Changes

This is the first time on the Web for Ockham's commentary on Aristotle's <i>Perihermaneias</i> (<i>De Interpretatione</i>, <i>On Exposition</i>).  The Latin (section (book I, sections 2 to 12) is transcribed from the Latin edition of A. Gambatese and S. Brown, the translation into English is mine (also a first, I think – it is ironic that most of Ockham's work has never been translated into his own native language – a version of which he would have certainly spoken, being alive when Chaucer was born in 1345).

This is the first time on the Web for Ockham's commentary on Aristotle's <i>Perihermaneias</i> (<i>De Interpretatione</i>, <i>On Exposition</i>).  The Latin (section (book I, sections 2 to 12) is transcribed from the Latin edition of A. Gambatese and S. Brown, the translation into English is mine (also a first, I think – it is ironic that most of Ockham's work has never been translated into his own native language – a version of which he would have certainly spoken, being alive when Chaucer was born in 1345).

This section of the commentary is interesting for its extended discussion of 'mental language'.  This is the idea that there exists in the mind (or 'in the soul') a language of conceptual terms, corresponding to the language of written and spoken terms.  Conceptual terms are the 'mental words' that the blessed Augustine (<i>De Trinitate</i> XV), says do not belong to any language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be spoken outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as if signs subordinated to them.

This section of the commentary is interesting for its extended discussion of 'mental language'.  This is the idea that there exists in the mind (or 'in the soul') a language of conceptual terms, corresponding to the language of written and spoken terms.  Conceptual terms are the 'mental words' that the blessed Augustine (<i>De Trinitate</i> XV), says do not belong to any language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be spoken outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as if signs subordinated to them.

Mental terms signify the same things as spoken and written ones.  Thus, the mental term <i>dog</i> signifies a dog, just like the written term 'dog'.  But the mental term signifies a dog naturally, primarily, and without any need for agreement or convention, whereas the written term signifies it by convention, and secondarily.  The concept signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies only according to voluntary imposition.

Mental terms signify the same things as spoken and written ones.  Thus, the mental term <i>dog</i> signifies a dog, just like the written term 'dog'.  But the mental term signifies a dog naturally, primarily, and without any need for agreement or convention, whereas the written term signifies it by convention, and secondarily.  The concept signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies only according to voluntary imposition.

Ockham discusses this idea in much-quoted sections of the <i>Summa Logicae</i>,  

 

also available in the Logic Museum <a href = "ockhamlogicalform.htm">here</a>.

Ockham discusses this idea in much-quoted sections of the <i>Summa Logicae</i>, also available in the Logic Museum <a href = "ockhamlogicalform.htm">here</a>.   But he leaves the question of what these mental terms might be.  Here, he gives an extended treatment of the question, although it is one which, he says, belongs to metaphysics rather than logic. In <a href = "#I2">section 2</a> ('on the order of utterances and of concepts in signifying') Ockham discusses the 'order of signifying' of spoken terms and concepts in the mind, a question which much occupied the minds of medieval philosophers. Is it words or concepts which primarily signify?  He argues that it is primarily a concept that signifies a thing.  A word,  by contrast, primarily signifies a concept, but secondarily (via the concept) signifies a thing.  Thus if there were to be a change in what the concept signified, this would immediately result in a change in what the word signified, without any new imposition or institution to established the meaning of the word.  This is clear, he says,if we consider the relation between written words and spoken words.  If we decided that the spoken word 'man' were to signify whiteness, the written word 'man' would immediately signify whiteness.  

But he leaves the question of what these mental terms might be.  Here, he gives an extended treatment of the question, although it is one which, he says, belongs to metaphysics rather than logic.

 

In <a href = "#I2">section 2</a> ('on the order of utterances and of concepts in signifying') Ockham discusses the 'order of signifying' of spoken terms and concepts in the mind,  

a question which much occupied the minds of medieval philosophers. Is it words or concepts which primarily signify?  He argues that it is primarily a concept that signifies a thing.  A word,  by contrast, primarily signifies a concept, but secondarily (via the concept) signifies a thing.  Thus if there were to be a change in what the concept signified, this would immediately result in a change in what the word signified, without any new imposition or institution to established the meaning of the word.   

