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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS CXV - CXIX

Question 115 The action of the bodily creature
Question 116 Fate which is ascribed to certain bodies
Question 117 How man, who is both body and spirit, changes in general (117)
Question 118 The production of man from man as to the soul
Question 119 The production of man from man as to the body

Latin	Latin
IЄ q. 115 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de actione corporalis creaturae; et fato, quod aliquibus corporibus attribuitur. Circa actiones corporales quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum aliquod corpus sit activum. Secundo, utrum in corporibus sint aliquae seminales rationes. Tertio, utrum corpora caelestia sint causa eorum quae hic per inferiora corpora fiunt. Quarto, utrum sint causa humanorum actuum. Quinto, utrum eorum actionibus Daemones subdantur. Sexto, utrum caelestia corpora imponant necessitatem his quae eorum actionibus subduntur.	Question 115. The action of the corporeal creatureCan a body be active? Do certain seminal virtues exist in bodies? Are the heavenly bodies the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies? Are they the cause of human acts? Are demons subject to their influence? Do the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum. Dicit enim Augustinus quod in rebus invenitur aliquid actum et non agens, sicut sunt corpora; aliquid agens et non actum, sicut Deus; aliquid agens et actum, sicut substantiae spirituales.	Objection 1. It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances."
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne agens, excepto primo agente, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. Sed infra substantiam corporalem non est substantia quae sit susceptibilis suae actionis, quia haec substantia tenet infimum gradum in entibus. Ergo substantia corporalis non est activa.	Objection 2. Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore corporeal substance is not active.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis substantia corporalis concluditur quantitate. Sed quantitas impedit substantiam a motu et actione, quia comprehendit eam, et mergitur in ea, sicut impeditur aer nubilosus a perceptione luminis. Et huius signum est, quod quanto magis accreverit quantitas corporis, tanto est ponderosius et gravius ad hoc quod moveatur. Ergo nulla substantia corporalis est activa.	Objection 3. Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, omne agens habet virtutem agendi ex propinquitate ad primum activum. Sed a primo activo, quod est simplicissimum, remotissima sunt corpora, quae sunt maxime composita. Ergo nullum corpus est agens.	Objection 4. Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, si aliquod corpus est agens, aut agit ad formam substantialem; aut ad formam accidentalem. Sed non ad formam substantialem, quia non invenitur in corporibus principium actionis nisi aliqua qualitas activa, quae est accidens; accidens autem non potest esse causa formae substantialis, cum causa sit potior quam effectus. Similiter etiam neque ad formam accidentalem, quia accidens non se extendit ultra suum subiectum, ut Augustinus dicit IX de Trin. Ergo nullum corpus est activum.	Objection 5. Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, XV cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates corporei ignis, dicit quod ad susceptas materias manifestat sui ipsius magnitudinem activus et potens.	On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold."
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sensibiliter apparet aliqua corpora esse activa. Sed circa corporum actiones tripliciter aliqui erraverunt. Fuerunt enim aliqui qui totaliter corporibus actiones subtraxerunt. Et haec est opinio Avicebron in libro fontis vitae, ubi per rationes quae tactae sunt, probare nititur quod nullum corpus agit, sed omnes actiones quae videntur esse corporum, sunt actiones cuiusdam virtutis spiritualis quae penetrat per omnia corpora; ita quod ignis, secundum eum, non calefacit, sed virtus spiritualis penetrans per ipsum. Et videtur haec opinio derivata esse ab opinione Platonis. Nam Plato posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, esse participatas et determinatas et contractas ad hanc materiam; formas vero separatas esse absolutas et quasi universales; et ideo illas formas separatas dicebat esse causas formarum quae sunt in materia. Secundum hoc ergo quod forma quae est in materia corporali, determinata est ad hanc materiam individuatam per quantitatem, ponebat Avicebron quod a quantitate, prout est individuationis principium, retinetur et arcetur forma corporalis, ne possit se extendere per actionem in aliam materiam; sed solum forma spiritualis et immaterialis, quae non est coarctata per quantitatem, potest effluere per actionem in aliud. Sed ista ratio non concludit quod forma corporalis non sit agens, sed quod non sit agens universale. Secundum enim quod participatur aliquid, secundum hoc est necessarium quod participetur id quod est proprium ei, sicut quantum participatur de lumine, tantum participatur de ratione visibilis. Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare. Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum. Sed tamen haec opinio Avicebron superexcedit opinionem Platonis. Nam Plato ponebat solum formas substantiales separatas; accidentia vero reducebat ad principia materialia quae sunt magnum et parvum, quae ponebat esse prima contraria, sicut et alii rarum et densum. Et ideo tam Plato quam Avicenna, in aliquo ipsum sequens, ponebant quod agentia corporalia agunt secundum formas accidentales, disponendo materiam ad formam substantialem; sed ultima perfectio, quae est per introductionem formae substantialis est a principio immateriali. Et haec est secunda opinio de actione corporum, de qua supra dictum est, cum de creatione ageretur. Tertia vero opinio fuit Democriti, qui ponebat actionem esse per effluxionem atomorum a corpore agente, et passionem esse per receptionem eorundem in poris corporis patientis. Quam opinionem improbat Aristoteles in I de Generat. Sequeretur enim quod corpus non pateretur per totum, et quod quantitas corporis agentis diminueretur ex hoc quod agit, quae sunt manifeste falsa. Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia.	I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else. But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies. But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (45, 8). The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue. We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Augustini est intelligendum de tota natura corporali simul accepta, quae non habet aliquam inferiorem naturam infra se, in quam agat, sicut natura spiritualis in corporalem, et natura increata in creatam. Sed tamen unum corpus est infra alterum, inquantum est in potentia ad id quod habet aliud in actu.	Reply to Objection 1. This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 ad 2 Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Sciendum est tamen quod, cum Avicebron sic argumentatur, est aliquid quod est movens non motum, scilicet primus factor rerum, ergo, ex opposito, est aliquid quod est motum et patiens tantum, quod concedendum est. Sed hoc est materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus. Corpus autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens.	From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas non impedit formam corporalem omnino ab actione, sicut dictum est, sed impedit eam ne sit agens universale, inquantum forma individuatur prout est in materia quantitati subiecta. Signum tamen quod inducitur de ponderositate corporum, non est ad propositum. Primo quidem, quia additio quantitatis non est causa gravitatis; ut probatur in IV de caelo et mundo. Secundo, quia falsum est quod ponderositas facit tardiorem motum, immo quanto aliquid est gravius, tanto magis movetur motu proprio. Tertio, quia actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit; sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum.	Reply to Objection 3. Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de similitudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum.	Reply to Objection 4. A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.
