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=====1.3.9.3.  The Formative Tension=====

=====1.3.9.3.  The Formative Tension=====

The incidental arena or informal context is presently described in casual, derivative, or negative terms, simply as the "not yet formal", and so this admittedly unruly region is currently depicted in ways that suggest a purely unformed and a wholly formless chaos, which it is not.  Increasing experience with the formalization process can help one to develop a better appreciation of the informal context, and in time one can argue for a more positive characterization of this realm as a truly "formative context".  The formal domain is where risks are contemplated, but the formative context is where risks are taken.  In this view, the informal context is more clearly seen as the off-stage staging ground where everything that appears on the formal scene is first assembled for a formal presentation.  In taking this view, one is stepping back a bit in one's imagination from the scene that presses on one's attention, getting a sense of its frame and its stage, and becoming accustomed to see what appears in ever dimmer lights, in short, one is learning to reflect on the more obvious actions, to read their pretexts, and to detect the motives that end in them.

The incidental arena or informal context is presently described in casual, derivative, or negative terms, simply as the ''not yet formal'', and so this admittedly unruly region is currently depicted in ways that suggest a purely unformed and a wholly formless chaos, which it is not.  Increasing experience with the formalization process can help one to develop a better appreciation of the informal context, and in time one can argue for a more positive characterization of this realm as a truly ''formative context''.  The formal domain is where risks are contemplated, but the formative context is where risks are taken.  In this view, the informal context is more clearly seen as the off-stage staging ground where everything that appears on the formal scene is first assembled for a formal presentation.  In taking this view, one is stepping back a bit in one's imagination from the scene that presses on one's attention, getting a sense of its frame and its stage, and becoming accustomed to see what appears in ever dimmer lights, in short, one is learning to reflect on the more obvious actions, to read their pretexts, and to detect the motives that end in them.

It is fair to assume that an agent of inquiry possesses a faculty of inquiry that is available for exercise in an informal context, that is, without being required to formalize its properties prior to their use.  If this faculty of inquiry is a unity, then it appears as a whole on both sides of the "glass", that is, on both sides of the imaginary line that one pretends to draw between a formal arena and its informal context.

It is fair to assume that an agent of inquiry possesses a faculty of inquiry that is available for exercise in an informal context, that is, without being required to formalize its properties prior to their use.  If this faculty of inquiry is a unity, then it appears as a whole on both sides of the "glass", that is, on both sides of the imaginary line that one pretends to draw between a formal arena and its informal context.

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The style of this discussion, based on the distinction between possession and exercise that arises so naturally in this context, stems from a root that is old indeed.  In this connection, it is fruitful to compare the current alignments with those given in Aristotle's treatise "On the Soul", a germinal textbook of psychology that ventures to analyze the concept of the mind, psyche, or soul to the point of arriving at a definition.  The alignments of capacites, analogous correspondences, and illustrative materials outlined by Aristotle are summarized in Table 6.

The style of this discussion, based on the distinction between possession and exercise that arises so naturally in this context, stems from a root that is old indeed.  In this connection, it is fruitful to compare the current alignments with those given in Aristotle's treatise ''On the Soul'', a germinal textbook of psychology that ventures to analyze the concept of the mind, psyche, or soul to the point of arriving at a definition.  The alignments of capacites, analogous correspondences, and illustrative materials outlined by Aristotle are summarized in Table 6.

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| valign=top | e. || But of natural bodies some have life (zoe) and some have not;  by life we mean the capacity for self-sustenance, growth, and decay.

| valign=top | e. || But of natural bodies some have life (zoe) and some have not;  by life we mean the capacity for self-sustenance, growth, and decay.

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| valign=top | f. || Every natural body (soma physikon), then, which possesses  

| valign=top | f. || Every natural body (soma physikon), then, which possesses life must be substance, and substance of the compound type (synthete).

life must be substance, and substance of the compound type (synthete).

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| valign=top | g. || But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz., having life, the body (soma) cannot be soul (psyche), for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but rather is itself to be regarded as a subject, i.e., as matter.

| valign=top | g. || But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz., having life, the body (soma) cannot be soul (psyche), for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but rather is itself to be regarded as a subject, i.e., as matter.