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==Collection Of Source Materials (COSM)==
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==Notes & Queries & Discussion==
 
==Notes & Queries & Discussion==
 
[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 07:14, 3 November 2008 (PST)
 
[[User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] 07:14, 3 November 2008 (PST)
 +
 +
==Collection Of Source Materials (COSM)==
 +
 +
<pre>
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
IDS -- DET, INF, LAS
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Determination
 +
INF.  Inquiry Into Information
 +
LAS.  Logic As Semiotic
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Determination
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 1
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything
 +
| comes to pass according to determinate reasons, there
 +
| cannot be any more difficulty over these principles
 +
| of God's foreknowledge.  Although these determinations
 +
| do not compel, they cannot but be certain, and they
 +
| foreshadow what shall happen.
 +
|
 +
| It is true that God sees all at once the whole sequence
 +
| of this universe, when he chooses it, and that thus he
 +
| has no need of the connexion of effects and causes in
 +
| order to foresee these effects.  But since his wisdom
 +
| causes him to choose a sequence in perfect connexion,
 +
| he cannot but see one part of the sequence in the other.
 +
|
 +
| It is one of the rules of my system of general harmony,
 +
| 'that the present is big with the future', and that he
 +
| who sees all sees in that which is that which shall be.
 +
|
 +
| What is more, I have proved conclusively that God sees in
 +
| each portion of the universe the whole universe, owing to
 +
| the perfect connexion of things.  He is infinitely more
 +
| discerning than Pythagoras, who judged the height of
 +
| Hercules by the size of his footprint.  There must
 +
| therefore be no doubt that effects follow their
 +
| causes determinately, in spite of contingency
 +
| and even of freedom, which nevertheless exist
 +
| together with certainty or determination.
 +
|
 +
| Gottfried Wilhelm (Freiherr von) Leibniz,
 +
|'Theodicy:  Essays on the Goodness of God,
 +
| the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil',
 +
| Edited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer,
 +
| Translated by E.M. Huggard from C.J. Gerhardt's
 +
| Edition of the 'Collected Philosophical Works',
 +
| 1875-1890.  Routledge 1951.  Open Court 1985.
 +
| Paragraph 360, page 341.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 2
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Earlier this century in 'The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism',
 +
| Karl Popper wrote, "Common sense inclines, on the one hand, to assert that
 +
| every event is caused by some preceding events, so that every event can be
 +
| explained or predicted. ...  On the other hand, ... common sense attributes
 +
| to mature and sane human persons ... the ability to choose freely between
 +
| alternative possibilities of acting."  This "dilemma of determinism", as
 +
| William James called it, is closely related to the meaning of time.  Is the
 +
| future given, or is it under perpetual construction?  A profound dilemma for
 +
| all of mankind, as time is the fundamental dimension of our existence.
 +
|
 +
| Ilya Prigogine (In Collaboration with Isabelle Stengers),
 +
|'The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature',
 +
| The Free Press, New York, NY, 1997, p. 1.  Originally published as:
 +
|'La Fin des Certitudes', Éditions Odile Jacob, 1996.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 3
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Of triadic Being the multitude of forms
 +
| is so terrific that I have usually shrunk
 +
| from the task of enumerating them;  and for
 +
| the present purpose such an enumeration would
 +
| be worse than superfluous:  it would be a great
 +
| inconvenience.  In another paper, I intend to
 +
| give the formal definition of a sign, which I
 +
| have worked out by arduous and long labour.
 +
| I will omit the explanation of it here.
 +
| Suffice it to say that a sign endeavors
 +
| to represent, in part at least, an Object,
 +
| which is therefore in a sense the cause, or
 +
| determinant, of the sign even if the sign
 +
| represents its object falsely.  But to say
 +
| that it represents its Object implies that
 +
| it affects a mind, and so affects it as,
 +
| in some respect, to determine in that mind
 +
| something that is mediately due to the Object.
 +
| That determination of which the immediate cause,
 +
| or determinant, is the Sign, and of which the
 +
| mediate cause is the Object may be termed the
 +
| 'Interpretant'.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 6.347
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 4
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned
 +
| with the result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable
 +
| or is too evident to be demonstrable.  But in case that dyadic
 +
| action is merely a member of a triadic action, then so far from
 +
| its furnishing the least shade of presumption that all the action
 +
| in the physical universe is dyadic, on the contrary, the entire and
 +
| triadic action justifies a guess that there may be other and more marked
 +
| examples in the universe of the triadic pattern.  No sooner is the guess
 +
| made than instances swarm upon us amply verifying it, and refuting the
 +
| agnostic position;  while others present new problems for our study.
 +
| With the refutation of agnosticism, the agnostic is shown to be
 +
| a superficial neophyte in philosophy, entitled at most to
 +
| an occasional audience on special points, yet infinitely
 +
| more respectable than those who seek to bolster up what
 +
| is really true by sophistical arguments -- the traitors
 +
| to truth that they are.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 6.332
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 5
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Accurate writers have apparently made a distinction
 +
| between the 'definite' and the 'determinate'.  A subject
 +
| is 'determinate' in respect to any character which inheres
 +
| in it or is (universally and affirmatively) predicated of
 +
| it, as well as in respect to the negative of such character,
 +
| these being the very same respect.  In all other respects it
 +
| is 'indeterminate'.  The 'definite' shall be defined presently.
 +
|
 +
| A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought,
 +
| and not alone external signs), that is in any respect objectively
 +
| indeterminate (i.e., whose object is undetermined by the sign itself)
 +
| is objectively 'general' in so far as it extends to the interpreter
 +
| the privilege of carrying its determination further.  'Example':
 +
| "Man is mortal."  To the question, What man? the reply is that the
 +
| proposition explicitly leaves it to you to apply its assertion to
 +
| what man or men you will.
 +
|
 +
| A sign that is objectively indeterminate in any respect
 +
| is objectively 'vague' in so far as it reserves further
 +
| determination to be made in some other conceivable sign,
 +
| or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its deputy
 +
| in this office.  'Example':  "A man whom I could mention seems
 +
| to be a little conceited."  The 'suggestion' here is that the
 +
| man in view is the person addressed;  but the utterer does not
 +
| authorize such an interpretation or 'any' other application of
 +
| what she says.  She can still say, if she likes, that she does
 +
| 'not' mean the person addressed.  Every utterance naturally
 +
| leaves the right of further exposition in the utterer;  and
 +
| therefore, in so far as a sign is indeterminate, it is vague,
 +
| unless it is expressly or by a well-understood convention
 +
| rendered general.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.447
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 6
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Perhaps a more scientific pair of definitions would be
 +
| that anything is 'general' in so far as the principle of
 +
| the excluded middle does not apply to it and is 'vague'
 +
| in so far as the principle of contradiction does not
 +
| apply to it.
 +
|
 +
| Thus, although it is true that "Any proposition
 +
| you please, 'once you have determined its identity',
 +
| is either true or false";  yet 'so long as it remains
 +
| indeterminate and so without identity', it need neither
 +
| be true that any proposition you please is true, nor that
 +
| any proposition you please is false.
 +
|
 +
| So likewise, while it is false that "A proposition 'whose
 +
| identity I have determined' is both true and false", yet
 +
| until it is determinate, it may be true that a proposition
 +
| is true and that a proposition is false.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 7
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| These remarks require supplementation.  Determination, in general, is not
 +
| defined at all;  and the attempt at defining the determination of a subject
 +
| with respect to a character only covers (or seems only to cover) explicit
 +
| propositional determination.  The incidental remark [5.447] to the effect
 +
| that words whose meaning should be determinate would leave "no latitude of
 +
| interpretation" is more satisfactory, since the context makes it plain that
 +
| there must be no such latitude either for the interpreter or for the utterer.
 +
| The explicitness of the words would leave the utterer no room for explanation
 +
| of his meaning.  This definition has the advantage of being applicable to a
 +
| command, to a purpose, to a medieval substantial form;  in short to anything
 +
| capable of indeterminacy.  (That everything indeterminate is of the nature
 +
| of a sign can be proved inductively by imagining and analyzing instances of
 +
| the surdest description.  Thus, the indetermination of an event which should
 +
| happen by pure chance without cause, 'sua sponte', as the Romans mythologically
 +
| said, 'spontanément' in French (as if what was done of one's own motion were sure
 +
| to be irrational), does not belong to the event -- say, an explosion -- 'per se',
 +
| or as an explosion.  Neither is it by virtue of any real relation:  it is by
 +
| virtue of a relation of reason.  Now what is true by virtue of a relation of
 +
| reason is representative, that is, is of the nature of a sign.  A similar
 +
| consideration applies to the indiscriminate shots and blows of a Kentucky
 +
| free fight.)  Even a future event can only be determinate in so far as it
 +
| is a consequent.  Now the concept of a consequent is a logical concept.
