Changes

One thing does appear certain, at least, once the issue is addressed:  Whatever it means, and however it is qualified, the relation of being ''independent of'' does not mean a relation of being ''not in relation to''.  After all, did I not just call this, with all due justice, a relation?  Indeed, independently of all questions of independence, the very notion of there being a relation ''not in relation to'' is a self cancelling nullity.  Perhaps the closest that one can approach to conceiving of relations like ''not related to'' or ''not a relative of'', in short, perhaps the simplest analogues or approximations to such a relation that one can devise are:  ''considered as not in relation to'' or ''treated as not in relation to'', prompting the questions: ''considered by whom?'' and ''treated by whom?'', all of which goes to make it manifest that a triadic relation is the minimal support needed for any such brand of speculative relation.

One thing does appear certain, at least, once the issue is addressed:  Whatever it means, and however it is qualified, the relation of being ''independent of'' does not mean a relation of being ''not in relation to''.  After all, did I not just call this, with all due justice, a relation?  Indeed, independently of all questions of independence, the very notion of there being a relation ''not in relation to'' is a self cancelling nullity.  Perhaps the closest that one can approach to conceiving of relations like ''not related to'' or ''not a relative of'', in short, perhaps the simplest analogues or approximations to such a relation that one can devise are:  ''considered as not in relation to'' or ''treated as not in relation to'', prompting the questions: ''considered by whom?'' and ''treated by whom?'', all of which goes to make it manifest that a triadic relation is the minimal support needed for any such brand of speculative relation.

In trying to reach a form of relation that is minimal in a certain regard, the analysis comes to a point where it is forced to reverse its direction and to synthesize a complex relation, one that possesses a higher arity than might be expected of a structure intended as a primitive rudiment.  What is ultimately suggested is a triadic relation that formulates the idea of a ''consideration'', a ''regard'', or a ''treatment''.  This involves an agent that acts as the overseer of the consideration, the regard, or the treatment in question along with a couple of other entities that fall in a dyadic relation to each other under this consideration, this regard, or this treatment.  The way to treat this triadic relation as sparingly as possible, in regard to the level of consideration that is assigned to it, is to let the agency of this oversight ignore as much as it possibly can about all the relations that conceivably exist between the overseen pair, the couple of agents, entities, or objects that fall within its purview.  Thus, the least that the overseer can manage to do is to mark a relation between the other two parties, without codifying, conveying, recording, or retaining any information about the particular kind of relation it is.  At any rate, this is the best interpretation that I find myself able to contrive at present for &ldquo;<math>X\!</math> regards <math>Y\!</math> as not in relation to <math>Z\!</math>&rdquo;.

In trying to reach a form of relation that is minimal in a certain regard, the analysis comes to a point where it is forced to reverse its direction and to synthesize a complex relation, one that possesses a higher arity than might be expected of a structure intended as a primitive rudiment.  What is ultimately suggested is a triadic relation that formulates the idea of a "consideration", a "regard", or a "treatment".  This involves an agent that acts as the overseer of the consideration, the regard, or the treatment in question along with a couple of other entities that fall in a dyadic relation to each other under this consideration, this regard, or this treatment.  The way to treat this triadic relation as sparingly as possible, in regard to the level of consideration that is assigned to it, is to let the agency of this oversight ignore as much as it possibly can about all the relations that conceivably exist between the overseen pair, the couple of agents, entities, or objects that fall within its purview.  Thus, the least that the overseer can manage to do is to mark a relation between the other two parties, without codifying, conveying, recording, or retaining any information about the particular kind of relation it is.  At any rate, this is the best interpretation that I find myself able to contrive at present for "X regards Y as not in relation to Z".

The preceding analysis may appear to lead up to a trivial point, but the argument just recounted is formally identical to a demonstration that is basic to pragmatic thinking, namely, that "we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable" (Peirce, CP 5.265).  Whether or not one wishes to say that there are such things as the "absolutely incognizable", we have no conception of them.  Any concept that we do have cannot truly be a concept "of" them, that is, it cannot be held to be "true" of them, since this all by itself would amount in fact to making them cognizable.  The idea that a successful conception is intended by its very nature to result in a true concept is critical and crucial in this regard.  If one merely wants to point out the triviality that we can have false concepts of anything we please, for example, the false concepts that are attached to the verbal formula "absolutely incognizable", then it is easy enough to stipulate that we are likely to have false conceits and misleading concepts about very many things indeed.

The preceding analysis may appear to lead up to a trivial point, but the argument just recounted is formally identical to a demonstration that is basic to pragmatic thinking, namely, that &ldquo;we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable&rdquo; (Peirce, CP&nbsp;5.265).  Whether or not one wishes to say that there are such things as the &ldquo;absolutely incognizable&rdquo;, we have no conception of them.  Any concept that we do have cannot truly be a concept ''of'' them, that is, it cannot be held to be ''true'' of them, since this all by itself would amount in fact to making them cognizable.  The idea that a successful conception is intended by its very nature to result in a true concept is critical and crucial in this regard.  If one merely wants to point out the triviality that we can have false concepts of anything we please, for example, the false concepts that are attached to the verbal formula &ldquo;absolutely incognizable&rdquo;, then it is easy enough to stipulate that we are likely to have false conceits and misleading concepts about very many things indeed.

Since the pragmatic theory of sign relations welcomes partial symbols and verbal formulas of every species of description as well as mental impressions, concepts, and ideas of every genus and level of generation into the same broad class of entities that it takes as "signs", the idea of an object that is not the object of a sign imparts a formal impression within its material that is identical, or at least indistinguishable in the structure of the relations that it suggests, to the idea of a relation that fits the verbal formula or the specious specification "not in relation to".  A rigorous critique of these very ideas is required in order to prevent their specious impressions from flowering into malign oppressions that obsess both the mind and the spirit.  The pragmatic critique of prior philosophy and the pragmatic theory of signs are intended, in part, precisely to address this task of "weeding out" delusive ideas.

Since the pragmatic theory of sign relations welcomes partial symbols and verbal formulas of every species of description as well as mental impressions, concepts, and ideas of every genus and level of generation into the same broad class of entities that it takes as signs, the idea of an object that is not the object of a sign imparts a formal impression within its material that is identical, or at least indistinguishable in the structure of the relations that it suggests, to the idea of a relation that fits the verbal formula or the specious specification ''not in relation to''.  A rigorous critique of these very ideas is required in order to prevent their specious impressions from flowering into malign oppressions that obsess both the mind and the spirit.  The pragmatic critique of prior philosophy and the pragmatic theory of signs are intended, in part, precisely to address this task of weeding out delusive ideas.

=====5.2.11.6. Questions of Justification=====

=====5.2.11.6. Questions of Justification=====