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</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Excerpt 9====

====Excerpt 9.  Peirce (CP 5.448, n. 1)

<pre>

<blockquote>

| At the same time, it is tolerably evident that the definition,

<p>At the same time, it is tolerably evident that the definition, as it stands, is not sufficiently explicit, and further, that at the present stage of our inquiry cannot be made altogether satisfactory.  For what is the interpretation alluded to? To answer that convincingly would be either to establish or to refute the doctrine of pragmaticism.</p>

| as it stands, is not sufficiently explicit, and further, that

 

| at the present stage of our inquiry cannot be made altogether

<p>Still some explanations may be made.  Every sign has a single object, though this single object may be a single set or a single continuum of objects.  No general description can identify an object.  But the common sense of the interpreter of the sign will assure him that the object must be one of a limited collection of objects.  [Long example].</p>

| satisfactory.  For what is the interpretation alluded to?

 

| To answer that convincingly would be either to establish

<p>[And so] the latitude of interpretation which constitutes the indeterminacy of a sign must be understood as a latitude which might affect the achievement of a purpose.  For two signs whose meanings are for all possible purposes equivalent are absolutely equivalent.  This, to be sure, is rank pragmaticism;  for a purpose is an affection of action.</p>

| or to refute the doctrine of pragmaticism.

 

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Collected Papers'', CP 5.448, n. 1</p>

| Still some explanations may be made.  Every sign has a single object,

</blockquote>

| though this single object may be a single set or a single continuum

| of objects.  No general description can identify an object.  But the

| common sense of the interpreter of the sign will assure him that the

| object must be one of a limited collection of objects.  [Long example].

| [And so] the latitude of interpretation which constitutes the

| indeterminacy of a sign must be understood as a latitude which

| might affect the achievement of a purpose.  For two signs whose

| meanings are for all possible purposes equivalent are absolutely

| equivalent.  This, to be sure, is rank pragmaticism;  for a purpose

| is an affection of action.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1

</pre>

====Excerpt 10====

====Excerpt 10====