IЄ q. 115 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem; sicut et calor naturalis, inquantum est instrumentum animae, agit ad generationem carnis. Ad accidens vero agit propria virtute. Nec est contra rationem accidentis, quod excedat suum subiectum in agendo, sed quod excedat in essendo, nisi forsan quis imaginetur idem accidens numero defluere ab agente in patiens, sicut Democritus ponebat fieri actionem per defluxum atomorum.	Reply to Objection 5. The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in materia corporali non sint aliquae rationes seminales. Ratio enim importat aliquid secundum esse spirituale. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquid spiritualiter, sed materialiter tantum, secundum scilicet modum eius in quo est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes.	Objection 1. It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Daemones quaedam opera faciunt adhibendo occultis motibus quaedam semina, quae in elementis cognoscunt. Sed ea quae per motum localem adhibentur, sunt corpora, non rationes. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod sunt in corporali materia seminales rationes.	Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, semen est principium activum. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquod principium activum, cum materiae non competat agere, ut dictum est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes.	Objection 3. Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (1, ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, in materia corporali dicuntur esse quaedam causales rationes, quae videntur sufficere ad rerum productionem. Sed seminales rationes sunt aliae a causalibus, quia praeter seminales rationes fiunt miracula, non autem praeter causales. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod seminales rationes sunt in materia corporali.	Objection 4. Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., omnium rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur. Manifestum est autem quod principium activum et passivum generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia generantur. Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat. Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales. Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis. Tertio vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc animali, tanquam in particularibus causis. Quarto modo, sunt in seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales causae universales ad primos effectus productos.	I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in materia corporali; possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.	Reply to Objection 1. These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales].
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae vel passivae sunt in aliquibus partibus corporalibus; quae dum adhibentur per motum localem ad aliquos effectus complendos, dicuntur semina adhiberi per Daemones.	Reply to Objection 2. These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod semen maris est principium activum in generatione animalis. Sed potest etiam dici semen id quod est ex parte feminae, quod est principium passivum. Et sic sub semine comprehendi possunt vires activae et passivae.	Reply to Objection 3. The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles.
IЄ q. 115 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium. Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt praeter rationes seminales.	Reply to Objection 4. From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia non sint causa eorum quae hic in inferioribus corporibus fiunt. Dicit enim Damascenus, nos autem dicimus quoniam ipsa, scilicet corpora caelestia, non sunt causa alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae corrumpuntur, signa autem sunt magis imbrium et aeris transmutationis.	Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"--namely, the heavenly bodies--"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes."
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad faciendum aliquid, sufficit agens et materia. Sed in istis inferioribus invenitur materia patiens, inveniuntur etiam contraria agentia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Ergo non est necessarium, ad causandum ea quae hic inferius fiunt, causalitatem caelestibus corporibus attribuere.	Objection 2. Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, agens agit sibi simile. Sed videmus quod omnia quae fiunt hic inferius, fiunt per hoc quod calefiunt et frigidantur, et humectantur et desiccantur, et aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus alterantur, quae non inveniuntur in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa eorum quae hic fiunt.	Objection 3. Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, nihil est magis corporeum quam corporis sexus. Sed corporis sexus non causatur ex corporibus caelestibus, cuius signum esse videtur, quod duorum geminorum sub una constellatione natorum, unus est masculus et alter est femina. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa rerum corporalium quae hic fiunt.	Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur. Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod lumen solis ad generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum omnis multitudo ab unitate procedat; quod autem immobile est, uno modo se habet, quod vero movetur, multiformiter, considerandum est, in tota natura, quod omnis motus ab immobili procedit. Et ideo quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia. Corpora autem caelestia sunt inter alia corpora magis immobilia, non enim moventur nisi motu locali. Et ideo motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in causam.	I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Damasceni intelligendum est, quod corpora caelestia non sunt prima causa generationis et corruptionis eorum quae hic fiunt; sicut dicebant illi qui ponebant corpora caelestia esse deos.	Reply to Objection 1. These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod principia activa in istis inferioribus corporibus non inveniuntur nisi qualitates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Et si sic esset quod formae substantiales inferiorum corporum non diversificarentur nisi secundum huiusmodi accidentia, quorum principia rarum et densum antiqui naturales posuerunt; non oporteret super haec inferiora corpora aliquod principium activum ponere, sed ipsa sufficerent ad agendum. Sed recte considerantibus apparet quod huiusmodi accidentia se habent sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substantiales naturalium corporum. Materia autem non sufficit ad agendum. Et ideo oportet super has materiales dispositiones ponere aliquod principium activum. Unde Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secundum quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia species separatae semper eodem modo se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles, et sic sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse falsum. Unde secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod homo generat hominem, et sol.	Reply to Objection 2. The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions. This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false. Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod corpora caelestia inferioribus corporibus non sunt similia similitudine speciei; sed inquantum sua universali virtute continent in se quidquid in inferioribus corporibus generatur; secundum quem modum dicimus etiam omnia esse Deo similia.	Reply to Objection 3. The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like God.
IЄ q. 115 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.	Reply to Objection 4. The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum. Corpora enim caelestia, cum moveantur a spiritualibus substantiis, sicut supra dictum est, agunt in virtute earum quasi instrumenta. Sed illae substantiae spirituales sunt superiores animabus nostris. Ergo videtur quod possint imprimere in animas nostras, et sic causare actus humanos.	Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above (110, 3), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne multiforme reducitur in aliquod uniforme principium. Sed actus humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo videtur quod reducantur in uniformes motus caelestium corporum, sicut in sua principia.	Objection 2. Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, astrologi frequenter vera annuntiant de eventibus bellorum, et aliis humanis actibus, quorum principia sunt intellectus et voluntas. Quod facere non possent secundum caelestia corpora, nisi essent humanorum actuum causa. Sunt ergo corpora caelestia humanorum actuum causa.	Objection 3. Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod corpora caelestia humanorum actuum nequaquam sunt causa.	On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod corpora caelestia in corpora quidem imprimunt directe et per se, sicut iam dictum est. In vires autem animae quae sunt actus organorum corporeorum, directe quidem, sed per accidens, quia necesse est huiusmodi actus harum potentiarum impediri secundum impedimenta organorum, sicut oculus turbatus non bene videt. Unde si intellectus et voluntas essent vires corporeis organis alligatae, sicut posuerunt aliqui, dicentes quod intellectus non differt a sensu; ex necessitate sequeretur quod corpora caelestia essent causa electionum et actuum humanorum. Et ex hoc sequeretur quod homo naturali instinctu ageretur ad suas actiones, sicut cetera animalia, in quibus non sunt nisi vires animae corporeis organis alligatae, nam illud quod fit in istis inferioribus ex impressione corporum caelestium, naturaliter agitur. Et ita sequeretur quod homo non esset liberi arbitrii, sed haberet actiones determinatas, sicut et ceterae res naturales. Quae manifeste sunt falsa, et conversationi humanae contraria. Sciendum est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas. Nam intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus. Sed voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. Et ideo impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum. Ponere igitur caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam eorum dicebant quod talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater virorum deorumque. Quia ergo constat intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum, impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum.	I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (3). They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect. To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.	Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (111, 2).
