Changes

===Note 2===

===Note 2===

{| align="center" width="90%"

| We come now to the last problem which has to be treated

|

|

| Let us again take the proposition "A and B are similar".

 

| It is plain, to begin with, that the 'complex'

<p>Let us again take the proposition "A and B are similar".</p>

| "A and B being similar", even if it exists,

 

| does not enter in, for if it did, we could

<p>It is plain, to begin with, that the 'complex' "A and B being similar", even if it exists, does not enter in, for if it did, we could not understand false propositions, because in their case there is no such complex.</p>

| not understand false propositions, because

 

| in their case there is no such complex.

<p>It is plain, also, from what has been said, that we cannot understand the proposition unless we are acquainted with A and B and similarity and the form "something and something have some relation".  Apart from these four objects, there does not appear, so far as we can see, to be any object with which we need be acquainted in order to understand the proposition.</p>

 

| It is plain, also, from what has been said, that we cannot understand

<p>It seems to follow that these four objects, and these only, must be united with the subject in one complex when the subject understands the proposition.  It cannot be any complex composed of them that enters in, since they need not form any complex, and if they do, we need not be acquainted with it.  But they themselves must all enter in, since if they did not, it would be at least theoretically possible to understand the proposition without being acquainted with them.</p>

| the proposition unless we are acquainted with A and B and similarity

 

| and the form "something and something have some relation".  Apart

<p>In this argument, I appeal to the principle that, when we understand, those objects with which we must be acquainted when we understand, and those only, are object-constituents (i.e. constituents other than understanding itself and the subject) of the understanding-complex.</p>

| from these four objects, there does not appear, so far as we can

 

| see, to be any object with which we need be acquainted in order

<p>(Russell, TOK, pp. 116&ndash;117).</p>

| to understand the proposition.

|}

 

| It seems to follow that these four objects, and these only, must be

<p>Bertrand Russell, ''Theory of Knowledge : The 1913 Manuscript'', edited by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames in collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell, Routledge, London, UK, 1992.  First published, George Allen and Unwin, 1984.</p>

| united with the subject in one complex when the subject understands

| the proposition.  It cannot be any complex composed of them that

| enters in, since they need not form any complex, and if they do,

| we need not be acquainted with it.  But they themselves must

| all enter in, since if they did not, it would be at least

| theoretically possible to understand the proposition

| without being acquainted with them.

| In this argument, I appeal to the principle that,

| when we understand, those objects with which we

| must be acquainted when we understand, and those

| only, are object-constituents (i.e. constituents

| other than understanding itself and the subject)

| of the understanding-complex.

| Russell, TOK, pp. 116-117.

|

| Bertrand Russell, 'Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript',

| edited by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames in collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell,

| Routledge, London, UK, 1992.  First published, George Allen & Unwin, 1984.

</pre>

===Note 3===

===Note 3===