering distinctions are rendered ineffective by the lack of any operational, much less consensual, definitions.  The most heated border disputes arise over concepts for which no clear agreement exists even as to the proper direction of inquiry, whether the form of argument demanded ought to be working from a definition or groping toward a definition of the concept at issue.

partial resolutions, has shown a recurring tendency to lose sight of the breadth  

and power that originally drew it to examine such faculties as memory and  

imagination.  The fact that this form of forgetfulness happens so often is  

already an argument that there may be some reason for it, in the sociology and  

psychology of science if not in the nature of the subject matter.  No matter  

what the cause the pattern is seen again and again.  The spirit of the original  

quest that imparts a certain verve to the revolutionary stages of a field's  

development repeatedly devolves into a kind of volleyball game, an exercise  

engaged in by opposing parties to settle, by rhetorical hook or strategic crook,  

which side of a conceptual net the whole globe in contention shall be judged to  

rest.  But most of the purportedly world-shattering distinctions are rendered  

ineffective by the lack of any operational, much less consensual, definitions.   

The most heated border disputes arise over concepts for which no clear agreement  

exists even as to the proper direction of inquiry, whether the form of argument  

demanded ought to be working from a definition or groping toward a definition of  

the concept at issue.

It may be inevitable as a natural part of the annealing process of any  

It may be inevitable as a natural part of the annealing process of any specialized instrument of science to periodically enter phases of chafing over indeterminate trifles.  But it remains a good idea to preserve a few landmarks sighting on the initial aims and the original goals of the inquiry. With respect to imagination, memory, and their interaction within the media of description and expression, a wide field of illumination on the expanses rolling out from under their natural scope is cast by the following sources: (Sartre, 1948), (Yates, 1966), and (Krell, 1990).  The critique of pragmatism for "differences that don't make a difference" is legend, e.g. (James, 1907). The form of reasoning that argues toward a definition is bound up with the question of abductive reasoning as described by C.S. Peirce (CE, CP, NE). An interesting, recent discussion of the problem of definition appears

specialized instrument of science to periodically enter phases of chafing

over indeterminate trifles.  But it remains a good idea to preserve a few

landmarks sighting on the initial aims and the original goals of the inquiry.

With respect to imagination, memory, and their interaction within the media

of description and expression, a wide field of illumination on the expanses

rolling out from under their natural scope is cast by the following sources:

(Sartre, 1948), (Yates, 1966), and (Krell, 1990).  The critique of pragmatism

for "differences that don't make a difference" is legend, e.g. (James, 1907).

The form of reasoning that argues toward a definition is bound up with the

question of abductive reasoning as described by C.S. Peirce (CE, CP, NE).

An interesting, recent discussion of the problem of definition appears

in (Eco, 1983).

in (Eco, 1983).

===1.2.  Hodos : Methods, Media, and Middle Courses===

===1.2.  Hodos : Methods, Media, and Middle Courses===