Changes

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<tr> <td>     

<div id="c1">Chapter 1</div>

<div id="c1">Chapter 1</div> <b>[01]</b> Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, postea quid est negatio et affirmatio et enuntiatio et oratio.  

<b>[01]</b> Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, postea quid est negatio et affirmatio et enuntiatio et oratio.  

               </td> <td>    First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation', then 'proposition' and 'sentence.'  

               </td> <td>    First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation', then 'proposition' and 'sentence.'  

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<tr> <td>    <div id="c2">Chapter 2</div>  <b>[02]</b> DE NOMINE Nomen ergo est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata; in 'equiferus' enim 'ferus' nihil per se significat, quemadmodum in oratione quae est 'equus ferus'. At vero non quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus, sic se habet et in compositis; in illis enim nullo modo pars significativa est, in his autem vult quidem sed nullius separati, ut in 'equiferus' <'ferus'>.

 

<tr> <td>    == Chapter 2 == <b>[02]</b> DE NOMINE Nomen ergo est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata; in 'equiferus' enim 'ferus' nihil per se significat, quemadmodum in oratione quae est 'equus ferus'. At vero non quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus, sic se habet et in compositis; in illis enim nullo modo pars significativa est, in his autem vult quidem sed nullius separati, ut in 'equiferus' <'ferus'>.

               </td> <td>    By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In the noun 'Fairsteed,' the part 'steed' has no significance in and by itself, as in the phrase 'fair steed.' Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word 'pirate-boat' the word 'boat' has no meaning except as part of the whole word.  

               </td> <td>    By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In the noun 'Fairsteed,' the part 'steed' has no significance in and by itself, as in the phrase 'fair steed.' Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word 'pirate-boat' the word 'boat' has no meaning except as part of the whole word.  

               </td> <td>    The expressions 'of Philo', 'to Philo', and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with 'is', 'was', or will be', they do not, as they are, form a proposition either true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under these conditions. Take the words 'of Philo is' or 'of or 'of Philo is not'; these words do not, as they stand, form either a true or a false proposition.  

               </td> <td>    The expressions 'of Philo', 'to Philo', and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with 'is', 'was', or will be', they do not, as they are, form a proposition either true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under these conditions. Take the words 'of Philo is' or 'of or 'of Philo is not'; these words do not, as they stand, form either a true or a false proposition.  

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<tr> <td>    == Chapter 3 == <b>[03]</b> DE VERBO Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus, cuius pars nihil extra significat; et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota.  

<tr> <td>    <div id="c3">Chapter 3</div> <b>[03]</b> DE VERBO Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus, cuius pars nihil extra significat; et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota.  

               </td> <td>    A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else.

               </td> <td>    A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else.

               </td> </tr>

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               </td> <td>    Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer's mind, and fixes his attention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are 'to be' and 'not to be' the participle 'being' significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.  

               </td> <td>    Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer's mind, and fixes his attention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are 'to be' and 'not to be' the participle 'being' significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.  

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "c4"><b>[04]</b> DE ORATIONE Oratio autem est vox significativa, cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatum (ut dictio, non ut affirmatio); dico autem ut 'homo' significat aliquid (sed non quoniam est aut non est; sed erit affirmatio vel negatio, si quid addatur) sed non una 'hominis' syllaba; nec in hoc quod est 'sorex' 'rex' significat sed vox est nunc sola.  

 

 

 

 

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c4"><b>[04]</b> DE ORATIONE Oratio autem est vox significativa, cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatum (ut dictio, non ut affirmatio); dico autem ut 'homo' significat aliquid (sed non quoniam est aut non est; sed erit affirmatio vel negatio, si quid addatur) sed non una 'hominis' syllaba; nec in hoc quod est 'sorex' 'rex' significat sed vox est nunc sola.  

               </td> <td>    A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the expression of any positive judgement. Let me explain. The word 'human' has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word 'human' from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word 'mouse', the part 'ouse' has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound.

               </td> <td>    A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the expression of any positive judgement. Let me explain. The word 'human' has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word 'human' from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word 'mouse', the part 'ouse' has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound.

               </td> <td>    Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.

               </td> <td>    Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "c5"><b>[05]</b> Est autem una prima oratio enuntiativa affirmatio, deinde negatio; aliae vero coniunctione unae.

<tr> <td>    <div id = "c5">Chapter 5</div><b>[05]</b> Est autem una prima oratio enuntiativa affirmatio, deinde negatio; aliae vero coniunctione unae.

               </td> <td>    The first class of simple propositions is the simple affirmation, the next, the simple denial; all others are only one by conjunction.

