Changes

Assertions of these relations can be read in various ways, for example:

Assertions of these relations can be read in various ways, for example:

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In making these free interpretations of genres and motifs, one needs to read them in a ''logical'' rather than a ''cognitive'' sense.  A statement like "''j'' thinks ''x'' an instance of ''y'' " should be understood as saying that "''j'' is a thought with the logical import that ''x'' is an instance of ''y'' ", and a statement like "''j'' proposes ''y'' a property of ''x'' " should be taken to mean that "''j'' is a proposition to the effect that ''y'' is a property of ''x'' ".

In making these free interpretations of genres and motifs, one needs to read them in a ''logical'' rather than a ''cognitive'' sense.  A statement like "<math>j\!</math> thinks <math>x\!</math> an instance of <math>y\!</math>" should be understood as saying that "<math>j\!</math> is a thought with the logical import that <math>x\!</math> is an instance of <math>y\!</math>", and a statement like "<math>j\!</math> proposes <math>y\!</math> a property of <math>x\!</math>" should be taken to mean that "<math>j\!</math> is a proposition to the effect that <math>y\!</math> is a property of <math>x\!</math>".

These cautions are necessary to forestall the problems of intentional attitudes and contexts, something I intend to clarify later on in this project.  At present, I regard the well-known opacities of this subject as arising from the circumstance that cognitive glosses tend to impute an unspecified order of extra reflection to each construal of the basic predicates.  The way I plan to approach this issue is through a detailed analysis of the cognitive capacity for reflective thought, to be developed to the extent possible in formal terms by using sign relational models.

These cautions are necessary to forestall the problems of intentional attitudes and contexts, something I intend to clarify later on in this project.  At present, I regard the well-known opacities of this subject as arising from the circumstance that cognitive glosses tend to impute an unspecified order of extra reflection to each construal of the basic predicates.  The way I plan to approach this issue is through a detailed analysis of the cognitive capacity for reflective thought, to be developed to the extent possible in formal terms by using sign relational models.

By way of anticipating the nature of the problem, consider the following examples to illustrate the contrast between logical and cognitive senses:

By way of anticipating the nature of the problem, consider the following examples to illustrate the contrast between logical and cognitive senses: