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| − | SUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS XLIV - XLIX
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| − | [[Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa Theologiae|Index]] | |
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| − | *[[#q44a1|Question 44.1 The first cause of beings]]
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| − | *[[#q44a2|Question 44.2 ]]
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| − | *[[#q44a3|Question 44.3 ]]
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| − | *[[#q44a4|Question 44.4 ]]
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| − | *[[#q45a1|Question 45.1 Creation, which is the mode of emanation of creatures from the first cause]]
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| − | *[[#q45a2|Question 45.2 ]]
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| − | *[[#q45a3|Question 45.3 ]]
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| − | *[[#q45a4|Question 45.4 ]]
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| − | *[[#q45a5|Question 45.5 ]]
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| − | *[[#q45a6|Question 45.6 ]]
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| − | *[[#q45a7|Question 45.7 ]]
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| − | *[[#q45a8|Question 45.8 ]]
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| − | *[[#q46a1|Question 46.1 The beginning of the duration of creatures]]
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| − | *[[#q46a2|Question 46.2 ]]
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| − | *[[#q46a3|Question 46.3 ]]
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| − | *[[#q47a1|Question 47.1 The distinction of things in general]]
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| − | *[[#q47a2|Question 47.2 ]]
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| − | *[[#q47a3|Question 47.3 ]]
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| − | *[[#q48a1|Question 48.1 The distinction of good and evil]]
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| − | *[[#q48a2|Question 48.2 ]]
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| − | *[[#q48a3|Question 48.3 ]]
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| − | *[[#q48a4|Question 48.4 ]]
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| − | *[[#q48a5|Question 48.5 ]]
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| − | *[[#q48a6|Question 48.6 ]]
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| − | *[[#q49a1|Question 49.1 The cause of evil]]
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| − | *[[#q49a2|Question 49.2 ]]
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| − | *[[#q49a3|Question 49.3 ]]
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 pr. </b>Post considerationem divinarum personarum, considerandum restat de processione creaturarum a Deo. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideretur de productione creaturarum; secundo, de earum distinctione; tertio, de conservatione et gubernatione. Circa primum tria sunt consideranda, primo quidem, quae sit prima causa entium; secundo, de modo procedendi creaturarum a prima causa; tertio vero, de principio durationis rerum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit causa efficiens omnium entium. Secundo, utrum materia prima sit creata a Deo, vel sit principium ex aequo coordinatum ei. Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa exemplaris rerum, vel sint alia exemplaria praeter ipsum. Quarto, utrum ipse sit causa finalis rerum. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q44a1"><b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum a Deo. Nihil enim prohibet inveniri rem sine eo quod non est de ratione rei, sicut hominem sine albedine. Sed habitudo causati ad causam non videtur esse de ratione entium quia sine hac possunt aliqua entia intelligi. Ergo sine hac possunt esse. Ergo nihil prohibet esse aliqua entia non creata a Deo. ||Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, ad hoc aliquid indiget causa efficiente, ut sit. Ergo quod non potest non esse, non indiget causa efficiente. Sed nullum necessarium potest non esse, quia quod necesse est esse, non potest non esse. Cum igitur multa sint necessaria in rebus, videtur quod non omnia entia sint a Deo. ||Objection 2. Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quorumcumque est aliqua causa, in his potest fieri demonstratio per causam illam. Sed in mathematicis non fit demonstratio per causam agentem, ut per philosophum patet, in III Metaphys. Non igitur omnia entia sunt a Deo sicut a causa agente. ||Objection 3. Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. XI, ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia. ||On the contrary, It is said (Romans 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse. Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et Aristoteles dicit, in II Metaphys., quod id quod est maxime ens et maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod maxime calidum est, est causa omnis caliditatis. ||I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (3, 4) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (11, 3,4) that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly. Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius ratione, quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec homo, quin sit risibile. Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum. ||Reply to Objection 1. Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hac ratione quidam moti fuerunt ad ponendum quod id quod est necessarium non habeat causam, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed hoc manifeste falsum apparet in scientiis demonstrativis, in quibus principia necessaria sunt causae conclusionum necessariarum. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, in V Metaphys., quod sunt quaedam necessaria quae habent causam suae necessitatis. Non ergo propter hoc solum requiritur causa agens, quia effectus potest non esse, sed quia effectus non esset, si causa non esset. Haec enim conditionalis est vera, sive antecedens et consequens sint possibilia, sive impossibilia. ||Reply to Objection 2. This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod mathematica accipiuntur ut abstracta secundum rationem, cum tamen non sint abstracta secundum esse. Unicuique autem competit habere causam agentem, secundum quod habet esse. Licet igitur ea quae sunt mathematica habeant causam agentem, non tamen secundum habitudinem quam habent ad causam agentem, cadunt sub consideratione mathematici. Et ideo in scientiis mathematicis non demonstratur aliquid per causam agentem. ||Reply to Objection 3. The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause.
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| − | ||<div id="q44a2"><b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia prima non sit creata a Deo. Omne enim quod fit, componitur ex subiecto et ex aliquo alio, ut dicitur in I Physic. Sed materiae primae non est aliquod subiectum. Ergo materia prima non potest esse facta a Deo. ||Objection 1. It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, actio et passio dividuntur contra se invicem. Sed sicut primum principium activum est Deus, ita primum principium passivum est materia. Ergo Deus et materia prima sunt duo principia contra se invicem divisa, quorum neutrum est ab alio. ||Objection 2. Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne agens agit sibi simile, et sic, cum omne agens agat inquantum est actu, sequitur quod omne factum aliquo modo sit in actu. Sed materia prima est tantum in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi. Ergo contra rationem materiae primae est, quod sit facta. ||Objection 3. Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., duo fecisti, domine, unum prope te, scilicet Angelum, aliud prope nihil, scilicet materiam primam. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"--viz. angels--"the other nigh unto nothing"--viz. primary matter.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium. ||I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [The zodiac], according to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as "such," but as "beings." Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus in I Physic. loquitur de fieri particulari, quod est de forma in formam, sive accidentalem sive substantialem nunc autem loquimur de rebus secundum emanationem earum ab universali principio essendi. A qua quidem emanatione nec materia excluditur, licet a primo modo factionis excludatur. ||Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular--that is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod passio est effectus actionis. Unde et rationabile est quod primum principium passivum sit effectus primi principii activi, nam omne imperfectum causatur a perfecto. Oportet enim primum principium esse perfectissimum, ut dicit Aristoteles, in XII Metaphys. ||Reply to Objection 2. Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa non ostendit quod materia non sit creata, sed quod non sit creata sine forma. Licet enim omne creatum sit in actu, non tamen est actus purus. Unde oportet quod etiam illud quod se habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse ipsius pertinet, creatum est. ||Reply to Objection 3. The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.
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| − | ||<div id="q44a3"><b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod causa exemplaris sit aliquid praeter Deum. Exemplatum enim habet similitudinem exemplaris. Sed creaturae longe sunt a divina similitudine. Non ergo Deus est causa exemplaris earum. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omne quod est per participationem, reducitur ad aliquid per se existens, ut ignitum ad ignem, sicut iam dictum est. Sed quaecumque sunt in sensibilibus rebus, sunt solum per participationem alicuius speciei, quod ex hoc patet, quod in nullo sensibilium invenitur solum id quod ad rationem speciei pertinet, sed adiunguntur principiis speciei principia individuantia. Oportet ergo ponere ipsas species per se existentes, ut per se hominem, et per se equum, et huiusmodi. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Sunt igitur exemplaria res quaedam extra Deum. ||Objection 2. Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above (1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, scientiae et definitiones sunt de ipsis speciebus, non secundum quod sunt in particularibus, quia particularium non est scientia nec definitio. Ergo sunt quaedam entia, quae sunt entia vel species non in singularibus. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Ergo idem quod prius. ||Objection 3. Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, hoc idem videtur per Dionysium, qui dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod ipsum secundum se esse, prius est eo quod est per se vitam esse, et eo quod est per se sapientiam esse. ||Objection 4. Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod exemplar est idem quod idea. Sed ideae, secundum quod Augustinus libro octoginta trium quaest. dicit, sunt formae principales, quae divina intelligentia continentur. Ergo exemplaria rerum non sunt extra Deum. ||On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod ad productionem alicuius rei ideo necessarium est exemplar, ut effectus determinatam formam consequatur, artifex enim producit determinatam formam in materia, propter exemplar ad quod inspicit, sive illud sit exemplar ad quod extra intuetur, sive sit exemplar interius mente conceptum. Manifestum est autem quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatas formas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum determinatio oportet quod reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quae ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. Possunt etiam in rebus creatis quaedam aliorum exemplaria dici, secundum quod quaedam sunt ad similitudinem aliorum, vel secundum eandem speciem, vel secundum analogiam alicuius imitationis. ||I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (15, 1). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint similes Deo secundum suam naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis. ||Reply to Objection 1. Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod de ratione hominis est quod sit in materia, et sic non potest inveniri homo sine materia. Licet igitur hic homo sit per participationem speciei, non tamen potest reduci ad aliquid existens per se in eadem specie; sed ad speciem superexcedentem, sicut sunt substantiae separatae. Et eadem ratio est de aliis sensibilibus. ||Reply to Objection 2. It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet quaelibet scientia et definitio sit solum entium, non tamen oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo, quem intellectus habet in intelligendo. Nos enim, per virtutem intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universales a particularibus conditionibus, non tamen oportet quod universalia praeter particularia subsistant, ut particularium exemplaria. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, XI cap. de Div. Nom., per se vitam et per se sapientiam quandoque nominat ipsum Deum, quandoque virtutes ipsis rebus datas, non autem quasdam subsistentes res, sicut antiqui posuerunt. ||Reply to Objection 4. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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| − | ||<div id="q44a4"><b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa finalis omnium. Agere enim propter finem videtur esse alicuius indigentis fine. Sed Deus nullo est indigens. Ergo non competit sibi agere propter finem. ||Objection 1. It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, finis generationis et forma generati et agens non incidunt in idem numero, ut dicitur in II Physic., quia finis generationis est forma generati. Sed Deus est primum agens omnium. Non ergo est causa finalis omnium. ||Objection 2. Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause of all things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, finem omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia neque omnia ipsum cognoscunt. Deus ergo non est omnium finis. ||Objection 3. Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the end of all things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, finalis causa est prima causarum. Si igitur Deus sit causa agens et causa finalis, sequitur quod in eo sit prius et posterius. Quod est impossibile. ||Objection 4. Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVI, universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus. ||On the contrary, It is said (Proverbs 16:4): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis agentis et patientis, inquantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter, unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta, et his convenit quod etiam in agendo intendant aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium. ||I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod agere propter indigentiam non est nisi agentis imperfecti, quod natum est agere et pati. Sed hoc Deo non competit. Et ideo ipse solus est maxime liberalis, quia non agit propter suam utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem. ||Reply to Objection 1. To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod forma generati non est finis generationis nisi inquantum est similitudo formae generantis, quod suam similitudinem communicare intendit. Alioquin forma generati esset nobilior generante, cum finis sit nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. ||Reply to Objection 2. The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque bonum, sive appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali, qui est sine cognitione, quia nihil habet rationem boni et appetibilis, nisi secundum quod participat Dei similitudinem. ||Reply to Objection 3. All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 44 a. 4 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod primum principium omnium rerum sit unum tantum secundum rem. Nihil tamen prohibet in eo considerari multa secundum rationem, quorum quaedam prius cadunt in intellectu nostro quam alia. ||Reply to Objection 4. Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 pr. </b>Deinde quaeritur de modo emanationis rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creatio. De qua quaeruntur octo. Primo, quid sit creatio. Secundo, utrum Deus possit aliquid creare. Tertio, utrum creatio sit aliquod ens in rerum natura. Quarto, cui competit creari. Quinto, utrum solius Dei sit creare. Sexto, utrum commune sit toti Trinitati, aut proprium alicuius personae. Septimo, utrum vestigium aliquod Trinitatis sit in rebus creatis. Octavo, utrum opus creationis admisceatur in operibus naturae et voluntatis. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q45a1"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creare non sit ex nihilo aliquid facere. Dicit enim Augustinus, contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, facere est quod omnino non erat, creare vero est ex eo quod iam erat educendo aliquid constituere. ||Objection 1. It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, nobilitas actionis et motus ex terminis consideratur. Nobilior igitur est actio quae ex bono in bonum est, et ex ente in ens, quam quae est ex nihilo in aliquid. Sed creatio videtur esse nobilissima actio, et prima inter omnes actiones. Ergo non est ex nihilo in aliquid, sed magis ex ente in ens. ||Objection 2. Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, haec praepositio ex importat habitudinem alicuius causae, et maxime materialis; sicut cum dicimus quod statua fit ex aere. Sed nihil non potest esse materia entis, nec aliquo modo causa eius. Ergo creare non est ex nihilo aliquid facere. ||Objection 3. Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod super illud Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum etc., dicit Glossa quod creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere. ||On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non solum oportet considerare emanationem alicuius entis particularis ab aliquo particulari agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae est Deus, et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis. Quod autem procedit secundum emanationem particularem, non praesupponitur emanationi, sicut, si generatur homo, non fuit prius homo, sed homo fit ex non homine, et album ex non albo. Unde, si consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio, impossibile est quod aliquod ens praesupponatur huic emanationi. Idem autem est nihil quod nullum ens. Sicut igitur generatio hominis est ex non ente quod est non homo, ita creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil. ||I answer that, As said above (44, 2), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," and white from "not-white." Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus aequivoce utitur nomine creationis, secundum quod creari dicuntur ea quae in melius reformantur, ut cum dicitur aliquis creari in episcopum. Sic autem non loquimur hic de creatione, sed sicut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod mutationes accipiunt speciem et dignitatem non a termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Tanto ergo perfectior et prior est aliqua mutatio, quanto terminus ad quem illius mutationis est nobilior et prior; licet terminus a quo, qui opponitur termino ad quem, sit imperfectior. Sicut generatio simpliciter est nobilior et prior quam alteratio, propter hoc quod forma substantialis est nobilior quam forma accidentalis, tamen privatio substantialis formae, quae est terminus a quo in generatione, est imperfectior quam contrarium, quod est terminus a quo in alteratione. Et similiter creatio est perfectior et prior quam generatio et alteratio, quia terminus ad quem est tota substantia rei. Id autem quod intelligitur ut terminus a quo, est simpliciter non ens. ||Reply to Objection 2. Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, haec praepositio ex non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum; sicut cum dicitur, ex mane fit meridies, idest, post mane fit meridies. Sed intelligendum est quod haec praepositio ex potest includere negationem importatam in hoc quod dico nihil, vel includi ab ea. Si primo modo, tunc ordo remanet affirmatus, et ostenditur ordo eius, quod est ad non esse praecedens. Si vero negatio includat praepositionem, tunc ordo negatur, et est sensus, fit ex nihilo, idest non fit ex aliquo; sicut si dicatur, iste loquitur de nihilo, quia non loquitur de aliquo. Et utroque modo verificatur, cum dicitur ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Sed primo modo, haec praepositio ex importat ordinem, ut dictum est, secundo modo, importat habitudinem causae materialis, quae negatur. ||Reply to Objection 3. When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing--i.e. it is not made from anything"--as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.
