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====Note 4.====
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====Note 4. Peirce (188&ndash;189)====
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<pre>
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<blockquote>
| Let us now take the two statements, S is P, T is P;
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<p>Let us now take the two statements, <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P,</math> <math>\Sigma\ \operatorname{is}\ P;</math>  let us suppose that <math>\Sigma\!</math> is much more distinct than <math>S\!</math> and that it is also more extensive.  But we ''know'' that <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P.</math>  Now if <math>\Sigma\!</math> were not more extensive than S, <math>\Sigma\ \operatorname{is}\ P</math> would contain more truth than <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P;</math> being more extensive it ''may'' contain more truth and it may also introduce a falsehood.  Which of these probabilities is the greatest?  <math>\Sigma\!</math> by being more extensive becomes less intensive;  it is the intension which introduces truth and the extension which introduces falsehood.  If therefore <math>\Sigma\!</math> increases the intension of <math>S\!</math> more than its extension, <math>\Sigma\!</math> is to be preferred to <math>S;\!</math> otherwise not.  Now this is the case of induction.  Which contains most truth, ''neat'' and ''deer'' are herbivora, or cloven-footed animals are herbivora?</p>
| let us suppose that T is much more distinct than S and
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| that it is also more extensive.  But we 'know' that S is P.
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<p>In the two statements, <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P,</math> <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ \Pi,</math> let <math>\Pi\!</math> be at once more ''formal'' and more ''intensive'' than <math>P;\!</math> and suppose we only ''know'' that <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P.</math> In this case the increase of formality gives a chance of additional truth and the increase of intension a chance of error.  If the extension of <math>\Pi\!</math> is more increased than than its intension, then <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ \Pi</math> is likely to contain more truth than <math>S\ \operatorname{is}\ P</math> and ''vice versa''.  This is the case of ''à posteriori'' reasoning.  We have for instance to choose between
| Now if T were not more extensive than S, T is P would contain
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| more truth than S is P;  being more extensive it 'may' contain
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:{| cellpadding="4"
| more truth and it may also introduce a falsehood.  Which of these
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| &nbsp; || Light gives fringes of such and such a description
| probabilities is the greatest?  T by being more extensive becomes
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| less intensive;  it is the intension which introduces truth and the
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| and   || Light is ether-waves.
| extension which introduces falsehood.  If therefore T increases the
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| intension of S more than its extension, T is to be preferred to S;
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| otherwise not.  Now this is the case of induction.  Which contains
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<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 188&ndash;189</p>
| most truth, 'neat' and 'deer' are herbivora, or cloven-footed
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| animals are herbivora?
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<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&nbsp;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>
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</blockquote>
| In the two statements, S is P, S is Q, let Q be at once more 'formal' and
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| more 'intensive' than P;  and suppose we only 'know' that S is P.  In this
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| case the increase of formality gives a chance of additional truth and the
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| increase of intension a chance of error.  If the extension of Q is more
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| increased than than its intension, then S is Q is likely to contain more
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| truth than S is P and 'vice versa'.  This is the case of 'à posteriori'
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| reasoning.  We have for instance to choose between
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|   Light gives fringes of such and such a description
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| and
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|   Light is ether-waves.
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| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 188-189.
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| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
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|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
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| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
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</pre>
      
====Note 5.====
 
====Note 5.====
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