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The principal difficulties associated with this task appear to spring from two roots.

The principal difficulties associated with this task appear to spring from two roots.

First, there is the issue of "computational mediation".  In using the sorts of sequences that computers go through to mediate discussion of the sorts of sequences that people go through, it becomes necessary to re-examine all of the facilitating assumptions that are commonly taken for granted in relating one human experience to another, that is, in describing and building structural relationships among the experiences of human agents.

First, there is the issue of ''computational mediation''.  In using the sorts of sequences that computers go through to mediate discussion of the sorts of sequences that people go through, it becomes necessary to re-examine all of the facilitating assumptions that are commonly taken for granted in relating one human experience to another, that is, in describing and building structural relationships among the experiences of human agents.

Second, there is the problem of "representing the general in the particular".  How is it possible for the most particular imaginable things, namely, the transient experiential states of agents, to represent the most general imaginable things, namely, the agents' own conceptions of the abstract categories of experience?

 

Second, there is the problem of ''representing the general in the particular''.  How is it possible for the most particular imaginable things, namely, the transient experiential states of agents, to represent the most general imaginable things, namely, the agents' own conceptions of the abstract categories of experience?

Finally, not altogether as an afterthought, there is a question that binds these issues together.  How does it make sense to apply one's individual conceptions of the abstract categories of experience, not only to the experiences of oneself and others, but in points of form to compare them with the structures present in mathematical models?

Finally, not altogether as an afterthought, there is a question that binds these issues together.  How does it make sense to apply one's individual conceptions of the abstract categories of experience, not only to the experiences of oneself and others, but in points of form to compare them with the structures present in mathematical models?