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| − | ||<div id="q45a2"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid creare. Quia secundum philosophum, I Physic., antiqui philosophi acceperunt ut communem conceptionem animi, ex nihilo nihil fieri. Sed potentia Dei non se extendit ad contraria primorum principiorum; utpote quod Deus faciat quod totum non sit maius sua parte, vel quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid ex nihilo facere, vel creare. ||Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, si creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere, ergo creari est aliquid fieri. Sed omne fieri est mutari. Ergo creatio est mutatio. Sed omnis mutatio est ex subiecto aliquo, ut patet per definitionem motus, nam motus est actus existentis in potentia. Ergo est impossibile aliquid a Deo ex nihilo fieri. ||Objection 2. Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quod factum est, necesse est aliquando fieri. Sed non potest dici quod illud quod creatur, simul fiat et factum sit, quia in permanentibus, quod fit, non est, quod autem factum est, iam est; simul ergo aliquid esset et non esset. Ergo, si aliquid fit, fieri eius praecedit factum esse. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi praeexistat subiectum in quo sustentetur ipsum fieri. Ergo impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo. ||Objection 3. Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, infinitam distantiam non est pertransire. Sed infinita distantia est inter ens et nihil. Ergo non contingit ex nihilo aliquid fieri. ||Objection 4. Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. ||On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod non solum non est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari, sed necesse est ponere a Deo omnia creata esse, ut ex praemissis habetur. Quicumque enim facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit praesupponitur actioni eius, et non producitur per ipsam actionem, sicut artifex operatur ex rebus naturalibus, ut ex ligno et aere, quae per artis actionem non causantur, sed causantur per actionem naturae. Sed et ipsa natura causat res naturales quantum ad formam, sed praesupponit materiam. Si ergo Deus non ageret nisi ex aliquo praesupposito, sequeretur quod illud praesuppositum non esset causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra quod nihil potest esse in entibus quod non sit a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius esse. Unde necesse est dicere quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse producit. ||I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God, as appears from what has been said (44, 1). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (44, 1,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi, sicut supra dictum est, non consideraverunt nisi emanationem effectuum particularium a causis particularibus, quas necesse est praesupponere aliquid in sua actione, et secundum hoc erat eorum communis opinio, ex nihilo nihil fieri. Sed tamen hoc locum non habet in prima emanatione ab universali rerum principio. ||Reply to Objection 1. Ancient philosophers, as is said above (44, 2), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est, quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius, nam quandoque est idem ens actu, aliter se habens nunc et prius, sicut in motibus secundum quantitatem et qualitatem et ubi; quandoque vero est idem ens in potentia tantum, sicut in mutatione secundum substantiam, cuius subiectum est materia. Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota substantia rerum, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in substantia motus, et differant solum secundum habitudines diversas, ut dicitur in III Physic., oportet quod, subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversae habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi, ut dictum est, creatio significatur per modum mutationis, et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere. Quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari, quia facere et fieri important habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed mutationem ex consequenti. ||Reply to Objection 2. Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (13, 1), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et factum esse, sive talis factio sit terminus motus, sicut illuminatio (nam simul aliquid illuminatur et illuminatum est); sive non sit terminus motus, sicut simul formatur verbum in corde et formatum est. Et in his, quod fit, est, sed cum dicitur fieri, significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde, cum creatio sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est. ||Reply to Objection 3. In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit ex falsa imaginatione, ac si sit aliquod infinitum medium inter nihilum et ens, quod patet esse falsum. Procedit autem falsa haec imaginatio ex eo quod creatio significatur ut quaedam mutatio inter duos terminos existens. ||Reply to Objection 4. This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms.
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| − | ||<div id="q45a3"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatio non sit aliquid in creatura. Sicut enim creatio passive accepta attribuitur creaturae, ita creatio active accepta attribuitur creatori. Sed creatio active accepta non est aliquid in creatore, quia sic sequeretur quod in Deo esset aliquid temporale. Ergo creatio passive accepta non est aliquid in creatura. ||Objection 1. It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, nihil est medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatio significatur ut medium inter utrumque, non enim est creator, cum non sit aeterna; neque creatura, quia oporteret eadem ratione aliam ponere creationem qua ipsa crearetur, et sic in infinitum. Creatio ergo non est aliquid. ||Objection 2. Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, si creatio est aliquid praeter substantiam creatam, oportet quod sit accidens eius. Omne autem accidens est in subiecto. Ergo res creata esset subiectum creationis. Et sic idem esset subiectum creationis et terminus. Quod est impossibile, quia subiectum prius est accidente, et conservat accidens; terminus autem posterius est actione et passione cuius est terminus, et eo existente cessat actio et passio. Igitur ipsa creatio non est aliqua res. ||Objection 3. Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra, maius est fieri aliquid secundum totam substantiam, quam secundum formam substantialem vel accidentalem. Sed generatio simpliciter vel secundum quid, qua fit aliquid secundum formam substantialem vel accidentalem, est aliquid in generato. Ergo multo magis creatio, qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam, est aliquid in creato. ||On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in the thing created.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod creatio ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum. Quia quod creatur, non fit per motum vel per mutationem. Quod enim fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo praeexistenti, quod quidem contingit in productionibus particularibus aliquorum entium; non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius esse a causa universali omnium entium, quae est Deus. Unde Deus, creando, producit res sine motu. Subtracto autem motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam ad creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione quae est cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus. ||I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creatio active significata significat actionem divinam, quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed secundum rationem tantum. Relatio vero creaturae ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra dictum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur. ||Reply to Objection 1. Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (13, 7) in treating of the divine names.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia creatio significatur ut mutatio, sicut dictum est; mutatio autem media quodammodo est inter movens et motum, ideo etiam creatio significatur ut media inter creatorem et creaturam. Tamen creatio passive accepta est in creatura, et est creatura. Neque tamen oportet quod alia creatione creetur, quia relationes, cum hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid dicantur, non referuntur per aliquas alias relationes, sed per seipsas; sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de aequalitate personarum ageretur. ||Reply to Objection 2. Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (2, ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (42, 1, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod creationis, secundum quod significatur ut mutatio, creatura est terminus, sed secundum quod vere est relatio, creatura est eius subiectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subiectum accidente. Sed habet quandam rationem prioritatis ex parte obiecti ad quod dicitur, quod est principium creaturae. Neque tamen oportet quod, quandiu creatura sit, dicatur creari, quia creatio importat habitudinem creaturae ad creatorem cum quadam novitate seu incoeptione. ||Reply to Objection 3. The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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| − | ||<div id="q45a4"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creari non sit proprium compositorum et subsistentium. Dicitur enim in libro de causis, prima rerum creatarum est esse. Sed esse rei creatae non est subsistens. Ergo creatio proprie non est subsistentis et compositi. ||Objection 1. It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quod creatur est ex nihilo. Composita autem non sunt ex nihilo, sed ex suis componentibus. Ergo compositis non convenit creari. ||Objection 2. Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, illud proprie producitur per primam emanationem, quod supponitur in secunda, sicut res naturalis per generationem naturalem, quae supponitur in operatione artis. Sed illud quod supponitur in generatione naturali, est materia. Ergo materia est quae proprie creatur, et non compositum. ||Objection 3. Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Caelum autem et terra sunt res compositae subsistentes. Ergo horum proprie est creatio. ||On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est. Fieri autem ordinatur ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatae; sive sint composita, sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed quia eis aliquid est; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea subiectum est album. Unde, secundum philosophum, accidens magis proprie dicitur entis quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia et formae, et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia. ||I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (44, 2, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse non importat subiectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem obiecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est. Et est similis modus loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color, quamvis illud quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum. ||Reply to Objection 1. In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above (1). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex principiis praeexistentibus, sed compositum sic dicitur creari, quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur. ||Reply to Objection 2. Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa non probat quod sola materia creetur; sed quod materia non sit nisi ex creatione. Nam creatio est productio totius esse, et non solum materiae. ||Reply to Objection 3. This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
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| − | ||<div id="q45a5"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non solius Dei sit creare. Quia secundum philosophum, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Sed creaturae immateriales sunt perfectiores creaturis materialibus, quae faciunt sibi simile, ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem. Ergo substantia immaterialis potest facere substantiam sibi similem. Sed substantia immaterialis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, cum non habeat materiam ex qua fiat. Ergo aliqua creatura potest creare. ||Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quanto maior est resistentia ex parte facti, tanto maior virtus requiritur in faciente. Sed plus resistit contrarium quam nihil. Ergo maioris virtutis est aliquid facere ex contrario, quod tamen creatura facit; quam aliquid facere ex nihilo. Multo magis igitur creatura hoc facere potest. ||Objection 2. Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, virtus facientis consideratur secundum mensuram eius quod fit. Sed ens creatum est finitum, ut supra probatum est, cum de Dei infinitate ageretur. Ergo ad producendum per creationem aliquid creatum, non requiritur nisi virtus finita. Sed habere virtutem finitam non est contra rationem creaturae. Ergo non est impossibile creaturam creare. ||Objection 3. Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved above when treating of the infinity of God (7, 2,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod neque boni neque mali Angeli possunt esse creatores alicuius rei. Multo minus igitur aliae creaturae. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other creatures.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod satis apparet in primo aspectu, secundum praemissa, quod creare non potest esse propria actio nisi solius Dei. Oportet enim universaliores effectus in universaliores et priores causas reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus, universalissimum est ipsum esse. Unde oportet quod sit proprius effectus primae et universalissimae causae, quae est Deus. Unde etiam dicitur libro de causis, quod neque intelligentia vel anima nobilis dat esse, nisi inquantum operatur operatione divina. Producere autem esse absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio ipsius Dei. Contingit autem quod aliquid participet actionem propriam alicuius alterius, non virtute propria, sed instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in virtute alterius; sicut aer per virtutem ignis habet calefacere et ignire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui opinati sunt quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis causae, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum inquantum agit in virtute primae causae, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima substantia separata, creata a Deo, creat aliam post se, et substantiam orbis, et animam eius; et quod substantia orbis creat materiam inferiorum corporum. Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister dicit, in V dist. IV Sent., quod Deus potest creaturae communicare potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria auctoritate. Sed hoc esse non potest. Quia causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum, nec oporteret esse determinata instrumenta determinatarum actionum. Sic enim videmus quod securis, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex proprietate suae formae, producit scamni formam, quae est effectus proprius principalis agentis. Illud autem quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis, scilicet esse absolute. Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo praesupposito, quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis agentis. Sic igitur impossibile est quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per ministerium. Et hoc praecipue inconveniens est dici de aliquo corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat nisi tangendo vel movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid praeexistens, quod possit tangi et moveri; quod est contra rationem creationis. ||I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes (1), that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone. It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power. But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally--that is, ministerially. And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquod perfectum participans aliquam naturam, facit sibi simile, non quidem producendo absolute illam naturam, sed applicando eam ad aliquid. Non enim hic homo potest esse causa naturae humanae absolute, quia sic esset causa sui ipsius, sed est causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine generato. Et sic praesupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam per quam est hic homo. Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus Deus est suum esse, ut supra dictum est. Nullum igitur ens creatum potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi inquantum esse causat in hoc, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur id per quod aliquid est hoc, actioni qua facit sibi simile. In substantia autem immateriali non potest praeintelligi aliquid per quod sit haec, quia est haec per suam formam, per quam habet esse, cum sint formae subsistentes. Igitur substantia immaterialis non potest producere aliam substantiam immaterialem sibi similem, quantum ad esse eius; sed quantum ad perfectionem aliquam superadditam; sicut si dicamus quod superior Angelus illuminat inferiorem, ut Dionysius dicit. Secundum quem modum etiam in caelestibus est paternitas, ut ex verbis apostoli patet, Ephes. III, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Et ex hoc etiam evidenter apparet quod nullum ens creatum potest causare aliquid, nisi praesupposito aliquo. Quod repugnat rationi creationis. ||Reply to Objection 1. A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own being, as we have said above (7, 1,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Ephesians 3:15): "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod ex contrario fit aliquid per accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic., per se autem fit aliquid ex subiecto, quod est in potentia. Contrarium igitur resistit agenti, inquantum impedit potentiam ab actu in quem intendit reducere agens, sicut ignis intendit reducere materiam aquae in actum sibi similem, sed impeditur per formam et dispositiones contrarias, quibus quasi ligatur potentia ne reducatur in actum. Et quanto magis fuerit potentia ligata, tanto requiritur maior virtus in agente ad reducendam materiam in actum. Unde multo maior potentia requiritur in agente, si nulla potentia praeexistat. Sic ergo patet quod multo maioris virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex contrario. ||Reply to Objection 2. A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus facientis non solum consideratur ex substantia facti, sed etiam ex modo faciendi, maior enim calor non solum magis, sed etiam citius calefacit. Quamvis igitur creare aliquem effectum finitum non demonstret potentiam infinitam, tamen creare ipsum ex nihilo demonstrat potentiam infinitam. Quod ex praedictis patet. Si enim tanto maior virtus requiritur in agente, quanto potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex nulla praesupposita potentia, quale agens est creans, sit infinita, quia nulla proportio est nullius potentiae ad aliquam potentiam, quam praesupponit virtus agentis naturalis, sicut et non entis ad ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam infinitam, sicut neque esse infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod nulla creatura possit creare. ||Reply to Objection 3. The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (7, 2), it follows that no creature can create.