 +
| It is derived from the concept of the conclusion of an argument.  But an
 +
| argument is a sign of the truth of its conclusion;  its conclusion is the
 +
| rational 'interpretation' of the sign.  This is in the spirit of the Kantian
 +
| doctrine that metaphysical concepts are logical concepts applied somewhat
 +
| differently from their logical application.  The difference, however, is
 +
| not really as great as Kant represents it to be, and as he was obliged to
 +
| represent it to be, owing to his mistaking the logical and metaphysical
 +
| correspondents in almost every case.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 8
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Another advantage of this definition is that it saves us
 +
| from the blunder of thinking that a sign is indeterminate
 +
| simply because there is much to which it makes no reference;
 +
| that, for example, to say, "C.S. Peirce wrote this article",
 +
| is indeterminate because it does not say what the color of
 +
| the ink used was, who made the ink, how old the father of
 +
| the ink-maker when his son was born, nor what the aspect
 +
| of the planets was when that father was born.  By making
 +
| the definition turn upon the interpretation, all that is
 +
| cut off.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 9
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| At the same time, it is tolerably evident that the definition,
 +
| as it stands, is not sufficiently explicit, and further, that
 +
| at the present stage of our inquiry cannot be made altogether
 +
| satisfactory.  For what is the interpretation alluded to?
 +
| To answer that convincingly would be either to establish
 +
| or to refute the doctrine of pragmaticism.
 +
|
 +
| Still some explanations may be made.  Every sign has a single object,
 +
| though this single object may be a single set or a single continuum
 +
| of objects.  No general description can identify an object.  But the
 +
| common sense of the interpreter of the sign will assure him that the
 +
| object must be one of a limited collection of objects.  [Long example].
 +
|
 +
| [And so] the latitude of interpretation which constitutes the
 +
| indeterminacy of a sign must be understood as a latitude which
 +
| might affect the achievement of a purpose.  For two signs whose
 +
| meanings are for all possible purposes equivalent are absolutely
 +
| equivalent.  This, to be sure, is rank pragmaticism;  for a purpose
 +
| is an affection of action.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 10
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| The October remarks [i.e. those in the above paper] made the
 +
| proper distinction between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.:
 +
| indefiniteness and generality, of which the former consists in
 +
| the sign's not sufficiently expressing itself to allow of an
 +
| indubitable determinate interpretation, while the [latter]
 +
| turns over to the interpreter the right to complete the
 +
| determination as he please.
 +
|
 +
| It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign
 +
| should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning;  but the
 +
| explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe --
 +
| not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe,
 +
| embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which
 +
| we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth" -- that all this
 +
| universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively
 +
| of signs.  Let us note this in passing as having a bearing upon the
 +
| question of pragmaticism.
 +
|
 +
| The October remarks, with a view to brevity, omitted to mention that
 +
| both indefiniteness and generality might primarily affect either the
 +
| logical breadth or the logical depth of the sign to which it belongs.
 +
| It now becomes pertinent to notice this.  When we speak of the depth,
 +
| or signification, of a sign we are resorting to hypostatic abstraction,
 +
| that process whereby we regard a thought as a thing, make an interpretant
 +
| sign the object of a sign.  It has been a butt of ridicule since Molière's
 +
| dying week, and the depth of a writer on philosophy can conveniently be
 +
| sounded by his disposition to make fun of the basis of voluntary inhibition,
 +
| which is the chief characteristic of mankind.  For cautious thinkers will
 +
| not be in haste to deride a kind of thinking that is evidently founded
 +
| upon observation -- namely, upon observation of a sign.  At any rate,
 +
| whenever we speak of a predicate we are representing a thought as
 +
| a thing, as a 'substantia', since the concepts of 'substance' and
 +
| 'subject' are one, its concomitants only being different in the two
 +
| cases.  It is needful to remark this in the present connexion, because,
 +
| were it not for hypostatic abstraction, there could be no generality of
 +
| a predicate, since a sign which should make its interpreter its deputy to
 +
| determine its signification at his pleasure would not signify anything,
 +
| unless 'nothing' be its significate.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 11
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Concepts, or terms, are, in logic, conceived to have
 +
| 'subjective parts', being the narrower terms into which
 +
| they are divisible, and 'definitive parts', which are the
 +
| higher terms of which their definitions or descriptions are
 +
| composed:  these relationships constitute "quantity".
 +
|
 +
| This double way of regarding a class-term as a whole of parts
 +
| is remarked by Aristotle in several places (e.g., 'Metaphysics',
 +
| D. xxv. 1023 b22).  It was familiar to logicians of every age.
 +
| ... and it really seems to have been Kant who made these ideas
 +
| pervade logic and who first expressly called them quantities.
 +
| But the idea was old.  Archbishop Thomson, W.D. Wilson, and
 +
| C.S. Peirce endeavor to make out a third quantity of terms.
 +
| The last calls his third quantity "information", and defines
 +
| it as the "sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol
 +
| is subject or predicate", antecedent or consequent.  The word
 +
| "symbol" is here employed because this logician regards the
 +
| quantities as belonging to propositions and to arguments,
 +
| as well as to terms.
 +
|
 +
| A distinction of 'extensive' and 'comprehensive distinctness' is
 +
| due to Scotus ('Opus Oxon.', I. ii. 3):  namely, the usual effect
 +
| upon a term of an increase of information will be either to increase
 +
| its breadth without without diminishing its depth, or to increase its
 +
| depth without diminishing its breadth.  But the effect may be to show
 +
| that the subjects to which the term was already known to be applicable
 +
| include the entire breadth of another another term which had not been
 +
| known to be so included.  In that case, the first term has gained in
 +
| 'extensive distinctness'.  Or the effect may be to teach that the
 +
| marks already known to be predicable of the term include the
 +
| entire depth of another term not previously known to be so
 +
| included, thus increasing the 'comprehensive distinctness'
 +
| of the former term.
 +
|
 +
| The passage of thought from a broader to a narrower concept
 +
| without change of information, and consequently with increase
 +
| of depth, is called 'descent';  the reverse passage, 'ascent'.
 +
|
 +
| For various purposes, we often imagine our information to be less than
 +
| it is.  When this has the effect of diminishing the breadth of a term
 +
| without increasing its depth, the change is called 'restriction';
 +
| just as when, by an increase of real information, a term gains
 +
| breadth without losing depth, it is said to gain extension.
 +
| This is, for example, a common effect of 'induction'.
 +
| In such case, the effect is called generalization.
 +
|
 +
| A decrease of supposed information may have the effect
 +
| of diminishing the depth of a term without increasing its
 +
| information.  This is often called 'abstraction';  but it is
 +
| far better to call it 'prescission';  for the word 'abstraction'
 +
| is wanted as the designation of an even far more important procedure,
 +
| whereby a transitive element of thought is made substantive, as in the
 +
| grammatical change of an adjective into an abstract noun.  This may be
 +
| called the principal engine of mathematical thought.
 +
|
 +
| When an increase of real information has the effect of increasing the
 +
| depth of a term without diminishing the breadth, the proper word for the
 +
| process is 'amplification'.  In ordinary language, we are inaccurately said
 +
| to 'specify', instead of to 'amplify', when we add to information in this way.
 +
| The logical operation of forming a hypothesis often has this effect, which may,
 +
| in such case, be called 'supposition'.  Almost any increase of depth may be called
 +
| 'determination'.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.364
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 12
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Determine.
 +
|
 +
| The 'termination' is an ending, and a 'term' is
 +
| a period (that comes to an end).  'Terminal' was
 +
| first (and still may be) an adjective;  The Latin
 +
| noun 'terminus' has come directly into English:
 +
| Latin 'terminare, terminat-', to end;  'terminus',
 +
| boundary.  From the limit itself, as in 'term' of
 +
| office or imprisonment, 'term' grew to mean the
 +
| limiting conditions (the 'terms' of an agreement);
 +
| hence, the 'defining' (Latin 'finis', end;  compare
 +
| 'finance') of the idea, as in a 'term' of reproach;
 +
| 'terminology'.  To 'determine' is to set down limits
 +
| or bounds to something, as when you 'determine' to
 +
| perform a task, or as 'determinism' pictures limits
 +
| set to man's freedom.  'Predetermined' follows this
 +
| sense;  but 'extermination' comes later.  Otherwise,
 +
| existence would be 'interminable'.