This is clear, he says,if we consider the relation between written words and spoken words.  If we decided that the spoken word 'man' were to signify whiteness, the written word 'man' would immediately signify whiteness.

In the short <a href = "#I3">section 3</a>  ('what is an affection of the soul, or concept?'), Ockham introduces the subject which occupies much of what is to come, namely the nature of the 'affection of the soul', the concept which spoken terms primarily signify.  He says it is for the metaphyician, not the logician, to decide what sort of thing this affection may be, i.e whether it is some thing external to the soul, or something really existing in the soul, or something made up, existing only in the soul objectively.  Nonetheless, he cannot forbear from given some the opinions of others (together with a few of his own opinions) on the subject.

In the short <a href = "#I3">section 3</a>  ('what is an affection of the soul, or concept?'), Ockham introduces the subject which occupies much of what is to come, namely the nature of the 'affection of the soul', the concept which spoken terms primarily signify.  He says it is for the metaphyician, not the logician, to decide what sort of thing this affection may be, i.e whether it is some thing external to the soul, or something really existing in the soul, or something made up, existing only in the soul objectively.  Nonetheless, he cannot forbear from given some the opinions of others (together with a few of his own opinions) on the subject.

In <a href = "#I4">section 4</a>  ('is an affection a quality of the soul distinct from the act of understanding?') he considers the opinion that an 'affection of the soul', is some quality of the soul, distinct in reality from the act of understanding, taking the act of understanding, itself as an object. This quality is a true likeness of the thing outside, on account of which it represents the thing itself outside, and stands for it by its nature, just as an utterance denotes things by institution.

In <a href = "#I4">section 4</a>  ('is an affection a quality of the soul distinct from the act of understanding?') he considers the opinion that an 'affection of the soul', is some quality of the soul, distinct in reality from the act of understanding, taking the act of understanding, itself as an object. This quality is a true likeness of the thing outside, on account of which it represents the thing itself outside, and stands for it by its nature, just as an utterance denotes things by institution.

In <a href = "#I5">section 5</a>  ('an irrational opinion: an affection is a species of thing')  

 

he considers the opinion that this affection of the soul is something that can be subject or a predicate,  

In <a href = "#I5">section 5</a>  ('an irrational opinion: an affection is a species of thing') he considers the opinion that this affection of the soul is something that can be subject or a predicate, from which a proposition in the mind is composed, and which corresponds to a proposition in an utterance, and that this affection is a species of thing which naturally represents a thing, and so can naturally denote the thing in a proposition. He says that this opinion seems to him to be more irrational than the first, because such a species is not to be supposed on account of [its] superfluity (<i>Talis species non est ponenda propter superfluitatem</i> is one of the famous formulations of 'Ockham's Razor', discussed by Thorburn in a Logic Museum page <a href = "../latin/mythofockham.htm">here</a>.   He objects that, according to Aristotle there is nothing in the soul that is really distinct from the soul.  Also, if this were so, then such affections would remain in the soul, with the soul itself thinking nothing, and there would be propositions in the soul when nothing actually was thought.

from which a proposition in the mind is composed, and which corresponds to a proposition in an utterance,  

 

and that this affection is a species of thing which naturally represents a thing,  

In <a href = "#I6">section 6</a>  ('a more probable opinion among opinions supposing that concepts are qualities: an affection of the soul is the act of understanding, itself') he considers the opinion that an affection of the soul is the act of understanding, itself.  He thinks is the most probable of all the opinions which propose that such affections are really in the soul. He first gives the view in a way that makes it seem probable, which is that one who has the singular thought expressed by 'Socrates runs' comprehends that the person, Socrates himself, is running.  Thus an act of understanding, by its nature and without any imposition, denotes the very thing of which it is [an understanding].  General thoughts, such as expressed by 'a man runs', involve an understanding which is not true of one thing more than another, i.e. not of Socrates more than of Plato.  And similarly, for 'an animal runs', there would be an act of understanding by which it would be no more understood this animal, than that animal, and so on.  

and so can naturally denote the thing in a proposition.