               </td> <td>    The first class of simple propositions is the simple affirmation, the next, the simple denial; all others are only one by conjunction.

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               </td> <td>    Every proposition must contain a verb or the tense of a verb. The phrase which defines the species 'man', if no verb in present, past, or future time be added, is not a proposition. It may be asked how the expression 'a footed animal with two feet' can be called single; for it is not the circumstance that the words follow in unbroken succession that effects the unity. This inquiry, however, finds its place in an investigation foreign to that before us.  

               </td> <td>    Every proposition must contain a verb or the tense of a verb. The phrase which defines the species 'man', if no verb in present, past, or future time be added, is not a proposition. It may be asked how the expression 'a footed animal with two feet' can be called single; for it is not the circumstance that the words follow in unbroken succession that effects the unity. This inquiry, however, finds its place in an investigation foreign to that before us.  

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "estautemuna">

<tr> <td>    <div id ="estautemuna">

Est autem una oratio enuntiativa quae unum significat vel coniunctione una, plures autem quae plura et non unum vel inconiunctae.  

Est autem una oratio enuntiativa quae unum significat vel coniunctione una, plures autem quae plura et non unum vel inconiunctae.  

               </td> <td>    We call those propositions single which indicate a single fact, or the conjunction of the parts of which results in unity: those propositions, on the other hand, are separate and many in number, which indicate many facts, or whose parts have no conjunction.

               </td> <td>    We call those propositions single which indicate a single fact, or the conjunction of the parts of which results in unity: those propositions, on the other hand, are separate and many in number, which indicate many facts, or whose parts have no conjunction.

               </td> <td>    To return: of propositions one kind is simple, i.e. that which asserts or denies something of something, the other composite, i.e. that which is compounded of simple propositions. A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future, according to the divisions of time.

               </td> <td>    To return: of propositions one kind is simple, i.e. that which asserts or denies something of something, the other composite, i.e. that which is compounded of simple propositions. A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future, according to the divisions of time.

               </td> </tr>

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "c6"><b>[06]</b> Affirmatio vero est enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo, negatio vero enuntiatio alicuius ab aliquo.  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c6">Chapter 6</div><b>[06]</b> Affirmatio vero est enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo, negatio vero enuntiatio alicuius ab aliquo.  

               </td> <td>    An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a denial a negative assertion.

               </td> <td>    An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a denial a negative assertion.

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "quoniamautemest">Quoniam autem est enuntiare et quod est non esse et quod non est esse et quod est esse et quod non est non esse, et circa ea extrinsecus praesentis temporis similiter omne contingit quod quis affirmaverit negare et quod quis negaverit affirmare; quare manifestum est quoniam omni affirmationi est negatio opposita et omni negationi affirmatio.

<tr> <td>    <div id ="quoniamautemest">Quoniam autem est enuntiare et quod est non esse et quod non est esse et quod est esse et quod non est non esse, et circa ea extrinsecus praesentis temporis similiter omne contingit quod quis affirmaverit negare et quod quis negaverit affirmare; quare manifestum est quoniam omni affirmationi est negatio opposita et omni negationi affirmatio.

               </td> <td>    Now it is possible both to affirm and to deny the presence of something which is present or of something which is not, and since these same affirmations and denials are possible with reference to those times which lie outside the present, it would be possible to contradict any affirmation or denial. Thus it is plain that every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every denial an opposite affirmation.

               </td> <td>    Now it is possible both to affirm and to deny the presence of something which is present or of something which is not, and since these same affirmations and denials are possible with reference to those times which lie outside the present, it would be possible to contradict any affirmation or denial. Thus it is plain that every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every denial an opposite affirmation.

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "etsichoc">

<tr> <td>    <div id ="etsichoc">

Et sit hoc contradictio, affirmatio et negatio oppositae; <a name = "dicoautem">dico autem opponi eiusdem de eodem, <a name = "nonautem">non autem aequivoce <a name = "etquaecumque">

Et sit hoc contradictio, affirmatio et negatio oppositae; <div id ="dicoautem">dico autem opponi eiusdem de eodem, <div id ="nonautem">non autem aequivoce <div id ="etquaecumque">

et quaecumque caetera talium determinamus contra sophisticas importunitates.  

et quaecumque caetera talium determinamus contra sophisticas importunitates.  

               </td> <td>    We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate must not be 'equivocal'. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.  

               </td> <td>    We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate must not be 'equivocal'. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.  

