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<a name = "intro"><b>Introduction</b>
On this page I am collecting together primary references on the medieval discussion on the question whether 'every man is an animal' is true, when no man exists. The question is closely connected with Terence Parsons' <a href = "http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square">discussion of the O proposition</a> in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Parsons claims that 'For most of the history of Aristotelian logic, logicians assumed that negative particular propositions [i.e. Latin propositions of the form <i>quoddam A est B</i>, standardly represented in English as 'some A is not B'] are vacuously true if their subjects are empty'. I am suspicious of this claim. There is pretty firm evidence that no logician before Abelard even considered the special case where the subject term is empty. There is ample evidence that post-scholastic traditional logicians (i.e. from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century and later) did not hold the view that Parsons mentions. But there is almost no literature in the high scholastic period on the O proposition, and what references we do have are confusing.
However, it turns out there is an extensive literature on the question of whether the proposition 'Every man is an animal' is true when no man exists
(<i>Utrum haec sit vera, homo est animal nullo homine existente</i>), which was a favourite subject of sophism-literature in the late thirteenth century. Alain de Libera (<i>loc. cit</i>), lists 36 texts devoted to this question, which I reproduce below, together with a number of additions of my own. If Parsons' claim is correct, and for most of the history of Aristotelian logic, logicians assumed that negative particular or O propositions are vacuously true if their subjects are empty, it follows they must have thought that universal affirmative propositions are vacuously <i>false</i> if their subjects are empty, since the A and the O propositions are contradictory. So the question hangs upon what the logicians of the high scholastic period thought about 'every man is an animal', when the subject is empty, i.e. no men exist.
The answer is fairly straightforward, and probably what you would expect: they were deeply divided on the subject. The problem is that certain universal propositions seem to be essentially or necessarily true. How could 'every man is an animal' or 'three and four are seven' possibly be false? It is contrary to the view of all philosophers, according to Francisco Suarez, writing at the very end of the scholastic period. Furthermore, great authorities of the Church such as Augustine and Anselm, had said that such propositions are perpetually and eternally true. Augustine says (IV <i>On the Literal Exposition of Genesis</i>, c. 7) 'Six is a perfect number, not because God completed all things in six days, but rather, conversely, the reason God completed things in six days, was because that number is perfect, which would be perfect even if those things did not exist'. Therefore, such propositions should be <i>true</i>, even when their subjects are empty.
However, Aristotelian doctrine, strictly interpreted, requires that such propositions be <i>false</i> when their subjects are empty. A proposition is only true, according to Aristotle, when the combination of terms in the proposition (e.g. 'man' with 'animal') corresponds to some existing combination in reality (e.g. <i>man</i> and <i>animal</i>. Now the proposition 'a man is an animal' is true when a man exists, because the predicate 'animal' belongs to the 'essence' of its subject, man. (An essence is a set of attributes which make that substance the kind of thing it is, thus any essential attribute is necessarily found in the substance to which it belongs). But Aristotle also holds that when the existence of anything ceases, its essence perishes also (<i>ablata existentia, perit essentia</i>). So, by implication, the composition of things in that essence (man and animal) ceases to be a real composition when the man perishes. But when every man perishes, every combination of <i>man</i> and <i>animal</i> also perishes, therefore a proposition in which a predicate is essentially predicated of a thing is not necessarily or forever true. Aristotelian doctrine seems to imply something which is false and contrary to all philosophical opinion.
<blockquote><i>Quia si, ablata existentia, perit essentia, ergo propositiones illae in quibus praedicata essentialia de re praedicantur non sunt necessariae neque perpetuae veritatis; consequens autem est falsum et contra omnium philosophorum sententiam. </i> [Suarez]</blockquote>
Opinions were divided on the subject, and the arguments on each side are diverse and interesting. The were some very curious views on the subject. Siger of Brabant thought the proposition <i>would</i> be false if there were no men, but as men necessarily exist, the proposition is necessarily true. (He thought that every man must have parents, from whom the essence of man is handed down through the ages, therefore men must always have existed – a false and heretical view, which was condemned in 1277). A number of philosophers, including Scotus, argued that by a syllogism based on opposite propositions, every animal is a substance, some man is not a substance, we derive 'some man is not an animal'. But Aristotle says (<i>Prior Analytic</i>s II, 64b7-10) that the conclusion of such a proposition is not possible. Ergo its contradictory, namely 'every man is an animal' is necessary. Boethius of Dacia points out the obvious fallacy in this argument.
