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====4.2.4. The Trivializing of Integration====

====4.2.4. The Trivializing of Integration====

The roots of this "modern" structure appear to be traceable to Aristotle and Descartes.

The roots of this "modern" structure appear to be traceable to Aristotle and Descartes.

The presence of this assumption can be detected in three fundamental texts, the implications of which are well worth the time to examine.

 

The first passage occurs in Aristotle's treatise On Interpretation, where he articulates his understanding of the fundamental relationship that exists among objects or objectives in the world, signs and images in the various media of communication, and ideas or "affective impressions" in the mind.  Due to the complexity of this relationship, Aristotle is forced to make a number of simplifying assumptions.  This is a reasonable way to begin, but the fixing of these assumptions into the form of a dogma led many subsequent generations of thinkers to ignore the full potential of this relationship.

The presence of this assumption can be detected in three fundamental texts, the implications of which are well worth the time to examine.

Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche);  written words are the signs of words spoken.  As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men.  But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata).

 

(Aristotle, On Interpretation, i.16a4 9, p.115).

The first passage occurs in Aristotle's treatise ''On Interpretation'', where he articulates his understanding of the fundamental relationship that exists among objects or objectives in the world, signs and images in the various media of communication, and ideas or "affective impressions" in the mind.  Due to the complexity of this relationship, Aristotle is forced to make a number of simplifying assumptions.  This is a reasonable way to begin, but the fixing of these assumptions into the form of a dogma led many subsequent generations of thinkers to ignore the full potential of this relationship.

 

<p>Words spoken are symbols or signs (''symbola'') of affections or impressions (''pathemata'') of the soul (''psyche'');  written words are the signs of words spoken.  As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men.  But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs (''semeia''), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects (''pragmata'') of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (''homoiomata'').</p>

| align="right" | (Aristotle, ''On Interpretation'', i.16^a4&ndash;9, p. 115)

 

Aristotle's account contains two claims of constancy or uniformity, asserting that objects and ideas are the same, respectively, for all human interpreters.  This ignores the plurality and the mutability of interpretation, issues that we cannot afford to trivialize in the general consideration of diverse perspectives, if only with respect to the human potential for creative variation, or else in the application to education, where the whole idea is to learn new interpretations.  In their effects, these assumptions lead to the idea that every diversity among observers is merely a disagreement about words.

Aristotle's account contains two claims of constancy or uniformity, asserting that objects and ideas are the same, respectively, for all human interpreters.  This ignores the plurality and the mutability of interpretation, issues that we cannot afford to trivialize in the general consideration of diverse perspectives, if only with respect to the human potential for creative variation, or else in the application to education, where the whole idea is to learn new interpretations.  In their effects, these assumptions lead to the idea that every diversity among observers is merely a disagreement about words.

The second passage occurs in Aristotle's discussion of psychology, where he argues that the mind has an inherent capacity to integrate the data of the senses.  Aristotle's doctrine of the common sense faculty, or sensus communis, is ably summarized by W.S. Hett in his introduction to Aristotle's treatise On the Soul, where he glosses this term in the following way:

 

Book III is chiefly concerned with other vital faculties, but some accessories to the theory of sensation overflow into its opening chapters.  The connecting link is formed by the problem:  What is it that unifies (or distinguishes) the data of sense?

The second passage occurs in Aristotle's discussion of psychology, where he argues that the mind has an inherent capacity to integrate the data of the senses.  Aristotle's doctrine of the common sense faculty, or ''sensus communis'', is ably summarized by W.S. Hett in his introduction to Aristotle's treatise ''On the Soul'', where he glosses this term in the following way:

Sensus Communis.  The solution given is that there is a common sense faculty (located in or near the heart ...) which receives and co ordinates the stimuli passed on to it from the various sense organs.  This same faculty also directly perceives the "common sensibles" (i.e., those attributes, such as shape, size, number, etc., which are perceptible by more than one sense), among which Aristotle includes movement and time ... .  It also accounts for our consciousness of sensation, and it is responsible for the process of imagination.

 

(Hett, in (Aristotle, 1936), 5).

<p>Book III is chiefly concerned with other vital faculties, but some accessories to the theory of sensation overflow into its opening chapters.  The connecting link is formed by the problem:  What is it that unifies (or distinguishes) the data of sense?</p>

 

<p>''Sensus Communis''.  The solution given is that there is a common sense faculty (located in or near the heart &hellip;) which receives and co ordinates the stimuli passed on to it from the various sense organs.  This same faculty also directly perceives the "common sensibles" (''i.e.'', those attributes, such as shape, size, number, etc., which are perceptible by more than one sense), among which Aristotle includes movement and time &hellip;.  It also accounts for our consciousness of sensation, and it is responsible for the process of imagination.</p>

| align="right" | (Hett, in (Aristotle, 1936), p. 5)

 

Without trying to answer Shakespeare's question, that appears to be an echo of this very issue, I can stop to make the following observations.  The question of a common sense, that compares and contrasts the data of the senses, can be put in relation to the question of interpretation by recognizing that the data of the senses are particular kinds of signs that naturally refer to objects in the world.