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "c7"><b>[07]</b> <a name = "quoniamautemsunt">Quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum universalia, illa vero singillatim  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c7">Chapter 7</div><b>[07]</b> <div id ="quoniamautemsunt">Quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum universalia, illa vero singillatim  

(dico autem universale quod in pluribus natum est praedicari, singulare vero quod non, ut 'homo' quidem universale, <a name = "platovero">'Plato' vero eorum quae sunt singularia), <a name = "necesseest">necesse est autem enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid aut non, aliquotiens quidem eorum alicui quae sunt universalia, aliquotiens vero eorum quae sunt singularia.

(dico autem universale quod in pluribus natum est praedicari, singulare vero quod non, ut 'homo' quidem universale, <div id ="platovero">'Plato' vero eorum quae sunt singularia), <div id ="necesseest">necesse est autem enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid aut non, aliquotiens quidem eorum alicui quae sunt universalia, aliquotiens vero eorum quae sunt singularia.

               </td> <td>    Some things are universal, others individual. By the term 'universal' I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by 'individual' that which is not thus predicated. Thus 'man' is a universal, 'Callias' an individual.  Our propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, sometimes an individual.

               </td> <td>    Some things are universal, others individual. By the term 'universal' I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by 'individual' that which is not thus predicated. Thus 'man' is a universal, 'Callias' an individual.  Our propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, sometimes an individual.

               </td> </tr>

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "siergouniversaliter">Si ergo universaliter enuntiet in universali quoniam est aut non,  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="siergouniversaliter">Si ergo universaliter enuntiet in universali quoniam est aut non,  

erunt contrariae enuntiationes (<a name = "dicoautemin">dico autem in universali enuntiationem universalem ut 'omnis homo albus est', 'nullus homo albus est'); <a name = "quandoautem">quando autem in universalibus non universaliter,  

erunt contrariae enuntiationes (<div id ="dicoautemin">dico autem in universali enuntiationem universalem ut 'omnis homo albus est', 'nullus homo albus est'); <div id ="quandoautem">quando autem in universalibus non universaliter,  

non sunt contrariae, <a name = "quaeautem">quae autem significantur est esse contraria  

non sunt contrariae, <div id ="quaeautem">quae autem significantur est esse contraria  

(<a name = "dicoautemnon">dico autem non universaliter enuntiare in his quae sunt universalia, ut 'est albus homo', 'non est albus homo'; <a name = "cumenim">cum enim universale sit homo, non universaliter utitur enuntiatione;  

(<div id ="dicoautemnon">dico autem non universaliter enuntiare in his quae sunt universalia, ut 'est albus homo', 'non est albus homo'; <div id ="cumenim">cum enim universale sit homo, non universaliter utitur enuntiatione;  

'omnis' namque non 'universale' sed 'quoniam universaliter' consignificat).

'omnis' namque non 'universale' sed 'quoniam universaliter' consignificat).

In eo vero quod praedicatur universaliter universale praedicare universaliter non est verum; nulla

In eo vero quod praedicatur universaliter universale praedicare universaliter non est verum; nulla

               </td> <td>    If, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of universal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions are 'contrary'. By the expression 'a proposition of universal character with regard to a universal', such propositions as 'every man is white', 'no man is white' are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and negative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet not of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning intended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with regard to a universal, but not of universal character, we may take the 'propositions 'man is white', 'man is not white'. 'Man' is a universal, but the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word 'every' does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition a universal character.

               </td> <td>    If, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of universal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions are 'contrary'. By the expression 'a proposition of universal character with regard to a universal', such propositions as 'every man is white', 'no man is white' are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and negative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet not of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning intended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with regard to a universal, but not of universal character, we may take the 'propositions 'man is white', 'man is not white'. 'Man' is a universal, but the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word 'every' does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition a universal character.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "opponiautem">Opponi autem affirmationem negationi dico contradictorie quae universale significat eidem quoniam non universaliter,  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="opponiautem">Opponi autem affirmationem negationi dico contradictorie quae universale significat eidem quoniam non universaliter,  

ut 'omnis homo albus est', '<a name = "nonomnishomo">non omnis homo albus est', 'nullus homo albus est', 'quidam homo albus est';  

ut 'omnis homo albus est', '<div id ="nonomnishomo">non omnis homo albus est', 'nullus homo albus est', 'quidam homo albus est';  

<a name = "contrarievero">contrarie vero universalem affirmationem et universalem negationem, <a name = "utomnis">ut 'omnis homo iustus est', 'nullus homo iustus est'; <a name = "quocircahas">quocirca has quidem impossibile est simul veras esse, <a name = "hisvero">

<div id ="contrarievero">contrarie vero universalem affirmationem et universalem negationem, <div id ="utomnis">ut 'omnis homo iustus est', 'nullus homo iustus est'; <div id ="quocircahas">quocirca has quidem impossibile est simul veras esse, <div id ="hisvero">

his vero oppositas contingit in eodem, 'non omnis homo albus est', et 'est quidam homo albus'.

his vero oppositas contingit in eodem, 'non omnis homo albus est', et 'est quidam homo albus'.

