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=====5.2.11.4. Descriptions of the Mind=====

=====5.2.11.4. Descriptions of the Mind=====

In the process of interpreting Aristotle's text on interpretation as an early account of sign relations, I invoked a number of distinctions that appeared to be called for to guide the interpretation of the text and to form what I sense to be the most reasonable interpretation of its terms.  All of these distinctions are drawn from common practice and are usually assumed to be easy to make in any case.  And yet, on reflection, I find that I have little or no faith in their advertised properties or in my right to take them for granted.

In the process of interpreting Aristotle's text on interpretation as an early account of sign relations, I invoked a number of distinctions that appeared to be called for to guide the interpretation of the text and to form what I sense to be the most reasonable interpretation of its terms.  All of these distinctions are drawn from common practice and are usually assumed to be easy to make in any case.  And yet, on reflection, I find that I have little or no faith in their advertised properties or in my right to take them for granted.

For instance, consider the distinction between form and matter.  When I reflect on the question of how and whether I can make this distinction, I find myself hard pressed to tell whether the distinction itself is a formal distinction, a material distinction, or something else entirely.  Trying to pin it down between the first two cases, it seems to be either, or both, and yet neither, depending on the light that I choose to throw on the question, to consider the alternatives by, and to interrogate the usual answers under.  If it is either, then the significance of the other is diminished to nothing, as all that the opposite side of the divide can amount to is sliced away by a gradual slippage down the apposite slope, until the significance of the entire distinction appears but to disappear.  If it is both, then it violates the exclusiveness that is usually assumed to hold between the two sides of the distinction.  If it is neither, then it invalidates the exhaustiveness that is usually assumed to apply to the distinction between form and matter.  Whatever the case, I am called on to assume something unusual.  Indeed, it seems I am forced to recognize a "tertium quid" or a "third something", in other words, an option that can supply a novel alternative to the choice between form and matter, a category that the Greeks only hint at obscurely or obliquely allude to under the name of an "entelechy", and something that I can well nigh call the "interpretive" case.

For instance, consider the distinction between form and matter.  When I reflect on the question of how and whether I can make this distinction, I find myself hard pressed to tell whether the distinction itself is a formal distinction, a material distinction, or something else entirely.  Trying to pin it down between the first two cases, it seems to be either, or both, and yet neither, depending on the light that I choose to throw on the question, to consider the alternatives by, and to interrogate the usual answers under.  If it is either, then the significance of the other is diminished to nothing, as all that the opposite side of the divide can amount to is sliced away by a gradual slippage down the apposite slope, until the significance of the entire distinction appears but to disappear.  If it is both, then it violates the exclusiveness that is usually assumed to hold between the two sides of the distinction.  If it is neither, then it invalidates the exhaustiveness that is usually assumed to apply to the distinction between form and matter.  Whatever the case, I am called on to assume something unusual.  Indeed, it seems I am forced to recognize a ''tertium quid'' or a ''third something'', in other words, an option that can supply a novel alternative to the choice between form and matter, a category that the Greeks only hint at obscurely or obliquely allude to under the name of an ''entelechy'', and something that I can well nigh call the ''interpretive'' case.

By way of guidance in this innovation, or this novel effort to capture interpretation in and of itself, I adduce two texts that help to show the way that the relationship between form and matter has often been seen.

By way of guidance in this innovation, or this novel effort to capture interpretation in and of itself, I adduce two texts that help to show the way that the relationship between form and matter has often been seen.

The first text illustrates the use of this distinction in the context of a psychological investigation.

The first text illustrates the use of this distinction in the context of a psychological investigation.

We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia);  and this we subdivide into three:  (1) matter (hyle), which in itself is not an individual thing;  (2) shape (morphe) or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is directly attributed;  and (3) the compound of the two.

We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia);  and this we subdivide into three:  (1) matter (hyle), which in itself is not an individual thing;  (2) shape (morphe) or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is directly attributed;  and (3) the compound of the two.

It is also uncertain whether the soul as an actuality bears the same relation to the body as the sailor to the ship.

It is also uncertain whether the soul as an actuality bears the same relation to the body as the sailor to the ship.

Aristotle, De Anima, II.i.412a22-413a9

Aristotle, De Anima, II.i.412a22-413a9

The second text illustrates the use of an analogous distinction between form and matter within the context of a logical investigation.

The second text illustrates the use of an analogous distinction between form and matter within the context of a logical investigation.

And how can one know the certainty of demonstrations except by examining the argument in detail, the form and the matter, in order to see if the form is good, and then if each premiss is either admitted or proved by another argument of like force, until one is able to make do with admitted premisses alone?

Leibniz, Theodicy, [Leib, 89]  

<p>And how can one know the certainty of demonstrations except by examining the argument in detail, the form and the matter, in order to see if the form is good, and then if each premiss is either admitted or proved by another argument of like force, until one is able to make do with admitted premisses alone?</p>

| align="right" | Leibniz, ''Theodicy'', [Leib, 89]

Take once again the distinction between form and matter, and allow me to say that this distinction is "interpretive" in character or nature.  This gives me the option of saying that it is formal in some cases but material in other cases.  It can all depend on choice and circumstance.  If I interpret it as formal then certain things follow.  If I interpret it as material then other things follow.  But I can rest with calling it interpretive, leaving it to the moment to actualize what is most fitting.  If I interpret it as interpretive, which amounts to a way of holding any further decision in suspense, then I am choosing to remain all the while constantly aware of the circumstances and the conditions that affect the actualization of this distinction as either form or matter, or else to experience the consequences of failing to do so.

