Changes

A particular agent does what appears to be necessary at each moment in a succession of moments in order to achieve a particular aim, and hopes that what appears to be necessary to an agent who follows a given path cannot be totally immaterial to what is actually necessary in general.  The relationship between apparent necessity and actual necessity is the topic of another discussion later in this work, so I leave it till then.  At this point, it only needs to be observed that an apparent necessity constitutes a real force on the agent who observes it, in other words, that it constrains the acts of the agent to whom it appears necessary.  Given the freedom of intellect that comes from the reflective criticism of particular developments, a particular agent's particular inquiries are hopefully conceived in such a way as to work toward necessary truths.

A particular agent does what appears to be necessary at each moment in a succession of moments in order to achieve a particular aim, and hopes that what appears to be necessary to an agent who follows a given path cannot be totally immaterial to what is actually necessary in general.  The relationship between apparent necessity and actual necessity is the topic of another discussion later in this work, so I leave it till then.  At this point, it only needs to be observed that an apparent necessity constitutes a real force on the agent who observes it, in other words, that it constrains the acts of the agent to whom it appears necessary.  Given the freedom of intellect that comes from the reflective criticism of particular developments, a particular agent's particular inquiries are hopefully conceived in such a way as to work toward necessary truths.

I'm truly sorry man's dominion

| colspan="2" | I'm truly sorry man's dominion

Has broken Nature's social union,

An justifies that ill opinion,

| colspan="2" | Has broken Nature's social union,

Which makes thee startle

At me, thy poor, earth born companion,

| colspan="2" | An justifies that ill opinion,

An fellow mortal!

Robert Burns, To a Mouse, [CPW, 131]

| width="5%"  |   || Which makes thee startle

| colspan="2" | At me, thy poor, earth born companion,

| width="5%"  |   || An fellow mortal!

| colspan="2" align="right" | — Robert Burns, ''To a Mouse'', [CPW, 131]

Given the nature of particular agency, along with the circumstance that an inquiry must be carried out by a particular agent, an inquiry is apt to proceed in ways that are far from being absolutely necessary, and it is bound to wander on paths that fail to be optimal in the use of time.  But this fact — the fact that many departures from necessity are likely to affect the progress of any particular inquiry, and the fact that such contingencies, deficiencies, and facticities are almost sure to apply to one's present inquiry — although its likelihood in general is frequently suspected by a reflective agent and its certainty in theory is probably apparent to a critical agent, its import is usually not clearly "known", not in the detailed sense that its application to the moment in question is available to the agent who needs to act on it, and not in the pressing sense that its bearings on the consequences for experience are apparent to the agent who ought to be concerned about their subsequent effects.  But the widespread suspicion that what appears to be necessary is not always actually and absolutely necessary, however much it is likely to verge on the truth, remains completely vague in that form, and it does not conjure up enough of an objection to deter action on what appears to be necessary, not unless a concrete alternative also appears.

Given the nature of particular agency, along with the circumstance that an inquiry must be carried out by a particular agent, an inquiry is apt to proceed in ways that are far from being absolutely necessary, and it is bound to wander on paths that fail to be optimal in the use of time.  But this fact — the fact that many departures from necessity are likely to affect the progress of any particular inquiry, and the fact that such contingencies, deficiencies, and facticities are almost sure to apply to one's present inquiry — although its likelihood in general is frequently suspected by a reflective agent and its certainty in theory is probably apparent to a critical agent, its import is usually not clearly ''known'', not in the detailed sense that its application to the moment in question is available to the agent who needs to act on it, and not in the pressing sense that its bearings on the consequences for experience are apparent to the agent who ought to be concerned about their subsequent effects.  But the widespread suspicion that what appears to be necessary is not always actually and absolutely necessary, however much it is likely to verge on the truth, remains completely vague in that form, and it does not conjure up enough of an objection to deter action on what appears to be necessary, not unless a concrete alternative also appears.

In this way one is able to see the form of short term independence, the apparent indifference and the seeming lack of correlation that persists in the meantime, between actual necessities and apparent necessities.  The apparent necessity continues to subsist as a facticious matter, no matter how grave it appears to the agent who falls within its orbit and no matter how much it constrains the circumstantial actions of the agent to whom it in fact appears necessary.  A lack of actual necessity does not prevent an apparent necessity from continuing to appear just as if it were called for.  Conversely, a lack of apparent necessity in no way impedes an actual necessity from continuing to rule the total situation.  With all due respect to apparent necessities, the fact of their actual facticity is perfectly capable of holding true, however much these very conditions are able to constrain the actions of the particular agents to whom they appear necessary.  Moreover, the facticious nature and the virtual force that are severally attributed to an apparent necessity are just as apparently independent of each other, at least, in medias res.  The facticity of an apparent necessity continues to hold in fact, however forcefully it actually succeeds in compelling the activities of an agent.  The force of an apparent necessity continues to stay in effect, in spite of its actual facticity, right up until the time when it no longer appears to be necessary.