               </td> <td>    An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term 'contradictory', when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation 'every man is white' is the contradictory of the denial 'not every man is white', or again, the proposition 'no man is white' is the contradictory of the proposition 'some men are white'. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences 'every man is white', 'no man is white', 'every man is just', 'no man is just'.  We see that in a pair of this sort both propositions cannot be true, but the contradictories of a pair of contraries can sometimes both be true with reference to the same subject; for instance 'not every man is white' and some men are white' are both true.  

               </td> <td>    An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term 'contradictory', when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation 'every man is white' is the contradictory of the denial 'not every man is white', or again, the proposition 'no man is white' is the contradictory of the proposition 'some men are white'. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences 'every man is white', 'no man is white', 'every man is just', 'no man is just'.  We see that in a pair of this sort both propositions cannot be true, but the contradictories of a pair of contraries can sometimes both be true with reference to the same subject; for instance 'not every man is white' and some men are white' are both true.  

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "quaecumqueigitur">Quaecumque igitur contradictiones universalium sunt universaliter,  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="quaecumqueigitur">Quaecumque igitur contradictiones universalium sunt universaliter,  

necesse est alteram esse veram vel falsam, et quaecumque in singularibus sunt,  

necesse est alteram esse veram vel falsam, et quaecumque in singularibus sunt,  

ut 'est Socrates albus', 'non est Socrates albus';  

ut 'est Socrates albus', 'non est Socrates albus';  

<a name = "quaecumqautem">quaecumque autem in universalibus non universaliter, non semper haec vera est,  

<div id ="quaecumqautem">quaecumque autem in universalibus non universaliter, non semper haec vera est,  

illa vero falsa (<a name = "simulenimverum">simul enim verum est dicere quoniam est homo albus et non est homo albus, et est homo probus et non est homo probus;  

illa vero falsa (<div id ="simulenimverum">simul enim verum est dicere quoniam est homo albus et non est homo albus, et est homo probus et non est homo probus;  

<a name = "sienimturpis">si enim turpis, non probus; et si fit aliquid, et non est).

<div id ="sienimturpis">si enim turpis, non probus; et si fit aliquid, et non est).

               </td> <td>    Of such corresponding positive and negative propositions as refer to universals and have a universal character, one must be true and the other false. This is the case also when the reference is to individuals, as in the propositions 'Socrates is white', 'Socrates is not white'.

               </td> <td>    Of such corresponding positive and negative propositions as refer to universals and have a universal character, one must be true and the other false. This is the case also when the reference is to individuals, as in the propositions 'Socrates is white', 'Socrates is not white'.

When, on the other hand, the reference is to universals, but the propositions are not universal, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false, for it is possible to state truly that man is white and that man is not white and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful, also if he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful.

When, on the other hand, the reference is to universals, but the propositions are not universal, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false, for it is possible to state truly that man is white and that man is not white and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful, also if he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful.

               </td> </tr>

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<tr> <td>    <a name = "videbiturautem">Videbitur autem subito inconveniens esse, idcirco quoniam videtur significare 'non est homo albus' simul etiam quoniam nemo homo albus est; hoc autem neque idem significat neque simul necessario.

<tr> <td>    <div id ="videbiturautem">Videbitur autem subito inconveniens esse, idcirco quoniam videtur significare 'non est homo albus' simul etiam quoniam nemo homo albus est; hoc autem neque idem significat neque simul necessario.

               </td> <td>    This statement might seem at first sight to carry with it a contradiction, owing to the fact that the proposition 'man is not white' appears to be equivalent to the proposition 'no man is white'. This, however, is not the case, nor are they necessarily at the same time true or false.