Another argument was that the universal proposition is ambiguous between signifying a categorical proposition, in which one existing thing is predicated of another existing thing, and a conditional proposition of the form 'if x is A, x is B'. With no men existing, the former is false, but the latter is true. We find this view as early as the 1250's, defended by William of Sherwood. It is roundly denounced by William of Ockham. We find it again in Vincent Ferrar, and again in Francisico Suarez, and substantially the same view is held by Maritain and other neo-scholastic logicians. Another view, unsurprisingly held by Scotus, is that essence has a separate being, <i>esse essentiae</i>, and that in some sense it does not perish when all the individuals that possess it have perished.
The list of primary references is below. I have located many of these, and they will start to appear in the Logic Museum in the coming months (August-November 2007). There is very little secondary literature on the subject, but it is all the more interesting for that.
<b>Philosophers and dates</b><br>
Richard the Sophister (fl c 1230-40) <br>
Boethius of Dacia (fl c. 1270-80) <br>
Siger of Brabant (1240 – <i>post</i> 1282) <br>
John Duns Scotus (1266 – 1308) <br>
William of Ockham (1285 – 1347) <br>
Paul of Venice (1369 - 1429) <br>
Simon of Faversham (1260-1306)<br>
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617)<br>
<b>Primary Sources</b><br>
In approximate date order:
<b>c. 1235</b> Ricardus Sophista, <i>Omne coloratum est</i>; ed. J. Pinborg, in <i>Magister Abstractionum</i>, CIMAGL, 18 (1976), 1-4.<br>
<b>c. 1235</b> Ricardus Sophista, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed. ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis in 'English Tracts on Syncategorematic Terms &c', 161.<br>
<b>c. 1235</b> Ricardus Cornubiensis [= Richard the Sophist?], <i>In Sent.</i>, ms. Oxford, Balliol 62, fol. 222C-223D; ed F. Pelster, in 'Roger Bacons <i>Compendium Studii theologiae</i> und der Sentenzkommentar des Richardus Rufus …', 275-79.<br>
<b>Anon</b>., <i>Utrum haec sit vera 'Caesar est homo Caesare non existente</i>, ms. London, B.L. Arundel 383, fol. 207vb; ed S. Ebbesen, in 'Stray Quaestiones and Sophismata in British and French Manuscripts', <i>Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age grec et latin</i>, 57 (1988), p. 70-2.<br>
<b>Anon</b>., <i>Utrum haec sit vera, 'Homo est animal' homine non exsistente</i>, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fol. 49ra –vb; ed. A. Zimmermann, in 'Eine anonyme Quaestio: 'Utrum haec sit vera 'Homo est animal' homine non exsistente', <i>Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie</i>, 49 (1967), p. 184-8.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Anon., <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>, ms. Paris, <i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 11rb-12vb.[<a href = "selectionsnullohomine.htm#anon">extracts</a>]<br>
<b>Anon</b> <i>Omnis homo est</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 49vb-52vb.<br>
<b>Anon</b> <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 52vb-62vb.<br>
<b>after 1250</b> Anon <i> Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 99rb-103vb. <br>
<b>Anon</b>., <i>Sor est Sor mortuus</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 107va-108rb. <br>
<b>c 1250</b> Nicholas of Paris, <i>Syncategoremata</i>, Braakhuis <i>De 13de Eewse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen, II: Uitgave van Nicolaas van Parij's Sincategoreumata</i>, Meppel, 1979.<br>
<b>[?]</b> Peter of Cornwall, <i>Omnis homo est</i>; ed S. Ebbesen, in 'Talking about what is no more …' CIMAGL, 55 1987), 139-54.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> William of Sherwood, <i>Introductiones in Logicam</i>; ed. Ch. H. Lohr, P. Kunze & B. Mussler, in 'William of Sherwood, <i>Introductiones in Logicam</i>, Critical Text, <i>Traditio</i>, 39 (1983), 222-99.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> William of Sherwood, <i>Syncategoremata</i>; ed. J.R.O'Donnell, C.S.B., in 'The <i>Syncategoremata</i> of William of Sherwood', <i>Medieval Studies</i>, 3 (1941), 46-93. <br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Robert Kilwardby, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed. S. Ebbesen & J. Pinborg, in 'Studies in the Logical Writings attributed to Boethius of Dacia', CIMAGL, 3 (1970), 37-40 [<a href = "selectionsnullohomine.htm#kilwardby ">extracts</a>].