 

He says that this opinion seems to him to be more irrational than the first, because such a species is not to be supposed on account of [its] superfluity (<i>Talis species non est ponenda propter superfluitatem</i> is one of the famous formulations of 'Ockham's Razor',  

But this view faces certain difficulties.  Is there something understood by the the thought corresponding to the word 'man'?  Either something or nothing.  But we cannot say nothing, for the same reason it is impossible for there to be vision, and nothing to be seen, or for there to be loving, and nothing to be loved.  It is likewise impossible for their to be thought, and nothing thought of. But if the thought has something, this is either something in the soul or something outside the soul.   If outside the soul, and it is not a universal, for there is no such thing.   Therefore it is a singular thing; but this cannot be not more one thing than another (i.e. not more Plato than Socrates, or any other man) therefore everything.   Thus, when I understand 'man' or grasp the proposition 'a man is an animal', I understand every man, and think about many men who I will never see, or whom have I ever thought, which seems an absurdity.  (Reminding us perhaps of <a href ="..\hypothetical\hypothetical.htm">Frege's remark</a> that if I utter a sentence with the grammatical subject 'all men', I do not wish to say something about 'some Central African chief' wholly unknown to me).

discussed by Thorburn in a Logic Museum page <a href = "../latin/mythofockham.htm">here</a>.

 

He objects that, according to Aristotle there is nothing in the soul that is really distinct from the soul.  Also, if this were so, then such affections would remain in the soul, with the soul itself thinking nothing, and there would be propositions in the soul when nothing actually was thought.

Ockham addresses these problems, together with some other difficult questions, including whether a proposition in the mind that corresponds to 'every man is an animal' is complex in the same way that the spoken proposition is complex, and whether we can distinguish the mental propositions corresponding to 'every animal is a white thing' from the one corresponding to 'every white thing is an animal'  

In <a href = "#I6">section 6</a>  ('a more probable opinion among opinions supposing that concepts are qualities:  

 

an affection of the soul is the act of understanding, itself')  

In <a href = "#I7">section 7</a>  ('A probable opinion: affections of the soul are effigies or fictions') Ockham discusses a view he seems to favour.  An intention of the soul, or a concept or affection of the soul is nothing other than a predicable or 'subjectible' in a proposition in the mind, to which there corresponds a predicable or subjectible in utterance, and, generally, affections of the soul, whether intentions of the soul or concepts, are propositions in the mind, or syllogisms, or parts of them. These mental terms and propositions are 'effigies' or 'fictions'.  They are not true qualities of the mind, and are not real beings existing subjectively in it, but they are certain things thought by the mind whose being is nothing other than being thought.  They exist in the sense that a building designed by an architect really exists, which exists in virtue of being designed or made-up, and so does not exist in reality. This made-up thing can also be called an 'intention', because it is not real, and has intentional being, i.e. being thought of in the soul.

he considers the opinion that an affection of the soul is the act of understanding, itself.  He thinks is the most probable of all the opinions which propose that such affections are really in the soul.

 

He first gives the view in a way that makes it seem probable, which is that one who has the singular thought expressed by 'Socrates runs' comprehends that the person, Socrates himself, is running.  Thus an act of understanding, by its nature and without any imposition, denotes the very thing of which it is [an understanding].  General thoughts, such as expressed by 'a man runs', involve an understanding which is not true of one thing more than another, i.e. not of Socrates more than of Plato.  And similarly, for 'an animal runs', there would be an act of understanding by which it would be no more understood this animal, than that animal, and so on.

This view is not entirely clear.  If a thing has being by being thought, is this not a kind of being?  But what kind of being?  Ockham himself notes the difficulty of supposing that anything can be understood by us, which does not exist in reality, nor any part of it, and which is neither a substance nor a property of anything.  

But this view faces certain difficulties.  Is there something understood by the the thought corresponding to the word 'man'?  Either something or nothing.  But we cannot say nothing, for the same reason it is impossible for there to be vision, and nothing to be seen, or for there to be loving, and nothing to be loved.  It is likewise impossible for their to be thought, and nothing thought of. But if the thought has something, this is either something in the soul or something outside the soul.

 

If outside the soul, and it is not a universal, for there is no such thing.

Therefore it is a singular thing; but this cannot be not more one thing than another (i.e. not more Plato than Socrates, or any other man) therefore everything.

