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| </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
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− | ====Note 4.==== | + | ====Note 4. Peirce (188–189)==== |
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− | <pre> | + | <blockquote> |
− | | Let us now take the two statements, S is P, T is P;
| + | <p>Let us now take the two statements, <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P,</math> <math>\Sigma\ \operatorname{is}\ P;</math> let us suppose that <math>\Sigma\!</math> is much more distinct than <math>S\!</math> and that it is also more extensive. But we ''know'' that <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P.</math> Now if <math>\Sigma\!</math> were not more extensive than S, <math>\Sigma\ \operatorname{is}\ P</math> would contain more truth than <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P;</math> being more extensive it ''may'' contain more truth and it may also introduce a falsehood. Which of these probabilities is the greatest? <math>\Sigma\!</math> by being more extensive becomes less intensive; it is the intension which introduces truth and the extension which introduces falsehood. If therefore <math>\Sigma\!</math> increases the intension of <math>S\!</math> more than its extension, <math>\Sigma\!</math> is to be preferred to <math>S;\!</math> otherwise not. Now this is the case of induction. Which contains most truth, ''neat'' and ''deer'' are herbivora, or cloven-footed animals are herbivora?</p> |
− | | let us suppose that T is much more distinct than S and
| + | |
− | | that it is also more extensive. But we 'know' that S is P.
| + | <p>In the two statements, <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P,</math> <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ \Pi,</math> let <math>\Pi\!</math> be at once more ''formal'' and more ''intensive'' than <math>P;\!</math> and suppose we only ''know'' that <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P.</math> In this case the increase of formality gives a chance of additional truth and the increase of intension a chance of error. If the extension of <math>\Pi\!</math> is more increased than than its intension, then <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ \Pi</math> is likely to contain more truth than <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P</math> and ''vice versa''. This is the case of ''à posteriori'' reasoning. We have for instance to choose between |
− | | Now if T were not more extensive than S, T is P would contain
| + | |
− | | more truth than S is P; being more extensive it 'may' contain
| + | :{| cellpadding="4" |
− | | more truth and it may also introduce a falsehood. Which of these
| + | | || Light gives fringes of such and such a description |
− | | probabilities is the greatest? T by being more extensive becomes
| + | |- |
− | | less intensive; it is the intension which introduces truth and the
| + | | and || Light is ether-waves. |
− | | extension which introduces falsehood. If therefore T increases the
| + | |} |
− | | intension of S more than its extension, T is to be preferred to S;
| + | |
− | | otherwise not. Now this is the case of induction. Which contains
| + | <p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 188–189</p> |
− | | most truth, 'neat' and 'deer' are herbivora, or cloven-footed
| + | |
− | | animals are herbivora?
| + | <p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857 1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p> |
− | |
| + | </blockquote> |
− | | In the two statements, S is P, S is Q, let Q be at once more 'formal' and
| |
− | | more 'intensive' than P; and suppose we only 'know' that S is P. In this
| |
− | | case the increase of formality gives a chance of additional truth and the
| |
− | | increase of intension a chance of error. If the extension of Q is more
| |
− | | increased than than its intension, then S is Q is likely to contain more
| |
− | | truth than S is P and 'vice versa'. This is the case of 'à posteriori'
| |
− | | reasoning. We have for instance to choose between
| |
− | | | |
− | | Light gives fringes of such and such a description | |
− | | | |
− | | and | |
− | | | |
− | | Light is ether-waves. | |
− | | | |
− | | C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 188-189.
| |
− | |
| |
− | | Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
| |
− | |'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| |
− | | Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| |
− | </pre> | |
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| ====Note 5.==== | | ====Note 5.==== |