Changes

There are harvests of complexity which sprout from the earliest elements and the simplest levels of the discussion that follows.  I will try to clarify a few of these issues in the process of fixing terminology.  This may create an impression of making much ado about nothing, but it is a good idea in computational modeling to forge connections between the complex, the subtle, and the simple -- even to the point of forcing things a bit.  Further, I will use this space to profile the character and the consistency of the grounds being tended by systems theory and AI.  Finally, I will let myself be free to mention features of this work that connect with the broader horizons of human cultivation.  Although these concerns are properly outside the range of my next few steps, I believe that it is important to be aware of our bearings:  to know what our practice depends upon, to think what our activity impacts upon.

There are harvests of complexity which sprout from the earliest elements and the simplest levels of the discussion that follows.  I will try to clarify a few of these issues in the process of fixing terminology.  This may create an impression of making much ado about nothing, but it is a good idea in computational modeling to forge connections between the complex, the subtle, and the simple -- even to the point of forcing things a bit.  Further, I will use this space to profile the character and the consistency of the grounds being tended by systems theory and AI.  Finally, I will let myself be free to mention features of this work that connect with the broader horizons of human cultivation.  Although these concerns are properly outside the range of my next few steps, I believe that it is important to be aware of our bearings:  to know what our practice depends upon, to think what our activity impacts upon.

===1.1  Topos: Rudiments and Immediate Resources===

===1.1. Topos : Rudiments and Immediate Resources===

This inquiry is guided by two questions that express themselves in many different guises.  In their most laconic and provocative style, self-referent but not purely so, they typically bring a person to ask:

This inquiry is guided by two questions that express themselves in many different guises.  In their most laconic and provocative style, self-referent but not purely so, they typically bring a person to ask:

:* ''What competence enables a system to exit from its problem states?''

:* ''What competence enables a system to exit from its problem states?''

====1.1.1  Systematic Inquiry====

====1.1.1. Systematic Inquiry====

In their underlying form and tone these questions sound a familiar tune.  Their basic tenor was brought to a pitch of perfection by Immanuel Kant, in a canon of inquiry that exceeds my present range.  Luckily, my immediate aim is much more limited and concrete.  For the present it is only required to ask:  ''How are systematic inquiry and knowledge possible?''  That is, how are inquiry and knowledge to be understood and implemented as functions of systems and how ought they be investigated by systems theory?  In short:  ''How can systems have knowledge as a goal?''  This effort is constrained to the subject of systems and the frame of systems theory.  It will attempt to give system-theoretic analyses of concepts and capacities that can be recognized as primitive archetypes, at least, of those that AI research pursues with avid interest and aspires one day to more fully capture.  By limiting questions about the possibility of inquiry and knowledge to the subject and scope of systems theory there may be reason to hope for a measure of practical success.

In their underlying form and tone these questions sound a familiar tune.  Their basic tenor was brought to a pitch of perfection by Immanuel Kant, in a canon of inquiry that exceeds my present range.  Luckily, my immediate aim is much more limited and concrete.  For the present it is only required to ask:  ''How are systematic inquiry and knowledge possible?''  That is, how are inquiry and knowledge to be understood and implemented as functions of systems and how ought they be investigated by systems theory?  In short:  ''How can systems have knowledge as a goal?''  This effort is constrained to the subject of systems and the frame of systems theory.  It will attempt to give system-theoretic analyses of concepts and capacities that can be recognized as primitive archetypes, at least, of those that AI research pursues with avid interest and aspires one day to more fully capture.  By limiting questions about the possibility of inquiry and knowledge to the subject and scope of systems theory there may be reason to hope for a measure of practical success.

Kant's challenge is this:  To say precisely ''how'' it is possible, in procedural terms, for contingent beings and empirical creatures, physically embodied and even engineered systems, to move toward or synthetically acquire forms of knowledge with an ''a priori'' character, that is, declarative statements with a global application to all of the situations that these agents might pass through.  It is not feasible within the scope of systems theory and engineered systems to deal with the larger question:  Whether these forms of knowledge are somehow ''necessary'' laws, applying to all conceivable systems and universes.  But it does seem reasonable to ask how a system's trajectory might intersect with states whose associated knowledge components have a wider application to the system's manifold as a whole.

Kant's challenge is this:  To say precisely ''how'' it is possible, in procedural terms, for contingent beings and empirical creatures, physically embodied and even engineered systems, to move toward or synthetically acquire forms of knowledge with an ''a priori'' character, that is, declarative statements with a global application to all of the situations that these agents might pass through.  It is not feasible within the scope of systems theory and engineered systems to deal with the larger question:  Whether these forms of knowledge are somehow ''necessary'' laws, applying to all conceivable systems and universes.  But it does seem reasonable to ask how a system's trajectory might intersect with states whose associated knowledge components have a wider application to the system's manifold as a whole.

====1.1.2  Intelligence, Knowledge, Execution====

====1.1.2. Intelligence, Knowledge, Execution====

Intelligence, for my purposes, is characterized as a technical ability of choice in a situation as represented.  It is the ability to pick out a line on a map, to find a series of middle terms making connections between represented positions. In the situation that commonly calls it out, intelligence is faced with two representations of position.  This pair of pointers to points on a map are typically interpreted as indices of current and desired positions.  The two images are symbols or analogues of the actual site and the intended goal of a system.  They themselves exist in a space that shadows the dynamic reality of the agent involved.  But the dynamic reality of the intelligent agent forms a manifold of states that subsists beneath its experience and becomes manifest  

Intelligence, for my purposes, is characterized as a technical ability of choice

only gradually and partially in the observations of that agent.  It is among the states of this basic manifold that all the real sites and goals of the agent are located.

in a situation as represented.  It is the ability to pick out a line on a map,

to find a series of middle terms making connections between represented positions.

In the situation that commonly calls it out, intelligence is faced with two

representations of position.  This pair of pointers to points on a map are

typically interpreted as indices of current and desired positions.  The two  

images are symbols or analogues of the actual site and the intended goal of

a system.  They themselves exist in a space that shadows the dynamic reality

of the agent involved.  But the dynamic reality of the intelligent agent forms

a manifold of states that subsists beneath its experience and becomes manifest  

only gradually and partially in the observations of that agent.  It is among

the states of this basic manifold that all the real sites and goals of the

agent are located.

The concept of intelligence laid out here has been abstracted from two

The concept of intelligence laid out here has been abstracted from two capacities that it both requires and supports:  knowledge and execution. Knowledge is a fund of available representations, a glove-box full of maps. Execution is an array of possible actions and the power of performing them, an executive ability that directs motor responses in accord with the line that is picked out on the map.  To continue the metaphor, execution is associated with the driving-gloves, which must be sorted out from the jumble of maps and used to get a grip on the mechanisms of performance and control that are capable of serving in order to actualize choices.

capacities that it both requires and supports:  knowledge and execution.

Knowledge is a fund of available representations, a glove-box full of maps.

Execution is an array of possible actions and the power of performing them,

an executive ability that directs motor responses in accord with the line

that is picked out on the map.  To continue the metaphor, execution is

associated with the driving-gloves, which must be sorted out from the

jumble of maps and used to get a grip on the mechanisms of performance

and control that are capable of serving in order to actualize choices.

1.1.2.1  Vector Field and Control System

=====1.1.2.1. Vector Field and Control System=====

Dynamically, as in a control system, intelligence is a decision process that

Dynamically, as in a control system, intelligence is a decision process that

selects an indicator of a tangent vector to follow at a point or a descriptor

selects an indicator of a tangent vector to follow at a point or a descriptor