Changes

Because the initial discussion seems to flow more smoothly if I apply dyadic relations on the left, I formulate these definitions as follows:

Because the initial discussion seems to flow more smoothly if I apply dyadic relations on the left, I formulate these definitions as follows:

: For Icons:     Sign (Obj) = Inst (Prop (Obj)),

:{|

 

| For Icons:

: For Indices:   Sign (Obj) = Prop (Inst (Obj)).

| Sign (Obj)

| =

| Inst (Prop (Obj)),

| For Indices:

| Sign (Obj)

| =

| Prop (Inst (Obj)).

Imagine starting from the sign and retracing steps to reach the object, in this way finding the converses of these relations to be as follows:

Imagine starting from the sign and retracing steps to reach the object, in this way finding the converses of these relations to be as follows:

: For Icons:     Obj (Sign) = Inst (Prop (Sign)),

:{|

 

| For Icons:

: For Indices:   Obj (Sign) = Prop (Inst (Sign)).

| Obj (Sign)

| =

| Inst (Prop (Sign)),

| For Indices:

| Obj (Sign)

| =

| Prop (Inst (Sign)).

In spite of the apparent duality between these patterns of composition, there is a significant asymmetry to be observed in the way that the insistent theme of realism interrupts the underlying genre.  In order to understand this, it is necessary to note that the strain of pragmatic thinking I am using here takes its definition of ''reality'' from the word's original Scholastic sources, where the adjective ''real'' means ''having properties''.  Taken in this sense, reality is necessary but not sufficient to ''actuality'', where ''actual'' means "existing in act and not merely potentially" (Webster's).  To reiterate, actuality is sufficient but not necessary to reality.  The distinction between the ideas is further pointed up by the fact that a potential can be real, and that its reality can be independent of any particular moment in which the power acts.

In spite of the apparent duality between these patterns of composition, there is a significant asymmetry to be observed in the way that the insistent theme of realism interrupts the underlying genre.  In order to understand this, it is necessary to note that the strain of pragmatic thinking I am using here takes its definition of ''reality'' from the word's original Scholastic sources, where the adjective ''real'' means ''having properties''.  Taken in this sense, reality is necessary but not sufficient to ''actuality'', where ''actual'' means "existing in act and not merely potentially" (Webster's).  To reiterate, actuality is sufficient but not necessary to reality.  The distinction between the ideas is further pointed up by the fact that a potential can be real, and that its reality can be independent of any particular moment in which the power acts.

These ''angelic doctrines'' would probably remain distant from the present concern, were it not for two points of connection:

These ''angelic doctrines'' would probably remain distant from the present concern, were it not for two points of connection:

1. Relative to the present genre, the distinction of reality, that can be granted to certain objects of thought and not to others, fulfills an analogous role to the distinction that singles out ''sets'' among ''classes'' in modern versions of set theory.  Taking the membership relation "∈" as a predecessor relation in a pre-designated hierarchy of classes, a class attains the status of a set, and by dint of this becomes an object of more determinate discussion, simply if it has successors.  Pragmatic reality is distinguished from both the medieval and the modern versions, however, by the fact that its reality is always a reality to somebody.  This is due to the circumstance that it takes both an abstract property and a concrete interpreter to establish the practical reality of an object.

# Relative to the present genre, the distinction of reality, that can be granted to certain objects of thought and not to others, fulfills an analogous role to the distinction that singles out ''sets'' among ''classes'' in modern versions of set theory.  Taking the membership relation "∈" as a predecessor relation in a pre-designated hierarchy of classes, a class attains the status of a set, and by dint of this becomes an object of more determinate discussion, simply if it has successors.  Pragmatic reality is distinguished from both the medieval and the modern versions, however, by the fact that its reality is always a reality to somebody.  This is due to the circumstance that it takes both an abstract property and a concrete interpreter to establish the practical reality of an object.

2. This project seeks articulations and implementations of intelligent activity within dynamically realistic systems.  The individual stresses placed on articulation, implementation, actuality, dynamics, and reality collectively reinforce the importance of several issues:

::* Systems theory, consistently pursued, eventually demands for its rationalization a distinct ontology, in which states of being and modes of action form the principal objects of thought, out of which the ordinary sorts of stably extended objects must be constructed. In the "grammar" of process philosophy, verbs and pronouns are more basic than nouns.  In its influence on the course of this discussion, the emphasis on systematic action is tantamount to an objective genre that makes dynamic systems, their momentary states and their passing actions, become the ultimate objects of synthesis and analysis.  Consequently, the drift of this inquiry will be turned toward conceiving actions, as traced out in the trajectories of systems, to be the primitive elements of construction, more fundamental in this objective genre than stationary objects extended in space.  As a corollary, it expects to find that physical objects of the static variety have a derivative status in relation to the activities that orient agents, both organisms and organizations, toward purposeful objectives.

a. Systems theory, consistently pursued, eventually demands for its rationalization a distinct ontology, in which states of being and modes of action form the principal objects of thought, out of which the ordinary sorts of stably extended objects must be constructed.  In the "grammar" of process philosophy, verbs and pronouns are more basic than nouns.  In its influence on the course of this discussion, the emphasis on systematic action is tantamount to an objective genre that makes dynamic systems, their momentary states and their passing actions, become the ultimate objects of synthesis and analysis.  Consequently, the drift of this inquiry will be turned toward conceiving actions, as traced out in the trajectories of systems, to be the primitive elements of construction, more fundamental in this objective genre than stationary objects extended in space.  As a corollary, it expects to find that physical objects of the static variety have a derivative status in relation to the activities that orient agents, both organisms and organizations, toward purposeful objectives.