<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Robert Kilwardby, <i>Omnis Phoenix est</i>; ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, in 'Kilwardby versus Bacon? The Contribution to the Discussion on Univocal Signification of Beings and Non-Beings Found in a Sophisma attributed to Rober Kilwardby', in <i>Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L.M. De Rijk, PhD on the Occasion of his 60th birthday</i>, ed. E.P. Bos, (Artistarium, Supplementa 2), Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1985, 126-142 [extracts].<br>
<b>? 1250</b> Robert Kilwardby (pseudo), <i>In Priscianum Maiorem</i>; ed K.M. Fredborg, N.J. Green-Pedersen, L. Nielsen & J. Pinborg, CIMAGL, 15 (1975), 1-143.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices I-II; ed. A. de Libera, in 'Les <i>Summulae dialectices</i> de Roger Bacon. I-II, <i>De Termino. De Enuntiatione</i>' AHDLMA, 53 (1986), 139-289.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices III; ed. A. de Libera, in 'Les <i>Summulae dialectices</i> de Roger Bacon. III, <i>De argumentatione</i>' AHDLMA, 54 (1987), 171-278.<br>
<b>1260</b> Roger Bacon, <i>De Signis</i>; ed. K.M. Fredborg, L. Nielsen & J. Pinborg, in 'An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's <i>Opus Maius: De Signis</i>', <i>Traditio</i>, 34 (1978), 75-136.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed. B. Bazan, in <i>Siger de Brabant. Ecrits de logique, de morale et de physique. Edition critique</i>, (Philosophes medievaux, 14) Louvain, Publications universitaires-Paris, Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974, 43-52.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, <i>Quaestio Utrum haec sit vera: 'Homo est animal', nullo homine existente</i>; ed. B. Bazan, op. cit., 53-9.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones logicales; ed. B. Bazan, op. cit., 60-66.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, 'Utrum nomen idem significet et univoce re existente et non existente', in <i>Quaestiones in Metaphysicam</i>; ed. Graiff, <i>Questions sur la Metaphysique</i>, Louvain 1948, 224-9<br>
<b>c. 1270</b>. Boethius of Dacia, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed M.Grabmann, in Die sophismataliteratur des 12 und 13 Jahrhunderts mit Textausgabe eines Sophisma des Boethius von Dacien, BeitrGPhThMa, 36 / 1 (1940) pp. 77-95<br>
<b>c. 1270</b>. Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super libros Topicorum II q. 1-5 (Paris, <i>Nat. lat.</i> 16297, fol. 114r, abreviation de Godefried de Fontaines); ed J. Pinborg, in 'Bezeichnung in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts', <i>Miscellanea mediaevalia</i>, 8 (1971), p. 258-9.<br>
<b>c. 1280</b> Henry of Ghent, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i> [in <i>Syncategoremata</i>]; ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, in <i>De 13de Eewse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen</i>, <i>Inleidende Studie</i>, Meppel, 1979, 368 [also in 'English Tracts on Syncategorematic Terms from Robert Bacon to Walter Burley', in <i>English Logic and Semantics from the End of the 12th century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh. Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. LeidenNijmegen, 23-7 April 1979</i>, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, & al. (Artistarium Supplementa, 1), Nimegue, Ingenium Publishers, 1981, 165].<br>
<b>[??]</b> John of Dacia, <i>Summa Grammatica</i>, 'quaestio Utrum ad corruptionem rei vox cadit a sua significatione'; ed A. Otto, (Corpus philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, I/ 1-2), Haunie, 1955, 183-5.<br>
<b>[??]</b> Jean Le Page, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i> [in <i>Syncategoremata</i>] ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis <i>ibid</i> 237-40.<br>
<b>1292</b> Roger Bacon, <i>Compendium Studii Theologiae</i>; ed. Th. S. Maloney, (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgechichte des Mittelalters, 20), Leiden-Koln, 1988.<br>
<b>c. 1295</b> Simon of Faversham, <i>Quaestiones super Analytica Priora</i>, I, q.56; ed. S. Ebbesen, in 'Talking about what is no more', 158-160. <br>