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut multiformitas corporalium motuum reducitur sicut in causam in uniformitatem motuum caelestium; ita multiformitas actuum qui sunt ab intellectu et voluntate, reducitur in principium uniforme quod est intellectus et voluntas divina.	Reply to Objection 2. Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will.
IЄ q. 115 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quae sunt motus sensitivi appetitus, ad quas cooperari possunt corpora caelestia, pauci autem sunt sapientes, qui huiusmodi passionibus resistant. Et ideo astrologi ut in pluribus vera possunt praedicere, et maxime in communi. Non autem in speciali, quia nihil prohibet aliquem hominem per liberum arbitrium passionibus resistere. Unde et ipsi astrologi dicunt quod sapiens homo dominatur astris, inquantum scilicet dominatur suis passionibus.	Reply to Objection 3. The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia possint imprimere in ipsos Daemones. Daemones enim secundum certa augmenta lunae aliquos homines vexant, qui et propter hoc lunatici dicuntur; ut patet Matth. IV et XVII. Sed hoc non esset, nisi corporibus caelestibus subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum.	Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matthew 4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, necromantici observant certas constellationes ad invocandos Daemones. Non autem per corpora caelestia invocarentur, si non eis subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum.	Objection 2. Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, corpora caelestia virtuosiora sunt quam corpora inferiora. Sed quibusdam inferioribus corporibus Daemones arcentur, scilicet herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et quibusdam sonis certis ac vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis, ut a Porphyrio dictum Augustinus introducit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo multo magis Daemones subduntur actioni caelestium corporum.	Objection 3. Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Daemones sunt superiores ordine naturae quam corpora caelestia. Agens autem est superius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni corporum caelestium.	On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa Daemones fuit triplex opinio. Prima Peripateticorum, qui posuerunt Daemones non esse; sed ea quae attribuuntur Daemonibus, secundum artem necromanticam, fiunt virtute caelestium corporum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, introducit dictum a Porphyrio, quod fabricantur in terra ab hominibus potestates idoneae siderum variis effectibus exequendis. Sed haec positio est manifeste falsa. Experimento enim scitur multa per Daemones fieri, ad quae nullo modo virtus caelestium corporum sufficeret; puta quod arreptitii loquuntur lingua ignota, quod recitant versus et auctoritates quas nunquam sciverunt, quod necromantici faciunt statuas loqui et moveri, et similia. Ex quibus Platonici moti fuerunt ut ponerent Daemones esse animalia corpore aerea, animo passiva; ut ab Apuleio dictum Augustinus introducit VIII de Civ. Dei. Et haec est secunda opinio, secundum quam dici posset quod Daemones hoc modo subduntur corporibus caelestibus, sicut et de hominibus dictum est. Sed haec opinio ex superioribus patet esse falsa, dicimus enim Daemones esse substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas. Unde patet quod non subduntur actioni caelestium corporum, nec per se nec per accidens, nec directe nec indirecte.	I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things. For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto (4). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (51, 1): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae homines vexant, contingit propter duo. Primo quidem, ad hoc quod infament creaturam Dei, scilicet lunam, ut Hieronymus et Chrysostomus dicunt. Secundo quia, cum non possint operari nisi mediantibus naturalibus virtutibus, ut supra dictum est; in suis operibus considerant corporum aptitudines ad effectus intentos. Manifestum est autem quod cerebrum humidissimum est omnium partium corporis, ut Aristoteles dicit, et ideo maxime subiicitur operationi lunae, quae ex sua proprietate habet movere humorem. In cerebro autem perficiuntur vires animales, et ideo Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae perturbant hominis phantasiam, quando considerant cerebrum ad hoc esse dispositum.	Reply to Objection 1. That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (114, 4, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones advocati in certis constellationibus, propter duo veniunt. Primo quidem, ut homines in hunc errorem inducant, quod credant aliquod numen esse in stellis. Secundo, quia considerant secundum aliquas certas constellationes materiam corporalem magis esse dispositam ad effectus pro quibus advocantur.	Reply to Objection 2. Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.
IЄ q. 115 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, Daemones alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum, animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus signis; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi.	Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia imponant necessitatem iis quae eorum actioni subduntur. Causa enim sufficienti posita, necesse est effectum poni. Sed corpora caelestia sunt sufficiens causa suorum effectuum. Cum igitur corpora caelestia, cum suis motibus et dispositionibus, ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia; videtur quod effectus eorum ex necessitate consequantur.	Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, effectus agentis ex necessitate sequitur in materia, quando virtus agentis tanta fuerit quod possit sibi subiicere totaliter materiam. Sed tota materia inferiorum corporum subiicitur virtuti caelestium corporum, tanquam excellentiori. Ergo ex necessitate effectus caelestium corporum recipitur in materia corporali.	Objection 2. Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, si effectus caelestis corporis non ex necessitate proveniat, hoc est propter aliquam causam impedientem. Sed quamlibet causam corpoream quae impedire posset effectum caelestis corporis, necesse est reduci in aliquod caeleste principium, cum caelestia corpora sint causa omnium quae hic fiunt. Ergo, cum et illud caeleste principium sit necessarium, sequitur quod necesse sit impediri effectum alterius corporis caelestis. Et sic omnia quae hic contingunt, ex necessitate eveniunt.	Objection 3. Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod neque eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum caelestium, velut aquarum et ventorum, inconveniens est multa non evenire. Sic ergo non omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [De Divin. per Somn. ii): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio partim quidem absoluta est, secundum praemissa; partim autem difficultatem habet. Ostensum enim est quod, quamvis ex impressione corporum caelestium fiant aliquae inclinationes in natura corporali, voluntas tamen non ex necessitate sequitur has inclinationes. Et ideo nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit. Sed nullum tale principium invenitur in rebus naturalibus, quod habeat libertatem sequendi vel non sequendi impressiones caelestes. Unde videtur quod in talibus, ad minus, omnia ex necessitate proveniant, secundum antiquam quorundam rationem, qui, supponentes omne quod est causam habere, et quod, posita causa, ex necessitate ponitur effectus, concludebant, quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Quam quidem opinionem repellit Aristoteles in VI Metaphys., secundum duo quae ipsi supponunt. Primo enim, non est verum quod, posita quacumque causa, necesse sit effectum poni. Sunt enim quaedam causae quae ordinantur ad suos effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut in pluribus, quae quandoque deficiunt in minori parte. Sed quia huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens non vitari, quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate contingit. Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per se, habet causam, quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generetur et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem, et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. Et sic patet quod non omnes effectus caelestium corporum sunt ex necessitate.	I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above (4); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends. But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity. Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere possunt in minori parte.	Reply to Objection 1. The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus corporis caelestis non est infinita. Unde requirit determinatam dispositionem in materia ad inducendum suum effectum, et quantum ad distantiam loci, et quantum ad alias conditiones. Et ideo sicut distantia loci impedit effectum caelestis corporis (non enim sol eundem caloris effectum habet in Dacia, quem habet in Aethiopia); ita et grossities materiae, vel frigiditas aut caliditas, aut alia huiusmodi dispositio, impedire potest effectum corporis caelestis.	Reply to Objection 2. The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.