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| − | ||<div id="q45a6"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creare sit proprium alicuius personae. Quod enim est prius, est causa eius quod est post; et perfectum imperfecti. Sed processio divinae personae est prior quam processio creaturae, et magis perfecta, quia divina persona procedit in perfecta similitudine sui principii, creatura vero in imperfecta. Ergo processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa processionis rerum. Et sic creare est proprium personae. ||Objection 1. It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, personae divinae non distinguuntur ab invicem nisi per suas processiones et relationes. Quidquid igitur differenter attribuitur divinis personis, hoc convenit eis secundum processiones et relationes personarum. Sed causalitas creaturarum diversimode attribuitur divinis personis, nam in symbolo fidei patri attribuitur quod sit creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium; filio autem attribuitur quod per eum omnia facta sunt; sed spiritui sancto, quod sit dominus et vivificator. Causalitas ergo creaturarum convenit personis secundum processiones et relationes. ||Objection 2. Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, si dicatur quod causalitas creaturae attenditur secundum aliquod attributum essentiale quod appropriatur alicui personae, hoc non videtur sufficiens. Quia quilibet effectus divinus causatur a quolibet attributo essentiali, scilicet potentia, bonitate et sapientia, et sic non magis pertinet ad unum quam ad aliud. Non deberet ergo aliquis determinatus modus causalitatis attribui uni personae magis quam alii, nisi distinguerentur in creando secundum relationes et processiones. ||Objection 3. Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute--viz. by power, goodness and wisdom--and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations and processions.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod communia totius divinitatis sunt omnia causalia. ||On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum. Cum autem omne agens agat sibi simile, principium actionis considerari potest ex actionis effectu, ignis enim est qui generat ignem. Et ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse, quod est eius essentia, quae est communis tribus personis. Unde creare non est proprium alicui personae, sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen divinae personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra ostensum est, cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur, Deus est causa rerum per suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum. Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur. Unde et Deus pater operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est filius; et per suum amorem, qui est spiritus sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et voluntas. ||I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above (14, 8; 19, 4), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa creationis sicut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, inquantum filius accipit naturam divinam a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque; ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit; nam filius habet eam a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque. Unde creatorem esse attribuitur patri, ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De filio autem dicitur per quem omnia facta sunt, inquantum habet eandem virtutem, sed ab alio, nam haec praepositio per solet denotare causam mediam, sive principium de principio. Sed spiritui sancto, qui habet eandem virtutem ab utroque, attribuitur quod dominando gubernet, et vivificet quae sunt creata a patre per filium. Potest etiam huius attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, patri appropriatur potentia, quae maxime manifestatur in creatione, et ideo attribuitur patri creatorem esse. Filio autem appropriatur sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur de filio, per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui sancto autem appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in debitos fines, et vivificatio, nam vita in interiori quodam motu consistit, primum autem movens est finis et bonitas. ||Reply to Objection 2. As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (John 1:3), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through" usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (39, 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life--for life consists in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 6 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud attributum, cum quo habet convenientiam secundum propriam rationem, sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam, et iustificatio impii ad misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio vero, quae est productio ipsius substantiae rei, reducitur ad potentiam. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
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| − | ||<div id="q45a7"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1 </b>Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in creaturis non sit necesse inveniri vestigium Trinitatis. Per sua enim vestigia unumquodque investigari potest. Sed Trinitas personarum non potest investigari ex creaturis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo vestigia Trinitatis non sunt in creatura. ||Objection 1. It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated (32, 1). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quidquid in creatura est, creatum est. Si igitur vestigium Trinitatis invenitur in creatura secundum aliquas proprietates suas, et omne creatum habet vestigium Trinitatis, oportet in unaquaque illarum inveniri etiam vestigium Trinitatis, et sic in infinitum. ||Objection 2. Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, effectus non repraesentat nisi suam causam. Sed causalitas creaturarum pertinet ad naturam communem, non autem ad relationes, quibus personae distinguuntur et numerantur. Ergo in creatura non invenitur vestigium Trinitatis, sed solum unitatis essentiae. ||Objection 3. Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the unity of essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Trinitatis vestigium in creatura apparet. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod omnis effectus aliqualiter repraesentat suam causam, sed diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem, et talis repraesentatio dicitur esse repraesentatio vestigii; vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat causam quantum ad similitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem, et statua Mercurii Mercurium, et haec est repraesentatio imaginis. Processiones autem divinarum personarum attenduntur secundum actus intellectus et voluntatis, sicut supra dictum est, nam filius procedit ut verbum intellectus, spiritus sanctus ut amor voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus, in quibus est intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor procedens. Sed in creaturis omnibus invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per modum vestigii, inquantum in qualibet creatura inveniuntur aliqua quae necesse est reducere in divinas personas sicut in causam. Quaelibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et habet formam per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quaedam substantia creata, repraesentat causam et principium, et sic demonstrat personam patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod habet quandam formam et speciem, repraesentat verbum; secundum quod forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod habet ordinem, repraesentat spiritum sanctum, inquantum est amor, quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, in VI Lib. de Trin., quod vestigium Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum aliquid est, et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur, et secundum quod quendam ordinem tenet. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur illa tria, numerus, pondus et mensura, quae ponuntur Sap. XI, nam mensura refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis, numerus ad speciem, pondus ad ordinem. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur alia tria quae ponit Augustinus, modus species et ordo. Et ea quae ponit in libro octoginta trium quaest. quod constat, quod discernitur, quod congruit, constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci possunt quaecumque sic dicuntur. ||I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was said above (27). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding. But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according "as it is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three, "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod repraesentatio vestigii attenditur secundum appropriata, per quem modum ex creaturis in Trinitatem divinarum personarum veniri potest, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (32, 1).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura est res proprie subsistens, in qua est praedicta tria invenire. Neque oportet quod in quolibet eorum quae ei insunt, haec tria inveniantur, sed secundum ea vestigium rei subsistenti attribuitur. ||Reply to Objection 2. A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 7 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam processiones personarum sunt causa et ratio creationis aliquo modo, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 3. The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above (6).
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| − | ||<div id="q45a8"><b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1 </b>Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatio admisceatur in operibus naturae et artis. In qualibet enim operatione naturae et artis producitur aliqua forma. Sed non producitur ex aliquo, cum non habeat materiam partem sui. Ergo producitur ex nihilo. Et sic in qualibet operatione naturae et artis est creatio. ||Objection 1. It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, effectus non est potior sua causa. Sed in rebus naturalibus non invenitur aliquid agens nisi forma accidentalis, quae est forma activa vel passiva. Non ergo per operationem naturae producitur forma substantialis. Relinquitur igitur quod sit per creationem. ||Objection 2. Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, natura facit sibi simile. Sed quaedam inveniuntur generata in natura non ab aliquo sibi simili, sicut patet in animalibus generatis per putrefactionem. Ergo eorum forma non est a natura, sed a creatione. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. ||Objection 3. Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, quod non creatur, non est creatura. Si igitur in his quae sunt a natura non adiungatur creatio, sequitur quod ea quae sunt a natura, non sunt creaturae. Quod est haereticum. ||Objection 4. Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus, super Gen. ad Lit., distinguit opus propagationis, quod est opus naturae, ab opere creationis. ||On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod haec dubitatio inducitur propter formas. Quas quidam posuerunt non incipere per actionem naturae, sed prius in materia extitisse, ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia materiae, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum, quia enim formae praeexistunt in materia in potentia, posuerunt eas simpliciter praeexistere. Alii vero posuerunt formas dari vel causari ab agente separato, per modum creationis. Et secundum hoc cuilibet operationi naturae adiungitur creatio. Sed hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia formae. Non enim considerabant quod forma naturalis corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est, et ideo, cum fieri et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri neque creari, sed concreata esse. Quod autem proprie fit ab agente naturali, est compositum, quod fit ex materia. Unde in operibus naturae non admiscetur creatio, sed praesupponitur ad operationem naturae. ||I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter. Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod formae incipiunt esse in actu, compositis factis, non quod ipsae fiant per se, sed per accidens tantum. ||Reply to Objection 1. Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod qualitates activae in natura agunt in virtute formarum substantialium. Et ideo agens naturale non solum producit sibi simile secundum qualitatem, sed secundum speciem. ||Reply to Objection 2. The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality, but according to species.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ad generationem animalium imperfectorum sufficit agens universale, quod est virtus caelestis, cui assimilantur non secundum speciem, sed secundum analogiam quandam, neque oportet dicere quod eorum formae creantur ab agente separato. Ad generationem vero animalium perfectorum non sufficit agens universale, sed requiritur agens proprium, quod est generans univocum. ||Reply to Objection 3. For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 45 a. 8 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod operatio naturae non est nisi ex praesuppositione principiorum creatorum, et sic ea quae per naturam fiunt, creaturae dicuntur. ||Reply to Objection 4. The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are called creatures.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 pr. </b>Consequenter considerandum est de principio durationis rerum creatarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum creaturae semper fuerint. Secundo, utrum eas incoepisse sit articulus fidei. Tertio, quomodo Deus dicatur in principio caelum et terram creasse. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q46a1"><b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod universitas creaturarum, quae mundi nomine nuncupatur, non incoeperit, sed fuerit ab aeterno. Omne enim quod incoepit esse, antequam fuerit, possibile fuit ipsum esse, alioquin impossibile fuisset ipsum fieri. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse, antequam inciperet, possibile fuit ipsum esse. Sed quod possibile est esse, est materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, quod est per formam, et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia. Sed non potest esse materia sine forma, materia autem mundi cum forma, est mundus. Fuit ergo mundus antequam esse inciperet, quod est impossibile. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, nihil quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, quandoque est et quandoque non est, quia ad quantum se extendit virtus alicuius rei, tandiu est. Sed omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper, non enim virtutem habet ad determinatum durationis tempus. Nullum ergo incorruptibile quandoque est et quandoque non est. Sed omne quod incipit esse, quandoque est et quandoque non est. Nullum ergo incorruptibile incipit esse. Sed multa sunt in mundo incorruptibilia, ut corpora caelestia, et omnes substantiae intellectuales. Ergo mundus non incoepit esse. ||Objection 2. Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, nullum ingenitum incoepit esse. Sed philosophus probat in I Physic., quod materia est ingenita; et in I de caelo et mundo, quod caelum est ingenitum. Non ergo universitas rerum incoepit esse. ||Objection 3. Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, vacuum est ubi non est corpus, sed possibile est esse. Sed si mundus incoepit esse, ubi nunc est corpus mundi, prius non fuit aliquod corpus, et tamen poterat ibi esse, alioquin nunc ibi non esset. Ergo ante mundum fuit vacuum, quod est impossibile. ||Objection 4. Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, nihil de novo incipit moveri, nisi per hoc quod movens vel mobile aliter se habet nunc quam prius. Sed quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius, movetur. Ergo ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit aliquis motus. Motus ergo semper fuit. Ergo et mobile, quia motus non est nisi in mobili. ||Objection 5. Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, omne movens aut est naturale, aut est voluntarium. Sed neutrum incipit movere, nisi aliquo motu praeexistente. Natura enim semper eodem modo operatur. Unde, nisi praecedat aliqua immutatio vel in natura moventis vel in mobili, non incipiet a movente naturali esse motus, qui non fuit prius. Voluntas autem absque sui immutatione retardat facere quod proponit, sed hoc non est nisi per aliquam immutationem quam imaginatur, ad minus ex parte ipsius temporis. Sicut qui vult facere domum cras, et non hodie, expectat aliquid futurum cras, quod hodie non est; et ad minus expectat quod dies hodiernus transeat, et crastinus adveniat; quod sine mutatione non est, quia tempus est numerus motus. Relinquitur ergo quod ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit alius motus. Et sic idem quod prius. ||Objection 6. Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7 </b>Praeterea, quidquid est semper in principio et semper in fine, nec incipere nec desinere potest, quia quod incipit, non est in suo fine; quod autem desinit, non est in suo principio. Sed tempus semper est in suo principio et fine, quia nihil est temporis nisi nunc, quod est finis praeteriti, et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nec incipere nec desinere potest. Et per consequens nec motus, cuius numerus tempus est. ||Objection 7. Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the measure of what is time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8 </b>Praeterea, Deus aut est prior mundo natura tantum, aut duratione. Si natura tantum, ergo, cum Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus est ab aeterno. Si autem est prior duratione; prius autem et posterius in duratione constituunt tempus, ergo ante mundum fuit tempus; quod est impossibile. ||Objection 8. Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9 </b>Praeterea, posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus, causa enim ad quam non sequitur effectus, est causa imperfecta, indigens alio ad hoc quod effectus sequatur. Sed Deus est sufficiens causa mundi; et finalis, ratione suae bonitatis; et exemplaris, ratione suae sapientiae; et effectiva, ratione suae potentiae; ut ex superioribus patet. Cum ergo Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus fuit ab aeterno. ||Objection 9. Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (44, 2,3,4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10 </b>Praeterea, cuius actio est aeterna, et effectus aeternus. Sed actio Dei est eius substantia, quae est aeterna. Ergo et mundus est aeternus. ||Objection 10. Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, clarifica me, pater, apud temetipsum, claritate quam habui priusquam mundus fieret; et Proverb. VIII, dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio. ||On the contrary, It is said (John 17:5), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (Proverbs 8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc quidem ponere non est impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quod voluntas Dei est causa rerum. Sic ergo aliqua necesse est esse, sicut necesse est Deum velle illa, cum necessitas effectus ex necessitate causae dependeat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ostensum est autem supra quod, absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum. Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed eatenus mundus est, quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi ex voluntate Dei dependeat sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur necessarium mundum semper esse. Unde nec demonstrative probari potest. Nec rationes quas ad hoc Aristoteles inducit, sunt demonstrativae simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet ad contradicendum rationibus antiquorum, ponentium mundum incipere secundum quosdam modos in veritate impossibiles. Et hoc apparet ex tribus. Primo quidem, quia tam in VIII Physic. quam in I de caelo, praemittit quasdam opiniones, ut Anaxagorae et Empedoclis et Platonis, contra quos rationes contradictorias inducit. Secundo, quia, ubicumque de hac materia loquitur, inducit testimonia antiquorum, quod non est demonstratoris, sed probabiliter persuadentis. Tertio, quia expresse dicit in I Lib. Topic., quod quaedam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habemus, ut utrum mundus sit aeternus. ||I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (19, 4) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (19, 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration. Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative--viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse, non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia; sed secundum potentiam activam Dei. Et etiam secundum quod dicitur aliquid absolute possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam sed ex sola habitudine terminorum, qui sibi non repugnant; secundum quod possibile opponitur impossibili, ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaphys. ||Reply to Objection 1. Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper ex quo habet illam virtutem, non quandoque est et quandoque non est, sed antequam haberet illam virtutem, non fuit. Unde haec ratio, quae ponitur ab Aristotele in I de caelo, non concludit simpliciter quod incorruptibilia non incoeperunt esse, sed quod non incoeperunt esse per modum naturalem, quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt esse. ||Reply to Objection 2. Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before it received that power, it did not exist. Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod Aristoteles, in I Physic., probat materiam esse ingenitam, per hoc quod non habet subiectum de quo sit. In I autem de caelo et mundo, probat caelum ingenitum, quia non habet contrarium ex quo generetur. Unde patet quod per utrumque non concluditur nisi quod materia et caelum non incoeperunt per generationem, ut quidam ponebant, praecipue de caelo. Nos autem dicimus quod materia et coelum producta sunt in esse per creationem, ut ex dictis patet. ||Reply to Objection 3. Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (44, 1, ad 2).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod ad rationem vacui non sufficit in quo nihil est, sed requiritur quod sit spatium capax corporis, in quo non sit corpus, ut patet per Aristotelem, in IV Physic. Nos autem dicimus non fuisse locum aut spatium ante mundum. ||Reply to Objection 4. The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world was.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod primus motor semper eodem modo se habuit primum autem mobile non semper eodem modo se habuit, quia incoepit esse, cum prius non fuisset. Sed hoc non fuit per mutationem, sed per creationem, quae non est mutatio, ut supra dictum est. Unde patet quod haec ratio, quam ponit Aristoteles in VIII Physic., procedit contra eos qui ponebant mobilia aeterna, sed motum non aeternum; ut patet ex opinionibus Anaxagorae et Empedoclis. Nos autem ponimus, ex quo mobilia incoeperunt, semper fuisse motum. ||Reply to Objection 5. The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (45, 2, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod primum agens est agens voluntarium. Et quamvis habuit voluntatem aeternam producendi aliquem effectum, non tamen produxit aeternum effectum. Nec est necesse quod praesupponatur aliqua mutatio, nec etiam propter imaginationem temporis. Aliter enim est intelligendum de agente particulari, quod praesupponit aliquid, et causat alterum, et aliter de agente universali, quod producit totum. Sicut agens particulare producit formam, et praesupponit materiam, unde oportet quod formam inducat secundum proportionem ad debitam materiam. Unde rationabiliter in ipso consideratur quod inducit formam in talem materiam et non in aliam, ex differentia materiae ad materiam. Sed hoc non rationabiliter consideratur in Deo, qui simul producit formam et materiam, sed consideratur rationabiliter in eo, quod ipse producit materiam congruam formae et fini. Agens autem particulare praesupponit tempus, sicut et materiam. Unde rationabiliter consideratur in eo, quod agit in tempore posteriori et non in priori, secundum imaginationem successionis temporis post tempus. Sed in agente universali, quod producit rem et tempus, non est considerare quod agat nunc et non prius, secundum imaginationem temporis post tempus, quasi tempus praesupponatur eius actioni, sed considerandum est in eo, quod dedit effectui suo tempus quantum voluit, et secundum quod conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset, omne enim quod non semper fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de eo quod semper fuit. ||Reply to Objection 6. The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 7 </b>Ad septimum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., prius et posterius est in tempore, secundum quod prius et posterius est in motu. Unde principium et finis accipienda sunt in tempore, sicut et in motu. Supposita autem aeternitate motus, necesse est quod quodlibet momentum in motu acceptum sit principium et terminus motus, quod non oportet, si motus incipiat. Et eadem ratio est de nunc temporis. Et sic patet quod ratio illa instantis nunc, quod semper sit principium et finis temporis, praesupponit aeternitatem temporis et motus. Unde Aristoteles hanc rationem inducit, in VIII Physic., contra eos qui ponebant aeternitatem temporis, sed negabant aeternitatem motus. ||Reply to Objection 7. As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 8 </b>Ad octavum dicendum quod Deus est prior mundo duratione. Sed ly prius non designat prioritatem temporis, sed aeternitatis. Vel dicendum quod designat aeternitatem temporis imaginati, et non realiter existentis. Sicut, cum dicitur, supra caelum nihil est, ly supra designat locum imaginatum tantum, secundum quod possibile est imaginari dimensionibus caelestis corporis dimensiones alias superaddi. ||Reply to Objection 8. God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 9 </b>Ad nonum dicendum quod, sicut effectus sequitur a causa agente naturaliter secundum modum suae formae, ita sequitur ab agente per voluntatem secundum formam ab eo praeconceptam et definitam, ut ex superioribus patet. Licet igitur Deus ab aeterno fuerit sufficiens causa mundi, non tamen oportet quod ponatur mundus ab eo productus, nisi secundum quod est in praedefinitione suae voluntatis; ut scilicet habeat esse post non esse, ut manifestius declaret suum auctorem. ||Reply to Objection 9. As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (19, 4; 41, 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as preordained by His will--that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 1 ad 10 </b>Ad decimum dicendum quod, posita actione, sequitur effectus secundum exigentiam formae quae est principium actionis. In agentibus autem per voluntatem, quod conceptum est et praedefinitum, accipitur ut forma quae est principium actionis. Ex actione igitur Dei aeterna non sequitur effectus aeternus, sed qualem Deus voluit, ut scilicet haberet esse post non esse. ||Reply to Objection 10. Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not being.
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| − | ||<div id="q46a2"><b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundum incoepisse non sit articulus fidei, sed conclusio demonstrabilis. Omne enim factum habet principium suae durationis. Sed demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit causa effectiva mundi, et hoc etiam probabiliores philosophi posuerunt. Ergo demonstrative probari potest quod mundus incoeperit. ||Objection 1. It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, si necesse est dicere quod mundus factus est a Deo, aut ergo ex nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo, quia sic materia mundi praecessisset mundum; contra quod procedunt rationes Aristotelis ponentis caelum ingenitum. Ergo oportet dicere quod mundus sit factus ex nihilo. Et sic habet esse post non esse. Ergo oportet quod esse incoeperit. ||Objection 2. Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne quod operatur per intellectum, a quodam principio operatur, ut patet in omnibus artificibus. Sed Deus est agens per intellectum. Ergo a quodam principio operatur mundus igitur, qui est eius effectus, non fuit semper. ||Objection 3. Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, manifeste apparet artes aliquas, et habitationes regionum, ex determinatis temporibus incoepisse. Sed hoc non esset, si mundus semper fuisset. Mundum igitur non semper fuisse manifestum est. ||Objection 4. Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, certum est nihil Deo aequari posse. Sed si mundus semper fuisset, aequipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo certum est non semper mundum fuisse. ||Objection 5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, si mundus semper fuit, infiniti dies praecesserunt diem istum. Sed infinita non est pertransire. Ergo nunquam fuisset perventum ad hunc diem, quod est manifeste falsum. ||Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7 </b>Praeterea, si mundus fuit aeternus, et generatio fuit ab aeterno. Ergo unus homo genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens filii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo in causis efficientibus est procedere in infinitum, quod improbatur in II Metaphys. ||Objection 7. Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8 </b>Praeterea, si mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti homines praecesserunt. Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitae animae humanae nunc essent actu, quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri potest quod mundus incoeperit; et non sola fide tenetur. ||Objection 8. Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra, fidei articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, quia fides de non apparentibus est, ut dicitur ad Hebr. XI. Sed Deum esse creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus incoeperit esse, est articulus fidei, dicimus enim, credo in unum Deum et cetera. Et iterum, Gregorius dicit, in Homil. I in Ezech., quod Moyses prophetizavit de praeterito, dicens in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; in quo novitas mundi traditur. Ergo novitas mundi habetur tantum per revelationem. Et ideo non potest probari demonstrative. ||On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Hebrews 11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est. Et huius ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem, secundum rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hic et nunc, propter quod dicitur quod universalia sunt ubique et semper. Unde demonstrari non potest quod homo, aut caelum, aut lapis non semper fuit. Similiter etiam neque ex parte causae agentis, quae agit per voluntatem. Voluntas enim Dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi circa ea quae absolute necesse est Deum velle, talia autem non sunt quae circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est. Potest autem voluntas divina homini manifestari per revelationem, cui fides innititur. Unde mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel scibile. Et hoc utile est ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod fidei est demonstrare praesumens, rationes non necessarias inducat, quae praebeant materiam irridendi infidelibus, existimantibus nos propter huiusmodi rationes credere quae fidei sunt. ||I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity (32, 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (19, 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, philosophorum ponentium aeternitatem mundi, duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim posuerunt quod substantia mundi non sit a Deo. Et horum est intollerabilis error; et ideo ex necessitate refellitur. Quidam autem sic posuerunt mundum aeternum, quod tamen mundum a Deo factum dixerunt. Non enim mundum temporis volunt habere, sed suae creationis initium, ut quodam modo vix intelligibili semper sit factus. Id autem quomodo intelligant, invenerunt, ut idem dicit in X de Civ. Dei. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium, quod a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; sic et mundus semper fuit, semper existente qui fecit. Et ad hoc intelligendum, considerandum est quod causa efficiens quae agit per motum, de necessitate praecedit tempore suum effectum, quia effectus non est nisi in termino actionis, agens autem omne oportet esse principium actionis. Sed si actio sit instantanea, et non successiva, non est necessarium faciens esse prius facto duratione; sicut patet in illuminatione. Unde dicunt quod non sequitur ex necessitate, si Deus est causa activa mundi, quod sit prior mundo duratione, quia creatio, qua mundum produxit, non est mutatio successiva, ut supra dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (45, 2).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui ponerent mundum aeternum, dicerent mundum factum a Deo ex nihilo, non quod factus sit post nihilum, secundum quod nos intelligimus per nomen creationis; sed quia non est factus de aliquo. Et sic etiam non recusant aliqui eorum creationis nomen, ut patet ex Avicenna in sua metaphysica. ||Reply to Objection 2. Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod illa est ratio Anaxagorae, quae ponitur in III Physic. Sed non de necessitate concludit, nisi de intellectu qui deliberando investigat quid agendum sit, quod est simile motui. Talis autem est intellectus humanus, sed non divinus, ut supra patet. ||Reply to Objection 3. This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human intellect, but not the divine intellect (14, 7,12).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod ponentes aeternitatem mundi, ponunt aliquam regionem infinities esse mutatam de inhabitabili in habitabilem, et e converso. Et similiter ponunt quod artes, propter diversas corruptiones et accidentia, infinities fuerunt inventae, et iterum corruptae. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in libro Meteor., quod ridiculum est ex huiusmodi particularibus mutationibus opinionem accipere de novitate mundi totius. ||Reply to Objection 4. Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod, etsi mundus semper fuisset, non tamen parificaretur Deo in aeternitate, ut dicit Boetius, in fine de Consolat., quia esse divinum est esse totum simul, absque successione; non autem sic est de mundo. ||Reply to Objection 5. Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod transitus semper intelligitur a termino in terminum. Quaecumque autem praeterita dies signetur, ab illa usque ad istam sunt finiti dies, qui pertransiri poterunt. Obiectio autem procedit ac si, positis extremis, sint media infinita. ||Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 7 </b>Ad septimum dicendum quod in causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in infinitum per se; ut puta si causae quae per se requiruntur ad aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum; sicut si lapis moveretur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur impossibile; ut puta si omnes causae quae in infinitum multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi unius causae, sed earum multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis martellis per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic martello, quod agat post actionem alterius martelli. Et similiter accidit huic homini, inquantum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio, generat enim inquantum homo, et non inquantum est filius alterius hominis; omnes enim homines generantes habent gradum unum in causis efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Unde non est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Esset autem impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc homine, et a corpore elementari, et a sole, et sic in infinitum. ||Reply to Objection 7. In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 2 ad 8 </b>Ad octavum dicendum quod hanc rationem ponentes aeternitatem mundi multipliciter effugiunt quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse infinitas animas actu; ut patet in metaphysica Algazelis, dicentis hoc esse infinitum per accidens. Sed hoc improbatum est superius. Quidam vero dicunt animam corrumpi cum corpore. Quidam vero quod ex omnibus animabus remanet una tantum. Alii vero, ut Augustinus dicit, posuerunt propter hoc circuitum animarum; ut scilicet animae separatae a corporibus, post determinata temporum curricula, iterum redirent ad corpora. De quibus omnibus in sequentibus est agendum. Considerandum tamen quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset dicere aliquis quod mundus fuit aeternus, vel saltem aliqua creatura, ut Angelus; non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno. ||Reply to Objection 8. Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was disproved above (7, 4). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine says [Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13, asserted on this account a circuit of souls--viz. that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later (75, 2; 118, 6). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or least some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