 +
|
 +
| Joseph T. Shipley, 'Dictionary of Word Origins',
 +
| Rowman & Allanheld, Totowa, NJ, 1967, 1985.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 13
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| To determine means to make a circumstance different from what
 +
| it might have been otherwise.  For example, a drop of rain
 +
| falling on a stone determines it to be wet, provided the
 +
| stone may have been dry before.  But if the fact of
 +
| a whole shower half an hour previous is given,
 +
| then one drop does not determine the stone to
 +
| be wet;  for it would be wet, at any rate.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 245-246.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 14
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Taking it for granted, then, that the inner and outer worlds are
 +
| superposed throughout, without possibility of separation, let us
 +
| now proceed to another point.  There is a third world, besides the
 +
| inner and the outer;  and all three are coëxtensive and contain every
 +
| experience.  Suppose that we have an experience.  That experience has
 +
| three determinations -- three different references to a substratum or
 +
| substrata, lying behind it and determining it.  In the first place,
 +
| it is a determination of an object external to ourselves -- we feel
 +
| that it is so because it is extended in space.  Thereby it is in the
 +
| external world.  In the second place, it is a determination of our own
 +
| soul, it is 'our' experience;  we feel that it is so because it lasts in
 +
| time.  Were it a flash of sensation, there for less than an instant, and
 +
| then utterly gone from memory, we should not have time to think it ours.
 +
| But while it lasts, and we reflect upon it, it enters into the internal
 +
| world.  We have now considered that experience as a determination of the
 +
| modifying object and of the modified soul;  now, I say, it may be and is
 +
| naturally regarded as also a determination of an idea of the Universal
 +
| mind;  a preëxistent, archetypal Idea.  Arithmetic, the law of number,
 +
| 'was' before anything to be numbered or any mind to number had been
 +
| created.  It 'was' though it did not 'exist'.  It was not 'a fact'
 +
| nor a thought, but it was an unuttered word.  'En arche en o logos'.
 +
| We feel an experience to be a determination of such an archetypal
 +
| Logos, by virtue of its // 'depth of tone' / logical intension //,
 +
| and thereby it is in the 'logical world'.
 +
|
 +
| Note the great difference between this view and Hegel's.
 +
| Hegel says, logic is the science of the pure idea.  I should
 +
| describe it as the science of the laws of experience in virtue
 +
| of its being a determination of the idea, or in other words as
 +
| the formal science of the logical world.
 +
|
 +
| In this point of view, efforts to ascertain precisely how the
 +
| intellect works in thinking, -- that is to say investigation
 +
| of internal characterictics -- is no more to the purpose which
 +
| logical writers as such, however vaguely have in view, than
 +
| would be the investigation of external characteristics.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 168-169.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 15
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| But not to follow this subject too far, we have
 +
| now established three species of representations:
 +
| 'copies', 'signs', and 'symbols';  of the last of
 +
| which only logic treats.  A second approximation to
 +
| a definition of it then will be, the science of symbols
 +
| in general and as such.  But this definition is still
 +
| too broad;  this might, indeed, form the definition of
 +
| a certain science which would be a branch of Semiotic
 +
| or the general science of representations which might
 +
| be called Symbolistic, and of this logic would be
 +
| a species.  But logic only considers symbols
 +
| from a particular point of view.
 +
|
 +
| A symbol in general and as such has three relations.
 +
| The first is its relation to the pure Idea or Logos
 +
| and this (from the analogy of the grammatical terms
 +
| for the pronouns I, It, Thou) I call its relation
 +
| of the first person, since it is its relation to
 +
| its own essence.  The second is its relation to
 +
| the Consciousness as being thinkable, or to any
 +
| language as being translatable, which I call its
 +
| relation to the second person, since it refers to
 +
| its power of appealing to a mind.  The third is its
 +
| relation to its object, which I call its relation to
 +
| the third person or It.  Every symbol is subject to
 +
| three distinct systems of formal law as conditions
 +
| of its taking up these three relations.  If it
 +
| violates either one of these three codes, the
 +
| condition of its having either of the three
 +
| relations, it ceases to be a symbol and makes
 +
| 'nonsense'.  Nonsense is that which has a certain
 +
| resemblance to a symbol without being a symbol.  But
 +
| since it simulates the symbolic character it is usually
 +
| only one of the three codes which it violates;  at any rate,
 +
| flagrantly.  Hence there should be at least three different kinds
 +
| of nonsense.  And accordingly we remark that that we call nonsense
 +
| meaningless, absurd, or quibbling, in different cases.  If a symbol
 +
| violates the conditions of its being a determination of the pure
 +
| Idea or logos, it may be so nearly a determination thereof as
 +
| to be perfectly intelligible.  If for instance instead
 +
| of 'I am' one should say 'I is'.
 +
| 'I is' is in itself meaningless,
 +
| it violates the conditions of its
 +
| relation to the form it is meant
 +
| to embody.  Thus we see that the
 +
| conditions of the relation of the
 +
| first person are the laws of grammar.
 +
|
 +
| I will now take another example.  I know my opinion is false, still I hold it.
 +
| This is grammatical, but the difficulty is that it violates the conditions
 +
| of its having an object.  Observe that this is precisely the difficulty.
 +
| It not only cannot be a determination of this or that object, but it
 +
| cannot be a determination of any object, whatever.  This is the
 +
| whole difficulty.  I say that, I receive contradictories into
 +
| one opinion or symbolical representation;  now this implies
 +
| that it is a symbol of nothing.  Here is another example:
 +
| This very proposition is false.  This is a proposition to
 +
| which the law of excluded middle namely that every symbol
 +
| must be false or true, does not apply.  For if it is false it
 +
| is thereby true.  And if not false it is thereby not true.  Now
 +
| why does not this law apply to this proposition.  Simply because it
 +
| does itself state that it has no object.  It talks of itself and only
 +
| of itself and has no external relation whatever.  These examples show
 +
| that logical laws only hold good, as conditions of a symbol's having
 +
| an object.  The fact that it has often been called the science of
 +
| truth confirms this view.
 +
|
 +
| I define logic therefore as the science of the conditions
 +
| which enable symbols in general to refer to objects.
 +
|
 +
| At the same time 'symbolistic' in general gives a trivium consisting of
 +
| Universal Grammar, Logic, and Universal Rhetoric, using this last term to
 +
| signify the science of the formal conditions of intelligibility of symbols.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 174-175.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 16
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| The consideration of this imperfect datum leads us to make
 +
| a fundamental observation;  namely, that the problem how we
 +
| can make an induction is one and the same with the problem how
 +
| we can make any general statement, with reason;  for there is
 +
| no way left in which such a statement can originate except from
 +
| induction or pure fiction.  Hereby, we strike down at once all
 +
| attempts at solving the problem as involve the supposition of
 +
| a major premiss as a datum.  Such explanations merely show
 +
| that we can arrive at one general statement by deduction
 +
| from another, while they leave the real question,
 +
| untouched.  The peculiar merit of Aristotle's
 +
| theory is that after the objectionable portion
 +
| of it is swept away and after it has thereby been
 +
| left utterly powerless to account for any certainty
 +
| or even probability in the inference from induction,
 +
| we still retain these 'forms' which show what the
 +
| 'actual process' is.
 +
|
 +
| And what is this process?  We have in the apodictic conclusion,
 +
| some most extraordinary observation, as for example that a great
 +
| number of animals -- namely neat and deer, feed only upon vegetables.
 +
| This proposition, be it remarked, need not have had any generality;  if
 +
| the animals observed instead of being all 'neat' had been so very various
 +
| that we knew not what to say of them except that they were 'herbivora' and
 +
| 'cloven-footed', the effect would have been to render the argument simply
 +
| irresistable.  In addition to this datum, we have another;  namely that
 +
| these same animals are all cloven-footed.  Now it would not be so very
 +
| strange that all cloven-footed animals should be herbivora;  animals
 +
| of a particular structure very likely may use a particular food.
 +
| But if this be indeed so, then all the marvel of the conclusion
 +
| is explained away.  So in order to avoid a marvel which must in
 +
| some form be accepted, we are led to believe what is easy to
 +
| believe though it is entirely uncertain.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 179.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 17
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| There is a large class of reasonings which are neither deductive nor inductive.
 +
| I mean the inference of a cause from its effect or reasoning to a physical hypothesis.
 +
| I call this reasoning 'à posteriori'.  If I reason that certain conduct is wise because
 +
| it has a character which belongs 'only' to wise things, I reason 'à priori'.  If I think
 +
| it is wise because it once turned out to be wise, that is if I infer that it is wise on
 +
| this occasion because it was wise on that occasion, I reason inductively.  But if
 +
| I think it is wise because a wise man does it, I then make the pure hypothesis
 +
| that he does it because he is wise, and I reason 'à posteriori'.  The form
 +
| this reasoning assumes, is that of an inference of a minor premiss in
 +
| any of the figures.  The following is an example.
 +
|
 +
|    Light gives certain fringes.      |    Ether waves give certain fringes.
 +
|    Ether waves gives these fringes.  |    Light is ether waves.