IЄ q. 115 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
IЄ q. 116 pr. Deinde considerandum est de fato. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, an fatum sit. Secundo, in quo sit. Tertio, utrum sit immobile. Quarto, utrum omnia subsint fato.	Question 116. FateIs there such a thing as fate? Where is it? Is it unchangeable? Are all things subject to fate?
IЄ q. 116 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum nihil sit. Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia Epiphaniae, absit a fidelium cordibus ut fatum esse aliquid dicant.	Objection 1. It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."
IЄ q. 116 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae fato aguntur, non sunt improvisa, quia, ut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, fatum a fando dictum intelligimus, idest a loquendo; ut ea fato fieri dicantur, quae ab aliquo determinante sunt ante praelocuta. Quae autem sunt provisa, non sunt fortuita neque casualia. Si igitur res fato aguntur, excludetur casus et fortuna a rebus.	Objection 2. Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.
IЄ q. 116 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra quod non est, non definitur. Sed Boetius, in IV de Consol., definit fatum, dicens quod fatum est inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Ergo fatum aliquid est.	On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order."
IЄ q. 116 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in rebus inferioribus videntur quaedam a fortuna vel casu provenire. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquid, ad inferiores causas relatum, est fortuitum vel casuale, quod tamen, relatum ad causam aliquam superiorem, invenitur esse per se intentum. Sicut si duo servi alicuius domini mittantur ab eo ad eundem locum, uno de altero ignorante; concursus duorum servorum, si ad ipsos servos referatur, casualis est, quia accidit praeter utriusque intentionem; si autem referatur ad dominum, qui hoc praeordinavit, non est casuale, sed per se intentum. Fuerunt igitur aliqui qui huiusmodi casualia et fortuita, quae in his inferioribus accidunt, in nullam superiorem causam reducere voluerunt. Et hi fatum et providentiam negaverunt; ut de Tullio Augustinus recitat in V de Civ. Dei. Quod est contra ea quae superius de providentia dicta sunt. Quidam vero omnia fortuita et casualia quae in istis inferioribus accidunt, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducere voluerunt in superiorem causam, idest in caelestia corpora. Et secundum hos, fatum nihil aliud est quam dispositio siderum in qua quisque conceptus est vel natus. Sed hoc stare non potest, propter duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad res humanas. Quia iam ostensum est quod humani actus non subduntur actioni caelestium corporum, nisi per accidens et indirecte. Causa autem fatalis, cum habeat ordinationem super ea quae fato aguntur, necesse est quod sit directe et per se causa eius quod agitur. Secundo, quantum ad omnia quae per accidens aguntur. Dictum est enim supra quod id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis. Nulla ergo natura per se hoc facere potest, quod intendens fodere sepulcrum, inveniat thesaurum. Manifestum est autem quod corpus caeleste agit per modum naturalis principii, unde et effectus eius in hoc mundo sunt naturales. Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua virtus activa caelestis corporis sit causa eorum quae hic aguntur per accidens, sive a casu sive a fortuna. Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu, alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum. Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere, sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum. Et sic nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum agat; et praecipue intellectum divinum. Nam solus Deus potest voluntatem immutare, ut supra habitum est. Et per consequens ordinatio humanorum actuum, quorum principium est voluntas, soli Deo attribui debet. Sic igitur inquantum omnia quae hic aguntur, divinae providentiae subduntur, tanquam per eam praeordinata et quasi praelocuta, fatum ponere possumus, licet hoc nomine sancti doctores uti recusaverint, propter eos qui ad vim positionis siderum hoc nomen retorquebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Et sic etiam Gregorius fatum esse negat.	I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended. So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about Providence (22, 2). On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (115, 4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said (115, 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance. We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (105, 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate.
IЄ q. 116 a. 1 ad 1 Unde patet solutio ad primum.	Wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
IЄ q. 116 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse fortuita vel casualia per comparationem ad causas proximas, non tamen per comparationem ad divinam providentiam, sic enim nihil temere fit in mundo, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.	Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit in rebus creatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, V de Civ. Dei, quod ipsa Dei voluntas vel potestas fati nomine appellatur. Sed voluntas et potestas Dei non est in creaturis, sed in Deo. Ergo fatum non est in rebus creatis, sed in Deo.	Objection 1. It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, fatum comparatur ad ea quae ex fato aguntur, ut causa; ut ipse modus loquendi ostendit. Sed causa universalis per se eorum quae hic per accidens aguntur, est solus Deus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fatum est in Deo, et non in rebus creatis.	Objection 2. Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above (1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si fatum est in creaturis, aut est substantia, aut accidens, et quodcumque horum detur, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum creaturarum multitudinem. Cum ergo fatum videatur esse unum tantum, videtur quod fatum non sit in creaturis, sed in Deo.	Objection 3. Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod fatum est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens.	On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, divina providentia per causas medias suos effectus exequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in ipso Deo, et sic ipsa ordinatio effectuum vocatur providentia. Secundum vero quod praedicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet rationem fati. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., sive famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinae spiritibus fatum exercetur; seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, sive caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu Daemonum varia solertia, seu aliquibus eorum, seu omnibus, fatalis series texitur, de quibus omnibus per singula in praecedentibus dictum est. Sic ergo est manifestum quod fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus producendos.	I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (22, 3; 103, 6), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (1; 104, 2; 110, 1; 113; 114). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.	Reply to Objection 1. The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.	Reply to Objection 2. Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
IЄ q. 116 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, te tua fata trahunt.	Reply to Objection 3. Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
IЄ q. 116 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit immobile. Dicit enim Boetius, in IV de Consol., uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus; ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae stabilem simplicitatem.	Objection 1. It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence."
IЄ q. 116 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit in II Topic., motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt. Sed fatum est dispositio inhaerens rebus mobilibus, ut Boetius dicit. Ergo fatum est mobile.	Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.
IЄ q. 116 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si fatum est immobile, ea quae subduntur fato, immobiliter et ex necessitate eveniunt. Sed talia maxime videntur esse contingentia, quae fato attribuuntur. Ergo nihil erit contingens in rebus, sed omnia ex necessitate evenient.	Objection 3. Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
IЄ q. 116 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, quod fatum est immobilis dispositio.	On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition.
IЄ q. 116 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsas causas secundas, quae sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo, per relationem ad primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum. Quidam ergo posuerunt ipsam seriem seu dispositionem causarum esse secundum se necessariam, ita quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent; propter hoc, quod quilibet effectus habet causam, et causa posita necesse est effectum poni. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, per ea quae supra dicta sunt. Alii vero e contrario posuerunt fatum esse mobile, etiam secundum quod a divina providentia dependet. Unde Aegyptii dicebant quibusdam sacrificiis fatum posse mutari, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Sed hoc supra exclusum est, quia immobilitati divinae providentiae repugnat. Et ideo dicendum est quod fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est, sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae; secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit. Unde cum Boetius dixisset fati seriem esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, quae cum ab immobilis providentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse necesse est.	I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (115, 6). Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence. We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
IЄ q. 116 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.	From this the answers to the objections are clear.
