Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====LAS.  Note 7====

====Excerpt 7.  Peirce (CE 1, 186)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| Having discovered and demonstrated the grounds of the possibility of

<p>Having discovered and demonstrated the grounds of the possibility of the three inferences, let us take a preliminary glance at the manner in which additions to these principles may make them grounds of proceedure.</p>

| the three inferences, let us take a preliminary glance at the manner in

 

| which additions to these principles may make them grounds of proceedure.

<p>The principle of inference ''à priori'' has been apodictically demonstrated; the principle of inductive inference has been shown upon sufficient evidence to be true;  the principle of inference ''à posteriori'' has been shown to be one which nothing can contradict.  These three degrees of modality in the principles of the three inferences show the amount of certainty which each is capable of affording. Inference ''à priori'' is as we all know the only apodictic proceedure;  yet no one thinks of questioning a good induction;  while inference ''à posteriori'' is proverbially uncertain.  ''Hypotheses non fingo'', said Newton;  striving to place his theory on a firm inductive basis.  Yet provisionally we must make hypotheses;  we start with them;  the baby when he lies turning his fingers before his eyes is testing a hypothesis he has already formed, as to the connection of touch and sight.  Apodictic reasoning can only be applied to the manipulation of our knowledge; it never can extend it.  So that it is an induction which eventually settles every question of science;  and nine-tenths of the inferences we draw in any hour not of study are of this kind.</p>

 

| The principle of inference 'à priori' has been apodictically demonstrated;

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 186</p>

| the principle of inductive inference has been shown upon sufficient evidence

 

| to be true;  the principle of inference 'à posteriori' has been shown to be one

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| which nothing can contradict.  These three degrees of modality in the principles of

</blockquote>

| the three inferences show the amount of certainty which each is capable of affording.

| Inference 'à priori' is as we all know the only apodictic proceedure;  yet no one

| thinks of questioning a good induction;  while inference 'à posteriori' is

| proverbially uncertain.  'Hypotheses non fingo', said Newton;  striving

| to place his theory on a firm inductive basis.  Yet provisionally we

| must make hypotheses;  we start with them;  the baby when he lies

| turning his fingers before his eyes is testing a hypothesis he has

| already formed, as to the connection of touch and sight.  Apodictic

| reasoning can only be applied to the manipulation of our knowledge;

| it never can extend it.  So that it is an induction which eventually

| settles every question of science;  and nine-tenths of the inferences

| we draw in any hour not of study are of this kind.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 186.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

====LAS.  Note 8====

====LAS.  Note 8====