 +
| .: Light is ether waves.              | .: Light gives these fringes.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 180.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 18
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| We come now to the question, what is the 'rationale' of these three kinds
 +
| of reasoning.  And first let us understand precisely what we intend by this.
 +
| It is clear then that it is none of our business to inquire in what manner we
 +
| think when we reason, for we have already seen that logic is wholly separate
 +
| from psychology.  What we seek is an explicit statement of the logical ground
 +
| of these different kinds of inference.  This logical ground will have two parts,
 +
| 1st the ground of possibility and 2nd the ground of proceedure.  The ground of
 +
| possibility is the special property of symbols upon which every inference of
 +
| a certain kind rests.  The ground of proceedure is the property of symbols
 +
| which makes a certain inference possible from certain premisses.  The
 +
| ground of possibility must be both discovered and demonstrated, fully.
 +
| The ground of proceedure must be exhibited in outline, but it is not
 +
| requisite to fill up all the details of this subject, especially
 +
| as that would lead us too far into the technicalities of logic.
 +
|
 +
| As the three kinds of reasoning are entirely distinct, each must have
 +
| a different ground of possibility;  and the principle of each kind must
 +
| be proved by that same kind of inference for it would be absurd to attempt
 +
| to rest it on a weaker kind of inference and to rest it on one as strong as
 +
| itself would be simply to reduce it to that other kind of reasoning.  Moreover,
 +
| these principles must be logical principles because we do not seek any other
 +
| ground now, than a logical ground.  As logical principles, they will not
 +
| relate to the symbol in itself or in its relation to equivalent symbols
 +
| but wholly in its relation to what it symbolizes.  In other words
 +
| it will relate to the symbolization of objects.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 183.
 +
|
 +
| Chrales Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 19
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Now all symbolization is of three objects, at once;  the first is a possible thing,
 +
| the second is a possible form, the third is a possible symbol.  It will be objected
 +
| that the two latter are not properly objects.  We have hitherto regarded the symbol
 +
| as 'standing for' the thing, as a concrete determination of its form, and addressing
 +
| a symbol;  and it is true that it is only by referring to a possible thing that a
 +
| symbol has an objective relation, it is only by bearing in it a form that it has
 +
| any subjective relation, and it is only by equaling another symbol that it has any
 +
| tuistical relation.  But this objective relation once given to a symbol is at once
 +
| applicable to all to which it necessarily refers;  and this is shown by the fact
 +
| of our regarding every symbol as 'connotative' as well as 'denotative', and by our
 +
| regarding one word as standing for another whenever we endeavor to clear up a little
 +
| obscurity of meaning.  And the reason that this is so is that the possible symbol and
 +
| the possible form to which a symbol is related each relate also to that thing which
 +
| is its immediate object.  Things, forms, and symbols, therefore, are symbolized in
 +
| every symbolization.  And this being so, it is natural to suppose that our three
 +
| principles of inference which we know already refer to some three objects of
 +
| symbolization, refer to these.
 +
|
 +
| That such really is the case admits of proof.  For the principle of inference 'à priori'
 +
| must be established 'à priori';  that is by reasoning analytically from determinant to
 +
| determinate, in other words from definition.  But this can only be applied to an object
 +
| whose characteristics depend upon its definition.  Now of most things the definition
 +
| depends upon the character, the definition of a symbol alone determines its character.
 +
| Hence the principle of inference 'à priori' must relate to symbols.  The principle of
 +
| inference 'à posteriori' must be established 'à posteriori', that is by reasoning from
 +
| determinate to determinant.  This is only applicable to that which is determined by what
 +
| it determines;  in other words, to that which is only subject to the truth and falsehood
 +
| which affects its determinant and which in itself is mere 'zero'.  But this is only true
 +
| of pure forms.  Hence the principle of inference 'à posteriori' must relate to pure form.
 +
| The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively;  that is by reasoning
 +
| from parts to whole.  This is only applicable to that whose whole is given in the sum of the
 +
| parts;  and this is only the case with things.  Hence the principle of inductive inference
 +
| must relate to things.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 183-184.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 20
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Is there any knowledge 'à priori'?  All our thought begins with
 +
| experience, the mind furnishes no material for thought whatever.
 +
| This is acknowledged by all the philosophers with whom we need concern
 +
| ourselves at all.  The mind only works over the materials furnished by
 +
| sense;  no dream is so strange but that all its elementary parts are
 +
| reminiscences of appearance, the collocation of these alone are we
 +
| capable of originating.  In one sense, therefore, everything may
 +
| be said to be inferred from experience;  everything that we know,
 +
| or think or guess or make up may be said to be inferred by some
 +
| process valid or fallacious from the impressions of sense.  But
 +
| though everything in this loose sense is inferred from experience,
 +
| yet everything does not require experience to be as it is in order
 +
| to afford data for the inference.  Give me the relations of 'any'
 +
| geometrical intuition you please and you give me the data for proving
 +
| all the propositions of geometry.  In other words, everything is not
 +
| determined by experience.  And this admits of proof.  For suppose
 +
| there may be universal and necessary judgements;  as for example
 +
| the moon must be made of green cheese.  But there is no element of
 +
| necessity in an impression of sense for necessity implies that things
 +
| would be the same as they are were certain accidental circumstances
 +
| different from what they are.  I may here note that it is very common
 +
| to misstate this point, as though the necessity here intended were a
 +
| necessity of thinking.  But it is not meant to say that what we feel
 +
| compelled to think we are absolutely compelled to think, as this would
 +
| imply;  but that if we think a fact 'must be' we cannot have observed
 +
| that it 'must be'.  The principle is thus reduced to an analytical one.
 +
| In the same way universality implies that the event would be the same
 +
| were the things within certain limits different from what they are.
 +
| Hence universal and necessary elements of experience are not determined
 +
| from without.  But are they, therefore, determined from within?  Are they
 +
| determined at all?  Does not this very conception of determination imply
 +
| causality and thus beg the whole question of causality at the very outset?
 +
| Not at all.  The determination here meant is not real determination but
 +
| logical determination.  A cognition 'à priori' is one which any experience
 +
| contains reason for and therefore which no experience determines but which
 +
| contains elements such as the mind introduces in working up the materials
 +
| of sense, or rather as they are not new materials, they are the working up.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 246-247.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 21
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| The terms 'à priori' and 'à posteriori' in their ancient sense
 +
| denote respectively reasoning from an antecedent to a consequent
 +
| and from a consequent to an antecedent.  Thus suppose we know that
 +
| every incompetent general will meet with defeat.  Then if we reason
 +
| that because a given general is incompetent that he must meet with
 +
| a defeat, we reason 'à priori';  but if we reason that because a
 +
| general is defeated he was a bad one, we reason 'à posteriori'.
 +
|
 +
| Kant however uses these terms in another and derived sense.  He did not
 +
| entirely originate their modern use, for his contemporaries were already
 +
| beginning to apply them in the same way, but he fixed their 'meaning' in
 +
| the new application and made them household words in subsequent philosophy.
 +
|
 +
| If one judges that a house falls down on the testimony of his eyesight
 +
| then it is clear that he reasons 'à posteriori' because he infers the
 +
| fact from an effect of it on his eyes.  If he judges that a house falls
 +
| because he knows that the props have been removed he reasons 'à priori';
 +
| yet not purely 'à priori' for his premisses were obtained from experience.
 +
| But if he infers it from axioms innate in the constitution of the mind,
 +
| he may be said to reason purely 'à priori'.  All this had been said
 +
| previously to Kant.  I will now state how he modified the meaning
 +
| of the terms while preserving this application of them.  What is
 +
| known from experience must be known 'à posteriori', because the
 +
| thought is determined from without.  To determine means to make
 +
| a circumstance different from what it might have been otherwise.
 +
| For example, a drop of rain falling on a stone determines it to
 +
| be wet, provided the stone may have been dry before.  But if the
 +
| fact of a whole shower half an hour previous is given, then one
 +
| drop does not determine the stone to be wet;  for it would be wet,
 +
| at any rate.  Now, it is said that the results of experience are
 +
| inferred 'à posteriori', for this reason that they are determined
 +
| from without the mind by something not previously present to it;
 +
| being so determined their determinants or //causes/reasons// are
 +
| not present to the mind and of course could not be reasoned from.
 +
| Hence, a thought determined from without by something not in
 +
| consciousness even implicitly is inferred 'à posteriori'.
 +
|
 +
| Kant, accordingly, uses the term 'à posteriori' as meaning what
 +
| is determined from without.  The term 'à priori' he uses to mean
 +
| determined from within or involved implicitly in the whole of what
 +
| is present to consciousness (or in a conception which is the logical
 +
| condition of what is in consciousness).  The twist given to the words
 +
| is so slight that their application remains almost exactly the same.