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius, in IV de Consol., series fati caelum et sidera movet, elementa in se invicem temperat, et alterna format transmutatione; eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes foetuum seminumque renovat progressus; haec actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum connexione constringit. Nihil ergo excipi videtur, quod sub fati serie non contineatur.	Objection 1. It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod fatum aliquid est, secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei refertur. Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnium quae fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Ergo omnia subduntur fato.	Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, fatum, secundum Boetium, est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens. Sed omnes creaturae sunt mutabiles, et solus Deus vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis est fatum.	Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (9, 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant.	On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, quod ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur; quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.	I answer that, As stated above (2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia illa quae ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo mediantibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur. Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei, sicut ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subiicitur voluntati divinae vel potestati, subiiciatur fato, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 2. Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
IЄ q. 116 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis omnes creaturae sint aliquo modo mutabiles, tamen aliquae earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus. Et ideo non subiiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
IЄ q. 117 pr. Postea considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad actionem hominis, qui est compositus ex spirituali et corporali creatura. Et primo considerandum est de actione hominis; secundo, de propagatione hominis ex homine. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unus homo possit docere alium, causando in ipso scientiam. Secundo, utrum homo possit docere Angelum. Tertio, utrum homo per virtutem suae animae possit immutare materiam corporalem. Quarto, utrum anima hominis separata possit movere corpora motu locali.	Question 117. The action of manCan one man teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge? Can man teach an angel? Can man change corporeal matter by the power of his soul? Can the separate soul of man move bodies by local movement?
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit alium docere. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XXIII, nolite vocari Rabbi; ubi dicit Glossa Hieronymi, ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatis. Esse ergo magistrum pertinet proprie ad divinum honorem. Sed docere est proprium magistri. Homo ergo non potest docere, sed hoc est proprium Dei.	Objection 1. It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matthew 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, si homo alium docet, hoc non est nisi inquantum agit per scientiam suam ad causandum scientiam in alio. Sed qualitas per quam aliquis agit ad faciendum sibi simile, est qualitas activa. Ergo sequitur quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sicut et calor.	Objection 2. Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad scientiam requiritur lumen intelligibile, et species rei intellectae. Sed neutrum istorum potest causare unus homo in alio. Ergo unus homo non potest docendo causare scientiam in alio.	Objection 3. Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, doctor nihil agit ad discipulum nisi quod proponit ei quaedam signa, vel vocibus aliquid significando, vel nutibus. Sed proponendo signa non potest aliquis alium docere, causando in eo scientiam. Quia aut proponit signa rerum notarum; aut rerum ignotarum. Si rerum notarum, ille ergo cui signa proponuntur, iam habet scientiam, et eam non acquirit a magistro. Si autem rerum ignotarum, per huiusmodi signa nihil addiscit, sicut si aliquis proponeret alicui Latino verba Graeca, quorum significationem ignoraret, per hoc eum docere non posset. Nullo ergo modo unus homo potest, alium docendo, scientiam in eo causare.	Objection 4. Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. II, in quo positus sum ego praedicator et apostolus, doctor gentium in fide et veritate.	On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Timothy 2:7): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth."
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc, ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad intelligibilem apprehensionem. Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum, et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum diversa phantasmata; falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est. Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet. Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci. Sicut etiam ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte. Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae; quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda. Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars. Secundo attendendum est, quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum, sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum. Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui per inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori, ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., quod omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione. Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam, puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae. Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Et per hunc modum ille qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.	I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (76, 2). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (76, 2). Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (84, 3,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (79, 2; 84, 3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4). We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end. Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge." Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (106, 1; 111, 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans, sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae. Utrumque autem horum est a Deo. Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas; ita de eo dicitur, qui docet hominem scientiam, inquantum lumen vultus eius super nos signatur, per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur.	Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Psalm 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Psalm 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Psalm 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in operando.	Reply to Objection 2. As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit exterius.	Reply to Objection 3. The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.
IЄ q. 117 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.	Reply to Objection 4. The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines possint docere Angelos. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Ephes. III, ut innotescat principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia Dei. Sed Ecclesia est congregatio hominum fidelium. Ergo Angelis per homines aliqua innotescunt.	Objection 1. It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (Ephesians 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Angeli superiores, qui immediate de divinis a Deo illuminantur, inferiores Angelos instruere possunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed aliqui homines immediate de divinis per Dei verbum sunt instructi; sicut maxime patet de apostolis, secundum illud ad Heb. I, novissime, diebus istis, locutus est nobis in filio. Ergo aliqui homines aliquos Angelos docere potuerunt.	Objection 2. Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (116, 1; 112, 3). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles from Hebrews 1:1-2: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, inferiores Angeli a superioribus instruuntur. Sed quidam homines superiores sunt aliquibus Angelis, cum ad supremos ordines Angelorum aliqui homines assumantur, ut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Ergo aliqui inferiores Angeli per aliquos homines de divinis instrui possunt.	Objection 3. Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnes divinae illuminationes perferuntur ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Non ergo Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis.	On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, inferiores Angeli loqui quidem possunt superioribus Angelis, manifestando eis suas cogitationes; sed de rebus divinis superiores ab inferioribus nunquam illuminantur. Manifestum est autem quod eo modo quo inferiores Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam infimis Angelorum. Quod patet per id quod dominus dicit, Matth. XI, inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista; sed qui minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo. Sic igitur de rebus divinis ab hominibus Angeli nunquam illuminantur. Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius Dei est.	Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words (Matthew 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., sic exponit illam apostoli auctoritatem. Praemiserat enim apostolus, mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Ita dico absconditi, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus, per Ecclesiam scilicet, multiformis sapientia Dei. Quasi dicat, ita hoc sacramentum erat absconditum hominibus, ut tamen Ecclesiae caelesti, quae continetur in principibus et potestatibus, hoc sacramentum notum esset a saeculis, non ante saecula, quia ibi primitus Ecclesia fuit, quo post resurrectionem et ista Ecclesia hominum congreganda est. Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod illud quod absconditum est, non tantum in Deo innotescit Angelis, verum etiam hic eis apparet, cum efficitur atque propalatur, ut Augustinus ibidem subdit. Et sic dum per apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis occulta. Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod Hieronymus dicit, quod, apostolis praedicantibus, Angeli aliqua mysteria cognoverunt, quia scilicet per praedicationem apostolorum huiusmodi mysteria explebantur in rebus ipsis, sicut praedicante Paulo convertebantur gentes; de quo apostolus ibi loquitur.	Reply to Objection 1. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places--that is, through the Church." As though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together." It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur. Unde ratio non sequitur.	Reply to Objection 2. The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