<b>c. 1295</b> Simon of Faversham, <i>Quaestiones novae super libro Elenchorum</i>, q. 24.; <i>Utrum haec sit vera 'Caesar est mortuus'</i>; ed S. Ebbesen & al., in <i>Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum</i> (Studies and Texts, 60), Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984, 161-4.<br>
<b>c. 1295</b> – John Duns Scotus – In Perihermaneias I<br>
<b>c. 1300</b> Radulphus Brito, <i>Quaestiones super Analytica Posteriora I, q. 38</i>; ed Ebbesen <i>ibid</i>.<br>
<b>c. 1300</b> Rad ulphus Brito, <i>Quaestiones super libr. De interpr., q.4: Utrum vox significet idem re existente et non existente</i>; ed. J. Pinborg, in 'Bezeichnung', 278-81.<br>
<b>c. 1300</b> Radulphus Brito, <i>Quaestiones super libr. Top. II, q.6: Utrum terminus communis distribuat aequaliter et unica ratione pro suppositis praesentibus, praeteritatis et futuris</i>; ed J. Pinborg, in 'Bezeichnung', 274-75 (extracts).<br>
<b>? 1306</b> Richard de Clive, <i>Quaestiones Metaphysicae, quaestio Utrum terminus communis significet idem re existente et non existente</i>; ed S. Ebbesen, in 'Talking about what is no more …' 155-7.<br>
<b>1325</b> William of Ockham II 4 of <i>Summa Logicae</i>.<br>
<b>[??]</b> Robert Bacon ,<i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; [in <i>Syncategorema</i>] ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, in <i>De 13de Eewse Tractaten &c</i> 120-1, also 'English tracts &c', 162.<br>
<b>? 1410</b> Paul of Venice <i>Logica Magna II.3</i><br>
<b>1597</b> Francisco Suarez, <i>Utrum Essentia Creata sit Separabilis a sua Substantia</i>, in <i>Disputationes Metaphysicae</i>, D XXXI, Sectio xii, ed. Vives<br>
<b>Secondary Sources</b><br>
Bazan, B., 'La Theorie de la Signification chez Siger de Brabant', in <i>Progress in Linguistic Historiography</i>: Papers from the International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, Ottawa, August 1978, ed. Konrad Koerner, Amsterdam, Benjamins.<br>
Ebbesen, S., and Pinborg, J., 'Studies in the Logical Writings attributed to Boethius of Dacia', <i>Cahiers de l'Institut
du Moyen Age Grec et Latin</i>, University of Copenhagen, 1970 <br>
Henry, D.P. <i>That Most Subtle Question</i>, Manchester 1984. (esp. ch. 5 'Disputed Questions'). <br>
De Libera, Alain 'Roger Bacon et la référence vide. Sur quelques antécédents médiévaux du paradoxe de Meinong', <i>Lectionum varietates</i>, Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904-1987) (<i>Etudes de philosophie médiévale</i>, LXV), Ed . J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera, Paris, Vrin, 1991, p. 85-120.<br>
Perler, Dominic, Duns Scotus on Signification<br>
Putallaz, F. And Imbach, R.(1977) <i>Profession Philosophe, Siger de Brabant</i>, Paris: Editions du Cerf.<br>
Van Steenberghen, F., (1977), Maitre Siger de Brabant, Paris: Publications Universitaires, Louvain, Vander-Oyez S.A<br>
Edward Buckner<br>
London, July 2007
<hr>
*[[Directory:Logic_Museum/The_Square_of_Opposition |Main]]<br>
* [[Directory:Logic Museum/Nullo homine (1230-50)|Early writing (1230-50)]]<br>
* [[Directory:Logic Museum/ Nullo homine (Modist)|Late thirteenth and early fourteenth modist school (1270-1310)]<br>
<a name = "intro"><b>Introduction</b>
On this page I am collecting together primary references on the medieval discussion on the question whether 'every man is an animal' is true, when no man exists. The question is closely connected with Terence Parsons' <a href = "http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square">discussion of the O proposition</a> in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Parsons claims that 'For most of the history of Aristotelian logic, logicians assumed that negative particular propositions [i.e. Latin propositions of the form <i>quoddam A est B</i>, standardly represented in English as 'some A is not B'] are vacuously true if their subjects are empty'. I am suspicious of this claim. There is pretty firm evidence that no logician before Abelard even considered the special case where the subject term is empty. There is ample evidence that post-scholastic traditional logicians (i.e. from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century and later) did not hold the view that Parsons mentions. But there is almost no literature in the high scholastic period on the O proposition, and what references we do have are confusing.