               </td> <td>    This statement might seem at first sight to carry with it a contradiction, owing to the fact that the proposition 'man is not white' appears to be equivalent to the proposition 'no man is white'. This, however, is not the case, nor are they necessarily at the same time true or false.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "manifestumest"> Manifestum est autem quoniam una negatio unius affirmationis est;  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="manifestumest"> Manifestum est autem quoniam una negatio unius affirmationis est;  

<a name = "hocenim">hoc enim idem oportet negare negationem quod affirmavit affirmatio, et de eodem, vel de aliquo singularium vel de aliquo universalium,  

<div id ="hocenim">hoc enim idem oportet negare negationem quod affirmavit affirmatio, et de eodem, vel de aliquo singularium vel de aliquo universalium,  

vel universaliter vel non universaliter; <a name = "dicoautemut">

vel universaliter vel non universaliter; <div id ="dicoautemut">

dico autem ut 'est Socrates albus', 'non est Socrates albus' (si autem aliud aliquid vel de alio idem, non opposita sed erit ab ea diversa), huic vero quae est 'omnis homo albus est' illa quae est 'non omnis homo albus est', illi vero quae est 'aliquis homo albus est' illa quae est 'nullus homo albus est', illi autem quae est 'homo albus est' illa quae est 'non est homo albus'.  

dico autem ut 'est Socrates albus', 'non est Socrates albus' (si autem aliud aliquid vel de alio idem, non opposita sed erit ab ea diversa), huic vero quae est 'omnis homo albus est' illa quae est 'non omnis homo albus est', illi vero quae est 'aliquis homo albus est' illa quae est 'nullus homo albus est', illi autem quae est 'homo albus est' illa quae est 'non est homo albus'.  

               </td> <td>    It is evident also that the denial corresponding to a single affirmation is itself single; for the denial must deny just that which the affirmation affirms concerning the same subject, and must correspond with the affirmation both in the universal or particular character of the subject and in the distributed or undistributed sense in which it is understood.  For instance, the affirmation 'Socrates is white' has its proper denial in the proposition 'Socrates is not white'. If anything else be negatively predicated of the subject or if anything else be the subject though the predicate remain the same, the denial will not be the denial proper to that affirmation, but on that is distinct.  The denial proper to the affirmation 'every man is white' is 'not every man is white'; that proper to the affirmation 'some men are white' is 'no man is white', while that proper to the affirmation 'man is white' is 'man is not white'.  

               </td> <td>    It is evident also that the denial corresponding to a single affirmation is itself single; for the denial must deny just that which the affirmation affirms concerning the same subject, and must correspond with the affirmation both in the universal or particular character of the subject and in the distributed or undistributed sense in which it is understood.  For instance, the affirmation 'Socrates is white' has its proper denial in the proposition 'Socrates is not white'. If anything else be negatively predicated of the subject or if anything else be the subject though the predicate remain the same, the denial will not be the denial proper to that affirmation, but on that is distinct.  The denial proper to the affirmation 'every man is white' is 'not every man is white'; that proper to the affirmation 'some men are white' is 'no man is white', while that proper to the affirmation 'man is white' is 'man is not white'.  

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "quoniamergo">Quoniam ergo uni negationi una affirmatio opposita est contradictorie, et quae sint hae, dictum est, et quoniam aliae sunt contrariae et quae sint hae, et quoniam non omnis vera vel falsa contradictio, et quare, et quando vera vel falsa.  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="quoniamergo">Quoniam ergo uni negationi una affirmatio opposita est contradictorie, et quae sint hae, dictum est, et quoniam aliae sunt contrariae et quae sint hae, et quoniam non omnis vera vel falsa contradictio, et quare, et quando vera vel falsa.  

               </td> <td>    We have shown further that a single denial is contradictorily opposite to a single affirmation and we have explained which these are; we have also stated that contrary are distinct from contradictory propositions and which the contrary are; also that with regard to a pair of opposite propositions it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. We have pointed out, moreover, what the reason of this is and under what circumstances the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other.

               </td> <td>    We have shown further that a single denial is contradictorily opposite to a single affirmation and we have explained which these are; we have also stated that contrary are distinct from contradictory propositions and which the contrary are; also that with regard to a pair of opposite propositions it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. We have pointed out, moreover, what the reason of this is and under what circumstances the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "c8"><b>[08]</b> <a name = "unaautem">Una autem est affirmatio et negatio quae unum de uno significat, vel cum sit universale universaliter vel non similiter, ut 'omnis homo albus est', 'non est omnis homo albus', 'est homo albus', 'non est homo albus', 'nullus homo albus est', 'est quidam homo albus', si 'album' unum significat.

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c8">Chapter 8</div><b>[08]</b> <div id ="unaautem">Una autem est affirmatio et negatio quae unum de uno significat, vel cum sit universale universaliter vel non similiter, ut 'omnis homo albus est', 'non est omnis homo albus', 'est homo albus', 'non est homo albus', 'nullus homo albus est', 'est quidam homo albus', si 'album' unum significat.

               </td> <td>    An affirmation or denial is single, if it indicates some one fact about some one subject; it matters not whether the subject is universal and whether the statement has a universal character, or whether this is not so. Such single propositions are: 'every man is white', 'not every man is white';'man is white','man is not white'; 'no man is white', 'some men are white'; provided the word 'white' has one meaning.