IЄ q. 117 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.	Reply to Objection 3. Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per virtutem animae possit corporalem materiam immutare. Dicit enim Gregorius, II Dialog., quod sancti miracula aliquando ex prece faciunt, aliquando ex potestate, sicut Petrus, qui Tabitham mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram mentientes morti increpando tradidit. Sed in operatione miraculorum fit aliqua immutatio materiae corporalis. Ergo homines virtute suae animae possunt materiam corporalem immutare.	Objection 1. It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, super illud ad Gal. III, quis vos fascinavit veritati non obedire? Dicit Glossa quod quidam habent oculos urentes, qui solo aspectu inficiunt alios, et maxime pueros. Sed hoc non esset, nisi virtus animae posset materiam corporalem immutare. Ergo homo per virtutem suae animae potest materiam corporalem immutare.	Objection 2. Further, on these words (Galatians 3:1): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, corpus humanum est nobilius quam alia inferiora corpora. Sed per apprehensionem animae humanae immutatur corpus humanum ad calorem et frigus, ut patet in irascentibus et timentibus; et quandoque etiam haec immutatio pervenit usque ad aegritudinem et mortem. Ergo multo magis anima hominis potest sua virtute materiam corporalem immutare.	Objection 3. Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod materia corporalis soli Deo obedit ad nutum.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma; vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque. Unde et de Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus aliquibus corporibus.	I answer that, As stated above (110, 2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (110, 2) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, non naturae. Quod patet per illud quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, qui filii Dei ex potestate sunt, ut dicit Ioannes, quid mirum si signa facere ex potestate valeant?	Reply to Objection 1. The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says--what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fascinationis causam assignavit Avicenna ex hoc, quod materia corporalis nata est obedire spirituali substantiae magis quam contrariis agentibus in natura. Et ideo quando anima fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, corporalis materia immutatur secundum eam. Et hanc dicit esse causam oculi fascinantis. Sed supra ostensum est quod materia corporalis non obedit substantiae spirituali ad nutum, nisi soli creatori. Et ideo melius dicendum est, quod ex forti imaginatione animae immutantur spiritus corporis coniuncti. Quae quidem immutatio spirituum maxime fit in oculis, ad quos subtiliores spiritus perveniunt. Oculi autem inficiunt aerem continuum usque ad determinatum spatium, per quem modum specula, si fuerint nova et pura, contrahunt quandam impuritatem ex aspectu mulieris menstruatae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de Somn. et Vig. Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum modum praedictum aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.	Reply to Objection 2. Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the "evil eye." But it has been shown above (110, 2) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [De Insomniis ii). Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
IЄ q. 117 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod anima corpori humano unitur ut forma, et appetitus sensitivus, qui obedit aliqualiter rationi, ut supra dictum est, est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et ideo oportet quod ad apprehensionem animae humanae, commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum aliqua operatione corporali. Ad exteriora vero corpora immutanda apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above (81, 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
IЄ q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis separata possit corpora saltem localiter movere. Substantiae enim spirituali naturaliter obedit corpus ad motum localem, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima separata est substantia spiritualis. Ergo suo imperio potest exteriora corpora movere.	Objection 1. It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (110, 5). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.
IЄ q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, in itinerario Clementis dicitur, narrante Niceta ad Petrum, quod Simon magus per magicas artes pueri a se interfecti animam retinebat, per quam magicas operationes efficiebat. Sed hoc esse non potuisset sine aliqua corporum transmutatione, ad minus locali. Ergo anima separata habet virtutem localiter movendi corpora.	Objection 2. Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.
IЄ q. 117 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de anima quod anima non potest movere quodcumque corpus, sed solummodo proprium.	On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
IЄ q. 117 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod, cum anima est corpori unita, non movet corpus nisi vivificatum, unde si aliquod membrum corporis mortificetur, non obedit animae ad motum localem. Manifestum est autem quod ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur. Unde nullum corpus obedit ei ad motum localem, quantum est ex virtute suae naturae, supra quam potest aliquid ei conferri virtute divina.	I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.
IЄ q. 117 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes non determinantur ad aliqua corpora, sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt naturaliter a corporibus absoluti, et ideo diversa corpora eis possunt obedire ad motum. Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus, sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset movere caelum superius. Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.	Reply to Objection 1. There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
IЄ q. 117 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter Daemones simulant se esse animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc credebant. Et ideo credibile est quod Simon magus illudebatur ab aliquo Daemone, qui simulabat se esse animam pueri quem ipse occiderat.	Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
IЄ q. 118 pr. Deinde considerandum est de traductione hominis ex homine. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum anima sensitiva traducatur cum semine. Secundo, utrum anima intellectiva. Tertio, utrum omnes animae fuerint simul creatae.	Question 118. The production of man from man as to the soulIs the sensitive soul transmitted with the semen? Is the intellectual soul thus transmitted? Were all souls created at the same time?
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sensitiva non traducatur cum semine, sed sit per creationem a Deo. Omnis enim substantia perfecta quae non est composita ex materia et forma, si esse incipiat, hoc non est per generationem, sed per creationem, quia nihil generatur nisi ex materia. Sed anima sensitiva est substantia perfecta, alioquin non posset movere corpus, et cum sit forma corporis, non est ex materia et forma composita. Ergo non incipit esse per generationem, sed per creationem.	Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, principium generationis in rebus viventibus est per potentiam generativam; quae, cum numeretur inter vires animae vegetabilis, est infra animam sensitivam. Nihil autem agit ultra suam speciem. Ergo anima sensitiva non potest causari per vim generativam animalis.	Objection 2. Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, generans generat sibi simile, et sic oportet quod forma generati sit actu in causa generationis. Sed anima sensitiva non est actu in semine, nec ipsa nec aliqua pars eius, quia nulla pars animae sensitivae est nisi in aliqua parte corporis; in semine autem non est aliqua corporis particula, quia nulla particula corporis est quae non fiat ex semine, et per virtutem seminis. Ergo anima sensitiva non causatur ex semine.	Objection 3. Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, si in semine est aliquod principium activum animae sensitivae, aut illud principium manet, generato iam animali; aut non manet. Sed manere non potest. Quia vel esset idem cum anima sensitiva animalis generati, et hoc est impossibile, quia sic esset idem generans et generatum, faciens et factum. Vel esset aliquid aliud, et hoc etiam est impossibile, quia supra ostensum est quod in uno animali non est nisi unum principium formale, quod est una anima. Si autem non manet, hoc etiam videtur impossibile, quia sic aliquod agens ageret ad corruptionem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima sensitiva potest generari ex semine.	Objection 4. Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above (76, 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, ita se habet virtus quae est in semine, ad animalia quae ex semine generantur, sicut se habet virtus quae est in elementis mundi, ad animalia quae ex elementis mundi producuntur, sicut quae ex putrefactione generantur. Sed in huiusmodi animalibus animae producuntur ex virtute quae est in elementis; secundum illud Gen. I, producant aquae reptile animae viventis. Ergo et animalium quae generantur ex semine, animae producuntur ex virtute quae est in semine.	On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Genesis 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari. Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem, sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem. Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt. Unde et ipsis compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato, necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis. Quanto autem aliquod agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis distans, sicut quanto aliquod corpus est magis calidum, tanto ad remotius calefactionem producit. Corpora igitur non viventia, quae sunt inferiora naturae ordine, generant quidem sibi simile, non per aliquod medium, sed per seipsa; sicut ignis per seipsum generat ignem. Sed corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad generandum sibi simile et sine medio, et per medium. Sine medio quidem, in opere nutritionis, in quo caro generat carnem, cum medio vero, in actu generationis, quia ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum. Et sicut non refert dicere quod aliquid moveatur ab instrumento, vel a principali agente; ita non refert dicere quod anima generati causetur ab anima generantis, vel a virtute derivata ab ipsa, quae est in semine.	I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (65, 4). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation. But this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (75, 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them. Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed. Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium--in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium--in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic iterare.	Reply to Objection 1. The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (25, 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo virtus generativa plantae generat plantam; virtus vero generativa animalis generat animal. Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto virtus eius generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum.	Reply to Objection 2. The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae generantis, nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute; sicut in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod organum in actu; sed fundatur in ipso spiritu incluso in semine, quod est spumosum, ut attestatur eius albedo. In quo etiam spiritu est quidam calor ex virtute caelestium corporum, quorum etiam virtute agentia inferiora agunt ad speciem, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in huiusmodi spiritu concurrit virtus animae cum virtute caelesti, dicitur quod homo generat hominem, et sol. Calidum autem elementare se habet instrumentaliter ad virtutem animae, sicut etiam ad virtutem nutritivam, ut dicitur in II de anima.	Reply to Objection 3. This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (115, 3, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
IЄ q. 118 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in animalibus perfectis, quae generantur ex coitu, virtus activa est in semine maris, secundum philosophum in libro de Generat. Animal.; materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus. Cum autem incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc iam actu operatur. Huiusmodi igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quae est in semine maris, quousque perducatur in actum animae sensitivae, non ita quod ipsamet vis quae erat in semine, fiat anima sensitiva; quia sic idem esset generans et generatum; et hoc magis esset simile nutritioni et augmento, quam generationi, ut philosophus dicit. Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine, producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem eius principalem, tunc iam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit operari ad complementum proprii corporis, per modum nutritionis et augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in semine, esse desinit, dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat. Nec hoc est inconveniens, quia vis ista non est principale agens, sed instrumentale; motio autem instrumenti cessat, effectu iam producto in esse.	Reply to Objection 4. In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva causetur ex semine. Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, cunctae animae quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob, sexaginta sex. Sed nihil egreditur de femore hominis, nisi inquantum causatur ex semine. Ergo anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.	Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (Genesis 46:26): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut supra ostensum est, in homine est una et eadem anima secundum substantiam, intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva. Sed anima sensitiva in homine generatur ex semine, sicut in aliis animalibus, unde et philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. Animal., quod non simul fit animal et homo, sed prius fit animal habens animam sensitivam. Ergo et anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.	Objection 2. Further, as shown above (76, 3), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, unum et idem agens, est cuius actio terminatur ad formam, et materiam, alioquin ex forma et materia non fieret unum simpliciter. Sed anima intellectiva est forma corporis humani, quod formatur per virtutem seminis. Ergo et anima intellectiva per virtutem seminis causatur.	Objection 3. Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Sed species humana constituitur per animam rationalem. Ergo anima rationalis est a generante.	Objection 4. Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, inconveniens est dicere quod Deus cooperetur peccantibus. Sed si animae rationales crearentur a Deo, Deus interdum cooperaretur adulteris, de quorum illicito coitu proles interdum generatur. Non ergo animae rationales creantur a Deo.	Objection 5. Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod animae rationales non seminantur per coitum.	On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition."
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia, extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum. Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii. Similiter etiam quia virtus quae est in semine agit in virtute animae generantis, secundum quod anima generantis est actus corporis, utens ipso corpore in sua operatione. In operatione autem intellectus non communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, relinquitur intellectus solus de foris advenire. Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens, ut supra habitum est, et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri. Et cum sit immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non subsistentem; et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine.	I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle. Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without." Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (75, 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in auctoritate illa ponitur per synecdochen pars pro toto, idest anima pro toto homine.	Reply to Objection 1. In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitae quae apparent in embryone, non sunt ab anima eius, sed ab anima matris; vel a virtute formativa quae est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est, opera enim vitae non possunt esse a principio extrinseco, sicut sentire, nutriri et augeri. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima praeexistit in embryone a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum autem sensitiva, et tandem intellectiva. Dicunt ergo quidam quod supra animam vegetabilem quae primo inerat, supervenit alia anima, quae est sensitiva; et supra illam iterum alia, quae est intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animae, quarum una est in potentia ad aliam. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt quod illa eadem anima quae primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum, per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, perducitur ad hoc quod fiat etiam sensitiva; et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei deforis illustrantis. Et propter hoc dicit philosophus quod intellectus venit ab extrinseco. Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio maioris perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut additio unitatis facit aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens de imperfecto ad perfectum; sicut accidit in alteratione. Tertio, quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit generatio simpliciter, quia subiectum eius esset ens actu. Si enim a principio in materia prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur; erit semper additio perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis praecedentis. Quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut id quod causatur ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens, et ita oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma praeexistente, quae non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas in corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quaedam perfectio animae praeexistentis, et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima intellectiva corrumpatur, corrupto corpore; quod est impossibile. Est autem et alius modus dicendi, secundum eos qui ponunt unum intellectum in omnibus. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo dicendum est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius. Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus. Et hoc ad sensum apparet in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod anima intellectiva creatur a Deo in fine generationis humanae, quae simul est et sensitiva et nutritiva, corruptis formis praeexistentibus.	Reply to Objection 2. Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (76, 3). Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted. There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved above (76, 2). We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa locum habet in diversis agentibus non ordinatis ad invicem. Sed si sint multa agentia ordinata, nihil prohibet virtutem superioris agentis pertingere ad ultimam formam; virtutes autem inferiorum agentium pertingere solum ad aliquam materiae dispositionem; sicut virtus seminis disponit materiam, virtus autem animae dat formam, in generatione animalis. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod tota natura corporalis agit ut instrumentum spiritualis virtutis; et praecipue Dei. Et ideo nihil prohibet quin formatio corporis sit ab aliqua virtute corporali, anima autem intellectiva sit a solo Deo.	Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above (105, 5; 110, 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod homo generat sibi simile, inquantum per virtutem seminis eius disponitur materia ad susceptionem talis formae.	Reply to Objection 4. Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
IЄ q. 118 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod in actione adulterorum, illud quod est naturae, bonum est, et huic cooperatur Deus. Quod vero est inordinatae voluptatis, malum est, et huic Deus non cooperatur.	Reply to Objection 5. In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not concur.