However, it turns out there is an extensive literature on the question of whether the proposition 'Every man is an animal' is true when no man exists
(<i>Utrum haec sit vera, homo est animal nullo homine existente</i>), which was a favourite subject of sophism-literature in the late thirteenth century. Alain de Libera (<i>loc. cit</i>), lists 36 texts devoted to this question, which I reproduce below, together with a number of additions of my own. If Parsons' claim is correct, and for most of the history of Aristotelian logic, logicians assumed that negative particular or O propositions are vacuously true if their subjects are empty, it follows they must have thought that universal affirmative propositions are vacuously <i>false</i> if their subjects are empty, since the A and the O propositions are contradictory. So the question hangs upon what the logicians of the high scholastic period thought about 'every man is an animal', when the subject is empty, i.e. no men exist.
The answer is fairly straightforward, and probably what you would expect: they were deeply divided on the subject. The problem is that certain universal propositions seem to be essentially or necessarily true. How could 'every man is an animal' or 'three and four are seven' possibly be false? It is contrary to the view of all philosophers, according to Francisco Suarez, writing at the very end of the scholastic period. Furthermore, great authorities of the Church such as Augustine and Anselm, had said that such propositions are perpetually and eternally true. Augustine says (IV <i>On the Literal Exposition of Genesis</i>, c. 7) 'Six is a perfect number, not because God completed all things in six days, but rather, conversely, the reason God completed things in six days, was because that number is perfect, which would be perfect even if those things did not exist'. Therefore, such propositions should be <i>true</i>, even when their subjects are empty.
However, Aristotelian doctrine, strictly interpreted, requires that such propositions be <i>false</i> when their subjects are empty. A proposition is only true, according to Aristotle, when the combination of terms in the proposition (e.g. 'man' with 'animal') corresponds to some existing combination in reality (e.g. <i>man</i> and <i>animal</i>. Now the proposition 'a man is an animal' is true when a man exists, because the predicate 'animal' belongs to the 'essence' of its subject, man. (An essence is a set of attributes which make that substance the kind of thing it is, thus any essential attribute is necessarily found in the substance to which it belongs). But Aristotle also holds that when the existence of anything ceases, its essence perishes also (<i>ablata existentia, perit essentia</i>). So, by implication, the composition of things in that essence (man and animal) ceases to be a real composition when the man perishes. But when every man perishes, every combination of <i>man</i> and <i>animal</i> also perishes, therefore a proposition in which a predicate is essentially predicated of a thing is not necessarily or forever true. Aristotelian doctrine seems to imply something which is false and contrary to all philosophical opinion.
<blockquote><i>Quia si, ablata existentia, perit essentia, ergo propositiones illae in quibus praedicata essentialia de re praedicantur non sunt necessariae neque perpetuae veritatis; consequens autem est falsum et contra omnium philosophorum sententiam. </i> [Suarez]</blockquote>
Opinions were divided on the subject, and the arguments on each side are diverse and interesting. The were some very curious views on the subject. Siger of Brabant thought the proposition <i>would</i> be false if there were no men, but as men necessarily exist, the proposition is necessarily true. (He thought that every man must have parents, from whom the essence of man is handed down through the ages, therefore men must always have existed – a false and heretical view, which was condemned in 1277). A number of philosophers, including Scotus, argued that by a syllogism based on opposite propositions, every animal is a substance, some man is not a substance, we derive 'some man is not an animal'. But Aristotle says (<i>Prior Analytic</i>s II, 64b7-10) that the conclusion of such a proposition is not possible. Ergo its contradictory, namely 'every man is an animal' is necessary. Boethius of Dacia points out the obvious fallacy in this argument.