               </td> <td>    An affirmation or denial is single, if it indicates some one fact about some one subject; it matters not whether the subject is universal and whether the statement has a universal character, or whether this is not so. Such single propositions are: 'every man is white', 'not every man is white';'man is white','man is not white'; 'no man is white', 'some men are white'; provided the word 'white' has one meaning.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "sinvero">Sin vero duobus unum nomen est positum <a name = "exquibus"> ex quibus non est unum, non est una affirmatio; <a name = "utsiquis">ut, si quis ponat nomen 'tunica' homini et equo, 'est tunica alba' haec non est una affirmatio nec negatio una; nihil enim hoc differt dicere quam 'est equus et homo albus', <a name = "hocautem">

<tr> <td>    <div id ="sinvero">Sin vero duobus unum nomen est positum <div id ="exquibus"> ex quibus non est unum, non est una affirmatio; <div id ="utsiquis">ut, si quis ponat nomen 'tunica' homini et equo, 'est tunica alba' haec non est una affirmatio nec negatio una; nihil enim hoc differt dicere quam 'est equus et homo albus', <div id ="hocautem">

hoc autem <a name = "nihidiffert">nihil differt quam dicere 'est equus albus' et 'est homo albus'.

hoc autem <div id ="nihidiffert">nihil differt quam dicere 'est equus albus' et 'est homo albus'.

               </td> <td>    If, on the other hand, one word has two meanings which do not combine to form one, the affirmation is not single. For instance, if a man should establish the symbol 'garment' as significant both of a horse and of a man, the proposition 'garment is white' would not be a single affirmation, nor its opposite a single denial. For it is equivalent to the proposition 'horse and man are white', which, again, is equivalent to the two propositions 'horse is white', 'man is white'.

               </td> <td>    If, on the other hand, one word has two meanings which do not combine to form one, the affirmation is not single. For instance, if a man should establish the symbol 'garment' as significant both of a horse and of a man, the proposition 'garment is white' would not be a single affirmation, nor its opposite a single denial. For it is equivalent to the proposition 'horse and man are white', which, again, is equivalent to the two propositions 'horse is white', 'man is white'.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    Si ergo hae multa significant et sunt plures, <a name = "manifestumestquoniam">manifestum est quoniam et prima multa vel nihil significat (neque enim est aliquis homo equus); <a name = "quarenec">quare nec in his necesse est hanc quidem contradictionem veram esse, illam vero falsam.  

<tr> <td>    Si ergo hae multa significant et sunt plures, <div id ="manifestumestquoniam">manifestum est quoniam et prima multa vel nihil significat (neque enim est aliquis homo equus); <div id ="quarenec">quare nec in his necesse est hanc quidem contradictionem veram esse, illam vero falsam.  

               </td> <td>    If, then, these two propositions have more than a single significance, and do not form a single proposition, it is plain that the first proposition either has more than one significance or else has none; for a particular man is not a horse.  This, then, is another instance of those propositions of which both the positive and the negative forms may be true or false simultaneously.  

               </td> <td>    If, then, these two propositions have more than a single significance, and do not form a single proposition, it is plain that the first proposition either has more than one significance or else has none; for a particular man is not a horse.  This, then, is another instance of those propositions of which both the positive and the negative forms may be true or false simultaneously.  

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "c9"><b>[09]</b> <a name = "inhisergo"> In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse; in universalibus quidem universaliter semper hanc quidem veram, illam vero falsam, et in his quae sunt singularia, quemadmodum dictum est; in his vero quae in universalibus non universaliter dicuntur, non est necesse (dictum autem est et de his).

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c9">Chapter 9</div><b>[09]</b> <div id ="inhisergo"> In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse; in universalibus quidem universaliter semper hanc quidem veram, illam vero falsam, et in his quae sunt singularia, quemadmodum dictum est; in his vero quae in universalibus non universaliter dicuntur, non est necesse (dictum autem est et de his).

               </td> <td>    In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case of a pair of contradictories, either when the subject is universal and the propositions are of a universal character, or when it is individual, as has been said,' one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas when the subject is universal, but the propositions are not of a universal character, there is no such necessity. We have discussed this type also in a previous chapter.

               </td> <td>    In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case of a pair of contradictories, either when the subject is universal and the propositions are of a universal character, or when it is individual, as has been said,' one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas when the subject is universal, but the propositions are not of a universal character, there is no such necessity. We have discussed this type also in a previous chapter.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

               </td> <td>    It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather as we have indicated.

