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Scotus argued for an [[Formal distinction | formal distinction]] (''distinctio formalis a parte rei''), which holds between entities which are inseparable and indistinct in reality, but whose definitions are not identical.  For example, the personal properties of the [[Trinity]] are formally distinct from the Divine essence.  Similarly, the distinction between the 'thisness' or ''haecceity'' of a thing is intermediate between a real and a conceptual distinction<ref>Honderich p. 209</ref>.  There is also a formal distinction between the divine attributes and the powers of the soul.

Scotus argued for an [[Formal distinction | formal distinction]] (''distinctio formalis a parte rei''), which holds between entities which are inseparable and indistinct in reality, but whose definitions are not identical.  For example, the personal properties of the [[Trinity]] are formally distinct from the Divine essence.  Similarly, the distinction between the 'thisness' or ''haecceity'' of a thing is intermediate between a real and a conceptual distinction<ref>Honderich p. 209</ref>.  There is also a formal distinction between the divine attributes and the powers of the soul.

Ockham was opposed to the idea, arguing that whenever there is any distinction or non-identity in reality, then two contradictory statements can be made.  But  contradictory statements cannot be truly asserted unless the realities they stand for either (1) distinct real things (2) distinct concepts or (3) a thing and a concept.  But if they all exist in reality, they are not distinct concepts, nor are they a real thing and a concept.  Therefore they are distinct in reality<ref>Ockham, ''Ordinatio'' I. i. q1.</ref>.

[[William of Ockham]] was opposed to the idea, arguing that whenever there is any distinction or non-identity in reality, then two contradictory statements can be made.  But  contradictory statements cannot be truly asserted unless the realities they stand for either (1) distinct real things (2) distinct concepts or (3) a thing and a concept.  But if they all exist in reality, they are not distinct concepts, nor are they a real thing and a concept.  Therefore they are distinct in reality<ref>Ockham, ''Ordinatio'' I. i. q1.</ref>.

==Notes==

==Notes==