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| − | ||<div id="q46a3"><b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatio rerum non fuit in principio temporis. Quod enim non est in tempore, non est in aliquo temporis. Sed creatio rerum non fuit in tempore, per creationem enim rerum substantia in esse producta est; tempus autem non mensurat substantiam rerum, et praecipue incorporalium. Ergo creatio non fuit in principio temporis. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, philosophus probat quod omne quod fit, fiebat, et sic omne fieri habet prius et posterius. In principio autem temporis, cum sit indivisibile, non est prius et posterius. Ergo, cum creari sit quoddam fieri, videtur quod res non sint creatae in principio temporis. ||Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ipsum etiam tempus creatum est. Sed non potest creari in principio temporis, cum tempus sit divisibile, principium autem temporis indivisibile. Non ergo creatio rerum fuit in principio temporis. ||Objection 3. Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Gen. I dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. ||On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod illud verbum Genes. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, tripliciter exponitur, ad excludendum tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, et tempus non habere principium. Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio, scilicet temporis. Quidam vero posuerunt duo esse creationis principia, unum bonorum, aliud malorum. Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio, idest in filio. Sicut enim principium effectivum appropriatur patri, propter potentiam, ita principium exemplare appropriatur filio, propter sapientiam, ut sicut dicitur, omnia in sapientia fecisti, ita intelligatur Deum omnia fecisse in principio, idest in filio; secundum illud apostoli ad Coloss. I, in ipso, scilicet filio, condita sunt universa. Alii vero dixerunt corporalia esse creata a Deo mediantibus creaturis spiritualibus. Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, idest ante omnia. Quatuor enim ponuntur simul creata, scilicet caelum Empyreum, materia corporalis (quae nomine terrae intelligitur), tempus, et natura angelica. ||I answer that, The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the beginning" are expounded--viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded--"in the Son." For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Psalm 103:24), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Colossians 1:16), "In Him"--viz. the Son--"were created all things." But others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"--i.e. before all things--"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non dicuntur in principio temporis res esse creatae, quasi principium temporis sit creationis mensura sed quia simul cum tempore caelum et terra creata sunt. ||Reply to Objection 1. Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time heaven and earth were created.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi intelligitur de fieri quod est per motum, vel quod est terminus motus. Quia cum in quolibet motu sit accipere prius et posterius, ante quodcumque signum in motu signato, dum scilicet aliquid est in moveri et fieri, est accipere prius, et etiam aliquid post ipsum, quia quod est in principio motus, vel in termino, non est in moveri. Creatio autem neque est motus neque terminus motus, ut supra dictum est. Unde sic aliquid creatur, quod non prius creabatur. ||Reply to Objection 2. This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said above (45, 2,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 46 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil fit nisi secundum quod est. Nihil autem est temporis nisi nunc. Unde non potest fieri nisi secundum aliquod nunc, non quia in ipso primo nunc sit tempus, sed quia ab eo incipit tempus. ||Reply to Objection 3. Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 pr. </b>Post productionem creaturarum in esse, considerandum est de distinctione earum. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita. Nam primo considerabimus de distinctione rerum in communi; secundo, de distinctione boni et mali; tertio, de distinctione spiritualis et corporalis creaturae. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, de ipsa rerum multitudine seu distinctione. Secundo, de earum inaequalitate. Tertio, de unitate mundi. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q47a1"><b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod rerum multitudo et distinctio non sit a Deo. Unum enim semper natum est unum facere. Sed Deus est maxime unus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo non producit nisi unum effectum. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (11, 4). Therefore He produces but one effect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, exemplatum assimilatur suo exemplari. Sed Deus est causa exemplaris sui effectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo, cum Deus sit unus, effectus eius est unus tantum, et non distinctus. ||Objection 2. Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (44, 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ea quae sunt ad finem, proportionantur fini. Sed finis creaturae est unus, scilicet divina bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo effectus Dei non est nisi unus. ||Objection 3. Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above (44 , 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, quod Deus distinxit lucem a tenebris, et divisit aquas ab aquis. Ergo distinctio et multitudo rerum est a Deo. ||On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:4,7) that God "divided the light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod causam distinctionis rerum multipliciter aliqui assignaverunt. Quidam enim attribuerunt eam materiae, vel soli, vel simul cum agente. Soli quidem materiae, sicut Democritus, et omnes antiqui naturales, ponentes solam causam materialem, secundum quos distinctio rerum provenit a casu, secundum motum materiae. Materiae vero et agenti simul distinctionem et multitudinem rerum attribuit Anaxagoras, qui posuit intellectum distinguentem res, extrahendo quod erat permixtum in materia. Sed hoc non potest stare propter duo. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est quod etiam ipsa materia a Deo creata est. Unde oportet et distinctionem, si qua est ex parte materiae, in altiorem causam reducere. Secundo, quia materia est propter formam, et non e converso. Distinctio autem rerum est per formas proprias. Non ergo distinctio est in rebus propter materiam, sed potius e converso in materia creata est difformitas, ut esset diversis formis accommodata. Quidam vero attribuerunt distinctionem rerum secundis agentibus. Sicut Avicenna, qui dixit quod Deus, intelligendo se, produxit intelligentiam primam, in qua, quia non est suum esse, ex necessitate incidit compositio potentiae et actus, ut infra patebit. Sic igitur prima intelligentia, inquantum intelligit causam primam, produxit secundam intelligentiam; inquantum autem intelligit se secundum quod est in potentia, produxit corpus caeli, quod movet; inquantum vero intelligit se secundum illud quod habet de actu, produxit animam caeli. Sed hoc non potest stare propter duo. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est quod creare solius Dei est. Unde ea quae non possunt causari nisi per creationem, a solo Deo producuntur, et haec sunt omnia quae non subiacent generationi et corruptioni. Secundo, quia secundum hanc positionem, non proveniret ex intentione primi agentis universitas rerum, sed ex concursu multarum causarum agentium. Tale autem dicimus provenire a casu. Sic igitur complementum universi, quod in diversitate rerum consistit, esset a casu, quod est impossibile. Unde dicendum est quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia, nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et repraesentat eam, totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura. Et quia ex divina sapientia est causa distinctionis rerum, ideo Moyses dicit res esse distinctas verbo Dei, quod est conceptio sapientiae. Et hoc est quod dicitur Gen. I, dixit Deus, fiat lux. Et divisit lucem a tenebris. ||I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter. But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above (44, 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms. Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear later (50, 3). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens. But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was shown above (45, 5) that to create belongs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone--viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible. Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever. And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in Gn. 1:3,4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from the darkness."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod agens per naturam agit per formam per quam est, quae unius tantum est una, et ideo non agit nisi unum. Agens autem voluntarium, quale est Deus, ut supra ostensum est, agit per formam intellectam. Cum igitur Deum multa intelligere non repugnet unitati et simplicitati ipsius, ut supra ostensum est, relinquitur quod, licet sit unus, possit multa facere. ||Reply to Objection 1. The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (19, 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above (15, 2), it follows that, although He is one, He can make many things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa teneret de exemplato quod perfecte repraesentat exemplar, quod non multiplicatur nisi materialiter. Unde imago increata, quae est perfecta, est una tantum. Sed nulla creatura repraesentat perfecte exemplar primum, quod est divina essentia. Et ideo potest per multa repraesentari. Et tamen secundum quod ideae dicuntur exemplaria, pluralitati rerum correspondet in mente divina pluralitas idearum. ||Reply to Objection 2. This reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod in speculativis medium demonstrationis, quod perfecte demonstrat conclusionem, est unum tantum, sed media probabilia sunt multa. Et similiter in operativis, quando id quod est ad finem adaequat, ut ita dixerim, finem, non requiritur quod sit nisi unum tantum. Sed creatura non sic se habet ad finem qui est Deus. Unde oportuit creaturas multiplicari. ||Reply to Objection 3. In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.
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| − | ||<div id="q47a2"><b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inaequalitas rerum non sit a Deo. Optimi enim est optima adducere. Sed inter optima unum non est maius altero. Ergo Dei, qui est optimus, est omnia aequalia facere. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, aequalitas est effectus unitatis, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed Deus est unus. Ergo fecit omnia aequalia. ||Objection 2. Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, iustitiae est inaequalia inaequalibus dare. Sed Deus est iustus in omnibus operibus suis. Cum ergo operationi eius, qua esse rebus communicat, non praesupponatur aliqua inaequalitas rerum, videtur quod fecerit omnia aequalia. ||Objection 3. Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, quare dies diem superat, et iterum lux lucem, et annus annum, sol solem? A domini scientia separata sunt. ||On the contrary, It is said (Sirach 33:7): "Why does one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all come of the sun']. By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes, volens excludere positionem ponentium distinctionem in rebus ex contrarietate principiorum boni et mali, posuit a Deo a principio omnia creata esse aequalia. Dicit enim quod Deus primo creavit creaturas rationales tantum, et omnes aequales, in quibus primo exorta est inaequalitas ex libero arbitrio, quibusdam conversis in Deum secundum magis et minus, quibusdam etiam secundum magis et minus a Deo aversis. Illae igitur rationales creaturae quae ad Deum per liberum arbitrium conversae sunt, promotae sunt ad diversos ordines Angelorum, pro diversitate meritorum. Illae autem quae aversae sunt a Deo, sunt corporibus alligatae diversis, secundum diversitatem peccati, et hanc causam dicit esse creationis et diversitatis corporum. Sed secundum hoc, universitas corporalium creaturarum non esset propter bonitatem Dei communicandam creaturis, sed ad puniendum peccatum. Quod est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. I, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Et ut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, quid stultius dici potest, quam istum solem, ut in uno mundo unus esset, non decori pulchritudinis, vel saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem Deum; sed hoc potius evenisse, quia una anima sic peccaverat? Ac per hoc, si centum animae peccassent, centum soles haberet hic mundus. Et ideo dicendum est quod, sicut sapientia Dei est causa distinctionis rerum, ita et inaequalitatis. Quod sic patet. Duplex enim distinctio invenitur in rebus, una formalis, in his quae differunt specie; alia vero materialis, in his quae differunt numero tantum. Cum autem materia sit propter formam, distinctio materialis est propter formalem. Unde videmus quod in rebus incorruptibilibus non est nisi unum individuum unius speciei, quia species sufficienter conservatur in uno, in generabilibus autem et corruptibilibus, sunt multa individua unius speciei, ad conservationem speciei. Ex quo patet quod principalior est distinctio formalis quam materialis. Distinctio autem formalis semper requirit inaequalitatem, quia, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys., formae rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus species variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Unde in rebus naturalibus gradatim species ordinatae esse videntur, sicut mixta perfectiora sunt elementis, et plantae corporibus mineralibus, et animalia plantis, et homines aliis animalibus; et in singulis horum una species perfectior aliis invenitur. Sicut ergo divina sapientia causa est distinctionis rerum propter perfectionem universi, ita et inaequalitatis. Non enim esset perfectum universum, si tantum unus gradus bonitatis inveniretur in rebus. ||I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Genesis 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3): "What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred suns in the world?" Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod optimi agentis est producere totum effectum suum optimum, non tamen quod quamlibet partem totius faciat optimam simpliciter, sed optimam secundum proportionem ad totum, tolleretur enim bonitas animalis, si quaelibet pars eius oculi haberet dignitatem. Sic igitur et Deus totum universum constituit optimum, secundum modum creaturae, non autem singulas creaturas, sed unam alia meliorem. Et ideo de singulis creaturis dicitur Gen. I, vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona, et similiter de singulis, sed de omnibus simul dicitur, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. ||Reply to Objection 1. It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, "God saw the light that it was good" (Genesis 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Genesis 1:31).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod primum quod procedit ab unitate, est aequalitas; et deinde procedit multiplicitas. Et ideo a patre, cui, secundum Augustinum, appropriatur unitas, processit filius, cui appropriatur aequalitas; et deinde creatura, cui competit inaequalitas. Sed tamen etiam a creaturis participatur quaedam aequalitas, scilicet proportionis. ||Reply to Objection 2. The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality--namely, of proportion.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa est quae movit Origenem, sed non habet locum nisi in retributione praemiorum, quorum inaequalitas debetur inaequalibus meritis. Sed in constitutione rerum non est inaequalitas partium per quamcumque inaequalitatem praecedentem vel meritorum vel etiam dispositionis materiae; sed propter perfectionem totius. Ut patet etiam in operibus artis, non enim propter hoc differt tectum a fundamento, quia habet diversam materiam; sed ut sit domus perfecta ex diversis partibus, quaerit artifex diversam materiam, et faceret eam si posset. ||Reply to Objection 3. This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he would make such material if he could.