Another argument was that the universal proposition is ambiguous between signifying a categorical proposition, in which one existing thing is predicated of another existing thing, and a conditional proposition of the form 'if x is A, x is B'. With no men existing, the former is false, but the latter is true. We find this view as early as the 1250's, defended by William of Sherwood. It is roundly denounced by William of Ockham. We find it again in Vincent Ferrar, and again in Francisico Suarez, and substantially the same view is held by Maritain and other neo-scholastic logicians. Another view, unsurprisingly held by Scotus, is that essence has a separate being, <i>esse essentiae</i>, and that in some sense it does not perish when all the individuals that possess it have perished.
The list of primary references is below. I have located many of these, and they will start to appear in the Logic Museum in the coming months (August-November 2007). There is very little secondary literature on the subject, but it is all the more interesting for that.
<b>Philosophers and dates</b><br>
Richard the Sophister (fl c 1230-40) <br>
Boethius of Dacia (fl c. 1270-80) <br>
Siger of Brabant (1240 – <i>post</i> 1282) <br>
John Duns Scotus (1266 – 1308) <br>
William of Ockham (1285 – 1347) <br>
Paul of Venice (1369 - 1429) <br>
Simon of Faversham (1260-1306)<br>
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617)<br>
<b>Primary Sources</b><br>
In approximate date order:
<b>c. 1235</b> Ricardus Sophista, <i>Omne coloratum est</i>; ed. J. Pinborg, in <i>Magister Abstractionum</i>, CIMAGL, 18 (1976), 1-4.<br>
<b>c. 1235</b> Ricardus Sophista, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed. ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis in 'English Tracts on Syncategorematic Terms &c', 161.<br>
<b>c. 1235</b> Ricardus Cornubiensis [= Richard the Sophist?], <i>In Sent.</i>, ms. Oxford, Balliol 62, fol. 222C-223D; ed F. Pelster, in 'Roger Bacons <i>Compendium Studii theologiae</i> und der Sentenzkommentar des Richardus Rufus …', 275-79.<br>
<b>Anon</b>., <i>Utrum haec sit vera 'Caesar est homo Caesare non existente</i>, ms. London, B.L. Arundel 383, fol. 207vb; ed S. Ebbesen, in 'Stray Quaestiones and Sophismata in British and French Manuscripts', <i>Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age grec et latin</i>, 57 (1988), p. 70-2.<br>
<b>Anon</b>., <i>Utrum haec sit vera, 'Homo est animal' homine non exsistente</i>, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fol. 49ra –vb; ed. A. Zimmermann, in 'Eine anonyme Quaestio: 'Utrum haec sit vera 'Homo est animal' homine non exsistente', <i>Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie</i>, 49 (1967), p. 184-8.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Anon., <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>, ms. Paris, <i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 11rb-12vb.[<a href = "selectionsnullohomine.htm#anon">extracts</a>]<br>
<b>Anon</b> <i>Omnis homo est</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 49vb-52vb.<br>
<b>Anon</b> <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 52vb-62vb.<br>
<b>after 1250</b> Anon <i> Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 99rb-103vb. <br>
<b>Anon</b>., <i>Sor est Sor mortuus</i>, ms. Paris<i>Nat. lat.</i> 16135, fol. 107va-108rb. <br>
<b>c 1250</b> Nicholas of Paris, <i>Syncategoremata</i>, Braakhuis <i>De 13de Eewse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen, II: Uitgave van Nicolaas van Parij's Sincategoreumata</i>, Meppel, 1979.<br>