Take once again the distinction between form and matter, and allow me to say that this distinction is ''interpretive'' in character or nature.  This gives me the option of saying that it is formal in some cases but material in other cases.  It can all depend on choice and circumstance.  If I interpret it as formal then certain things follow.  If I interpret it as material then other things follow.  But I can rest with calling it interpretive, leaving it to the moment to actualize what is most fitting.  If I interpret it as interpretive, which amounts to a way of holding any further decision in suspense, then I am choosing to remain all the while constantly aware of the circumstances and the conditions that affect the actualization of this distinction as either form or matter, or else to experience the consequences of failing to do so.

But then, on marking any distinction, a moment's reflection brings me to ask:  "Who or what makes this distinction that I mark?"  And whether I say that it is I, or you, or whoever else agrees in marking it with us, whose activity constitutes the making of this distinction, or whether I think it is someone other or something else that makes this distinction that all of us merely mark and remark, and whether it is decided in the end that the maker is always coincident or sometimes distinct in regard to the marker, then I find myself still having to ask:  "How and why is this distinction being marked, in particular, what side or sides, with respect to each other, are its maker and its marker on?

But then, on marking any distinction, a moment's reflection brings me to ask:  "Who or what makes this distinction that I mark?"  And whether I say that it is I, or you, or whoever else agrees in marking it with us, whose activity constitutes the making of this distinction, or whether I think it is someone other or something else that makes this distinction that all of us merely mark and remark, and whether it is decided in the end that the maker is always coincident or sometimes distinct in regard to the marker, then I find myself still having to ask:  "How and why is this distinction being marked, in particular, what side or sides, with respect to each other, are its maker and its marker on?

For these reasons, it is necessary to use an indirect strategy in order to approach the questions of these distinctions that I want to consider.  The ostensible distinctions are first described in very rough terms and introduced in the ways that they are naturally and usually thought of.  Thus, without taking for granted the clarity, fidelity, sensibility, or validity of their formulations, the distinctions are initially presented in the terms by which they are commonly indicated, intended, suggested, or regarded as being established.  This manner of approach is demanded in order to keep from assuming, if at all possible, the prior worth of the very formulations that are being examined and tested, and it tries to make it a separate question whether these intentions to distinguish can continue to be maintained in the very same terms and formulations.  Once this preliminary investigation is carried through to a conclusion, positive or negative, I can then return to analyze more carefullly and more generally the whole process of making such distinctions.

For these reasons, it is necessary to use an indirect strategy in order to approach the questions of these distinctions that I want to consider.  The ostensible distinctions are first described in very rough terms and introduced in the ways that they are naturally and usually thought of.  Thus, without taking for granted the clarity, fidelity, sensibility, or validity of their formulations, the distinctions are initially presented in the terms by which they are commonly indicated, intended, suggested, or regarded as being established.  This manner of approach is demanded in order to keep from assuming, if at all possible, the prior worth of the very formulations that are being examined and tested, and it tries to make it a separate question whether these intentions to distinguish can continue to be maintained in the very same terms and formulations.  Once this preliminary investigation is carried through to a conclusion, positive or negative, I can then return to analyze more carefully and more generally the whole process of making such distinctions.

1. The rough idea of one distinction is to sort the properties of things into two categories:  the "properties that things have" versus the "properties that things are given".  More specifically, and in reference to a "typical" agent, the former class is intended to include the properties that things have, in and of themselves, independently of any agent, whereas the latter class is intended to include the properties that things are given by an agent.  Now, it is clear that the common usage of words like "have" and "give" leaves a wide range of ambiguity yet remaining that needs to be resolved by the right interpretation.  (essential vs imputed prop)

# The rough idea of one distinction is to sort the properties of things into two categories:  the "properties that things have" versus the "properties that things are given".  More specifically, and in reference to a "typical" agent, the former class is intended to include the properties that things have, in and of themselves, independently of any agent, whereas the latter class is intended to include the properties that things are given by an agent.  Now, it is clear that the common usage of words like "have" and "give" leaves a wide range of ambiguity yet remaining that needs to be resolved by the right interpretation.  (essential vs imputed prop)

 

# The rough idea of another distinction is to sort signs and ideas, no matter whether they are considered severally or together, into two categories:  "signs and ideas as they actually occur" versus "signs and ideas in an abstract vacuum".  More specifically, and with reference to a particular class, community, or population of interpretive agents, the former category is intended to include signs and ideas as they actually occur among these agents, for example, as actualized, embodied, implemented, operationalized, or realized, whether consciously or not, among human beings, whereas the latter category leaves unanswered the question of embodiment and is therefore open to any suggestion as to how these signs and these ideas are intended to be conceived.  (empirical and material vs theoretical and formal signs and ideas)

2. The rough idea of another distinction is to sort signs and ideas, no matter whether they are considered severally or together, into two categories:  "signs and ideas as they actually occur" versus "signs and ideas in an abstract vacuum".  More specifically, and with reference to a particular class, community, or population of interpretive agents, the former category is intended to include signs and ideas as they actually occur among these agents, for example, as actualized, embodied, implemented, operationalized, or realized, whether consciously or not, among human beings, whereas the latter category leaves unanswered the question of embodiment and is therefore open to any suggestion as to how these signs and these ideas are intended to be conceived.  (empirical and material vs theoretical and formal signs and ideas)

The form of distinction that I need at this point tagging "signs and ideas as they actually occur", for instance, as actualized, embodied, and realized, whether consciously or not, in human beings, and leaving "signs and ideas in a vacuum" untagged by any special mark.

The form of distinction that I need at this point tagging "signs and ideas as they actually occur", for instance, as actualized, embodied, and realized, whether consciously or not, in human beings, and leaving "signs and ideas in a vacuum" untagged by any special mark.