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====Excerpt 7. Peirce (CP 5.448, n. 1)====

====Excerpt 7. Peirce (CP 5.448, n. 1)====

<p>These remarks require supplementation.  Determination, in general, is not defined at all;  and the attempt at defining the determination of a subject with respect to a character only covers (or seems only to cover) explicit propositional determination.</p>

<p>These remarks require supplementation.  Determination, in general, is not defined at all;  and the attempt at defining the determination of a subject with respect to a character only covers (or seems only to cover) explicit propositional determination.</p>

<p>The incidental remark [5.447] to the effect that words whose meaning should be determinate would leave "no latitude of interpretation" is more satisfactory, since the context makes it plain that there must be no such latitude either for the interpreter or for the utterer.  The explicitness of the words would leave the utterer no room for explanation of his meaning.  This definition has the advantage of being applicable to a command, to a purpose, to a medieval substantial form;  in short to anything capable of indeterminacy.</p>

<p>The incidental remark [5.447] to the effect that words whose meaning should be determinate would leave &ldquo;no latitude of interpretation&rdquo; is more satisfactory, since the context makes it plain that there must be no such latitude either for the interpreter or for the utterer.  The explicitness of the words would leave the utterer no room for explanation of his meaning.  This definition has the advantage of being applicable to a command, to a purpose, to a medieval substantial form;  in short to anything capable of indeterminacy.</p>

<p>(That everything indeterminate is of the nature of a sign can be proved inductively by imagining and analyzing instances of the surdest description.  Thus, the indetermination of an event which should happen by pure chance without cause, ''sua sponte'', as the Romans mythologically said, ''spontanément'' in French (as if what was done of one's own motion were sure to be irrational), does not belong to the event &mdash; say, an explosion &mdash; ''per se'', or as an explosion.  Neither is it by virtue of any real relation:  it is by virtue of a relation of reason.  Now what is true by virtue of a relation of reason is representative, that is, is of the nature of a sign.  A similar consideration applies to the indiscriminate shots and blows of a Kentucky free fight.)</p>

<p>(That everything indeterminate is of the nature of a sign can be proved inductively by imagining and analyzing instances of the surdest description.  Thus, the indetermination of an event which should happen by pure chance without cause, ''sua sponte'', as the Romans mythologically said, ''spontanément'' in French (as if what was done of one's own motion were sure to be irrational), does not belong to the event &mdash; say, an explosion &mdash; ''per se'', or as an explosion.  Neither is it by virtue of any real relation:  it is by virtue of a relation of reason.  Now what is true by virtue of a relation of reason is representative, that is, is of the nature of a sign.  A similar consideration applies to the indiscriminate shots and blows of a Kentucky free fight.)</p>

<p>Even a future event can only be determinate in so far as it is a consequent.  Now the concept of a consequent is a logical concept.  It is derived from the concept of the conclusion of an argument.  But an argument is a sign of the truth of its conclusion;  its conclusion is the rational ''interpretation'' of the sign.  This is in the spirit of the Kantian doctrine that metaphysical concepts are logical concepts applied somewhat differently from their logical application.  The difference, however, is not really as great as Kant represents it to be, and as he was obliged to represent it to be, owing to his mistaking the logical and metaphysical correspondents in almost every case.</p>

<p>Even a future event can only be determinate in so far as it is a consequent.  Now the concept of a consequent is a logical concept.  It is derived from the concept of the conclusion of an argument.  But an argument is a sign of the truth of its conclusion;  its conclusion is the rational ''interpretation'' of the sign.  This is in the spirit of the Kantian doctrine that metaphysical concepts are logical concepts applied somewhat differently from their logical application.  The difference, however, is not really as great as Kant represents it to be, and as he was obliged to represent it to be, owing to his mistaking the logical and metaphysical correspondents in almost every case.</p>

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Collected Papers'', CP 5.448, n. 1</p>

<p align=right">C.S. Peirce, ''Collected Papers'', CP 5.448, n. 1</p>

====Excerpt 8. Peirce (CP 5.448, n. 1)====

====Excerpt 8. Peirce (CP 5.448, n. 1)====