               </td> <td>    It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather as we have indicated.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "c10"><b>[10]</b> <a name = "quoniamautem">Quoniam autem est de aliquo affirmatio significans aliquid, hoc autem est vel nomen vel innominabile, unum autem oportet esse et de uno hoc quod est in affirmatione (nomen autem dictum est et innominabile prius; 'non homo' enim nomen quidem non dico sed infinitum nomen -- unum enim significat infinitum -- quemadmodum et 'non currit' non verbum sed infinitum verbum), erit omnis affirmatio vel ex nomine vel ex verbo.

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c10">Chapter 10</div><b>[10]</b> <div id ="quoniamautem">Quoniam autem est de aliquo affirmatio significans aliquid, hoc autem est vel nomen vel innominabile, unum autem oportet esse et de uno hoc quod est in affirmatione (nomen autem dictum est et innominabile prius; 'non homo' enim nomen quidem non dico sed infinitum nomen -- unum enim significat infinitum -- quemadmodum et 'non currit' non verbum sed infinitum verbum), erit omnis affirmatio vel ex nomine vel ex verbo.

               </td> <td>    An affirmation is the statement of a fact with regard to a subject, and this subject is either a noun or that which has no name; the subject and predicate in an affirmation must each denote a single thing. I have already explained' what is meant by a noun and by that which has no name; for I stated that the expression 'not-man' was not a noun, in the proper sense of the word, but an indefinite noun, denoting as it does in a certain sense a single thing. Similarly the expression 'does not enjoy health' is not a verb proper, but an indefinite verb. Every affirmation, then, and every denial, will consist of a noun and a verb, either definite or indefinite.

               </td> <td>    An affirmation is the statement of a fact with regard to a subject, and this subject is either a noun or that which has no name; the subject and predicate in an affirmation must each denote a single thing. I have already explained' what is meant by a noun and by that which has no name; for I stated that the expression 'not-man' was not a noun, in the proper sense of the word, but an indefinite noun, denoting as it does in a certain sense a single thing. Similarly the expression 'does not enjoy health' is not a verb proper, but an indefinite verb. Every affirmation, then, and every denial, will consist of a noun and a verb, either definite or indefinite.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

               </td> <td>    It is evident, therefore, that the inversion of the relative position of subject and predicate does not affect the sense of affirmations and denials.

               </td> <td>    It is evident, therefore, that the inversion of the relative position of subject and predicate does not affect the sense of affirmations and denials.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "c11"><b>[11]</b> At vero unum de pluribus vel plura de uno affirmare vel negare, si non est unum ex pluribus, non est affirmatio una neque negatio.

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c11">Chapter 11</div><b>[11]</b> At vero unum de pluribus vel plura de uno affirmare vel negare, si non est unum ex pluribus, non est affirmatio una neque negatio.

               </td> <td>    There is no unity about an affirmation or denial which, either positively or negatively, predicates one thing of many subjects, or many things of the same subject, unless that which is indicated by the many is really some one thing.  

               </td> <td>    There is no unity about an affirmation or denial which, either positively or negatively, predicates one thing of many subjects, or many things of the same subject, unless that which is indicated by the many is really some one thing.  

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

               </td> <td>    But in the case of that which is not, it is not true to say that because it is the object of opinion, it is; for the opinion held about it is that it is not, not that it is.

               </td> <td>    But in the case of that which is not, it is not true to say that because it is the object of opinion, it is; for the opinion held about it is that it is not, not that it is.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "c12"><b>[12]</b> His vero determinatis perspiciendum est quemadmodum sese habent negationes et affirmationes ad se invicem, hae scilicet quae sunt de 'possibile esse' et 'non possibile' et 'contingere' et 'non contingere' et 'impossibile' et de necessario; habet enim aliquas dubitationes.

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c12">Chapter 12</div><b>[12]</b> His vero determinatis perspiciendum est quemadmodum sese habent negationes et affirmationes ad se invicem, hae scilicet quae sunt de 'possibile esse' et 'non possibile' et 'contingere' et 'non contingere' et 'impossibile' et de necessario; habet enim aliquas dubitationes.

               </td> <td>    As these distinctions have been made, we must consider the mutual relation of those affirmations and denials which assert or deny possibility or contingency, impossibility or necessity: for the subject is not without difficulty.