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae humanae fuerint creatae simul a principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen. II, requievit Deus ab omni opere quod patrarat. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas animas crearet. Ergo omnes animae sunt simul creatae.	Objection 1. It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (Genesis 2:2): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time.
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si igitur animae simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie innumerabiles spirituales substantiae perfectioni universi adderentur, et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum. Quod est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. II, Deum omne opus suum complesse.	Objection 2. Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Genesis 2:2, where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, finis rei respondet eius principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet, destructo corpore. Ergo incoepit esse ante corpus.	Objection 3. Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body.
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod simul anima creatur cum corpore.	On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body."
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod animae intellectivae accidat uniri corpori, ponentes eam esse eiusdem conditionis cum substantiis spiritualibus quae corpori non uniuntur. Et ideo posuerunt animas hominum simul a principio cum Angelis creatas. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Primo quidem, quantum ad radicem. Si enim accidentaliter conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum Angelis, ipse diversus modus intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad operationem sensitivae partis. Quod de Angelo dici non potest. Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab his quae sunt praeter naturam, non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore. Si vero aliquis dicat quod non est naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sint corporibus unitae. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex eius voluntate; aut ex alia causa. Si ex eius voluntate, videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec voluntas irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri, si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones caeli excedens. Tertio quia videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur, cum ad hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae advenientis, et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter eius naturam; oportet quod hoc sit ex causa violentiam inferente, et sic erit ei poenale et triste. Quod est secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas incorporari propter poenam peccati. Unde cum haec omnia sint inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est quod animae non sunt creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus infunduntur.	I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (75, 4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (55, 2; 85, 1): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (84, 6,7; 85, 1). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel. Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body. But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur--to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them.
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur cessasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni opere, cum dicatur Ioan. V, pater meus usque modo operatur; sed a novis rerum generibus et speciebus condendis, quae in operibus primis non aliquo modo praeextiterint. Sic enim animae quae nunc creantur, praeextiterunt secundum similitudinem speciei in primis operibus, in quibus anima Adae creata fuit.	Reply to Objection 1. God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (John 5:17): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum individuorum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad numerum specierum.	Reply to Objection 2. Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species.
IЄ q. 118 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per corporis corruptionem, quae consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera, quia, sicut scriptum est Sap. I, Deus mortem non fecit, sed impii manibus et verbis accersierunt eam.	Reply to Objection 3. That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wisdom 1:13-16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
IЄ q. 119 pr. Deinde considerandum est de propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae. Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae generationis principium, sit de superfluo alimenti.	Question 119. The propagation of man as to the bodyIs any part of the food changed into true human nature? Is the semen, which is the principle of human generation, produced from the surplus food?
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, omne quod in os intrat, in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur. Sed quod emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit.	Objection 1. It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Matthew 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem, et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit. Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam, non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non transit in veritatem humanae naturae.	Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae.	Objection 3. Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, si alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri.	Objection 4. Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, si alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae naturae.	Objection 5. Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., alimenta carnis corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam migrant. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse. Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. Sunt autem quaedam, quorum formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita quod quidquid aliud praeter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Sed illa materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. Sed haec positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium, omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiae, licet non secundum speciem formae. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem; nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales, esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. Unde alii dixerunt quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam, requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec opinio iudicat de materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit aliqua materia formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Et ideo, secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de anima, quod alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro.	I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body. Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature. But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire. But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible. Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (118, 1). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food. Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit.	Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"--because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod, sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et lapide, ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud secundum materiam. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius substituitur.	Reply to Objection 2. By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in matter"--for instance, wood or stone--"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains. It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis, et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus speciei in radice, quae non tollitur.	Reply to Objection 3. The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.	Reply to Objection 4. Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
IЄ q. 119 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I de Generat. quando aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari, quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur, semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem naturalem consumitur.	Reply to Objection 5. As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod semen non sit de superfluo alimenti, sed de substantia generantis. Dicit enim Damascenus quod generatio est opus naturae ex substantia generantis producens quod generatur. Sed id quod generatur, generatur ex semine. Ergo semen est de substantia generantis.	Objection 1. It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum hoc filius assimilatur patri, quod ab eo aliquid accipit. Sed si semen ex quo aliquid generatur, sit de superfluo alimenti; nihil acciperet aliquis ab avo et praecedentibus, in quibus hoc alimentum nullo modo fuit. Ergo non assimilaretur aliquis avo et praecedentibus, magis quam aliis hominibus.	Objection 2. Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, alimentum hominis generantis quandoque est ex carnibus bovis, vel porci, et aliorum huiusmodi. Si igitur semen esset de superfluo alimenti, homo generatus ex semine maiorem affinitatem haberet cum bove et porco, quam cum patre et aliis consanguineis.	Objection 3. Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam non solum secundum seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum corpulentam substantiam. Hoc autem non esset, si semen esset ex superfluo alimenti. Ergo semen non est superfluo alimenti.	Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod semen est superfluum alimenti.	On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio aliqualiter dependet ex praemissis. Si enim in natura humana est virtus ad communicandum suam formam materiae alienae non solum in alio, sed etiam in ipso; manifestum est quod alimentum, quod est in principio dissimile, in fine fit simile per formam communicatam. Est autem naturalis ordo ut aliquid gradatim de potentia reducatur in actum, et ideo in his quae generantur, invenimus quod primo unumquodque est imperfectum, et postea perficitur. Manifestum est autem quod commune se habet ad proprium et determinatum, ut imperfectum ad perfectum, et ideo videmus quod in generatione animalis prius generatur animal, quam homo vel equus. Sic igitur et ipsum alimentum primo quidem accipit quandam virtutem communem respectu omnium partium corporis, et in fine determinatur ad hanc partem vel ad illam. Non autem est possibile quod accipiatur pro semine id quod iam conversum est in substantiam membrorum, per quandam resolutionem. Quia illud resolutum, si non retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc iam esset recedens a natura generantis, quasi in via corruptionis existens; et sic non haberet virtutem convertendi aliud in similem naturam. Si vero retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc, cum esset contractum ad determinatam partem, non haberet virtutem movendi ad naturam totius, sed solum ad naturam partis. Nisi forte quis dicat quod esset resolutum ab omnibus partibus corporis, et quod retineat naturam omnium partium. Et sic semen esset quasi quoddam parvum animal in actu; et generatio animalis ex animali non esset nisi per divisionem, sicut lutum generatur ex luto, et sicut accidit in animalibus quae decisa vivunt. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Relinquitur ergo quod semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis, ut supra dictum est. Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute generativa ut semen. Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem causam.	I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above (1; 118, 1). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part. Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is inadmissible. It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (1; 108, 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius.	Reply to Objection 1. Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre.	Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 ad 3 Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium. Nam affinitas non attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae.	In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
IЄ q. 119 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut corpulenta eius substantia, sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis. Sed Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem virilis seminis, sed operatione spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus decebat eum, qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. Amen.	Reply to Objection 4. These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man.

Difference between revisions of "Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-115-119"

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