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| − | ||<div id="q47a3"><b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit unus mundus tantum, sed plures. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., inconveniens est dicere quod Deus sine ratione res creavit. Sed ea ratione qua creavit unum, potuit creare multos, cum eius potentia non sit limitata ad unius mundi creationem, sed est infinita, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo Deus plures mundos produxit. ||Objection 1. It would seem that there is not only one world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above (25, 2). Therefore God has produced many worlds.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, natura facit quod melius est, et multo magis Deus. Sed melius esset esse plures mundos quam unum, quia plura bona paucioribus meliora sunt. Ergo plures mundi facti sunt a Deo. ||Objection 2. Further, nature does what is best and much more does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne quod habet formam in materia, potest multiplicari secundum numerum, manente eadem specie, quia multiplicatio secundum numerum est ex materia. Sed mundus habet formam in materia, sicut enim cum dico homo, significo formam, cum autem dico hic homo, significo formam in materia; ita, cum dicitur mundus, significatur forma, cum autem dicitur hic mundus, significatur forma in materia. Ergo nihil prohibet esse plures mundos. ||Objection 3. Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say "this man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the form is signified, and when we say "this world," the form in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, mundus per ipsum factus est; ubi singulariter mundum nominavit, quasi uno solo mundo existente. ||On the contrary, It is said (John 1:10): "The world was made by Him," where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod ipse ordo in rebus sic a Deo creatis existens, unitatem mundi manifestat. Mundus enim iste unus dicitur unitate ordinis, secundum quod quaedam ad alia ordinantur. Quaecumque autem sunt a Deo, ordinem habent ad invicem et ad ipsum Deum, ut supra ostensum est. Unde necesse est quod omnia ad unum mundum pertineant. Et ideo illi potuerunt ponere plures mundos, qui causam mundi non posuerunt aliquam sapientiam ordinantem, sed casum; ut Democritus, qui dixit ex concursu atomorum factum esse hunc mundum, et alios infinitos. ||I answer that, The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, as shown above (11, 3; 21, 1). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec ratio est quare mundus est unus, quia debent omnia esse ordinata uno ordine, et ad unum. Propter quod Aristoteles, in XII Metaphys., ex unitate ordinis in rebus existentis concludit unitatem Dei gubernantis. Et Plato ex unitate exemplaris probat unitatem mundi, quasi exemplati. ||Reply to Objection 1. This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod nullum agens intendit pluralitatem materialem ut finem, quia materialis multitudo non habet certum terminum, sed de se tendit in infinitum; infinitum autem repugnat rationi finis. Cum autem dicitur plures mundos esse meliores quam unum, hoc dicitur secundum multitudinem materialem. Tale autem melius non est de intentione Dei agentis, quia eadem ratione dici posset quod, si fecisset duos, melius esset quod essent tres; et sic in infinitum. ||Reply to Objection 2. No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He had made three; and so on to infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 47 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod mundus constat ex sua tota materia. Non enim est possibile esse aliam terram quam istam, quia omnis terra ferretur naturaliter ad hoc medium, ubicumque esset. Et eadem ratio est de aliis corporibus quae sunt partes mundi. ||Reply to Objection 3. The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 pr. </b>Deinde considerandum est de distinctione rerum in speciali. Et primo, de distinctione boni et mali; deinde de distinctione spiritualis et corporalis creaturae. Circa primum, quaerendum est de malo; et de causa mali. Circa malum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum malum sit natura aliqua. Secundo, utrum malum inveniatur in rebus. Tertio, utrum bonum sit subiectum mali. Quarto, utrum malum totaliter corrumpat bonum. Quinto, de divisione mali per poenam et culpam. Sexto, quid habeat plus de ratione mali, utrum poena vel culpa. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q48a1"><b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum sit natura quaedam. Quia omne genus est natura quaedam. Sed malum est quoddam genus, dicitur enim in praedicamentis, quod bonum et malum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera aliorum. Ergo malum est natura quaedam. ||Objection 1. It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omnis differentia constitutiva alicuius speciei est natura quaedam. Malum autem est differentia constitutiva in moralibus, differt enim specie malus habitus a bono, ut liberalitas ab illiberalitate. Ergo malum significat naturam quandam. ||Objection 2. Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, utrumque contrariorum est natura quaedam. Sed malum et bonum non opponuntur ut privatio et habitus, sed ut contraria, ut probat philosophus, in praedicamentis, per hoc quod inter bonum et malum est aliquid medium, et a malo potest fieri reditus ad bonum. Ergo malum significat naturam quandam. ||Objection 3. Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, quod non est, non agit. Sed malum agit, quia corrumpit bonum. Ergo malum est quoddam ens, et natura quaedam. ||Objection 4. Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, ad perfectionem universitatis rerum non pertinet nisi quod est ens et natura quaedam. Sed malum pertinet ad perfectionem universitatis rerum, dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum, et suo loco positum, eminentius commendat bona. Ergo malum est natura quaedam. ||Objection 5. Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil is a nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum non est existens neque bonum. ||On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod unum oppositorum cognoscitur per alterum, sicut per lucem tenebra. Unde et quid sit malum, oportet ex ratione boni accipere. Diximus autem supra quod bonum est omne id quod est appetibile, et sic, cum omnis natura appetat suum esse et suam perfectionem, necesse est dicere quod esse et perfectio cuiuscumque naturae rationem habeat bonitatis. Unde non potest esse quod malum significet quoddam esse, aut quandam formam seu naturam. Relinquitur ergo quod nomine mali significetur quaedam absentia boni. Et pro tanto dicitur quod malum neque est existens nec bonum, quia cum ens, inquantum huiusmodi, sit bonum, eadem est remotio utrorumque. ||I answer that, One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Aristoteles ibi loquitur secundum opinionem Pythagoricorum, qui malum existimabant esse naturam quandam, et ideo ponebant bonum et malum genera. Consuevit enim Aristoteles, et praecipue in libris logicalibus, ponere exempla quae probabilia erant suo tempore, secundum opinionem aliquorum philosophorum. Vel dicendum, sicut dicit philosophus in X Metaphys., quod prima contrarietas est habitus et privatio, quia scilicet in omnibus contrariis salvatur, cum semper unum contrariorum sit imperfectum respectu alterius, ut nigrum respectu albi, et amarum respectu dulcis. Et pro tanto bonum et malum dicuntur genera, non simpliciter, sed contrariorum, quia sicut omnis forma habet rationem boni, ita omnis privatio, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali. ||Reply to Objection 1. Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum et malum non sunt differentiae constitutivae nisi in moralibus, quae recipiunt speciem ex fine, qui est obiectum voluntatis, a qua moralia dependent. Et quia bonum habet rationem finis, ideo bonum et malum sunt differentiae specificae in moralibus; bonum per se, sed malum inquantum est remotio debiti finis. Nec tamen remotio debiti finis constituit speciem in moralibus, nisi secundum quod adiungitur fini indebito, sicut neque in naturalibus invenitur privatio formae substantialis, nisi adiuncta alteri formae. Sic igitur malum quod est differentia constitutiva in moralibus, est quoddam bonum adiunctum privationi alterius boni, sicut finis intemperati est, non quidem carere bono rationis, sed delectabile sensus absque ordine rationis. Unde malum, inquantum malum, non est differentia constitutiva; sed ratione boni adiuncti. ||Reply to Objection 2. Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad tertium. Nam ibi philosophus loquitur de bono et malo, secundum quod inveniuntur in moralibus. Sic enim inter bonum et malum invenitur medium, prout bonum dicitur quod est ordinatum; malum autem, quod non solum est deordinatum, sed etiam nocivum alteri. Unde dicit philosophus in IV Ethic., quod prodigus vanus quidem est, sed non malus. Ab hoc etiam malo quod est secundum morem, contingit fieri reditum ad bonum; non autem ex quocumque malo. Non enim ex caecitate fit reditus ad visionem, cum tamen caecitas sit malum quoddam. ||Reply to Objection 3. This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquid agere dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, formaliter, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur albedo facere album. Et sic malum, etiam ratione ipsius privationis, dicitur corrumpere bonum, quia est ipsa corruptio vel privatio boni. Alio modo dicitur aliquid agere effective, sicut pictor dicitur facere album parietem. Tertio modo, per modum causae finalis, sicut finis dicitur efficere, movendo efficientem. His autem duobus modis malum non agit aliquid per se, idest secundum quod est privatio quaedam, sed secundum quod ei bonum adiungitur, nam omnis actio est ab aliqua forma, et omne quod desideratur ut finis, est perfectio aliqua. Et ideo, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum non agit neque desideratur nisi virtute boni adiuncti; per se autem est infinitum, et praeter voluntatem et intentionem. ||Reply to Objection 4. A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 1 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, partes universi habent ordinem ad invicem, secundum quod una agit in alteram, et est finis alterius et exemplar. Haec autem, ut dictum est, non possunt convenire malo, nisi ratione boni adiuncti. Unde malum neque ad perfectionem universi pertinet, neque sub ordine universi concluditur, nisi per accidens, idest ratione boni adiuncti. ||Reply to Objection 5. As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it.
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| − | ||<div id="q48a2"><b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum non inveniatur in rebus. Quidquid enim invenitur in rebus, vel est ens aliquod, vel privatio entis alicuius, quod est non ens. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum distat ab existente, et adhuc plus distat a non existente. Ergo malum nullo modo invenitur in rebus. ||Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, ens et res convertuntur. Si ergo malum est ens in rebus, sequitur quod malum sit res quaedam. Quod est contra praedicta. ||Objection 2. Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been said (1).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, albius est quod est nigro impermixtius, ut dicitur in III libro Topic. Aristotelis. Ergo et melius est quod est malo impermixtius. Sed Deus facit semper quod melius est, multo magis quam natura. Ergo in rebus a Deo conditis nihil malum invenitur. ||Objection 3. Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod secundum hoc removerentur omnes prohibitiones et poenae, quae non sunt nisi malorum. ||On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, perfectio universi requirit inaequalitatem esse in rebus, ut omnes bonitatis gradus impleantur. Est autem unus gradus bonitatis ut aliquid ita bonum sit, quod nunquam deficere possit. Alius autem gradus bonitatis est, ut sic aliquid bonum sit, quod a bono deficere possit. Qui etiam gradus in ipso esse inveniuntur, quaedam enim sunt, quae suum esse amittere non possunt, ut incorporalia; quaedam vero sunt, quae amittere possunt, ut corporalia. Sicut igitur perfectio universitatis rerum requirit ut non solum sint entia incorruptibilia, sed etiam corruptibilia; ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint; ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere. In hoc autem consistit ratio mali, ut scilicet aliquid deficiat a bono. Unde manifestum est quod in rebus malum invenitur, sicut et corruptio, nam et ipsa corruptio malum quoddam est. ||I answer that, As was said above (47, 1,2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible. As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum distat et ab ente simpliciter, et non ente simpliciter, quia neque est sicut habitus, neque sicut pura negatio, sed sicut privatio. ||Reply to Objection 1. Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in V Metaphys., ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem praedicamenta, et sic convertitur cum re. Et hoc modo, nulla privatio est ens, unde nec malum. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum est, et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem an est. Et sic caecitatem dicimus esse in oculo, vel quamcumque aliam privationem. Et hoc modo etiam malum dicitur ens. Propter huius autem distinctionis ignorantiam, aliqui, considerantes quod aliquae res dicuntur malae, vel quod malum dicitur esse in rebus, crediderunt quod malum esset res quaedam. ||Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus et natura, et quodcumque agens, facit quod melius est in toto; sed non quod melius est in unaquaque parte, nisi per ordinem ad totum, ut supra dictum est. Ipsum autem totum quod est universitas creaturarum, melius et perfectius est, si in eo sint quaedam quae a bono deficere possunt, quae interdum deficiunt, Deo hoc non impediente. Tum quia providentiae non est naturam destruere, sed salvare, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet, ut quae deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant. Tum quia, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid., Deus est adeo potens, quod etiam potest bene facere de malis. Unde multa bona tollerentur, si Deus nullum malum permitteret esse. Non enim generaretur ignis, nisi corrumperetur aer; neque conservaretur vita leonis, nisi occideretur asinus; neque etiam laudaretur iustitia vindicans, et patientia sufferens, si non esset iniquitas. ||Reply to Objection 3. God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above (47, 2). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.
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| − | ||<div id="q48a3"><b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum non sit in bono sicut in subiecto. Omnia enim bona sunt existentia. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum non est existens, neque in existentibus. Ergo malum non est in bono sicut in subiecto. ||Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, malum non est ens, bonum vero est ens. Sed non ens non requirit ens, in quo sit sicut in subiecto. Ergo nec malum requirit bonum, in quo sit sicut in subiecto. ||Objection 2. Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, unum contrariorum non est subiectum alterius. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria. Ergo malum non est in bono sicut in subiecto. ||Objection 3. Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, id in quo est albedo sicut in subiecto, dicitur esse album. Ergo et id in quo est malum sicut in subiecto, est malum. Si ergo malum sit in bono sicut in subiecto, sequitur quod bonum sit malum, contra id quod dicitur Isai. V, vae, qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum malum. ||Objection 4. Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (Isaiah 5:20): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in bono. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, malum importat remotionem boni. Non autem quaelibet remotio boni malum dicitur. Potest enim accipi remotio boni et privative, et negative. Remotio igitur boni negative accepta, mali rationem non habet, alioquin sequeretur quod ea quae nullo modo sunt, mala essent; et iterum quod quaelibet res esset mala, ex hoc quod non habet bonum alterius rei, utpote quod homo esset malus, quia non habet velocitatem capreae, vel fortitudinem leonis. Sed remotio boni privative accepta, malum dicitur, sicut privatio visus caecitas dicitur. Subiectum autem privationis et formae est unum et idem, scilicet ens in potentia, sive sit ens in potentia simpliciter, sicut materia prima, quae est subiectum formae substantialis et privationis oppositae; sive sit ens in potentia secundum quid et in actu simpliciter, ut corpus diaphanum, quod est subiectum tenebrarum et lucis. Manifestum est autem quod forma per quam aliquid est actu, perfectio quaedam est, et bonum quoddam, et sic omne ens in actu, bonum quoddam est. Et similiter omne ens in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum quoddam est, secundum quod habet ordinem ad bonum, sicut enim est ens in potentia, ita et bonum in potentia. Relinquitur ergo quod subiectum mali sit bonum. ||I answer that, As was said above (1), evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness. Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same--viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius intelligit malum non esse in existentibus sicut partem, aut sicut proprietatem naturalem alicuius existentis. ||Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens negative acceptum non requirit subiectum. Sed privatio est negatio in subiecto, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys., et tale non ens est malum. ||Reply to Objection 2. "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod malum non est sicut in subiecto in bono quod ei opponitur, sed in quodam alio bono, subiectum enim caecitatis non est visus, sed animal. Videtur tamen, ut Augustinus dicit, hic fallere dialecticorum regula, quae dicit contraria simul esse non posse. Hoc tamen intelligendum est secundum communem acceptionem boni et mali, non autem secundum quod specialiter accipitur hoc bonum et hoc malum. Album autem et nigrum, dulce et amarum, et huiusmodi contraria, non accipiuntur nisi specialiter, quia sunt in quibusdam generibus determinatis. Sed bonum circuit omnia genera, unde unum bonum potest simul esse cum privatione alterius boni. ||Reply to Objection 3. Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight," but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod propheta imprecatur vae illis qui dicunt id quod est bonum, secundum quod est bonum, esse malum. Hoc autem non sequitur ex praemissis, ut per praedicta patet. ||Reply to Objection 4. The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given.