Thus, when I understand 'man' or grasp the proposition 'a man is an animal',  

I understand every man, and think about many men who I will never see, or whom have I ever thought,  

which seems an absurdity.  (Reminding us perhaps of <a href ="..\hypothetical\hypothetical.htm">Frege's remark</a> that if I utter a sentence with the grammatical subject  

'all men', I do not wish to say something about 'some Central African chief' wholly unknown to me).

Ockham addresses these problems, together with some other difficult questions,  

including whether a proposition in the mind that corresponds to 'every man is an animal' is complex in the same way that the spoken proposition is complex, and whether we can distinguish the mental propositions corresponding to 'every animal is a white thing' from the one corresponding to 'every white thing is an animal'

In <a href = "#I7">section 7</a>  ('A probable opinion: affections of the soul are effigies or fictions')  

Ockham discusses a view he seems to favour.  An intention of the soul,  

or a concept or affection of the soul is nothing other than a predicable or 'subjectible' in a proposition in the mind,  

to which there corresponds a predicable or subjectible in utterance,  

and, generally, affections of the soul,  

whether intentions of the soul or concepts, are propositions in the mind, or syllogisms, or parts of them.

These mental terms and propositions are 'effigies' or 'fictions'.  They are not true qualities of the mind, and are not real beings existing subjectively in it, but they are certain things thought by the mind whose being is nothing other than being thought.  They exist in the sense that a building designed by an architect really exists, which exists in virtue of being designed or made-up, and so does not exist in reality. This made-up thing can also be called an 'intention', because it is not real, and has intentional being, i.e. being thought of in the soul.

This view is not entirely clear.  If a thing has being by being thought, is this not a kind of being?  But what kind of being?  Ockham himself notes the difficulty of supposing that anything can be understood by us, which does not exist in reality, nor any part of it, and which is neither a substance nor a property of anything.

In <a href = "#I8">sections 8</a>  to 10 ('A threefold opinion on the quiddity of affections, propositions, syllogisms and universals') he considers three views, of which the first is an absurd one: that 'affections of the soul are things outside, conceived'.

In <a href = "#I8">sections 8</a>  to 10 ('A threefold opinion on the quiddity of affections, propositions, syllogisms and universals') he considers three views, of which the first is an absurd one: that 'affections of the soul are things outside, conceived'.

(1) The first view turns out to be the one which Ockham is famous in his opposition to, namely, of the real existence of universals: that a thing outside that is conceived or understood is an affection of the soul, in that way by which some suppose that beyond singular things there are universal things, and that singular things conceived are subjects in singular propositions, and universal things conceived are parts of a universal proposition.   

(1) The first view turns out to be the one which Ockham is famous in his opposition to, namely, of the real existence of universals: that a thing outside that is conceived or understood is an affection of the soul, in that way by which some suppose that beyond singular things there are universal things, and that singular things conceived are subjects in singular propositions, and universal things conceived are parts of a universal proposition.   

He spends little time on refuting it (presumably considering that his other writings are refutation enough).  He dismisses it, saying that, as far as it supposes there are some things outside, beyond singulars, existing in them, it is to be deemed altogether absurd and destructive of the whole philosophy of Aristotle, and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy, and reproved by Aristotle in VII <i>Metaphyics</i>, and that those holding it are unready for science.

He spends little time on refuting it (presumably considering that his other writings are refutation enough).  He dismisses it, saying that, as far as it supposes there are some things outside, beyond singulars, existing in them, it is to be deemed altogether absurd and destructive of the whole philosophy of Aristotle, and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy, and reproved by Aristotle in VII <i>Metaphyics</i>, and that those holding it are unready for science.

(2) In <a href = "#I9">section 9</a> ('Affections of the soul are qualities subjectively existing in the mind'), he considers the second view: that affections of the soul are certain qualities of the mind, which actually exist there just as whiteness exists in a wall, or coldness in water.  This is apparently defended by Averroes in his commentary on book V of the <i>Metaphysics</i>.   

(2) In <a href = "#I9">section 9</a> ('Affections of the soul are qualities subjectively existing in the mind'), he considers the second view: that affections of the soul are certain qualities of the mind, which actually exist there just as whiteness exists in a wall, or coldness in water.  This is apparently defended by Averroes in his commentary on book V of the <i>Metaphysics</i>.   