Without trying to answer Shakespeare's question, that appears to be an echo of this very issue, I can stop to make the following observations.  The question of a common sense, that compares and contrasts the data of the senses, can be put in relation to the question of interpretation by recognizing that the data of the senses are particular kinds of signs that naturally refer to objects in the world.

The third passage that I offer for examination comes from Descartes' Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking the Truth in the Sciences.

 

Good sense is the most evenly shared thing in the world, for each of us thinks he is so well endowed with it that even those who are the hardest to please in all other respects are not in the habit of wanting more than they have.  It is unlikely that everyone is mistaken in this.  It indicates rather that the capacity to judge correctly and to distinguish the true from the false, which is properly what one calls common sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men, and consequently that the diversity of our opinions does not spring from some of us being more able to reason than others, but only from our conducting our thoughts along different lines and not examining the same things.

The third passage that I offer for examination comes from Descartes' ''Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking the Truth in the Sciences''.

 

[A]s far as reason or good sense is concerned, ... I am ready to believe that it is complete and entire in each one of us, ... that there are degrees only between accidents and not between the forms or natures of the individuals of a given specie. (Descartes, 1968, 27 28).

<p>Good sense is the most evenly shared thing in the world, for each of us thinks he is so well endowed with it that even those who are the hardest to please in all other respects are not in the habit of wanting more than they have.  It is unlikely that everyone is mistaken in this.  It indicates rather that the capacity to judge correctly and to distinguish the true from the false, which is properly what one calls common sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men, and consequently that the diversity of our opinions does not spring from some of us being more able to reason than others, but only from our conducting our thoughts along different lines and not examining the same things.</p>

 

 

<p>As far as reason or good sense is concerned, &hellip; I am ready to believe that it is complete and entire in each one of us, &hellip; that there are degrees only between ''accidents'' and not between the ''forms'' or ''natures'' of the ''individuals'' of a given ''specie''.</p>

| align="right" | (Descartes, 1968, 27 28)

 

Surprisingly enough, for all the passage of time that intervenes between the two accounts, and for all the other contingencies that are commonly imagined to have changed, this passage closely echoes in all of its main respects the doctrine of Aristotle concerning the common sense.

Surprisingly enough, for all the passage of time that intervenes between the two accounts, and for all the other contingencies that are commonly imagined to have changed, this passage closely echoes in all of its main respects the doctrine of Aristotle concerning the common sense.

In contemplating these texts and trying to assess their impact on the contemporary scene, one can view them as expressions of underlying assumptions, maintaining their force in our culture whether or not individual members of the culture have ever heard them rendered explicit in precisely these terms before.  These ideas form the basis for an especially refractory modernist thesis, one that I am calling the "triviality of integration".  This is the idea that nothing is lost in taking things apart, as in the processes of a selective observation or a reductive analysis, because "just about anyone" can put things back together.  In other words, common sense suffices to achieve the necessary synthesis or the subsequent reconstruction.

In contemplating these texts and trying to assess their impact on the contemporary scene, one can view them as expressions of underlying assumptions, maintaining their force in our culture whether or not individual members of the culture have ever heard them rendered explicit in precisely these terms before.  These ideas form the basis for an especially refractory modernist thesis, one that I am calling the "triviality of integration".  This is the idea that nothing is lost in taking things apart, as in the processes of a selective observation or a reductive analysis, because "just about anyone" can put things back together.  In other words, common sense suffices to achieve the necessary synthesis or the subsequent reconstruction.

Aristotle's thesis that the senses are integrated by a common sense has served as a metaphor for the relation of the special sciences to the overall unity of science and it has informed the relations that are instituted between the specialized disciplines and the whole realm of knowledge that is presided over by the university.  In exploiting this template, it has been taken for granted that the disciplines bear the same automatic relationship to the whole of knowledge that the senses bear to common sense.  This underlying belief leads to the problematic assumption that the integration of the disciplines is a trivial matter.  If anyone can do it, then it is not incumbent on us as educators to develop this skill in our students, and experts in any discipline are automatically well equipped to interpret and synthesize the knowledge that is delivered to them by disciplines in which they are novices.

Aristotle's thesis that the senses are integrated by a common sense has served as a metaphor for the relation of the special sciences to the overall unity of science and it has informed the relations that are instituted between the specialized disciplines and the whole realm of knowledge that is presided over by the university.  In exploiting this template, it has been taken for granted that the disciplines bear the same automatic relationship to the whole of knowledge that the senses bear to common sense.  This underlying belief leads to the problematic assumption that the integration of the disciplines is a trivial matter.  If anyone can do it, then it is not incumbent on us as educators to develop this skill in our students, and experts in any discipline are automatically well equipped to interpret and synthesize the knowledge that is delivered to them by disciplines in which they are novices.

====4.2.5. Tensions in the Field of Observation====

====4.2.5. Tensions in the Field of Observation====