<b>[?]</b> Peter of Cornwall, <i>Omnis homo est</i>; ed S. Ebbesen, in 'Talking about what is no more …' CIMAGL, 55 1987), 139-54.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> William of Sherwood, <i>Introductiones in Logicam</i>; ed. Ch. H. Lohr, P. Kunze & B. Mussler, in 'William of Sherwood, <i>Introductiones in Logicam</i>, Critical Text, <i>Traditio</i>, 39 (1983), 222-99.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> William of Sherwood, <i>Syncategoremata</i>; ed. J.R.O'Donnell, C.S.B., in 'The <i>Syncategoremata</i> of William of Sherwood', <i>Medieval Studies</i>, 3 (1941), 46-93. <br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Robert Kilwardby, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed. S. Ebbesen & J. Pinborg, in 'Studies in the Logical Writings attributed to Boethius of Dacia', CIMAGL, 3 (1970), 37-40 [<a href = "selectionsnullohomine.htm#kilwardby ">extracts</a>].<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Robert Kilwardby, <i>Omnis Phoenix est</i>; ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, in 'Kilwardby versus Bacon? The Contribution to the Discussion on Univocal Signification of Beings and Non-Beings Found in a Sophisma attributed to Rober Kilwardby', in <i>Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L.M. De Rijk, PhD on the Occasion of his 60th birthday</i>, ed. E.P. Bos, (Artistarium, Supplementa 2), Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1985, 126-142 [extracts].<br>
<b>? 1250</b> Robert Kilwardby (pseudo), <i>In Priscianum Maiorem</i>; ed K.M. Fredborg, N.J. Green-Pedersen, L. Nielsen & J. Pinborg, CIMAGL, 15 (1975), 1-143.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices I-II; ed. A. de Libera, in 'Les <i>Summulae dialectices</i> de Roger Bacon. I-II, <i>De Termino. De Enuntiatione</i>' AHDLMA, 53 (1986), 139-289.<br>
<b>c. 1250</b> Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices III; ed. A. de Libera, in 'Les <i>Summulae dialectices</i> de Roger Bacon. III, <i>De argumentatione</i>' AHDLMA, 54 (1987), 171-278.<br>
<b>1260</b> Roger Bacon, <i>De Signis</i>; ed. K.M. Fredborg, L. Nielsen & J. Pinborg, in 'An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's <i>Opus Maius: De Signis</i>', <i>Traditio</i>, 34 (1978), 75-136.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed. B. Bazan, in <i>Siger de Brabant. Ecrits de logique, de morale et de physique. Edition critique</i>, (Philosophes medievaux, 14) Louvain, Publications universitaires-Paris, Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974, 43-52.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, <i>Quaestio Utrum haec sit vera: 'Homo est animal', nullo homine existente</i>; ed. B. Bazan, op. cit., 53-9.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones logicales; ed. B. Bazan, op. cit., 60-66.<br>
<b>c. 1265</b> Siger of Brabant, 'Utrum nomen idem significet et univoce re existente et non existente', in <i>Quaestiones in Metaphysicam</i>; ed. Graiff, <i>Questions sur la Metaphysique</i>, Louvain 1948, 224-9<br>
<b>c. 1270</b>. Boethius of Dacia, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; ed M.Grabmann, in Die sophismataliteratur des 12 und 13 Jahrhunderts mit Textausgabe eines Sophisma des Boethius von Dacien, BeitrGPhThMa, 36 / 1 (1940) pp. 77-95<br>
<b>c. 1270</b>. Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super libros Topicorum II q. 1-5 (Paris, <i>Nat. lat.</i> 16297, fol. 114r, abreviation de Godefried de Fontaines); ed J. Pinborg, in 'Bezeichnung in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts', <i>Miscellanea mediaevalia</i>, 8 (1971), p. 258-9.<br>
<b>c. 1280</b> Henry of Ghent, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i> [in <i>Syncategoremata</i>]; ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, in <i>De 13de Eewse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen</i>, <i>Inleidende Studie</i>, Meppel, 1979, 368 [also in 'English Tracts on Syncategorematic Terms from Robert Bacon to Walter Burley', in <i>English Logic and Semantics from the End of the 12th century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh. Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. LeidenNijmegen, 23-7 April 1979</i>, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, & al. (Artistarium Supplementa, 1), Nimegue, Ingenium Publishers, 1981, 165].<br>