There are difficulties with this view. Figments such as the chimaera, the goat-stag are imaginable, yet do not exist in reality.  Similarly, everyone has tried in themselves to imagine castles and mountains of gold and things of that sort, which do not have, and cannot have any real being.  Similarly, a house designed by a builder has no real being before it has actually been built.  Furthermore, being outside the mind is divided into Aristotle's ten categories.  Into what category does being in the mind fall into?  If it is a quality of the mind, then it is a quality, and thus falls under the ten categories, and then it is not distinguished from being outside the mind, but is itself such a being.

There are difficulties with this view. Figments such as the chimaera, the goat-stag are imaginable, yet do not exist in reality.  Similarly, everyone has tried in themselves to imagine castles and mountains of gold and things of that sort, which do not have, and cannot have any real being.  Similarly, a house designed by a builder has no real being before it has actually been built.  Furthermore, being outside the mind is divided into Aristotle's ten categories.  Into what category does being in the mind fall into?  If it is a quality of the mind, then it is a quality, and thus falls under the ten categories, and then it is not distinguished from being outside the mind, but is itself such a being.

Replying on behalf of those who say it is a real being, Ockham argues that 'a chimaera exists in reality' has distinct meanings according to whether 'chimaera' denotes personally, or materially or simply.  If it denotes personally (i.e. if it is meant to denote a chimaera itself) it is false.  But if it denotes materially (i.e. if it stands for the word 'chimaera') or simply (it stands for the concept of a chimera), it is true, for the word 'chimaera', and the concept <i>chimaera</i> both exist in reality.  Similarly the proposition 'a chimaera is understood' is false, if 'chimaera' is meant to stand for a chimaera, but true, if it stands either for the word itself, or for the concept of a chimaera.  (An argument he repeats in Summa Logicae II.72).

Replying on behalf of those who say it is a real being, Ockham argues that 'a chimaera exists in reality' has distinct meanings according to whether 'chimaera' denotes personally, or materially or simply.  If it denotes personally (i.e. if it is meant to denote a chimaera itself) it is false.  But if it denotes materially (i.e. if it stands for the word 'chimaera') or simply (it stands for the concept of a chimera), it is true, for the word 'chimaera', and the concept <i>chimaera</i> both exist in reality.  Similarly the proposition 'a chimaera is understood' is false, if 'chimaera' is meant to stand for a chimaera, but true, if it stands either for the word itself, or for the concept of a chimaera.  (An argument he repeats in Summa Logicae II.72).

And when someone invents something, he invents in the sense that he spins out such and such acts of understanding,  

 

the same way someone lying invents many things, by uttering many lies, 'and yet there is nothing altogether except an utterances, or utterances, and yet he is said to invent, because he says something by which it is implied it is otherwise than it is'.  To the argument that things are divided into the ten categories, he replies that signs are contained under one category, just as all utterances are contained under the category of quality, and so beings in the mind are contained under the category of quality.

And when someone invents something, he invents in the sense that he spins out such and such acts of understanding, the same way someone lying invents many things, by uttering many lies, 'and yet there is nothing altogether except an utterances, or utterances, and yet he is said to invent, because he says something by which it is implied it is otherwise than it is'.  To the argument that things are divided into the ten categories, he replies that signs are contained under one category, just as all utterances are contained under the category of quality, and so beings in the mind are contained under the category of quality.

 

Thus, he argues, it can reasonably be held that every proposition in the mind which is not composed from signs instituted at pleasure is composed from real qualities of the mind, or is some quality of the mind equivalent to such a composite.

Thus, he argues, it can reasonably be held that every proposition in the mind which is not composed from signs instituted at pleasure is composed from real qualities of the mind, or is some quality of the mind equivalent to such a composite.

(3) In <a href = "#I10">section 10</a> ('Syllogisms and universals are fictions, having only objective existence in the soul') he discusses the view that affections of the soul, also propositions and syllogisms and universals are nothing but certain fictions, having only 'objective existence', i.e. a being-thought-about, nowhere really existing, which are fictions in the sense that they are not real beings.  This is similar to the view he has considered in section 7 above.   

