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| <pre> | | <pre> |
− | To every thing there is a season. To every concept there are minimal | + | To every thing there is a season. To every concept there are minimal contexts of sensible application, the most reduced situations in which the concept can be used to make sense. Every concept is an instrument of thought, and like every method has its bounds of useful application. In directions of simplicity, a concept is bounded by the minimum levels of complexity out of which it is, initially, recurrently, transiently, ultimately, able to arise. There is one form of rhetorical question that people often use to address this issue, if somewhat indirectly. It presents itself initially as a genuine question but precipitates the answer in enthymeme, dashing headlong to break off inquiry in the form of a blank. Ostensibly, the space extends the question, but it is only a pretext. The pretense of an open sentence is already filled in by the unexpressed beliefs of the questioner. |
− | contexts of sensible application, the most reduced situations in which | |
− | the concept can be used to make sense. Every concept is an instrument | |
− | of thought, and like every method has its bounds of useful application. | |
− | In directions of simplicity, a concept is bounded by the minimum levels | |
− | of complexity out of which it is, initially, recurrently, transiently, | |
− | ultimately, able to arise. There is one form of rhetorical question | |
− | that people often use to address this issue, if somewhat indirectly. | |
− | It presents itself initially as a genuine question but precipitates | |
− | the answer in enthymeme, dashing headlong to break off inquiry in | |
− | the form of a blank. Ostensibly, the space extends the question, | |
− | but it is only a pretext. The pretense of an open sentence is | |
− | already filled in by the unexpressed beliefs of the questioner. | |
| | | |
− | "What could be simpler than ___ ?" this question asks, and the automatic | + | "What could be simpler than ___ ?" this question asks, and the automatic completions that different customs have usually borne in mind are these: sets, functions, relations. My present purpose is to address the concept of information, and specifically the kind that results from observation. In answer to the question of its foundation, I have not found that the concept of information can make much sense in anything short of the following framework. |
− | completions that different customs have usually borne in mind are these: | |
− | sets, functions, relations. My present purpose is to address the concept | |
− | of information, and specifically the kind that results from observation. | |
− | In answer to the question of its foundation, I have not found that the | |
− | concept of information can make much sense in anything short of the | |
− | following framework. | |
| | | |
− | Three-place relations among systems are a minimum requirement. | + | Three-place relations among systems are a minimum requirement. Information is a property of a sign system by virtue of which it can reduce the uncertainty of an interpreting system about the state of an object system. Thus information is a feature that a state in a system has in relation to two other systems. The fundamental reality underlying the concept of information is the persistence of individual systems of relation, each of which exhibits a certain kind of relation among three domains and satisfies a definable set of definitive properties. Each domain in the relation is the state space of an entire system: sign system, interpreting system, object system, respectively. When a set of properties is identified that captures what all such sign systems have in common, a definition of the concept of a sign system will have been discovered. But what form of argument will serve to bring us to a definition, in this case or in its more general setting? Certainly, it cannot be that form of thought, unaided, that requires a definition to start. |
− | Information is a property of a sign system by virtue of which | |
− | it can reduce the uncertainty of an interpreting system about | |
− | the state of an object system. Thus information is a feature | |
− | that a state in a system has in relation to two other systems. | |
− | The fundamental reality underlying the concept of information | |
− | is the persistence of individual systems of relation, each of | |
− | which exhibits a certain kind of relation among three domains | |
− | and satisfies a definable set of definitive properties. Each | |
− | domain in the relation is the state space of an entire system: | |
− | sign system, interpreting system, object system, respectively. | |
− | When a set of properties is identified that captures what all | |
− | such sign systems have in common, a definition of the concept | |
− | of a sign system will have been discovered. But what form of | |
− | argument will serve to bring us to a definition, in this case | |
− | or in its more general setting? Certainly, it cannot be that | |
− | form of thought, unaided, that requires a definition to start. | |
| | | |
− | More carefully said, information is a property that can be attributed | + | More carefully said, information is a property that can be attributed to signs in a system by virtue of their relation to two other systems. This attribution projects a relation among three domains into a simpler order of relation. There are various ways of carrying out this reduction. Not all of them can be expected to preserve the information of the original sign relation. An attribution may create a logical property of elements in the sign domain or it may construct functions from the sign domain to ranges of qualitative meaning or quantitative measure. |
− | to signs in a system by virtue of their relation to two other systems. | |
− | This attribution projects a relation among three domains into a simpler | |
− | order of relation. There are various ways of carrying out this reduction. | |
− | Not all of them can be expected to preserve the information of the original | |
− | sign relation. An attribution may create a logical property of elements in | |
− | the sign domain or it may construct functions from the sign domain to ranges | |
− | of qualitative meaning or quantitative measure. | |
− | </pre>
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| ====1.2.1. Functions of Observation==== | | ====1.2.1. Functions of Observation==== |