 +
| If there is any change it is this.  A primary belief is 'à priori'
 +
| according to Kant;  for it is determined from within.  But it is not
 +
| 'inferred' at all and therefore neither of the terms is applicable in
 +
| their ancient sense.  And yet as an explicit judgment it is inferred
 +
| and inferred 'à priori'.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 245-246.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Note 22
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Though I talk of forms as something independent of the mind,
 +
| I only mean that the mind so conceives them and that that
 +
| conception is valid.  I thus say that all the qualities
 +
| we know are determinations of the pure idea.  But that
 +
| we have any further knowledge of the idea or that
 +
| this is to know it in itself I entirely deny.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 256.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Inquiry Into Information
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 1
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
I begin yet another excursion into C.S. Peirce's concept of information.
 +
Because Peirce's concept of determination is so deeply involved in his
 +
concept of information, it may be useful to keep these links close by:
 +
 +
DET.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/thread.html#2197
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 2
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| In order to understand how these principles of 'à posteriori'
 +
| and inductive inference can be put into practice, we must
 +
| consider by itself the substitution of one symbol for
 +
| another.  Symbols are alterable and comparable in
 +
| three ways.  In the first place they may denote
 +
| more or fewer possible differing things;  in this
 +
| regard they are said to have 'extension'.  In the
 +
| second place, they may imply more or less as to
 +
| the quality of these things;  in this respect
 +
| they are said to have 'intension'.  In the
 +
| third place they may involve more or less
 +
| real knowledge;  in this respect they
 +
| have 'information' and 'distinctness'.
 +
| Logical writers generally speak only
 +
| of extension and intension and Kant
 +
| has laid down the law that these
 +
| quantities are inverse in respect
 +
| of each other.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 187.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 3
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
I am going to run through the series of concrete illustrations
 +
that Peirce lays out to explain his take on the conceptions of
 +
extension, intension, and information.  It is a mite long, but
 +
helps better than anything else I know to bring what Peirce is
 +
talking about down to earth.  For ease of comprehension I will
 +
divide this extended paragraph into more moderate-sized chunks.
 +
 +
| For example, take 'cat';  now increase the extension of that greatly --
 +
| 'cat' or 'rabbit' or 'dog';  now apply to this extended class the
 +
| additional intension 'feline'; -- 'feline cat' or 'feline rabbit'
 +
| or 'feline dog' is equal to 'cat' again.  This law holds good as
 +
| long as the information remains constant, but when this is changed
 +
| the relation is changed.  Thus 'cats' are before we know about them
 +
| separable into 'blue cats" and 'cats not blue' of which classes 'cats'
 +
| is the most extensive and least intensive.  But afterwards we find out
 +
| that one of those classes cannot exist;  so that 'cats' increases its
 +
| intension to equal 'cats not blue' while 'cats not blue' increases its
 +
| extension to equal 'cats'.
 +
|
 +
| Again, to give a better case, 'rational animal' is divisible into 'mortal rational animal'
 +
| and 'immortal rational animal';  but upon information we find that no 'rational animal'
 +
| is 'immortal' and this fact is symbolized in the word 'man'.  'Man', therefore, has at
 +
| once the extension of 'rational animal' with the intension of 'mortal rational animal',
 +
| and far more beside, because it involves more 'information' than either of the previous
 +
| symbols.  'Man' is more 'distinct' than 'rational animal', and more 'formal' than
 +
| 'mortal rational animal'.
 +
|
 +
| Now of two statements both of which are true, it is obvious that
 +
| that contains the most truth which contains the most information.
 +
| If two predicates of the same intension, therefore, are true of
 +
| the same subject, the most formal one contains the most truth.
 +
|
 +
| Thus, it is better to say Socrates is a man, than to say Socrates
 +
| is an animal who is rational mortal risible biped &c. because
 +
| the former contains all the last and in addition it forms
 +
| the synthesis of the whole under a definite 'form'.
 +
|
 +
| On the other hand if the same predicate is applicable
 +
| to two equivalent subjects, that one is to be preferred
 +
| which is the most 'distinct';  thus it conveys more truth
 +
| to say All men are born of women, than All rational animals
 +
| are born of women, because the former has at once as much
 +
| extension as the latter, and a much closer reference to
 +
| the things spoken of.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 187-188.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 4
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Let us now take the two statements, S is P, T is P;
 +
| let us suppose that T is much more distinct than S and
 +
| that it is also more extensive.  But we 'know' that S is P.
 +
| Now if T were not more extensive than S, T is P would contain
 +
| more truth than S is P;  being more extensive it 'may' contain
 +
| more truth and it may also introduce a falsehood.  Which of these
 +
| probabilities is the greatest?  T by being more extensive becomes
 +
| less intensive;  it is the intension which introduces truth and the
 +
| extension which introduces falsehood.  If therefore T increases the
 +
| intension of S more than its extension, T is to be preferred to S;
 +
| otherwise not.  Now this is the case of induction.  Which contains
 +
| most truth, 'neat' and 'deer' are herbivora, or cloven-footed
 +
| animals are herbivora?
 +
|
 +
| In the two statements, S is P, S is Q, let Q be at once more 'formal' and
 +
| more 'intensive' than P;  and suppose we only 'know' that S is P.  In this
 +
| case the increase of formality gives a chance of additional truth and the
 +
| increase of intension a chance of error.  If the extension of Q is more
 +
| increased than than its intension, then S is Q is likely to contain more
 +
| truth than S is P and 'vice versa'.  This is the case of 'à posteriori'
 +
| reasoning.  We have for instance to choose between
 +
|
 +
|    Light gives fringes of such and such a description
 +
|
 +
| and
 +
|
 +
|    Light is ether-waves.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 188-189.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 5
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Thus the process of information disturbs the relations
 +
| of extension and comprehension for a moment and the
 +
| class which results from the equivalence of two
 +
| others has a greater intension than one and
 +
| a greater extension than the other.  Hence,
 +
| we may conveniently alter the formula for the
 +
| relations of extension and comprehension;  thus,
 +
| instead of saying that one is the reciprocal of
 +
| the other, or
 +
|
 +
|    comprehension  x  extension  =  constant,
 +
|
 +
| we may say
 +
|
 +
|    comprehension  x  extension  =  information.
 +
|
 +
| We see then that all symbols besides their denotative and connotative objects have another;
 +
| their informative object.  The denotative object is the total of possible things denoted.
 +
| The connotative object is the total of symbols translated or implied.  The informative
 +
| object is the total of forms manifested and is measured by the amount of intension the
 +
| term has, over and above what is necessary for limiting its extension.  For example,
 +
| the denotative object of 'man' is such collections of matter the word knows while it
 +
| knows them, i.e., while they are organized.  The connotative object of 'man' is the
 +
| total form which the word expresses.  The informative object of 'man' is the total
 +
| fact which it embodies;  or the value of the conception which is its equivalent
 +
| symbol.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 276.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 6
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| The difference between connotation, denotation, and information
 +
| supplies the basis for another division of terms and propositions;
 +
| a division which is related to the one we have just considered in
 +
| precisely the same way as the division of syllogism into 3 figures
 +
| is related to the division into Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis.
 +
|
 +
| Every symbol which has connotation and denotation has also information.
 +
| For by the denotative character of a symbol, I understand application
 +
| to objects implied in the symbol itself.  The existence therefore of
 +
| objects of a certain kind is implied in every connotative denotative
 +
| symbol;  and this is information.
 +
|
 +
| Now there are certain imperfect or false symbols produced by the combination
 +
| of true symbols which have lost either their denotation or their connotation.
 +
| When symbols are combined together in extension as for example in the compound
 +
| term "cats and dogs", their sum possesses denotation but no connotation or at least
 +
| no connotation which determines their denotation.  Hence, such terms, which I prefer
 +
| to call 'enumerative' terms, have no information and it remains unknown whether there
 +
| be any real kind corresponding to cats and dogs taken together.  On the other hand
 +
| when symbols are combined together in comprehension as for example in the compound
 +
| "tailed men" the product possesses connotation but no denotation, it not being
 +
| therein implied that there may be any 'tailed men'.  Such conjunctive terms
 +
| have therefore no information.  Thirdly there are names purporting to be of
 +
| real kinds as 'men';  and these are perfect symbols.
 +
|
 +
| Enumerative terms are not truly symbols but only signs;  and
 +
| Conjunctive terms are copies;  but these copies and signs must
 +
| be considered in symbolistic because they are composed of symbols.
 +
|
 +
| When an enumerative term forms the subject of a grammatical proposition,
 +
| as when we say "cats and dogs have tails", there is no logical unity in the
 +
| proposition at all.  Logically, therefore, it is two propositions and not one.
 +
| The same is the case when a conjunctive proposition forms the predicate of a
 +
| sentence;  for to say that "hens are feathered bipeds" is simply to predicate
 +
| two unconnected marks of them.