               </td> <td>    As these distinctions have been made, we must consider the mutual relation of those affirmations and denials which assert or deny possibility or contingency, impossibility or necessity: for the subject is not without difficulty.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "c13"><b>[13]</b> Et consequentiae vero secundum ordinem fiunt ita ponentibus: illi enim quae est 'possibile esse' illa quae est 'contingit esse', et hoc illi convertit, et 'non impossibile esse' et 'non necessarium esse'; illi vero quae est 'possibile non esse' et 'contingere non esse' ea quae est 'non necessarium non esse' et 'non impossibile non esse'; illi vero quae est 'non possibile esse' et 'non contingens esse' illa quae est 'necessarium non esse' et 'impossibile esse'; illi vero quae est 'non possibile non esse' et 'non contingens non esse' illa quae est 'necesse esse' et 'impossibile non esse'.  

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c13">Chapter 13</div><b>[13]</b> Et consequentiae vero secundum ordinem fiunt ita ponentibus: illi enim quae est 'possibile esse' illa quae est 'contingit esse', et hoc illi convertit, et 'non impossibile esse' et 'non necessarium esse'; illi vero quae est 'possibile non esse' et 'contingere non esse' ea quae est 'non necessarium non esse' et 'non impossibile non esse'; illi vero quae est 'non possibile esse' et 'non contingens esse' illa quae est 'necessarium non esse' et 'impossibile esse'; illi vero quae est 'non possibile non esse' et 'non contingens non esse' illa quae est 'necesse esse' et 'impossibile non esse'.  

               </td> <td>    Logical sequences follow in due course when we have arranged the propositions thus. From the proposition 'it may be' it follows that it is contingent, and the relation is reciprocal. It follows also that it is not impossible and not necessary.  From the proposition 'it may not be' or 'it is contingent that it should not be' it follows that it is not necessary that it should not be and that it is not impossible that it should not be. From the proposition 'it cannot be' or 'it is not contingent' it follows that it is necessary that it should not be and that it is impossible that it should be. From the proposition 'it cannot not be' or 'it is not contingent that it should not be' it follows that it is necessary that it should be and that it is impossible that it should not be.

               </td> <td>    Logical sequences follow in due course when we have arranged the propositions thus. From the proposition 'it may be' it follows that it is contingent, and the relation is reciprocal. It follows also that it is not impossible and not necessary.  From the proposition 'it may not be' or 'it is contingent that it should not be' it follows that it is not necessary that it should not be and that it is not impossible that it should not be. From the proposition 'it cannot be' or 'it is not contingent' it follows that it is necessary that it should not be and that it is impossible that it should be. From the proposition 'it cannot not be' or 'it is not contingent that it should not be' it follows that it is necessary that it should be and that it is impossible that it should not be.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

               </td> <td>    It is plain from what has been said that that which is of necessity is actual. Thus, if that which is eternal is prior, actuality also is prior to potentiality. Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, the primary substances; a second class consists of those things which are actual but also potential, whose actuality is in nature prior to their potentiality, though posterior in time; a third class comprises those things which are never actualized, but are pure potentialities.  

               </td> <td>    It is plain from what has been said that that which is of necessity is actual. Thus, if that which is eternal is prior, actuality also is prior to potentiality. Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, the primary substances; a second class consists of those things which are actual but also potential, whose actuality is in nature prior to their potentiality, though posterior in time; a third class comprises those things which are never actualized, but are pure potentialities.  

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>

<tr> <td>    <a name = "c14"><b>[14]</b> Utrum autem contraria est affirmatio negationi et oratio orationi quae dicit quoniam 'omnis homo iustus' ei quae est 'nullus homo iustus' aut 'omnis homo iustus' ei quae est 'omnis homo iniustus est', 'Callias iustus est', 'Callias iustus non est', 'Callias iniustus est', quae harum contraria est?

<tr> <td>    <div id ="c14">Chapter 14</div><b>[14]</b> Utrum autem contraria est affirmatio negationi et oratio orationi quae dicit quoniam 'omnis homo iustus' ei quae est 'nullus homo iustus' aut 'omnis homo iustus' ei quae est 'omnis homo iniustus est', 'Callias iustus est', 'Callias iustus non est', 'Callias iniustus est', quae harum contraria est?

               </td> <td>    The question arises whether an affirmation finds its contrary in a denial or in another affirmation; whether the proposition 'every man is just' finds its contrary in the proposition 'no man is just', or in the proposition 'every man is unjust'. Take the propositions 'Callias is just', 'Callias is not just', 'Callias is unjust'; we have to discover which of these form contraries.

               </td> <td>    The question arises whether an affirmation finds its contrary in a denial or in another affirmation; whether the proposition 'every man is just' finds its contrary in the proposition 'no man is just', or in the proposition 'every man is unjust'. Take the propositions 'Callias is just', 'Callias is not just', 'Callias is unjust'; we have to discover which of these form contraries.

               </td> </tr>

               </td> </tr>