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| − | ||<div id="q48a4"><b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum corrumpat totum bonum. Unum enim contrariorum totaliter corrumpitur per alterum. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria. Ergo malum potest corrumpere totum bonum. ||Objection 1. It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum nocet inquantum adimit bonum. Sed bonum est sibi simile et uniforme. Ergo totaliter tollitur per malum. ||Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, malum, quandiu est, nocet et aufert bonum. Sed illud a quo semper aliquid aufertur, quandoque consumitur, nisi sit infinitum; quod non potest dici de aliquo bono creato. Ergo malum consumit totaliter bonum. ||Objection 3. Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non potest totaliter consumere bonum. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot wholly consume good."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod malum non potest totaliter consumere bonum. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod est triplex bonum. Quoddam, quod per malum totaliter tollitur, et hoc est bonum oppositum malo; sicut lumen totaliter per tenebras tollitur, et visus per caecitatem. Quoddam vero bonum est, quod nec totaliter tollitur per malum, nec diminuitur, scilicet bonum quod est subiectum mali; non enim per tenebras aliquid de substantia aeris diminuitur. Quoddam vero bonum est, quod diminuitur quidem per malum, sed non totaliter tollitur, et hoc bonum est habilitas subiecti ad actum. Diminutio autem huius boni non est accipienda per subtractionem, sicut est diminutio in quantitatibus, sed per remissionem, sicut est diminutio in qualitatibus et formis. Remissio autem huius habilitatis est accipienda e contrario intensioni ipsius. Intenditur enim huiusmodi habilitas per dispositiones quibus materia praeparatur ad actum; quae quanto magis multiplicantur in subiecto, tanto habilius est ad recipiendum perfectionem et formam. Et e contrario remittitur per dispositiones contrarias; quae quanto magis multiplicatae sunt in materia, et magis intensae, tanto magis remittitur potentia ad actum. Si igitur contrariae dispositiones in infinitum multiplicari et intendi non possunt, sed usque ad certum terminum, neque habilitas praedicta in infinitum diminuitur vel remittitur. Sicut patet in qualitatibus activis et passivis elementorum, frigiditas enim et humiditas, per quae diminuitur sive remittitur habilitas materiae ad formam ignis, non possunt multiplicari in infinitum. Si vero dispositiones contrariae in infinitum multiplicari possunt, et habilitas praedicta in infinitum diminuitur vel remittitur. Non tamen totaliter tollitur, quia semper manet in sua radice, quae est substantia subiecti. Sicut si in infinitum interponantur corpora opaca inter solem et aerem, in infinitum diminuetur habilitas aeris ad lumen, nunquam tamen totaliter tollitur, manente aere, qui secundum naturam suam est diaphanus. Similiter in infinitum potest fieri additio in peccatis, per quae semper magis ac magis minuitur habilitas animae ad gratiam, quae quidem peccata sunt quasi obstacula interposita inter nos et Deum secundum illud Isaiae LIX, peccata nostra diviserunt inter nos et Deum. Neque tamen tollitur totaliter ab anima praedicta habilitas, quia consequitur naturam ipsius. ||I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality. The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality. Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum quod opponitur malo, totaliter tollitur, sed alia bona non totaliter tolluntur, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod habilitas praedicta est media inter subiectum et actum. Unde ex ea parte qua attingit actum, diminuitur per malum, sed ex ea parte qua tenet se cum subiecto, remanet. Ergo, licet bonum in se sit simile, tamen, propter comparationem eius ad diversa, non totaliter tollitur, sed in parte. ||Reply to Objection 2. The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam, imaginantes diminutionem boni praedicti ad similitudinem diminutionis quantitatis, dixerunt quod, sicut continuum dividitur in infinitum, facta divisione secundum eandem proportionem (ut puta quod accipiatur medium medii, vel tertium tertii), sic in proposito accidit. Sed haec ratio hic locum non habet. Quia in divisione in qua semper servatur eadem proportio, semper subtrahitur minus et minus, minus enim est medium medii quam medium totius. Sed secundum peccatum non de necessitate minus diminuit de habilitate praedicta, quam praecedens, sed forte aut aequaliter, aut magis. Dicendum est ergo quod, licet ista habilitas sit quoddam finitum, diminuitur tamen in infinitum, non per se, sed per accidens, secundum quod contrariae dispositiones etiam in infinitum augentur, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 3. Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more. Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.
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| − | ||<div id="q48a5"><b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum insufficienter dividatur per poenam et culpam. Omnis enim defectus malum quoddam esse videtur. Sed in omnibus creaturis est quidam defectus, quod se in esse conservare non possunt, qui tamen nec poena nec culpa est. Non ergo sufficienter malum dividitur per poenam et culpam. ||Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain [Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense."--Ed.] and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, in rebus irrationalibus non invenitur culpa nec poena. Invenitur tamen in eis corruptio et defectus, quae ad rationem mali pertinent. Ergo non omne malum est poena vel culpa. ||Objection 2. Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, tentatio quoddam malum est. Nec tamen est culpa, quia tentatio cui non consentitur, non est peccatum, sed materia exercendae virtutis, ut dicitur in Glossa II Cor. XII. Nec etiam poena, quia tentatio praecedit culpam, poena autem subsequitur. Insufficienter ergo malum dividitur per poenam et culpam. ||Objection 3. Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for "temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra, videtur quod divisio sit superflua. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., malum dicitur quia nocet. Quod autem nocet, poenale est. Omne ergo malum sub poena continetur. ||Objection 4.On the contrary, It would seem that this division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil "because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod malum, sicut supra dictum est, est privatio boni, quod in perfectione et actu consistit principaliter et per se. Actus autem est duplex, primus, et secundus. Actus quidem primus est forma et integritas rei, actus autem secundus est operatio. Contingit ergo malum esse dupliciter. Uno modo, per subtractionem formae, aut alicuius partis, quae requiritur ad integritatem rei; sicut caecitas malum est, et carere membro. Alio modo, per subtractionem debitae operationis; vel quia omnino non est; vel quia debitum modum et ordinem non habet. Quia vero bonum simpliciter est obiectum voluntatis, malum, quod est privatio boni, secundum specialem rationem invenitur in creaturis rationalibus habentibus voluntatem. Malum igitur quod est per subtractionem formae vel integritatis rei, habet rationem poenae; et praecipue supposito quod omnia divinae providentiae et iustitiae subdantur, ut supra ostensum est, de ratione enim poenae est, quod sit contraria voluntati. Malum autem quod consistit in subtractione debitae operationis in rebus voluntariis, habet rationem culpae. Hoc enim imputatur alicui in culpam, cum deficit a perfecta actione, cuius dominus est secundum voluntatem. Sic igitur omne malum in rebus voluntariis consideratum vel est poena vel culpa. ||I answer that, Evil, as was said above (3) is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above (22, 2); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia malum privatio est boni, et non negatio pura, ut dictum est supra; non omnis defectus boni est malum, sed defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi. Defectus enim visionis non est malum in lapide, sed in animali, quia contra rationem lapidis est, quod visum habeat. Similiter etiam contra rationem creaturae est, quod in esse conservetur a seipsa, quia idem dat esse et conservat. Unde iste defectus non est malum creaturae. ||Reply to Objection 1. Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above (3), therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod poena et culpa non dividunt malum simpliciter; sed malum in rebus voluntariis. ||Reply to Objection 2. Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod tentatio, prout importat provocationem ad malum, semper malum culpae est in tentante. Sed in eo qui tentatur, non est proprie, nisi secundum quod aliqualiter immutatur, sic enim actio agentis est in patiente. Secundum autem quod tentatus immutatur ad malum a tentante, incidit in culpam. ||Reply to Objection 3. Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 5 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod de ratione poenae est, quod noceat agenti in seipso. Sed de ratione culpae est, quod noceat agenti in sua actione. Et sic utrumque sub malo continetur, secundum quod habet rationem nocumenti. ||Reply to Objection 4. In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as including the idea of injury.
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| − | ||<div id="q48a6"><b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habeat plus de ratione mali poena quam culpa. Culpa enim se habet ad poenam, ut meritum ad praemium. Sed praemium habet plus de ratione boni quam meritum, cum sit finis eius. Ergo poena plus habet de ratione mali quam culpa. ||Objection 1. It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, illud est maius malum, quod opponitur maiori bono. Sed poena, sicut dictum est, opponitur bono agentis, culpa autem bono actionis. Cum ergo melius sit agens quam actio, videtur quod peius sit poena quam culpa. ||Objection 2. Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above (5), is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ipsa privatio finis poena quaedam est, quae dicitur carentia visionis divinae. Malum autem culpae est per privationem ordinis ad finem. Ergo poena est maius malum quam culpa. ||Objection 3. Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra, sapiens artifex inducit minus malum ad vitandum maius; sicut medicus praecidit membrum, ne corrumpatur corpus. Sed Dei sapientia infert poenam ad vitandam culpam. Ergo culpa est maius malum quam poena. ||On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod culpa habet plus de ratione mali quam poena, et non solum quam poena sensibilis, quae consistit in privatione corporalium bonorum, cuiusmodi poenas plures intelligunt; sed etiam universaliter accipiendo poenam, secundum quod privatio gratiae vel gloriae poenae quaedam sunt. Cuius est duplex ratio. Prima quidem est, quia ex malo culpae fit aliquis malus, non autem ex malo poenae; secundum illud Dionysii, IV cap. de Div. Nom., puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum. Et hoc ideo est quia, cum bonum simpliciter consistat in actu, et non in potentia, ultimus autem actus est operatio, vel usus quarumcumque rerum habitarum; bonum hominis simpliciter consideratur in bona operatione, vel bono usu rerum habitarum. Utimur autem rebus omnibus per voluntatem. Unde ex bona voluntate, qua homo bene utitur rebus habitis, dicitur homo bonus; et ex mala, malus. Potest enim qui habet malam voluntatem, etiam bono quod habet, male uti; sicut si grammaticus voluntarie incongrue loquatur. Quia ergo culpa consistit in deordinato actu voluntatis, poena vero in privatione alicuius eorum quibus utitur voluntas; perfectius habet rationem mali culpa quam poena. Secunda ratio sumi potest ex hoc, quod Deus est auctor mali poenae, non autem mali culpae. Cuius ratio est, quia malum poenae privat bonum creaturae, sive accipiatur bonum creaturae aliquid creatum, sicut caecitas privat visum; sive sit bonum increatum, sicut per carentiam visionis divinae tollitur creaturae bonum increatum. Malum vero culpae opponitur proprie ipsi bono increato, contrariatur enim impletioni divinae voluntatis, et divino amori quo bonum divinum in seipso amatur; et non solum secundum quod participatur a creatura. Sic igitur patet quod culpa habet plus de ratione mali quam poena. ||I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to include privation of grace or glory. There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than pain has. The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet culpa terminetur ad poenam, sicut meritum ad praemium, tamen culpa non intenditur propter poenam, sicut meritum propter praemium, sed potius e converso poena inducitur ut vitetur culpa. Et sic culpa est peius quam poena. ||Reply to Objection 1. Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo actionis, qui tollitur per culpam, est perfectius bonum agentis, cum sit perfectio secunda, quam bonum quod tollitur per poenam, quod est perfectio prima. ||Reply to Objection 2. The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 48 a. 6 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod non est comparatio culpae ad poenam sicut finis et ordinis ad finem, quia utrumque potest privari aliquo modo et per culpam, et per poenam. Sed per poenam quidem, secundum quod ipse homo removetur a fine, et ab ordine ad finem, per culpam vero, secundum quod ista privatio pertinet ad actionem, quae non ordinatur ad finem debitum. ||Reply to Objection 3. Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 pr. </b>Consequenter quaeritur de causa mali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum bonum possit esse causa mali. Secundo, utrum summum bonum, quod est Deus, sit causa mali. Tertio, utrum sit aliquod summum malum, quod sit prima causa omnium malorum. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q49a1"><b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non possit esse causa mali. Dicitur enim Matth. VII, non potest arbor bona malos fructus facere. ||Objection 1. It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said (Matthew 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, unum contrariorum non potest esse causa alterius. Malum autem est contrarium bono. Ergo bonum non potest esse causa mali. ||Objection 2. Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, effectus deficiens non procedit nisi a causa deficiente. Sed malum, si causam habeat, est effectus deficiens. Ergo habet causam deficientem. Sed omne deficiens malum est. Ergo causa mali non est nisi malum. ||Objection 3. Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum non habet causam. Ergo bonum non est causa mali. ||Objection 4. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Iulianum, non fuit omnino unde oriri posset malum, nisi ex bono. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no possible source of evil except good."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod omne malum aliqualiter causam habeat. Malum enim est defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi. Quod autem aliquid deficiat a sua naturali et debita dispositione, non potest provenire nisi ex aliqua causa trahente rem extra suam dispositionem, non enim grave movetur sursum nisi ab aliquo impellente, nec agens deficit in sua actione nisi propter aliquod impedimentum. Esse autem causam non potest convenire nisi bono, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; omne autem ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est. Et si consideremus speciales rationes causarum, agens et forma et finis perfectionem quandam important, quae pertinet ad rationem boni, sed et materia, inquantum est potentia ad bonum, habet rationem boni. Et quidem quod bonum sit causa mali per modum causae materialis, iam ex praemissis patet, ostensum est enim quod bonum est subiectum mali. Causam autem formalem malum non habet, sed est magis privatio formae. Et similiter nec causam finalem, sed magis est privatio ordinis ad finem debitum; non solum enim finis habet rationem boni, sed etiam utile, quod ordinatur ad finem. Causam autem per modum agentis habet malum, non autem per se, sed per accidens. