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<p>Now, I ask, how is it that anything can be done with a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception, much less imagining the object that belongs to it?  It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature, which may be described thus, that when it is brought before the mind certain principles of its use - whether reflected on or not - by association immediately regulate the action of the mind;  and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself which it cannot as a symbol transgress. (Peirce, CE 1, 173).</p>

<p>Now, I ask, how is it that anything can be done with a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception, much less imagining the object that belongs to it?  It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature, which may be described thus, that when it is brought before the mind certain principles of its use — whether reflected on or not — by association immediately regulate the action of the mind;  and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself which it cannot ''as a symbol'' transgress. (Peirce, CE 1, 173).</p>

<p>Inference in general obviously supposes symbolization;  and all symbolization is inference.  For every symbol as we have seen contains information.  And ... all kinds of information involve inference.  Inference, then, is symbolization.  They are the same notions.  Now we have already analyzed the notion of a symbol, and we have found that it depends upon the possibility of representations acquiring a nature, that is to say an immediate representative power.  This principle is therefore the ground of inference in general. (Peirce, CE 1, 280).</p>

<p>Inference in general obviously supposes symbolization;  and all symbolization is inference.  For every symbol as we have seen contains information.  And … all kinds of information involve inference.  Inference, then, is symbolization.  They are the same notions.  Now we have already analyzed the notion of a ''symbol'', and we have found that it depends upon the possibility of representations acquiring a nature, that is to say an immediate representative power.  This principle is therefore the ground of inference in general. (Peirce, CE 1, 280).</p>

<p>A symbol which has connotation and denotation contains information.  Whatever symbol contains information contains more connotation than is necessary to limit its possible denotation to those things which it may denote.  That is, every symbol contains more than is sufficient for a principle of selection. (Peirce, CE 1, 282).</p>

<p>A symbol which has connotation and denotation contains information.  Whatever symbol contains information contains more connotation than is necessary to limit its possible denotation to those things which it may denote.  That is, every symbol contains more than is sufficient for a principle of selection. (Peirce, CE 1, 282).</p>

<p>The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  ...</p>

<p>The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  …</p>

<p>Every addition to the comprehension of a term, lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.  ...</p>

<p>Every addition to the comprehension of a term, lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.  …</p>

<p>And therefore as every term must have information, every term has superfluous comprehension.  And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot make it so empty that it shall have no superfluous comprehension.</p>

<p>And therefore as every term must have information, every term has superfluous comprehension.  And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot make it so empty that it shall have no superfluous comprehension.</p>

<p>I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in this superfluous comprehension and is therefore entirely removed by a consideration of the laws of information. (Peirce, CE 1, 467).</p>

<p>I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in this superfluous comprehension and is therefore entirely removed by a consideration of the laws of ''information''. (Peirce, CE 1, 467).</p>

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