 +
|
 +
| When an enumerative term as such is the predicate of a proposition, that proposition
 +
| cannot be a denotative one, for a denotative proposition is one which merely analyzes
 +
| the denotation of its predicate, but the denotation of an enumerative term is analyzed
 +
| in the term itself;  hence if an enumerative term as such were the predicate of a
 +
| proposition that proposition would be equivalent in meaning to its own predicate.
 +
| On the other hand, if a conjunctive term as such is the subject of a proposition,
 +
| that proposition cannot be connotative, for the connotation of a conjunctive term
 +
| is already analyzed in the term itself, and a connotative proposition does no more
 +
| than analyze the connotation of its subject.  Thus we have
 +
|
 +
|    Conjunctive    Simple      Enumerative
 +
|
 +
| propositions so related to
 +
|
 +
|    Denotative    Informative  Connotative
 +
|
 +
| propositions that what is on the left hand
 +
| of one line cannot be on the right hand of
 +
| the other.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 278-279.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 7
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| We are now in a condition to discuss the question
 +
| of the grounds of scientific inference.  This
 +
| problem naturally divides itself into parts:
 +
|
 +
|    1st  To state and prove the principles
 +
|        upon which the possibility in general
 +
|        of each kind of inference depends,
 +
|
 +
|    2nd  To state and prove the rules
 +
|        for making inferences
 +
|        in particular cases.
 +
|
 +
| The first point I shall discuss in the remainder of this lecture;
 +
| the second I shall scarcely be able to touch upon in these lectures.
 +
|
 +
| Inference in general obviously supposes symbolization;  and
 +
| all symbolization is inference.  For every symbol as we have seen
 +
| contains information.  And in the last lecture we saw that all kinds
 +
| of information involve inference.  Inference, then, is symbolization.
 +
| They are the same notions.  Now we have already analyzed the notion
 +
| of a 'symbol', and we have found that it depends upon the possibility
 +
| of representations acquiring a nature, that is to say an immediate
 +
| representative power.  This principle is therefore the ground
 +
| of inference in general.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 279-280.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 8
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| But there are three distinct kinds of inference;
 +
| inconvertible and different in their conception.
 +
| There must, therefore, be three different principles
 +
| to serve for their grounds.  These three principles
 +
| must also be indemonstrable;  that is to say, each
 +
| of them so far as it can be proved must be proved
 +
| by means of that kind of inference of which it
 +
| is the ground.  For if the principle of either
 +
| kind of inference were proved by another kind
 +
| of inference, the former kind of inference
 +
| would be reduced to the latter;  and since
 +
| the different kinds of inference are in
 +
| all respects different this cannot be.
 +
| You will say that it is no proof of
 +
| these principles at all to support
 +
| them by that which they themselves
 +
| support.  But I take it for granted
 +
| at the outset, as I said at the beginning
 +
| of my first lecture, that induction and hypothesis
 +
| have their own validity.  The question before us is 'why'
 +
| they are valid.  The principles, therefore, of which we
 +
| are in search, are not to be used to prove that the
 +
| three kinds of inference are valid, but only to
 +
| show how they come to be valid, and the proof
 +
| of them consists in showing that they
 +
| determine the validity of the
 +
| three kinds of inference.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 280.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 9
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| But these three principles must have this in common that they refer to 'symbolization'
 +
| for they are principles of inference which is symbolization.  As grounds of the
 +
| possibility of inference they must refer to the possibility of symbolization or
 +
| symbolizability.  And as logical principles they must relate to the reference
 +
| of symbols to objects;  for logic has been defined as the science of the
 +
| general conditions of the relations of symbols to objects.  But as three
 +
| different principles they must state three different relations of
 +
| symbols to objects.  Now we already found that a symbol has three
 +
| different relations to objects;  namely, connotation, denotation,
 +
| and information, which are its relations to the object considered
 +
| as a thing, a form, and an equivalent representation.  Hence,
 +
| it is obvious that these three principles must relate to
 +
| the symbolizability of things, of forms, and of symbols.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 280-281.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 10
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Our next business is to find out which is which.
 +
| For this purpose we must consider that each principle
 +
| is to be proved by the kind of inference which it supports.
 +
|
 +
| The ground of deductive inference then must be established deductively;
 +
| that is by reasoning from determinant to determinate, or in other words
 +
| by reasoning from definition.  But this kind of reasoning can only be
 +
| applied to an object whose character depends upon its definition.
 +
| Now of most objects it is the definition which depends upon the
 +
| character;  and so the definition must therefore itself rest on
 +
| induction or hypothesis.  But the principle of deduction must
 +
| rest on nothing but deduction, and therefore it must relate
 +
| to something whose character depends upon its definition.
 +
| Now the only objects of which this is true are symbols;
 +
| they indeed are created by their definition;  while
 +
| neither forms nor things are.  Hence, the principle
 +
| of deduction must relate to the symbolizability of
 +
| symbols.
 +
|
 +
| The principle of hypothetic inference must be established hypothetically,
 +
| that is by reasoning from determinate to determinant.  Now it is clear that
 +
| this kind of reasoning is applicable only to that which is determined by what
 +
| it determines;  or that which is only subject to truth and falsehood so far as
 +
| its determinate is, and is thus of itself pure 'zero'.  Now this is the case with
 +
| nothing whatever except the pure forms;  they indeed are what they are only in so
 +
| far as they determine some symbol or object.  Hence the principle of hypothetic
 +
| inference must relate to the symbolizability of forms.
 +
|
 +
| The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively,
 +
| that is by reasoning from parts to whole.  This kind of reasoning can
 +
| apply only to those objects whose parts collectively are their whole.
 +
| Now of symbols this is not true.  If I write 'man' here and 'dog' here
 +
| that does not constitute the symbol of 'man and dog', for symbols have
 +
| to be reduced to the unity of symbolization which Kant calls the unity
 +
| of apperception and unless this be indicated by some special mark they
 +
| do not constitute a whole.  In the same way forms have to determine the
 +
| same matter before they are added;  if the curtains are green and the
 +
| wainscot yellow that does not make a 'yellow-green'.  But with things
 +
| it is altogether different;  wrench the blade and handle of a knife
 +
| apart and the form of the knife has dissappeared but they are the
 +
| same thing -- the same matter -- that they were before.  Hence,
 +
| the principle of induction must relate to the symbolizability
 +
| of things.
 +
|
 +
| All these principles must as principles be universal.
 +
| Hence they are as follows: --
 +
|
 +
| All things, forms, symbols are symbolizable.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 281-282.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Note 11
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
I am forwarding this follow-up message from Joe Ransdell
 +
about a reference that is relevant to the discussion of
 +
inference, information, inquiry, and so on, especially
 +
with regard to the topics of generality and vagueness,
 +
and their further relationships to various notions of
 +
determination, extension, and so-called "comprehension"
 +
(the slightly more correct term for what most of us will
 +
probably continue to discuss under the more popular common
 +
name of "intension").
 +
 +
| Subj:  Re: Inquiry Into Inquiry
 +
| Date:  Sat, 28 Jul 2001 13:59:17 -0500
 +
| From:  Joseph Ransdell <ransdell@door.net>
 +
|    To:  Arisbe <arisbe@stderr.org>
 +
|
 +
| I forgot to mention, in my message about Peirce's information theory,
 +
| that the paper referrred to is available on-line at:
 +
|
 +
| http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/web/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm
 +
|
 +
| It appears in Vol. 2 of the 'Collected Papers' and Vol. 2 of the 'Writings' as well.
 +
| The 'Collected Papers' version is better, though, since it appends some additional
 +
| material from 1893, and is followed also by Peirce and Ladd-Franklin's entry on
 +
| "Signification and Application" in the 1902 Baldwin's Dictionary.
 +
|
 +
| Joe Ransdell
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Logic As Semiotic
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 1
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another
 +
| name for 'semiotic' (Greek 'semeiotike'), the quasi-necessary, or formal,
 +
| doctrine of signs.  By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary", or
 +
| formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know,
 +
| and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to
 +
| naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and
 +
| therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what 'must be' the
 +
| characters of all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to
 +
| say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.  As to that
 +
| process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation.
 +
|
 +
| The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which
 +
| ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories
 +
| of philosophers sometimes hardly leave room.  It is a familiar
 +
| experience to every human being to wish for something quite
 +
| beyond his present means, and to follow that wish by the
 +
| question, "Should I wish for that thing just the same, if
 +
| I had ample means to gratify it?"  To answer that question,
 +
| he searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I term an
 +
| abstractive observation.  He makes in his imagination a sort
 +
| of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers
 +
| what modifications the hypothetical state of things would
 +
| require to be made in that picture, and then examines it,
 +
| that is, 'observes' what he has imagined, to see whether
 +
| the same ardent desire is there to bediscerned.  By such
 +
| a process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical
 +
| reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what 'would be'
 +
| true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelligence
 +
| using them was scientific.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.227.
 +
| Eds. Note.  "From an unidentified fragment, c. 1897".
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 2
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Logic is an analysis of forms not a study of the mind.
 +
| It tells 'why' an inference follows not 'how' it arises
 +
| in the mind.  It is the business therefore of the logician
 +
| to break up complicated inferences from numerous premisses
 +
| into the simplest possible parts and not to leave them
 +
| as they are.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 217.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 3
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Some reasons having now been given for adopting the
 +
| unpsychological conception of the science, let us now
 +
| seek to make this conception sufficiently distinct to
 +
| serve for a definition of logic.  For this purpose we
 +
| must bring our 'logos' from the abstract to the concrete,
 +
| from the absolute to the dependent.  There is no science
 +
| of absolutes.  The metaphysical logos is no more to us
 +
| than the metaphysical soul or the metaphysical matter.
 +
| To the absolute Idea or Logos, the dependent or relative
 +
| 'word' corresponds.  The word 'horse', is thought of as
 +
| being a word though it be unwritten, unsaid, and unthought.
 +
| It is true, it must be considered as having been thought;
 +
| but it need not have been thought by the same mind which
 +
| regards it as being a word.  I can think of a word in
 +
| Feejee, though I can attach no definite articulation to
 +
| it, and do not guess what it would be like.  Such a word,
 +
| abstract but not absolute, is no more than the genus of
 +
| all symbols having the same meaning.  We can also think
 +
| of the higher genus which contains words of all meanings.
 +
| A first approximation to a definition, then, will be that
 +
| logic is the science of representations in general, whether
 +
| mental or material.  This definition coincides with Locke's.
 +
| It is however too wide for logic does not treat of all kinds
 +
| of representations.  The resemblance of a portrait to its
 +
| object, for example, is not logical truth.  It is necessary,
 +
| therefore, to divide the genus representation according to
 +
| the different ways in which it may accord with its object.
 +
|
 +
| The first and simplest kind of truth is the resemblance of a copy.
 +
| It may be roughly stated to consist in a sameness of predicates.
 +
| Leibniz would say that carried to its highest point, it would
 +
| destroy itself by becoming identity.  Whether that is true or
 +
| not, all known resemblance has a limit.  Hence, resemblance
 +
| is always partial truth.  On the other hand, no two things
 +
| are so different as to resemble each other in no particular.
 +
| Such a case is supposed in the proverb that Dreams go by
 +
| contraries, -- an absurd notion, since concretes have no
 +
| contraries.  A false copy is one which claims to resemble
 +
| an object which it does not resemble.  But this never fully
 +
| occurs, for two reasons;  in the first place, the falsehood
 +
| does not lie in the copy itself but in the 'claim' which is
 +
| made for it, in the 'superscription' for instance;  in the
 +
| second place, as there must be 'some' resemblance between
 +
| the copy and its object, this falsehood cannot be entire.
 +
| Hence, there is no absolute truth or falsehood of copies.
 +
| Now logical representations have absolute truth and
 +
| falsehood as we know 'à posteriori' from the law
 +
| of excluded middle.  Hence, logic does not treat
 +
| of copies.
 +
|
 +
| The second kind of truth, is the denotation of a sign,
 +
| according to a previous convention.  A child's name, for
 +
| example, by a convention made at baptism, denotes that person.
 +
| Signs may be plural but they cannot have genuine generality because
 +
| each of the objects to which they refer must have been fixed upon
 +
| by convention.  It is true that we may agree that a certain sign
 +
| shall denote a certain individual conception, an individual act
 +
| of an individual mind, and that conception may stand for all
 +
| conceptions resembling it;  but in this case, the generality
 +
| belongs to the 'conception' and not to the sign.  Signs,
 +
| therefore, in this narrow sense are not treated of in
 +
| logic, because logic deals only with general terms.
 +
|
 +
| The third kind of truth or accordance of a representation
 +
| with its object, is that which inheres in the very nature
 +
| of the representation whether that nature be original or
 +
| acquired.  Such a representation I name a 'symbol'.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 169-170.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 4
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| How often do we think of the thing in algebra?
 +
| When we use the symbol of multiplication we do not
 +
| even think out the conception of multiplication, we think
 +
| merely of the laws of that symbol, which coincide with the
 +
| laws of the conception, and what is more to the purpose,
 +
| coincide with the laws of multiplication in the object.
 +
| Now, I ask, how is it that anything can be done with
 +
| a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception,
 +
| much less imagining the object that belongs to it?
 +
| It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature,
 +
| which may be described thus, that when it is brought before
 +
| the mind certain principles of its use -- whether reflected on
 +
| or not -- by association immediately regulate the action of the
 +
| mind;  and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself
 +
| which it cannot 'as a symbol' transgress.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 173.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 5
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Finally, these principles as principles applying not to this or that
 +
| symbol, form, thing, but to all equally, must be universal.  And as
 +
| grounds of possibility they must state what is possible.  Now what
 +
| is the universal principle of the possible symbolization of symbols?
 +
| It is that all symbols are symbolizable.  And the other principles
 +
| must predicate the same thing of forms and things.
 +
|
 +
| These, then, are the three principles of inference.  Our next business is
 +
| to demonstrate their truth.  But before doing so, let me repeat that these
 +
| principles do not serve to prove that the kinds of inference are valid, since
 +
| their own proof, on the contrary, must rest on the assumption of that validity.
 +
| Their use is only to show what the condition of that validity is.  Hence, the
 +
| only proof of the truth of these principles is this;  to show, that if these
 +
| principles be admitted as sufficient, and if the validity of the several kinds
 +
| of inference be also admitted, that then the truth of these principles follows
 +
| by the respective kinds of inference which each establishes.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 184-185.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 6
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| To prove then, first, that all symbols are symbolizable.
 +
| Every syllogism consists of three propositions with two terms
 +
| each, a subject and a predicate, and three terms in all each term
 +
| being used twice.  It is obvious that one term must occur both as
 +
| subject and predicate.  Now a predicate is a symbol of its subject.
 +
| Hence in all reasoning 'à priori' a symbol must be symbolized.
 +
| But as reasoning 'à priori' is possible about a statement
 +
| without reference to its predicate, all symbols must be
 +
| symbolizable.
 +
|
 +
| 2nd To prove that all forms are symbolizable.
 +
| Since this proposition relates to pure form it is
 +
| sufficient to show that its consequences are true.
 +
| Now the consequence will be that if a symbol of any
 +
| object be given, but if this symbol does not adequately
 +
| represent any form then another symbol more formal may
 +
| always be substituted for it, or in other words as soon
 +
| as we know what form it ought to symbolize the symbol may
 +
| be so changed as to symbolize that form.  But this process
 +
| is a description of inference 'à posteriori'.  Thus in the
 +
| example relating to light;  the symbol of "giving such and
 +
| such phenomena" which is altogether inadequate to express a
 +
| form is replaced by "ether-waves" which is much more formal.
 +
| The consequence then of the universal symbolization of forms
 +
| is the inference 'à posteriori', and there is no truth or
 +
| falsehood in the principle except what appears in the
 +
| consequence.  Hence, the consequence being valid,
 +
| the principle may be accepted.
 +
|
 +
| 3rd To prove that all things may be symbolized.
 +
| If we have a proposition, the subject of which is not
 +
| properly a symbol of the thing it signifies;  then in case
 +
| everything may be symbolized, it is possible to replace this
 +
| subject by another which is true of it and which does symbolize
 +
| the subject.  But this process is inductive inference.  Thus having
 +
| observed of a great variety of animals that they all eat herbs, if I
 +
| substitute for this subject which is not a true symbol, the symbol
 +
| "cloven-footed animals" which is true of these animals, I make an
 +
| induction.  Accordingly I must acknowledge that this principle
 +
| leads to induction;  and as it is a principle of objects,
 +
| what is true of its subalterns is true of it;  and since
 +
| induction is always possible and valid, this principle
 +
| is true.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 185-186.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 7
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| Having discovered and demonstrated the grounds of the possibility of
 +
| the three inferences, let us take a preliminary glance at the manner in
 +
| which additions to these principles may make them grounds of proceedure.
 +
|
 +
| The principle of inference 'à priori' has been apodictically demonstrated;
 +
| the principle of inductive inference has been shown upon sufficient evidence
 +
| to be true;  the principle of inference 'à posteriori' has been shown to be one
 +
| which nothing can contradict.  These three degrees of modality in the principles of
 +
| the three inferences show the amount of certainty which each is capable of affording.
