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=====5.2.11.9. Pragmatic Certainties=====

=====5.2.11.9. Pragmatic Certainties=====

This brings me to the point of asking:  What does ''certainty'' mean in practice, that is, what meanings can be revealed for the concept if one attempts to translate the intentions behind it into operational terms?  Once one bothers to ask this eminently practical question, it becomes reasonably clear almost immediately that no brand of absolute certainty is ever in required practice.  For practical purposes, only a moderate amount of certainty is demanded, just enough for a particular agent to settle on a particular course of action.  A question about the kind of certainty expected or the level of certainty needed in order to make a decision is itself an interpretive issue.  In other words, no matter whether its instances remain to be decided on a case by case basis, or whether a general rule can be formed to cover them, their resolution occurs in a manner that retains an irreducible degree of arbitrariness about it, since it must relate to the degrees of freedom possessed by the agents who arbitrate the matter in question.  In the final analysis, this is an issue that devolves upon the nature and the constitution of the very form of agency that finds itself concerned with the question and exerts itself according to its interest in the action.  Namely and solely, this form of agency can be comprised of nothing other than the particular agents and the communities of agents who are compelled or inspired to act at the moment in question.

This brings me to the point of asking:  What does "certainty" mean in practice, that is, what meanings can be revealed for the concept if one attempts to translate the intentions behind it into operational terms?  Once one bothers to ask this eminently practical question, it becomes reasonably clear almost immediately that no brand of absolute certainty is ever in required practice.  For practical purposes, only a moderate amount of certainty is demanded, just enough for a particular agent to settle on a particular course of action.  A question about the kind of certainty expected or the level of certainty needed in order to make a decision is itself an interpretive issue.  In other words, no matter whether its instances remain to be decided on a case by case basis, or whether a general rule can be formed to cover them, their resolution occurs in a manner that retains an irreducible degree of arbitrariness about it, since it must relate to the degrees of freedom possessed by the agents who arbitrate the matter in question.  In the final analysis, this is an issue that devolves upon the nature and the constitution of the very form of agency that finds itself concerned with the question and exerts itself according to its interest in the action.  Namely and solely, this form of agency can be comprised of nothing other than the particular agents and the communities of agents who are compelled or inspired to act at the moment in question.

The idea that certainty is needed to begin, whether to start thinking or to get moving in any direction of conduct, is one of the most paralyzing traps that the mind can let itself fall into.  This is why the pragmatic theory of inquiry emphasizes uncertainty as the literal start of inquiry, since there is certainly no difficulty about the mind finding itself in a state of uncertainty.  Thus, there is no scarcity of events to throw the mind into confusion, no trouble at all getting into trouble, and so this renders the whole fabric of one's experience rife with moments of doubt.  But what is the mind to make of this dubious resource, and what is the ultimate good of noticing this abundance of ambivalence in the mind?

The idea that certainty is needed to begin, whether to start thinking or to get moving in any direction of conduct, is one of the most paralyzing traps that the mind can let itself fall into.  This is why the pragmatic theory of inquiry emphasizes uncertainty as the literal start of inquiry, since there is certainly no difficulty about the mind finding itself in a state of uncertainty.  Thus, there is no scarcity of events to throw the mind into confusion, no trouble at all getting into trouble, and so this renders the whole fabric of one's experience rife with moments of doubt.  But what is the mind to make of this dubious resource, and what is the ultimate good of noticing this abundance of ambivalence in the mind?

There is much that is curious in the picture of uncertainty that I just presented.  The paradoxical phrase "certainly no difficulty", that seemed to pop up from nowhere in my description of the situation, is evidently an artifact of reflection, that is, due to the reflective character of the description but not an element of the situation described.  Specifically, it focuses on what appears at first to be a purely incidental triviality:  How easy it is to find oneself in a state of uncertainty.  More carefully, since to "find oneself" may be still too much to expect at such an early stage of the game, it may be said:  How easy it is to be for the moment or to end up momentarily in a state of uncertainty.  And yet, with yet another reflection, one is forced to ask:  To what exactly, whether an aspect of the original situation, a newly introduced amendment to it, or a newly generated outlook on the situation, do all these attributions of certainty, ease, freedom from trouble, and lack of difficulty apply?  Since it seems a contradiction to attribute these predicates to the problematic state of uncertainty itself, that is to say, they are not what's the matter in the original situation, they must belong either to the attitude of approach that is capable of reflection, to the ensuing state that is entered on reflection, or to the manner of viewing the whole situation.

There is much that is curious in the picture of uncertainty that I just presented.  The paradoxical phrase “certainly no difficulty”, that seemed to pop up from nowhere in my description of the situation, is evidently an artifact of reflection, that is, due to the reflective character of the description but not an element of the situation described.  Specifically, it focuses on what appears at first to be a purely incidental triviality:  How easy it is to find oneself in a state of uncertainty.  More carefully, since to "find oneself" may be still too much to expect at such an early stage of the game, it may be said:  How easy it is to be for the moment or to end up momentarily in a state of uncertainty.  And yet, with yet another reflection, one is forced to ask:  To what exactly, whether an aspect of the original situation, a newly introduced amendment to it, or a newly generated outlook on the situation, do all these attributions of certainty, ease, freedom from trouble, and lack of difficulty apply?  Since it seems a contradiction to attribute these predicates to the problematic state of uncertainty itself, that is to say, they are not what's the matter in the original situation, they must belong either to the attitude of approach that is capable of reflection, to the ensuing state that is entered on reflection, or to the manner of viewing the whole situation.

 

 

# Those that affect the attitude toward it, the manner of regarding it, whether of absorption and irreflection or reflection and understanding.

Thus, it is possible to distinguish between two collections of properties, or, if one prefers, between two different applications of the same set of predicates:  (1) those that affect the state of inquiry, its matter, and (2) those that affect the attitude toward it, the manner of regarding it, whether of absorption and irreflection or reflection and understanding.  In order to keep track of this distinction, I introduce the designations of "lower order" (LO) and "higher order" (HO) properties, attitudes, or applications of predicates.

In order to keep track of this distinction, I introduce the designations of ''lower order'' (LO) and ''higher order'' (HO) properties, attitudes, or applications of predicates.

"Aha!" you might say, here is the hidden certainty that is needed to begin the inquiry, the initial knowledge of its true motive force that makes the whole process of inquiry feasible, the unshakable faith in its prime mover that is required to rest before the rest can get started, or the ultimate security that is necessary to sustain the entire endeavor.  But it is not that, not yet.  The particular brand of HO certainty that arises in this situation is actually of very little use in resolving the original uncertainty.  Although it can provide a modicum of security, a small peace of mind, and serve as a "sop to Cerberus" at critical times, the invitations to this escape can be as distracting as the delights of its certainties are in fact seductive, and the exercise of this method to the exclusion of risking the perils of real experience can just as easily become the main obstruction to the further progress of inquiry.

"Aha!" you might say, here is the hidden certainty that is needed to begin the inquiry, the initial knowledge of its true motive force that makes the whole process of inquiry feasible, the unshakable faith in its prime mover that is required to rest before the rest can get started, or the ultimate security that is necessary to sustain the entire endeavor.  But it is not that, not yet.  The particular brand of HO certainty that arises in this situation is actually of very little use in resolving the original uncertainty.  Although it can provide a modicum of security, a small peace of mind, and serve as a "sop to Cerberus" at critical times, the invitations to this escape can be as distracting as the delights of its certainties are in fact seductive, and the exercise of this method to the exclusion of risking the perils of real experience can just as easily become the main obstruction to the further progress of inquiry.