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<p>Earlier this century in ''The Open Universe : An Argument for Indeterminism'', Karl Popper wrote, "Common sense inclines, on the one hand, to assert that every event is caused by some preceding events, so that every event can be explained or predicted.  &hellip;  On the other hand, &hellip; common sense attributes to mature and sane human persons &hellip; the ability to choose freely between alternative possibilities of acting."  This "dilemma of determinism", as William James called it, is closely related to the meaning of time.  Is the future given, or is it under perpetual construction?  A profound dilemma for all of mankind, as time is the fundamental dimension of our existence.</p>

<p>Earlier this century in ''The Open Universe : An Argument for Indeterminism'', Karl Popper wrote, "Common sense inclines, on the one hand, to assert that every event is caused by some preceding events, so that every event can be explained or predicted.  &hellip;  On the other hand, &hellip; common sense attributes to mature and sane human persons &hellip; the ability to choose freely between alternative possibilities of acting."  This "dilemma of determinism", as William James called it, is closely related to the meaning of time.  Is the future given, or is it under perpetual construction?  A profound dilemma for all of mankind, as time is the fundamental dimension of our existence.</p>

<p>Ilya Prigogine (In Collaboration with Isabelle Stengers), ''The End of Certainty : Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature'', The Free Press, New York, NY, 1997, p. 1.  Originally published as ''La Fin des Certitudes'', Éditions Odile Jacob, 1996.</p>

<p>Ilya Prigogine (with Isabelle Stengers), ''The End of Certainty : Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature'', The Free Press, New York, NY, 1997, p. 1.  Originally published as ''La Fin des Certitudes'', Éditions Odile Jacob, 1996.</p>

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</blockquote>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Excerpt 4====

====Excerpt 4.  Peirce (CP 6.332)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned

<p>That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned with the result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable or is too evident to be demonstrable.  But in case that dyadic action is merely a member of a triadic action, then so far from its furnishing the least shade of presumption that all the action in the physical universe is dyadic, on the contrary, the entire and triadic action justifies a guess that there may be other and more marked examples in the universe of the triadic pattern.  No sooner is the guess made than instances swarm upon us amply verifying it, and refuting the agnostic position;  while others present new problems for our study. With the refutation of agnosticism, the agnostic is shown to be a superficial neophyte in philosophy, entitled at most to an occasional audience on special points, yet infinitely more respectable than those who seek to bolster up what is really true by sophistical arguments &mdash; the traitors to truth that they are.</p>

| with the result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable

 

| or is too evident to be demonstrable.  But in case that dyadic

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Collected Papers'', CP 6.332</p>

| action is merely a member of a triadic action, then so far from

</blockquote>

| its furnishing the least shade of presumption that all the action

| in the physical universe is dyadic, on the contrary, the entire and

| triadic action justifies a guess that there may be other and more marked

| examples in the universe of the triadic pattern.  No sooner is the guess

| made than instances swarm upon us amply verifying it, and refuting the

| agnostic position;  while others present new problems for our study.

| With the refutation of agnosticism, the agnostic is shown to be

| a superficial neophyte in philosophy, entitled at most to

| an occasional audience on special points, yet infinitely

| more respectable than those who seek to bolster up what

| is really true by sophistical arguments -- the traitors

| to truth that they are.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 6.332

</pre>

====Excerpt 5====

====Excerpt 5====