<b>[??]</b> John of Dacia, <i>Summa Grammatica</i>, 'quaestio Utrum ad corruptionem rei vox cadit a sua significatione'; ed A. Otto, (Corpus philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, I/ 1-2), Haunie, 1955, 183-5.<br>
<b>[??]</b> Jean Le Page, <i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i> [in <i>Syncategoremata</i>] ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis <i>ibid</i> 237-40.<br>
<b>1292</b> Roger Bacon, <i>Compendium Studii Theologiae</i>; ed. Th. S. Maloney, (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgechichte des Mittelalters, 20), Leiden-Koln, 1988.<br>
<b>c. 1295</b> Simon of Faversham, <i>Quaestiones super Analytica Priora</i>, I, q.56; ed. S. Ebbesen, in 'Talking about what is no more', 158-160. <br>
<b>c. 1295</b> Simon of Faversham, <i>Quaestiones novae super libro Elenchorum</i>, q. 24.; <i>Utrum haec sit vera 'Caesar est mortuus'</i>; ed S. Ebbesen & al., in <i>Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum</i> (Studies and Texts, 60), Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984, 161-4.<br>
<b>c. 1295</b> – John Duns Scotus – In Perihermaneias I<br>
<b>c. 1300</b> Radulphus Brito, <i>Quaestiones super Analytica Posteriora I, q. 38</i>; ed Ebbesen <i>ibid</i>.<br>
<b>c. 1300</b> Rad ulphus Brito, <i>Quaestiones super libr. De interpr., q.4: Utrum vox significet idem re existente et non existente</i>; ed. J. Pinborg, in 'Bezeichnung', 278-81.<br>
<b>c. 1300</b> Radulphus Brito, <i>Quaestiones super libr. Top. II, q.6: Utrum terminus communis distribuat aequaliter et unica ratione pro suppositis praesentibus, praeteritatis et futuris</i>; ed J. Pinborg, in 'Bezeichnung', 274-75 (extracts).<br>
<b>? 1306</b> Richard de Clive, <i>Quaestiones Metaphysicae, quaestio Utrum terminus communis significet idem re existente et non existente</i>; ed S. Ebbesen, in 'Talking about what is no more …' 155-7.<br>
<b>1325</b> William of Ockham II 4 of <i>Summa Logicae</i>.<br>
<b>[??]</b> Robert Bacon ,<i>Omnis homo de necessitate est animal</i>; [in <i>Syncategorema</i>] ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, in <i>De 13de Eewse Tractaten &c</i> 120-1, also 'English tracts &c', 162.<br>
<b>? 1410</b> Paul of Venice <i>Logica Magna II.3</i><br>
<b>1597</b> Francisco Suarez, <i>Utrum Essentia Creata sit Separabilis a sua Substantia</i>, in <i>Disputationes Metaphysicae</i>, D XXXI, Sectio xii, ed. Vives<br>
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Bazan, B., 'La Theorie de la Signification chez Siger de Brabant', in <i>Progress in Linguistic Historiography</i>: Papers from the International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, Ottawa, August 1978, ed. Konrad Koerner, Amsterdam, Benjamins.<br>
Ebbesen, S., and Pinborg, J., 'Studies in the Logical Writings attributed to Boethius of Dacia', <i>Cahiers de l'Institut
du Moyen Age Grec et Latin</i>, University of Copenhagen, 1970 <br>
Henry, D.P. <i>That Most Subtle Question</i>, Manchester 1984. (esp. ch. 5 'Disputed Questions'). <br>
De Libera, Alain 'Roger Bacon et la référence vide. Sur quelques antécédents médiévaux du paradoxe de Meinong', <i>Lectionum varietates</i>, Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904-1987) (<i>Etudes de philosophie médiévale</i>, LXV), Ed . J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera, Paris, Vrin, 1991, p. 85-120.<br>
Perler, Dominic, Duns Scotus on Signification<br>
Putallaz, F. And Imbach, R.(1977) <i>Profession Philosophe, Siger de Brabant</i>, Paris: Editions du Cerf.<br>
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Edward Buckner<br>
London, July 2007