In this way one is able to see the form of short term independence, the apparent indifference and the seeming lack of correlation that persists in the meantime, between actual necessities and apparent necessities.  The apparent necessity continues to subsist as a factitious matter, no matter how grave it appears to the agent who falls within its orbit and no matter how much it constrains the circumstantial actions of the agent to whom it in fact appears necessary.  A lack of actual necessity does not prevent an apparent necessity from continuing to appear just as if it were called for.  Conversely, a lack of apparent necessity in no way impedes an actual necessity from continuing to rule the total situation.  With all due respect to apparent necessities, the fact of their actual facticity is perfectly capable of holding true, however much these very conditions are able to constrain the actions of the particular agents to whom they appear necessary.  Moreover, the factitious nature and the virtual force that are severally attributed to an apparent necessity are just as apparently independent of each other, at least, in medias res.  The facticity of an apparent necessity continues to hold in fact, however forcefully it actually succeeds in compelling the activities of an agent.  The force of an apparent necessity continues to stay in effect, in spite of its actual facticity, right up until the time when it no longer appears to be necessary.

I doubt na, whyles, but thou may thieve;

What then?  poor beastie, thou maun live!

| colspan="2" | I doubt na, whyles, but thou may thieve;

A daimen icker in a thrave

'S a sma request;

| colspan="2" | What then?  poor beastie, thou maun live!

I'll get a blessin wi the lave,

An never miss't!

| colspan="2" | A daimen icker in a thrave

Robert Burns, To a Mouse, [CPW, 132]

| width="5%"  |   || 'S a sma request;

| colspan="2" | I'll get a blessin wi the lave,

| width="5%"  |   || An never miss't!

| colspan="2" align="right" | — Robert Burns, ''Title'', [CPW, 132]

What I hope that my discussion of The LOS leads to is an inkling of the type of dialogue that is capable of taking place between a formal domain and the informal context in which it lives, the world in which it is born, continues to grow, and even forces to evolve along with its development, the setting at times in which it lies dormant, remaining restively inert for years or simply sleeping through the appointed phases of the night, the fold in which it is able to be reborn, to come to a new life, and to arise afresh.  The form of this dialogue is one that suggests the name for itself of a "discursion", a word that is coined to carry a wealth of various possibilities:  a "dialectic recursion" or a "recursive dialogue", a "recursive analysis" (RA) or a "recursive excursion" (RE), perhaps the very form of "recursive inquiry" (RI) that admits of its decomposition into one or another "recursive undertaking" (RU) and thereby maintains the very form of its own constitution.  This array of acronyms serves to stake out a ready field of discursive research and exploration, one that is open in certain directions to unformalized possibilities of experience, in a sense or in essence, to its own future.

What I hope that my discussion of The LOS leads to is an inkling of the type of dialogue that is capable of taking place between a formal domain and the informal context in which it lives, the world in which it is born, continues to grow, and even forces to evolve along with its development, the setting at times in which it lies dormant, remaining restively inert for years or simply sleeping through the appointed phases of the night, the fold in which it is able to be reborn, to come to a new life, and to arise afresh.  The form of this dialogue is one that suggests the name for itself of a ''discursion'', a word that is coined to carry a wealth of various possibilities:  a ''dialectic recursion'' or a ''recursive dialogue'', a ''recursive analysis'' (RA) or a ''recursive excursion'' (RE), perhaps the very form of ''recursive inquiry'' (RI) that admits of its decomposition into one or another ''recursive undertaking'' (RU) and thereby maintains the very form of its own constitution.  This array of acronyms serves to stake out a ready field of discursive research and exploration, one that is open in certain directions to unformalized possibilities of experience, in a sense or in essence, to its own future.

But the question remains whether sign bearing agents can act, at least, as if they are able to be aware of their bearing as one component of a coherent, competent, and complete code of conduct, even a form of life.  And the question continues how interpreters can acquire their faculties for the conscientious development and the deliberate elaboration of the factors that affect their own interpretive activities, in sum, how they can reflect on the factual contingencies that affect their own sign use, on the facticity of the circumstances that constrain these uses, and on the factors that determine the facility of the conditions that lead up to these uses, and then act on the results of all these reflections to make improvements in all these factors.  In this way of broaching the subject of reflection, I am forced to drop it almost immediately, with the aim of starting afresh at another point and approaching the topic again, the next time from another direction.

But the question remains whether sign-bearing agents can act, at least, as if they are able to be aware of their bearing as one component of a coherent, competent, and complete code of conduct, even a form of life.  And the question continues how interpreters can acquire their faculties for the conscientious development and the deliberate elaboration of the factors that affect their own interpretive activities, in sum, how they can reflect on the factual contingencies that affect their own sign use, on the facticity of the circumstances that constrain these uses, and on the factors that determine the facility of the conditions that lead up to these uses, and then act on the results of all these reflections to make improvements in all these factors.  In this way of broaching the subject of reflection, I am forced to drop it almost immediately, with the aim of starting afresh at another point and approaching the topic again, the next time from another direction.

Thy wee bit housie, too, in ruin!

Thy wee bit housie, too, in ruin!

Its silly wa's the win's are strewin!

Its silly wa's the win's are strewin!