::* At root, the notion of ''dynamics'' is concerned with ''power'' in the sense of ''potential''.  The brand of pragmatic thinking that I use in this work permits potential entities to be analyzed as real objects and conceptual objects to be constituted by the conception of their actual effects in practical instances.  In the attempt to unify symbolic and dynamic approaches to intelligent systems (Upper and Lower Kingdoms?), there remains an insistent need to build conceptual bridges.  A facility for relating objects to their actualizing instances and their instantiating actions lends many useful tools to an effort of this nature, in which the search for understanding cannot rest until each object and phenomenon has been reconstructed in terms of active occurrences and ways of being.

::* In prospect of form, it does not matter whether one takes this project as a task of analyzing and articulating the actualizations of intelligence that already exist in nature, or whether one views it as a goal of synthesizing and artificing the potentials for intelligence that have yet to be conceived in practice.  From a formal perspective, the analysis and the synthesis are just reciprocal ways of tracing or retracing the same generic patterns of potential structure that determine actual form.

 

c. In prospect of form, it does not matter whether one takes this project as a task of analyzing and articulating the actualizations of intelligence that already exist in nature, or whether one views it as a goal of synthesizing and artificing the potentials for intelligence that have yet to be conceived in practice.  From a formal perspective, the analysis and the synthesis are just reciprocal ways of tracing or retracing the same generic patterns of potential structure that determine actual form.

Returning to the examination of icons and indices, and keeping the criterion of reality in mind, notice the radical difference that comes into play in recursive settings between the two types of contemplated moves that are needed to trace the respective signs back to their objects, that is, to discover their denotations:

Returning to the examination of icons and indices, and keeping the criterion of reality in mind, notice the radical difference that comes into play in recursive settings between the two types of contemplated moves that are needed to trace the respective signs back to their objects, that is, to discover their denotations:

1. Icon -> Object.  Taking the iconic sign as an initial instance, try to go up to a property and then down to a different or perhaps the same instance.  This form of ascent does not require a distinct object, since reality of the sign is sufficient to itself.  In other words, if the sign has any properties at all, then it is an icon of a real object, even if that object is only itself.

# Icon → Object.  Taking the iconic sign as an initial instance, try to go up to a property and then down to a different or perhaps the same instance.  This form of ascent does not require a distinct object, since reality of the sign is sufficient to itself.  In other words, if the sign has any properties at all, then it is an icon of a real object, even if that object is only itself.

 

# Index → Object.  Taking the indexical sign as an initial property, try to go down to an instance and then up to a different or perhaps the same property.  This form of descent requires a real instance to substantiate it, but not necessarily a distinct object.  Consequently, the index always has a real connection to its object, even if that object is only itself.

2. Index -> Object.  Taking the indexical sign as an initial property, try to go down to an instance and then up to a different or perhaps the same property.  This form of descent requires a real instance to substantiate it, but not necessarily a distinct object.  Consequently, the index always has a real connection to its object, even if that object is only itself.

In sum:  For icons a separate reality is optional, for indices a separate reality is obligatory.  As often happens with a form of analysis, each term under the indicated sum appears to verge on indefinite expansion:

In sum:  For icons a separate reality is optional, for indices a separate reality is obligatory.  As often happens with a form of analysis, each term under the indicated sum appears to verge on indefinite expansion:

1. ''For icons, the existence of a separate reality is optional.''  This means that the question of reality in the sign relation can depend on nothing more than the reality of each sign itself, on whether it has any property with respect to the OG in question.  In effect, icons can rely on their own reality to faithfully provide a real object.

# ''For icons, the existence of a separate reality is optional.''  This means that the question of reality in the sign relation can depend on nothing more than the reality of each sign itself, on whether it has any property with respect to the OG in question.  In effect, icons can rely on their own reality to faithfully provide a real object.

 

# ''For indices, the existence of a separate reality is obligatory.''  And yet this reality need not affect the object of the sign.  In essence, indices are satisfied with a basis in reality that need only reside in an actual object instance, one that establishes a real connection between the object and its index with regard to the OG in question.

2. ''For indices, the existence of a separate reality is obligatory.''  And yet this reality need not affect the object of the sign.  In essence, indices are satisfied with a basis in reality that need only reside in an actual object instance, one that establishes a real connection between the object and its index with regard to the OG in question.

Finally, suppose that M and N are hypothetical sign relations intended to capture all the iconic and indexical relationships, respectively, that a typical object x enjoys within its genre G.  A sign relation in which every sign has the same kind of relation to its object under an assumed form of analysis is appropriately called a ''homogeneous sign relation''.  In particular, if H is a homogeneous sign relation in which every sign has either an iconic or an indexical relation to its object, then it is convenient to apply the corresponding adjective to the whole of H.

Finally, suppose that M and N are hypothetical sign relations intended to capture all the iconic and indexical relationships, respectively, that a typical object x enjoys within its genre G.  A sign relation in which every sign has the same kind of relation to its object under an assumed form of analysis is appropriately called a ''homogeneous sign relation''.  In particular, if H is a homogeneous sign relation in which every sign has either an iconic or an indexical relation to its object, then it is convenient to apply the corresponding adjective to the whole of H.