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliter causatur malum in actione, et aliter in effectu. In actione quidem causatur malum propter defectum alicuius principiorum actionis, vel principalis agentis, vel instrumentalis, sicut defectus in motu animalis potest contingere vel propter debilitatem virtutis motivae, ut in pueris; vel propter solam ineptitudinem instrumenti, ut in claudis. Malum autem in re aliqua, non tamen in proprio effectu agentis, causatur quandoque ex virtute agentis; quandoque autem ex defectu ipsius, vel materiae. Ex virtute quidem vel perfectione agentis, quando ad formam intentam ab agente sequitur ex necessitate alterius formae privatio; sicut ad formam ignis sequitur privatio formae aeris vel aquae. Sicut ergo, quanto ignis fuerit perfectior in virtute, tanto perfectius imprimit formam suam, ita etiam tanto perfectius corrumpit contrarium, unde malum et corruptio aeris et aquae, est ex perfectione ignis. Sed hoc est per accidens, quia ignis non intendit privare formam aquae, sed inducere formam propriam; sed hoc faciendo, causat et illud per accidens. Sed si sit defectus in effectu proprio ignis, puta quod deficiat a calefaciendo, hoc est vel propter defectum actionis, qui redundat in defectum alicuius principii, ut dictum est; vel ex indispositione materiae, quae non recipit actionem ignis agentis. Sed et hoc ipsum quod est esse deficiens, accidit bono, cui per se competit agere. Unde verum est quod malum secundum nullum modum habet causam nisi per accidens. Sic autem bonum est causa mali. ||I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good. And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above (48, 3). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally. In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire--as, for instance, that it fails to heat--this comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Iulian., arborem malam appellat dominus voluntatem malam, et arborem bonam, voluntatem bonam. Ex voluntate autem bona non producitur actus moralis malus, cum ex ipsa voluntate bona iudicetur actus moralis bonus. Sed tamen ipse motus malae voluntatis causatur a creatura rationali, quae bona est. Et sic est causa mali. ||Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum non causat illud malum quod est sibi contrarium, sed quoddam aliud, sicut bonitas ignis causat malum aquae; et homo bonus secundum suam naturam, causat malum actum secundum morem. Et hoc ipsum per accidens est, ut dictum est. Invenitur autem quod etiam unum contrariorum causat aliud per accidens, sicut frigidum exterius ambiens calefacit, inquantum calor retrahitur ad interiora. ||Reply to Objection 2. Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above (19, 9), this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod malum habet causam deficientem aliter in rebus voluntariis, et naturalibus. Agens enim naturale producit effectum suum talem quale ipsum est, nisi impediatur ab aliquo extrinseco, et hoc ipsum est quidam defectus eius. Unde nunquam sequitur malum in effectu, nisi praeexistat aliquod aliud malum in agente vel materia, sicut dictum est. Sed in rebus voluntariis, defectus actionis a voluntate actu deficiente procedit, inquantum non subiicit se actu suae regulae. Qui tamen defectus non est culpa, sed sequitur culpa ex hoc quod cum tali defectu operatur. ||Reply to Objection 3. Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 1 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod malum non habet causam per se, sed per accidens tantum, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 4. Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above.
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| − | ||<div id="q49a2"><b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod summum bonum, quod est Deus, sit causa mali. Dicitur enim Isai. XLV, ego dominus, et non est alter Deus, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum. Et Amos III, si erit malum in civitate, quod dominus non fecerit. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Isaiah 45:5,7): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?"
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, effectus causae secundae reducitur in causam primam. Bonum autem est causa mali, ut dictum est. Cum igitur omnis boni causa sit Deus, ut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod etiam omne malum sit a Deo. ||Objection 2. Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (1). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (2, 3; 6, 1,4), it follows that also every evil is from God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, sicut dicitur in II Physic., idem est causa salutis navis, et periculi. Sed Deus est causa salutis omnium rerum. Ergo est ipse causa omnis perditionis et mali. ||Objection 3. Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod Deus non est auctor mali, quia non est causa tendendi ad non esse. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, malum quod in defectu actionis consistit, semper causatur ex defectu agentis. In Deo autem nullus defectus est, sed summa perfectio, ut supra ostensum est. Unde malum quod in defectu actionis consistit, vel quod ex defectu agentis causatur, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam. Sed malum quod in corruptione rerum aliquarum consistit, reducitur in Deum sicut in causam. Et hoc patet tam in naturalibus quam in voluntariis. Dictum est enim quod aliquod agens, inquantum sua virtute producit aliquam formam ad quam sequitur corruptio et defectus, causat sua virtute illam corruptionem et defectum. Manifestum est autem quod forma quam principaliter Deus intendit in rebus creatis, est bonum ordinis universi. Ordo autem universi requirit, ut supra dictum est, quod quaedam sint quae deficere possint, et interdum deficiant. Et sic Deus, in rebus causando bonum ordinis universi, ex consequenti, et quasi per accidens, causat corruptiones rerum; secundum illud quod dicitur I Reg. II, dominus mortificat et vivificat. Sed quod dicitur Sap. I, quod Deus mortem non fecit, intelligitur quasi per se intentam. Ad ordinem autem universi pertinet etiam ordo iustitiae, qui requirit ut peccatoribus poena inferatur. Et secundum hoc, Deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est culpa, ratione supra dicta. ||I answer that, As appears from what was said (1), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above (4, 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause. But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said (1) that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above (22, 2, ad 2; 48, 2), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kgs. 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made death" (Wisdom 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de malo poenae, non autem de malo culpae. ||Reply to Objection 1. These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod effectus causae secundae deficientis reducitur in causam primam non deficientem, quantum ad id quod habet entitatis et perfectionis, non autem quantum ad id quod habet de defectu. Sicut quidquid est motus in claudicatione, causatur a virtute motiva; sed quod est obliquitatis in ea, non est ex virtute motiva, sed ex curvitate cruris. Et similiter quidquid est entitatis et actionis in actione mala, reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, sed quod est ibi defectus, non causatur a Deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente. ||Reply to Objection 2. The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod submersio navis attribuitur nautae ut causae, ex eo quod non agit quod requiritur ad salutem navis. Sed Deus non deficit ab agendo quod est necessarium ad salutem. Unde non est simile. ||Reply to Objection 3. The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
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| − | ||<div id="q49a3"><b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit unum summum malum, quod sit causa omnis mali. Contrariorum enim effectuum contrariae sunt causae. Sed in rebus invenitur contrarietas, secundum illud Eccli. XXXIII, contra malum bonum est, et contra vitam mors; sic et contra virum iustum peccator. Ergo sunt contraria principia, unum boni, et aliud mali. ||Objection 1. It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good, the other of evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, si unum contrariorum est in rerum natura, et reliquum, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo. Sed summum bonum est in rerum natura, quod est causa omnis boni, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo est et summum malum ei oppositum, causa omnis mali. ||Objection 2. Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was shown above (2, 3; 6, 2,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, sicut in rebus invenitur bonum et melius, ita malum et peius. Sed bonum et melius dicuntur per respectum ad optimum. Ergo malum et peius dicuntur per respectum ad aliquod summum malum. ||Objection 3. Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, omne quod est per participationem, reducitur ad illud quod est per essentiam. Sed res quae sunt malae apud nos, non sunt malae per essentiam, sed per participationem. Ergo est invenire aliquod summum malum per essentiam, quod est causa omnis mali. ||Objection 4. Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad illud quod est per se. Sed bonum est causa mali per accidens. Ergo oportet ponere aliquod summum malum, quod sit causa malorum per se. Neque potest dici quod malum non habeat causam per se, sed per accidens tantum, quia sequeretur quod malum non esset ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus. ||Objection 5. Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is "per se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, malum effectus reducitur ad malum causae, quia effectus deficiens est a causa deficiente, sicut supra dictum est. Sed hoc non est procedere in infinitum. Ergo oportet ponere unum primum malum, quod sit causa omnis mali. ||Objection 6. Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause, as was said above (1,2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod summum bonum est causa omnis entis, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse aliquod principium ei oppositum, quod sit causa malorum. ||On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above (2, 3; 6, 4). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod ex praedictis patet non esse unum primum principium malorum, sicut est unum primum principium bonorum. Primo quidem, quia primum principium bonorum est per essentiam bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Nihil autem potest esse per suam essentiam malum, ostensum est enim quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, bonum est; et quod malum non est nisi in bono ut in subiecto. Secundo, quia primum bonorum principium est summum et perfectum bonum, quod praehabet in se omnem bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est. Summum autem malum esse non potest, quia, sicut ostensum est, etsi malum semper diminuat bonum, nunquam tamen illud potest totaliter consumere; et sic, semper remanente bono, non potest esse aliquid integre et perfecte malum. Propter quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod si malum integrum sit, seipsum destruet, quia destructo omni bono (quod requiritur ad integritatem mali), subtrahitur etiam ipsum malum, cuius subiectum est bonum. Tertio, quia ratio mali repugnat rationi primi principii. Tum quia omne malum causatur ex bono, ut supra ostensum est. Tum quia malum non potest esse causa nisi per accidens, et sic non potest esse prima causa, quia causa per accidens est posterior ea quae est per se, ut patet in II Physic. Qui autem posuerunt duo prima principia, unum bonum et alterum malum, ex eadem radice in hunc errorem inciderunt, ex qua et aliae extraneae positiones antiquorum ortum habuerunt, quia scilicet non consideraverunt causam universalem totius entis, sed particulares tantum causas particularium effectuum. Propter hoc enim, si aliquid invenerunt esse nocivum alicui rei per virtutem suae naturae, aestimaverunt naturam illius rei esse malam, puta si quis dicat naturam ignis esse malam, quia combussit domum alicuius pauperis. Iudicium autem de bonitate alicuius rei non est accipiendum secundum ordinem ad aliquid particulare; sed secundum seipsum, et secundum ordinem ad totum universum, in quo quaelibet res suum locum ordinatissime tenet, ut ex dictis patet. Similiter etiam, quia invenerunt duorum particularium effectuum contrariorum duas causas particulares contrarias, nesciverunt reducere causas particulares contrarias in causam universalem communem. Et ideo usque ad prima principia contrarietatem in causis esse iudicaverunt. Sed cum omnia contraria conveniant in uno communi, necesse est in eis, supra causas contrarias proprias, inveniri unam causam communem, sicut supra qualitates contrarias elementorum invenitur virtus corporis caelestis. Et similiter supra omnia quae quocumque modo sunt, invenitur unum primum principium essendi, ut supra ostensum est. ||I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good. First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above (6, 3,4). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good (5, 3); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (48, 3). Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above (6, 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above (48, 4), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good. Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above (1), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause. Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above (47, 2, ad 1). Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above (2, 3).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contraria conveniunt in genere uno, et etiam conveniunt in ratione essendi. Et ideo, licet habeant causas particulares contrarias, tamen oportet devenire ad unam primam causam communem. ||Reply to Objection 1. Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod privatio et habitus nata sunt fieri circa idem. Subiectum autem privationis est ens in potentia, ut dictum est. Unde, cum malum sit privatio boni, ut ex dictis patet, illi bono opponitur cui adiungitur potentia, non autem summo bono, quod est actus purus. ||Reply to Objection 2. Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said above (48, 3). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above (48, 1, 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod unumquodque intenditur secundum propriam rationem. Sicut autem forma est perfectio quaedam, ita privatio est quaedam remotio. Unde omnis forma et perfectio et bonum per accessum ad terminum perfectum intenditur, privatio autem et malum per recessum a termino. Unde non dicitur malum et peius per accessum ad summum malum, sicut dicitur bonum et melius per accessum ad summum bonum. ||Reply to Objection 3. Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum per participationem, sed per privationem participationis. Unde non oportet fieri reductionem ad aliquid quod sit per essentiam malum. ||Reply to Objection 4. No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod malum non potest habere causam nisi per accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Unde impossibile est fieri reductionem ad aliquid quod sit per se causa mali. Quod autem dicitur, quod malum est ut in pluribus, simpliciter falsum est. Nam generabilia et corruptibilia, in quibus solum contingit esse malum naturae, sunt modica pars totius universi. Et iterum in unaquaque specie defectus naturae accidit ut in paucioribus. In solis autem hominibus malum videtur esse ut in pluribus, quia bonum hominis secundum sensum non est hominis inquantum homo, idest secundum rationem; plures autem sequuntur sensum quam rationem. ||Reply to Objection 5. Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above (1). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man--that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 49 a. 3 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod in causis mali non est procedere in infinitum, sed est reducere omnia mala in aliquam causam bonam, ex qua sequitur malum per accidens. ||Reply to Objection 6. In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.
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