(3) In <a href = "#I10">section 10</a> ('Syllogisms and universals are fictions, having only objective existence in the soul') he discusses the view that affections of the soul, also propositions and syllogisms and universals are nothing but certain fictions, having only 'objective existence', i.e. a being-thought-about, nowhere really existing, which are fictions in the sense that they are not real beings.  This is similar to the view he has considered in section 7 above.   

Such a fiction has intentional being.  It is more to be distinguished from things in external reality, than any such things are distinguished from one another, yet it also is more assimilated to the thing it represents, than any other external thing, for if it could be really produced as it was in imagination, it would truly be similar in reality to a thing outside.   

Such a fiction has intentional being.  It is more to be distinguished from things in external reality, than any such things are distinguished from one another, yet it also is more assimilated to the thing it represents, than any other external thing, for if it could be really produced as it was in imagination, it would truly be similar in reality to a thing outside.   

In <a href = "#I11">section 11</a>  ('The difference between spoken utterances and writings, and affections of the soul'), he returns to Aristotle's text (16ª 6-9) where Aristotle makes a distinction between utterances and written signs on the one hand, and the affections of the soul on the other, saying that just as written letters are not the same among all men (as with Greek, Hebrew and Latin script), so spoken words are not the same eveywhere, because there is a different language [<i>idioma</i>] for the Greeks, the Latins, the Hebrews and the barbarians.

In <a href = "#I11">section 11</a>  ('The difference between spoken utterances and writings, and affections of the soul'), he returns to Aristotle's text (16ª 6-9) where Aristotle makes a distinction between utterances and written signs on the one hand, and the affections of the soul on the other, saying that just as written letters are not the same among all men (as with Greek, Hebrew and Latin script), so spoken words are not the same eveywhere, because there is a different language [<i>idioma</i>] for the Greeks, the Latins, the Hebrews and the barbarians.

However, affections of the soul which spoken and written words primarily signify are the same for all men.  (I.e. the English word 'dog' is different from the French word 'chien' and the Latin word 'canis'.  But the mental concept or 'affection' that these different words signify is the same for all).  Ockham alludes to a passage in <i>De Anima</i> where this is discussed in more detail.  However, this passage has never been found.

However, affections of the soul which spoken and written words primarily signify are the same for all men.  (I.e. the English word 'dog' is different from the French word 'chien' and the Latin word 'canis'.  But the mental concept or 'affection' that these different words signify is the same for all).  Ockham alludes to a passage in <i>De Anima</i> where this is discussed in more detail.  However, this passage has never been found.

In <a href = "#I12">section 12</a> ('Of concepts, and of simple and complex utterances) Ockham discusses the passage in 16ª 9-18, where Aristotle distinguishes understanding where there is no truth or falsity, from understanding where there is truth and falsity.  With the former, there is no complexity.  With the latter, we have a proposition, which is complex.  Truth and falsity consists in composition and division. An affirmative sentence [<i>oratio</i>] is composed of name and verb, is true or false.  But simples, i.e. a name or a verb taken by itself, have no composition, and are neither true nor false.  For example, if 'a man' or 'a white thing' are said, and no verb is added, neither something true nor something false is signified.

In <a href = "#I12">section 12</a> ('Of concepts, and of simple and complex utterances) Ockham discusses the passage in 16ª 9-18, where Aristotle distinguishes understanding where there is no truth or falsity, from understanding where there is truth and falsity.  With the former, there is no complexity.  With the latter, we have a proposition, which is complex.  Truth and falsity consists in composition and division. An affirmative sentence [<i>oratio</i>] is composed of name and verb, is true or false.  But simples, i.e. a name or a verb taken by itself, have no composition, and are neither true nor false.  For example, if 'a man' or 'a white thing' are said, and no verb is added, neither something true nor something false is signified.

Here, Ockham digresses again into a discussion about whether the proposition in the mind is simply an act of understanding, taking something outside the mind as an object, or whether it is itself an object of another understanding.

Here, Ockham digresses again into a discussion about whether the proposition in the mind is simply an act of understanding, taking something outside the mind as an object, or whether it is itself an object of another understanding.

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