Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Note 5.====

====Note 5. Peirce (CE 1, 276)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| Thus the process of information disturbs the relations

<p>Thus the process of information disturbs the relations of extension and comprehension for a moment and the class which results from the equivalence of two others has a greater intension than one and a greater extension than the other.  Hence, we may conveniently alter the formula for the relations of extension and comprehension;  thus, instead of saying that one is the reciprocal of the other, or:</p>

| of extension and comprehension for a moment and the

 

| class which results from the equivalence of two

| others has a greater intension than one and

<p>comprehension &nbsp; &times; &nbsp; extension &nbsp; = &nbsp; constant,</p>

| a greater extension than the other.  Hence,

| we may conveniently alter the formula for the

 

| relations of extension and comprehension;  thus,

<p>we may say:</p>

| instead of saying that one is the reciprocal of

 

| the other, or

<p>comprehension &nbsp; &times; &nbsp; extension &nbsp; = &nbsp; information.</p>

|    comprehension x  extension = constant,

 

| we may say

<p>We see then that all symbols besides their denotative and connotative objects have another; their informative object.  The denotative object is the total of possible things denoted. The connotative object is the total of symbols translated or implied.  The informative object is the total of forms manifested and is measured by the amount of intension the term has, over and above what is necessary for limiting its extension.  For example, the denotative object of ''man'' is such collections of matter the word knows while it knows them, i.e., while they are organized.  The connotative object of ''man'' is the total form which the word expresses.  The informative object of ''man'' is the total fact which it embodies;  or the value of the conception which is its equivalent symbol.</p>

 

|    comprehension x  extension = information.

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 276</p>

 

| We see then that all symbols besides their denotative and connotative objects have another;

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&nbsp;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| their informative object.  The denotative object is the total of possible things denoted.

</blockquote>

| The connotative object is the total of symbols translated or implied.  The informative

| object is the total of forms manifested and is measured by the amount of intension the

| term has, over and above what is necessary for limiting its extension.  For example,

| the denotative object of 'man' is such collections of matter the word knows while it

| knows them, i.e., while they are organized.  The connotative object of 'man' is the

| total form which the word expresses.  The informative object of 'man' is the total

| fact which it embodies;  or the value of the conception which is its equivalent

| symbol.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 276.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

====Note 6.====

====Note 6.====