 +
| Inference 'à priori' is as we all know the only apodictic proceedure;  yet no one
 +
| thinks of questioning a good induction;  while inference 'à posteriori' is
 +
| proverbially uncertain.  'Hypotheses non fingo', said Newton;  striving
 +
| to place his theory on a firm inductive basis.  Yet provisionally we
 +
| must make hypotheses;  we start with them;  the baby when he lies
 +
| turning his fingers before his eyes is testing a hypothesis he has
 +
| already formed, as to the connection of touch and sight.  Apodictic
 +
| reasoning can only be applied to the manipulation of our knowledge;
 +
| it never can extend it.  So that it is an induction which eventually
 +
| settles every question of science;  and nine-tenths of the inferences
 +
| we draw in any hour not of study are of this kind.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, p. 186.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 8
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| The first distinction we found it necessary to draw --
 +
| the first set of conceptions we have to signalize --
 +
| forms a triad
 +
|
 +
|    Thing  Representation  Form.
 +
|
 +
| Kant you remember distinguishes in all mental representations the
 +
| matter and the form.  The distinction here is slightly different.
 +
| In the first place, I do not use the word 'Representation' as
 +
| a translation of the German 'Vorstellung' which is the general
 +
| term for any product of the cognitive power.  Representation,
 +
| indeed, is not a perfect translation of that term, because it
 +
| seems necessarily to imply a mediate reference to its object,
 +
| which 'Vorstellung' does not.  I however would limit the term
 +
| neither to that which is mediate nor to that which is mental,
 +
| but would use it in its broad, usual, and etymological sense
 +
| for anything which is supposed to stand for another and which
 +
| might express that other to a mind which truly could understand
 +
| it.  Thus our whole world -- that which we can comprehend -- is
 +
| a world of representations.
 +
|
 +
| No one can deny that there are representations, for every thought is one.
 +
| But with 'things' and 'forms' scepticism, though still unfounded, is at first
 +
| possible.  The 'thing' is that for which a representation might stand prescinded
 +
| from all that would constitute a relation with any representation.  The 'form' is
 +
| the respect in which a representation might stand for a thing, prescinded from both
 +
| thing and representation.  We thus see that 'things' and 'forms' stand very differently
 +
| with us from 'representations'.  Not in being prescinded elements, for representations
 +
| also are prescinded from other representations.  But because we know representations
 +
| absolutely, while we only know 'forms' and 'things' through representations.  Thus
 +
| scepticism is possible concerning 'them'.  But for the very reason that they are
 +
| known only relatively and therefore do not belong to our world, the hypothesis
 +
| of 'things' and 'forms' introduces nothing false.  For truth and falsity only
 +
| apply to an object as far as it can be known.  If indeed we could know things
 +
| and forms in themselves, then perhaps our representations of them might
 +
| contradict this knowledge.  But since all that we know of them we know
 +
| through representations, if our representations be consistent they
 +
| have all the truth that the case admits of.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 256-257.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 9
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| We found representations to be of three kinds
 +
|
 +
|    Signs  Copies  Symbols.
 +
|
 +
| By a 'copy', I mean a representation whose agreement with
 +
| its object depends merely upon a sameness of predicates.
 +
|
 +
| By a 'sign', I mean a representation whose reference to
 +
| its object is fixed by convention.
 +
|
 +
| By a 'symbol', I mean one which upon being presented to the mind --
 +
| without any resemblance to its object and without any reference to
 +
| a previous convention -- calls up a concept.  I consider concepts,
 +
| themselves, as a species of symbols.
 +
|
 +
| A symbol is subject to three conditions.  First it must represent an object,
 +
| or informed and representable thing.  Second it must be a manifestation of
 +
| a 'logos', or represented and realizable form.  Third it must be translatable
 +
| into another language or system of symbols.
 +
|
 +
| The science of the general laws of relations of symbols to logoi is general grammar.
 +
| The science of the general laws of their relations to objects is logic.  And the
 +
| science of the general laws of their relations to other systems of symbols is
 +
| general rhetoric.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 257-258.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Note 10
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
| When have then three different kinds of inference.
 +
|
 +
|    Deduction or inference 'à priori',
 +
|
 +
|    Induction or inference 'à particularis', and
 +
|
 +
|    Hypothesis or inference 'à posteriori'.
 +
|
 +
| It is necessary now to examine this classification critically.
 +
|
 +
| And first let me specify what I claim for my invention.  I do not claim that it is
 +
| a natural classification, in the sense of being right while all others are wrong.
 +
| I do not know that such a thing as a natural classification is possible in the
 +
| nature of the case.  The science which most resembles logic is mathematics.
 +
| Now among mathematical forms there does not seem to be any natural classification.
 +
| It is true that in the solutions of quadratic equations, there are generally two
 +
| solutions from the positive and negative values of the root with an impossible
 +
| gulf between them.  But this classing is owing to the forms being restricted
 +
| by the conditions of the problem;  and I believe that all natural classes arise
 +
| from some problem -- something which was to be accomplished and which could be
 +
| accomplished only in certain ways.  Required to make a musical instrument;
 +
| you must set either a plate or a string in vibration.  Required to make
 +
| an animal;  it must be either a vertebrate, an articulate, a mollusk, or
 +
| a radiate.  However this may be, in Geometry we find ourselves free to make
 +
| several different classifications of curves, either of which shall be equally
 +
| good.  In fact, in order to make any classification of them whatever we must
 +
| introduce the purely arbitrary element of a system of coördinates or something
 +
| of the kind which constitutes the point of view from which we regard the curves
 +
| and which determines their classification completely.  Now it may be said that
 +
| one system of coördinates is more 'natural' than another;  and it is obvious
 +
| that the conditions of binocular vision limit us in our use of our eyes to
 +
| the use of particular coördinates.  But this fact that one such system
 +
| is more natural to us has clearly nothing to do with pure mathematics
 +
| but is merely introducing a problem;  given two eyes, required to form
 +
| geometrical judgements, how can we do it?  In the same way, I conceive
 +
| that the syllogism is nothing but the system of coördinates or method of
 +
| analysis which we adopt in logic.  There is no reason why arguments should
 +
| not be analyzed just as correctly in some other way.  It is a great mistake to
 +
| suppose that arguments as they are thought are often syllogisms, but even if this
 +
| were the case it would have no bearing upon pure logic as a formal science.  It is
 +
| the principal business of the logician to analyze arguments into their elements just
 +
| as it is part of the business of the geometer to analyze curves;  but the one is no
 +
| more bound to follow the natural process of the intellect in his analysis, than the
 +
| other is bound to follow the natural process of perception.
 +
|
 +
| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 267-268.
 +
|
 +
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
 +
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
 +
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
DET.  Determination
 +
 +
Ontology List
 +
 +
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 +
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 +
Inquiry List
 +
 +
00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/thread.html#2197
 +
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 +
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002198.html
 +
03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002199.html
 +
04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002200.html
 +
05.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002201.html
 +
06.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002202.html
 +
07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002203.html
 +
08.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002204.html
 +
09.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002205.html
 +
10.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002206.html
 +
11.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002207.html
 +
12.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002208.html
 +
13.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002209.html
 +
14.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002210.html
 +
15.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002211.html
 +
16.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002212.html
 +
17.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002213.html
 +
18.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002214.html
 +
19.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002215.html
 +
20.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002216.html
 +
21.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002217.html
 +
22.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002218.html
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
INF.  Inquiry Into Information
 +
 +
Ontology List
 +
 +
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03172.html
 +
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03174.html
 +
03.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03175.html
 +
04.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03176.html
 +
05.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03186.html
 +
06.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03194.html
 +
07.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03198.html
 +
08.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03199.html
 +
09.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03200.html
 +
10.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03203.html
 +
11.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03006.html
 +
 +
Inquiry List
 +
 +
00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/thread.html#2229
 +
01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002229.html
 +
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002230.html
 +
03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002231.html
 +
04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002232.html
 +
05.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002234.html
 +
06.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002235.html
 +
07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002236.html
 +
08.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002237.html
 +
09.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002238.html
 +
10.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002239.html
 +
11.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002240.html
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
 +
LAS.  Logic As Semiotic
 +
 +
Ontology List
 +
 +
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03070.html
 +
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03171.html
 +
03.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03178.html
 +
04.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03179.html
 +
05.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03184.html
 +
06.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03187.html
 +
07.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03189.html
 +
08.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03190.html
 +
09.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03192.html
 +
10.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03193.html
 +
 +
Inquiry List
 +
 +
00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/thread.html#2219
 +
01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002219.html
 +
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002220.html
 +
03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002221.html
 +
04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002222.html
 +
05.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002223.html
 +
06.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002224.html
 +
07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002225.html
 +
08.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002226.html
 +
09.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002227.html
 +
10.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002228.html
 +
 +
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
 +
</pre>
Jon Awbrey
12,080

edits

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