Changes

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce (1905), &ldquo;What Pragmatism Is&rdquo;, ''The Monist'' 15, 161&ndash;181.  Reprinted, ''Collected Papers'', CP&nbsp;5.411&mdash;437.</p>

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce (1905), &ldquo;What Pragmatism Is&rdquo;, ''The Monist'' 15, 161&ndash;181.  Reprinted, ''Collected Papers'', CP&nbsp;5.411&mdash;437.</p>

===Discussion Note 1===

 

CROM.  Discussion Note 1

 

JA = Jon Awbrey

* JA = Jon Awbrey

JH = Jay Halcomb

* JH = Jay Halcomb

Let me make a try at explaining some of this in plainer terms.

Let me make a try at explaining some of this in plainer terms.

The topic of second intentional logic was raised most recently by Bernard Morand, replying to a note that I cross-posted to the "Semiotics and Communication List":

The topic of second intentional logic was raised most recently by Bernard Morand, replying to a note that I cross-posted to the "Semiotics and Communication List":

http://yaka.univ-perp.fr/wws/arc/gdsemiocom

* http://yaka.univ-perp.fr/wws/arc/gdsemiocom

I thought that his comment was extremely helpful with respect to the entangled questions of abstract objects, the processes of abstraction, the relationships of abstractions to abstractees, and so on, that we were engaged in at the time.

I thought that his comment was extremely helpful with respect to the entangled questions of abstract objects, the processes of abstraction, the relationships of abstractions to abstractees, and so on, that we were engaged in at the time.

But I have since come to realize that in making the conventional translation from "higher intentional logic of relatives" (HILOR) to "higher order logic" (HOL) that some very serious distortions are almost inevitably introduced into the discussion.  I am still trying to work out what might account for these losses in translation, but the main fact seems to be that the traditions that have severally used these terminologies have very different purposes attached to their use, whatever form of "logically in principle" (LIP) conversion might be enunciated betweeen them.

But I have since come to realize that in making the conventional translation from ''higher intentional logic of relatives'' (HILOR) to ''higher order logic'' (HOL) that some very serious distortions are almost inevitably introduced into the discussion.  I am still trying to work out what might account for these losses in translation, but the main fact seems to be that the traditions that have severally used these terminologies have very different purposes attached to their use, whatever form of ''logically in principle'' (LIP) conversion might be enunciated betweeen them.

I am adducing to the HAPA account a few canonical remarks from Peirce that I hope will help to explain some of the things that the older traditions regarded as belonging under the heading of second and higher intentions:

I am adducing to the HAPA account a few canonical remarks from Peirce that I hope will help to explain some of the things that the older traditions regarded as belonging under the heading of second and higher intentions:

So far:

So far:

http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11271.html

* http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11271.html

http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11277.html

* http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11277.html

If I had to give a midflight capsule summary, I would probably say that

If I had to give a midflight capsule summary, I would probably say that the HOL concern is primarily levelled at issues of global coverage while the HIL concern starts out primarily from local operations, especially the formal logical processes that support ''critical reflection on method'' (CROM).

the HOL concern is primarily levelled at issues of global coverage while

the HIL concern starts out primarily from local operations, especially the

formal logical processes that support "critical reflection on method" (CROM).

In a way that is yet to be made as clear as I would like, HILOR demands slightly more "elbow room" than FOL can ever seem to afford -- but here it may not be the cramp of FOL per se so much as the habits of 2-adic reductive thinking that have been its accidents in history so far -- at any rate, HILOR doesn't really care all that much right at first "how high is the sky" the way that it sounds if you transduce higher intentional talk into higher order talk.  That's the best I can explain it right now.

In a way that is yet to be made as clear as I would like, HILOR demands slightly more &ldquo;elbow room&rdquo; than FOL can ever seem to afford &mdash; but here it may not be the cramp of FOL per&nbsp;se so much as the habits of 2-adic reductive thinking that have been its accidents in history so far &mdash; at any rate, HILOR doesn't really care all that much right at first &ldquo;how high is the sky&rdquo; the way that it sounds if you transduce higher intentional talk into higher order talk.  That's the best I can explain it right now.

Previously:

Previously: