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| − | SUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS XXXIX - XLIII
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| − | [[Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa Theologiae|Index]]
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| − | *[[#q39a1|Question 39.1 The person in reference to the essence]]
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| − | *[[#q39a2|Question 39.2]]
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| − | *[[#q39a3|Question 39.3]]
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| − | *[[#q39a4|Question 39.4]]
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| − | *[[#q39a5|Question 39.5]]
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| − | *[[#q39a6|Question 39.6]]
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| − | *[[#q39a7|Question 39.7]]
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| − | *[[#q40a1|Question 40.1 with the relations or properties]]
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| − | *[[#q40a2|Question 40.2]]
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| − | *[[#q40a3|Question 40.3]]
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| − | *[[#q40a4|Question 40.4]]
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| − | *[[#q41a1|Question 41.1 or to the notional acts ]]
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| − | *[[#q41a2|Question 41.2]]
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| − | *[[#q41a3|Question 41.3]]
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| − | *[[#q41a4|Question 41.4]]
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| − | *[[#q41a5|Question 41.5]]
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| − | *[[#q41a6|Question 41.6]]
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| − | *[[#q42a1|Question 42.1 The equality and likeness of the persons]]
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| − | *[[#q42a2|Question 42.2]]
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| − | *[[#q42a3|Question 42.3]]
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| − | *[[#q42a4|Question 42.4]]
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| − | *[[#q42a5|Question 42.5]]
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| − | *[[#q42a6|Question 42.6]]
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| − | *[[#q43a1|Question 43.1 Their mission ]]
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| − | *[[#q43a2|Question 43.2]]
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| − | *[[#q43a3|Question 43.3]]
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| − | *[[#q43a4|Question 43.4]]
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| − | *[[#q43a5|Question 43.5]]
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| − | *[[#q43a6|Question 43.6]]
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| − | *[[#q43a7|Question 43.7]]
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| − | *[[#q43a8|Question 43.8]]
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 pr. </b>Post ea quae de personis divinis absolute tractata sunt, considerandum restat de personis in comparatione ad essentiam, et ad proprietates, et ad actus notionales; et de comparatione ipsarum ad invicem. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, octo quaeruntur. Primo, utrum essentia in divinis sit idem quod persona. Secundo, utrum dicendum sit quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. Tertio, utrum nomina essentialia praedicanda sint de personis in plurali vel in singulari. Quarto, utrum adiectiva notionalia, aut verba vel participia, praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretive acceptis. Quinto, utrum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus in abstracto acceptis. Sexto, utrum nomina personarum praedicari possint de nominibus essentialibus concretis. Septimo, utrum essentialia attributa sint approprianda personis. Octavo, quod attributum cuique personae debeat appropriari. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q39a1"><b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis essentia non sit idem quod persona. In quibuscumque enim essentia est idem quod persona seu suppositum, oportet quod sit tantum unum suppositum unius naturae, ut patet in omnibus substantiis separatis, eorum enim quae sunt idem re, unum multiplicari non potest, quin multiplicetur et reliquum. Sed in divinis est una essentia et tres personae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo essentia non est idem quod persona. ||Objection 1. It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum," there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (28, 3; 30, 2). Therefore essence is not the same as person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, affirmatio et negatio simul et semel non verificantur de eodem. Sed affirmatio et negatio verificantur de essentia et persona, nam persona est distincta, essentia vero non est distincta. Ergo persona et essentia non sunt idem. ||Objection 2. Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, nihil subiicitur sibi ipsi. Sed persona subiicitur essentiae, unde suppositum vel hypostasis nominatur. Ergo persona non est idem quod essentia. ||Objection 3. Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis." Therefore person is not the same as essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VII de Trin., cum dicimus personam patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam patris. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod considerantibus divinam simplicitatem, quaestio ista in manifesto habet veritatem. Ostensum est enim supra quod divina simplicitas hoc requirit, quod in Deo sit idem essentia et suppositum; quod in substantiis intellectualibus nihil est aliud quam persona. Sed difficultatem videtur ingerere quod, multiplicatis personis divinis, essentia retinet unitatem. Et quia, ut Boetius dicit, relatio multiplicat personarum Trinitatem, posuerunt aliqui hoc modo in divinis differre essentiam et personam, quo et relationes dicebant esse assistentes, considerantes in relationibus solum quod ad alterum sunt, et non quod res sunt. Sed, sicut supra ostensum est, sicut relationes in rebus creatis accidentaliter insunt, ita in Deo sunt ipsa essentia divina. Ex quo sequitur quod in Deo non sit aliud essentia quam persona secundum rem; et tamen quod personae realiter ab invicem distinguantur. Persona enim, ut dictum est supra, significat relationem, prout est subsistens in natura divina. Relatio autem, ad essentiam comparata, non differt re, sed ratione tantum, comparata autem ad oppositam relationem, habet, virtute oppositionis, realem distinctionem. Et sic remanet una essentia, et tres personae. ||I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (3, 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be "adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference to another," and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (28, 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (29, 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in creaturis non potest esse distinctio suppositorum per relationes, sed oportet quod sit per essentialia principia, quia relationes non sunt subsistentes in creaturis. In divinis autem relationes sunt subsistentes, et ideo, secundum quod habent oppositionem ad invicem, possunt distinguere supposita. Neque tamen distinguitur essentia, quia relationes ipsae non distinguuntur ab invicem secundum quod sunt realiter idem cum essentia. ||Reply to Objection 1. There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the "supposita"; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, inquantum essentia et persona in divinis differunt secundum intelligentiae rationem, sequitur quod aliquid possit affirmari de uno, quod negatur de altero, et per consequens quod, supposito uno, non supponatur alterum. ||Reply to Objection 2. As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod rebus divinis nomina imponimus secundum modum rerum creatarum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia naturae rerum creatarum individuantur per materiam, quae subiicitur naturae speciei, inde est quod individua dicuntur subiecta, vel supposita, vel hypostases. Et propter hoc etiam divinae personae supposita vel hypostases nominantur, non quod ibi sit aliqua suppositio vel subiectio secundum rem. ||Reply to Objection 3. Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (13, 1,3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called "subjects," "supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine persons are named "supposita" or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed any real "supposition" or "subjection."
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| − | ||<div id="q39a2"><b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum tres personas esse unius essentiae. Dicit enim Hilarius, in libro de Synod., quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt quidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum. Sed substantia Dei est eius essentia. Ergo tres personae non sunt unius essentiae. ||Objection 1. It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, non est affirmandum aliquid de divinis, quod auctoritate Scripturae sacrae non est expressum, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom. Sed nunquam in Scriptura sacra exprimitur quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unius essentiae. Ergo hoc non est asserendum. ||Objection 2. Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, natura divina est idem quod essentia. Sufficeret ergo dicere quod tres personae sunt unius naturae. ||Objection 3. Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, non consuevit dici quod persona sit essentiae, sed magis quod essentia sit personae. Ergo neque convenienter videtur dici quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. ||Objection 4. Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod non dicimus tres personas esse ex una essentia, ne intelligatur in divinis aliud esse essentia et persona. Sed sicut praepositiones sunt transitivae, ita et obliqui. Ergo, pari ratione, non est dicendum quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. ||Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, id quod potest esse erroris occasio, non est in divinis dicendum. Sed cum dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae vel substantiae datur erroris occasio. Quia, ut Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., una substantia patris et filii praedicata, aut unum qui duas nuncupationes habeat, subsistentem significat; aut divisam unam substantiam duas imperfectas fecisse substantias; aut tertiam priorem substantiam, quae a duobus et usurpata sit et assumpta. Non est ergo dicendum tres personas esse unius substantiae. ||Objection 6. Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro II contra Maximinum, quod hoc nomen homousion, quod in Concilio Nicaeno adversus Arianos firmatum est, idem significat quod tres personas esse unius essentiae. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intellectus noster res divinas nominat, non secundum modum earum, quia sic eas cognoscere non potest; sed secundum modum in rebus creatis inventum. Et quia in rebus sensibilibus, a quibus intellectus noster scientiam capit, natura alicuius speciei per materiam individuatur; et sic natura se habet ut forma, individuum autem ut suppositum formae, propter hoc etiam in divinis, quantum ad modum significandi, essentia significatur ut forma trium personarum. Dicimus autem in rebus creatis formam quamcumque esse eius cuius est forma; sicut sanitatem vel pulchritudinem hominis alicuius. Rem autem habentem formam non dicimus esse formae, nisi cum adiectione alicuius adiectivi, quod designat illam formam, ut cum dicimus, ista mulier est egregiae formae, iste homo est perfectae virtutis. Et similiter, quia in divinis, multiplicatis personis, non multiplicatur essentia, dicimus unam essentiam esse trium personarum; et tres personas unius essentiae, ut intelligantur isti genitivi construi in designatione formae. ||I answer that, As above explained (13, 1,2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the "suppositum" of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia sumitur pro hypostasi; et non pro essentia. ||Reply to Objection 1. Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for the essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet tres personas esse unius essentiae non inveniatur in sacra Scriptura per haec verba, invenitur tamen quantum ad hunc sensum, sicut ibi, ego et pater unum sumus; et, ego in patre, et pater in me est. Et per multa alia haberi potest idem. ||Reply to Objection 2. Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the same import.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia natura designat principium actus, essentia vero ab essendo dicitur, possunt dici aliqua unius naturae, quae conveniunt in aliquo actu, sicut omnia calefacientia, sed unius essentiae dici non possunt, nisi quorum est unum esse. Et ideo magis exprimitur unitas divina per hoc quod dicitur quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae, quam si diceretur quod sunt unius naturae. ||Reply to Objection 3. Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod forma, absolute accepta, consuevit significari ut eius cuius est forma, ut virtus Petri. E converso autem, res habens formam aliquam non consuevit significari ut eius, nisi cum volumus determinare sive designare formam. Et tunc requiruntur duo genitivi, quorum unus significet formam, et alius determinationem formae, ut si dicatur, Petrus est magnae virtutis, vel etiam requiritur unus genitivus habens vim duorum genitivorum, ut cum dicitur, vir sanguinum est iste, idest effusor multi sanguinis. Quia igitur essentia divina significatur ut forma respectu personae, convenienter essentia personae dicitur. Non autem e converso, nisi aliquid addatur ad designationem essentiae; ut si dicatur quod pater est persona divinae essentiae, vel quod tres personae sunt unius essentiae. ||Reply to Objection 4. Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"--that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one essence."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod haec praepositio ex vel de non designat habitudinem causae formalis, sed magis habitudinem causae efficientis vel materialis. Quae quidem causae in omnibus distinguuntur ab his quorum sunt causae, nihil enim est sua materia, neque aliquid est suum principium activum. Aliquid tamen est sua forma, ut patet in omnibus rebus immaterialibus. Et ideo per hoc quod dicimus tres personas unius essentiae, significando essentiam in habitudine formae, non ostenditur aliud esse essentia quam persona, quod ostenderetur, si diceremus tres personas ex eadem essentia. ||Reply to Objection 5. The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from the same essence."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 2 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., male sanctis rebus praeiudicatur, si, quia non sanctae a quibusdam habentur, esse non debeant. Sic, si male intelligitur homousion, quid ad me bene intelligentem? Sit ergo una substantia ex naturae genitae proprietate, non sit autem ex portione, aut ex unione, aut ex communione. ||Reply to Objection 6. As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son."
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| − | ||<div id="q39a3"><b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia, ut hoc nomen Deus, non praedicentur singulariter de tribus personis, sed pluraliter. Sicut enim homo significatur ut habens humanitatem, ita Deus significatur ut habens deitatem. Sed tres personae sunt tres habentes deitatem. Ergo tres personae sunt tres dii. ||Objection 1. It would seem that essential names, as the name "God," should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Gen. I, ubi dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, Hebraica veritas habet Elohim, quod potest interpretari dii, sive iudices. Et hoc dicitur propter pluralitatem personarum. Ergo tres personae sunt plures dii, et non unus Deus. ||Objection 2. Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may be rendered "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several Gods," and not "one" God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, hoc nomen res, cum absolute dicatur, videtur ad substantiam pertinere. Sed hoc nomen pluraliter praedicatur de tribus personis, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Doctr. Christ., res quibus fruendum est, sunt pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Ergo et alia nomina essentialia pluraliter praedicari possunt de tribus personis. ||Objection 3. Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, sicut hoc nomen Deus significat habentem deitatem, ita hoc nomen persona significat subsistentem in natura aliqua intellectuali. Sed dicimus tres personas. Ergo, eadem ratione, dicere possumus tres deos. ||Objection 4. Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are "three Gods."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est. ||On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod nominum essentialium quaedam significant essentiam substantive, quaedam vero adiective. Ea quidem quae substantive essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis singulariter tantum, et non pluraliter, quae vero adiective essentiam significant, praedicantur de tribus personis in plurali. Cuius ratio est, quia nomina substantiva significant aliquid per modum substantiae, nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis, quod inhaeret subiecto. Substantia autem, sicut per se habet esse, ita per se habet unitatem vel multitudinem, unde et singularitas vel pluralitas nominis substantivi attenditur secundum formam significatam per nomen. Accidentia autem, sicut esse habent in subiecto, ita ex subiecto suscipiunt unitatem et multitudinem, et ideo in adiectivis attenditur singularitas et pluralitas secundum supposita. In creaturis autem non invenitur una forma in pluribus suppositis nisi unitate ordinis, ut forma multitudinis ordinatae. Unde nomina significantia talem formam, si sint substantiva, praedicantur de pluribus in singulari, non autem si sint adiectiva. Dicimus enim quod multi homines sunt collegium vel exercitus aut populus, dicimus tamen quod plures homines sunt collegiati. In divinis autem essentia divina significatur per modum formae, ut dictum est quae quidem simplex est et maxime una, ut supra ostensum est. Unde nomina significantia divinam essentiam substantive, singulariter, et non pluraliter, de tribus personis praedicantur. Haec igitur est ratio quare Socratem et Platonem et Ciceronem dicimus tres homines; patrem autem et filium et spiritum sanctum non dicimus tres deos, sed unum Deum, quia in tribus suppositis humanae naturae sunt tres humanitates; in tribus autem personis est una divina essentia. Ea vero quae significant essentiam adiective, praedicantur pluraliter de tribus, propter pluralitatem suppositorum. Dicimus enim tres existentes vel tres sapientes, aut tres aeternos et increatos et immensos, si adiective sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus unum increatum, immensum et aeternum, ut Athanasius dicit. ||I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their "supposita." In creatures, one form does not exist in several "supposita" except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (2), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (3, 7; 11, 4). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of "supposita." For we say there are three "existent" or three "wise" beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense" beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal being," as Athanasius declares.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Deus significet habentem deitatem, est tamen alius modus significandi, nam Deus dicitur substantive, sed habens deitatem dicitur adiective. Unde, licet sint tres habentes deitatem, non tamen sequitur quod sint tres dii. ||Reply to Objection 1. Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name "God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having Godhead," it does not follow that there are three Gods.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod diversae linguae habent diversum modum loquendi. Unde, sicut propter pluralitatem suppositorum Graeci dicunt tres hypostases, ita et in Hebraeo dicitur pluraliter Elohim. Nos autem non dicimus pluraliter neque deos neque substantias, ne pluralitas ad substantiam referatur. ||Reply to Objection 2. Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of "supposita" the Greeks said "three hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance," lest plurality be referred to the substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen res est de transcendentibus. Unde, secundum quod pertinet ad relationem, pluraliter praedicatur in divinis, secundum vero quod pertinet ad substantiam, singulariter praedicatur. Unde Augustinus dicit ibidem quod eadem Trinitas quaedam summa res est. ||Reply to Objection 3. This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod forma significata per hoc nomen persona, non est essentia vel natura, sed personalitas. Unde, cum sint tres personalitates, idest tres personales proprietates, in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, non singulariter, sed pluraliter praedicatur de tribus. ||Reply to Objection 4. The form signified by the word "person" is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities--that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost--it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural.
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| − | ||<div id="q39a4"><b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia concretiva non possunt supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, Deus genuit Deum. Quia, ut sophistae dicunt, terminus singularis idem significat et supponit. Sed hoc nomen Deus videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter praedicari non possit, ut dictum est. Ergo, cum significet essentiam, videtur quod supponat pro essentia, et non pro persona. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For, as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (3). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, terminus in subiecto positus non restringitur per terminum positum in praedicato, ratione significationis; sed solum ratione temporis consignificati. Sed cum dico, Deus creat, hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia. Ergo cum dicitur, Deus genuit, non potest iste terminus Deus, ratione praedicati notionalis, supponere pro persona. ||Objection 2. Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, si haec est vera, Deus genuit, quia pater generat; pari ratione haec erit vera, Deus non generat, quia filius non generat. Ergo est Deus generans, et Deus non generans. Et ita videtur sequi quod sint duo dii. ||Objection 3. Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget," because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut se Deum, aut alium Deum. Sed non se Deum, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., nulla res generat seipsam. Neque alium Deum, quia non est nisi unus Deus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum. ||Objection 4. Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, "God begot God."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Deus pater, aut Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si Deum qui est Deus pater, ergo Deus pater est genitus. Si Deum qui non est Deus pater, ergo Deus est qui non est Deus pater, quod est falsum. Non ergo potest dici quod Deus genuit Deum. ||Objection 5. Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod in symbolo dicitur Deum de Deo. ||On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod hoc nomen Deus, et similia, proprie secundum suam naturam supponunt pro essentia, sed ex adiuncto notionali trahuntur ad supponendum pro persona. Et haec opinio processisse videtur ex consideratione divinae simplicitatis, quae requirit quod in Deo idem sit habens et quod habetur, et sic habens deitatem, quod significat hoc nomen Deus, est idem quod deitas. Sed in proprietatibus locutionum, non tantum attendenda est res significata; sed etiam modus significandi. Et ideo, quia hoc nomen Deus significat divinam essentiam ut in habente ipsam, sicut hoc nomen homo humanitatem significat in supposito; alii melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen Deus ex modo significandi habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona, sicut et hoc nomen homo. Quandoque ergo hoc nomen Deus supponit pro essentia, ut cum dicitur, Deus creat, quia hoc praedicatum competit subiecto ratione formae significatae, quae est deitas. Quandoque vero supponit personam, vel unam tantum, ut cum dicitur, Deus generat; vel duas, ut cum dicitur Deus spirat; vel tres, ut cum dicitur, regi saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo etc., I Tim. I. ||I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified--that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, licet conveniat cum terminis singularibus in hoc, quod forma significata non multiplicatur; convenit tamen cum terminis communibus in hoc, quod forma significata invenitur in pluribus suppositis. Unde non oportet quod semper supponat pro essentia quam significat. ||Reply to Objection 1. Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several "supposita." So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit contra illos qui dicebant quod hoc nomen Deus non habet naturalem suppositionem pro persona. ||Reply to Objection 2. This holds good against those who say that the word "God" does not naturally stand for person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter se habet hoc nomen Deus ad supponendum pro persona, et hoc nomen homo. Quia enim forma significata per hoc nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem, unde iste terminus homo non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, homo est species. Sed forma significata per hoc nomen Deus, scilicet essentia divina, est una et communis secundum rem. Unde per se supponit pro natura communi, sed ex adiuncto determinatur eius suppositio ad personam. Unde cum dicitur, Deus generat, ratione actus notionalis supponit hoc nomen Deus pro persona patris. Sed cum dicitur, Deus non generat, nihil additur quod determinet hoc nomen ad personam filii, unde datur intelligi quod generatio repugnet divinae naturae. Sed si addatur aliquid pertinens ad personam filii, vera erit locutio; ut si dicatur, Deus genitus non generat. Unde etiam non sequitur, est Deus generans et est Deus non generans, nisi ponatur aliquid pertinens ad personas; ut puta si dicamus, pater est Deus generans, et filius est Deus non generans. Et ita non sequitur quod sint plures dii, quia pater et filius sunt unus Deus, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 3. The word "God" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified by this word "man"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"--that is, the divine essence--is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above (3).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod haec est falsa, pater genuit se Deum, quia ly se, cum sit reciprocum, refert idem suppositum. Neque est contrarium quod Augustinus dicit, ad maximum, quod Deus pater genuit alterum se. Quia ly se vel est casus ablativi; ut sit sensus, genuit alterum a se. Vel facit relationem simplicem, et sic refert identitatem naturae, sed est impropria vel emphatica locutio, ut sit sensus, genuit alterum simillimum sibi. Similiter et haec est falsa, genuit alium Deum. Quia licet filius sit alius a patre, ut supra dictum est, non tamen est dicendum quod sit alius Deus, quia intelligeretur quod hoc adiectivum alius poneret rem suam circa substantivum quod est Deus; et sic significaretur distinctio deitatis. Quidam tamen concedunt istam, genuit alium Deum, ita quod ly alius sit substantivum, et ly Deus appositive construatur cum eo. Sed hic est improprius modus loquendi, et evitandus, ne detur occasio erroris. ||Reply to Objection 4. This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se]," forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (31, 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 4 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est falsa, Deus genuit Deum qui est Deus pater, quia, cum ly pater appositive construatur cum ly Deus, restringit ipsum ad standum pro persona patris; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est ipse pater, et sic pater esset genitus, quod est falsum. Unde negativa est vera, genuit Deum qui non est Deus pater. Si tamen intelligeretur constructio non esse appositiva, sed aliquid esse interponendum; tunc e converso affirmativa esset vera, et negativa falsa; ut sit sensus, genuit Deum qui est Deus qui est pater. Sed haec est extorta expositio. Unde melius est quod simpliciter affirmativa negetur, et negativa concedatur. Praepositivus tamen dixit quod tam negativa quam affirmativa est falsa. Quia hoc relativum qui in affirmativa potest referre suppositum, sed in negativa refert et significatum et suppositum. Unde sensus affirmativae est, quod esse Deum patrem conveniat personae filii. Negativae vero sensus est, quod esse Deum patrem non tantum removeatur a persona filii, sed etiam a divinitate eius sed hoc irrationabile videtur, cum, secundum philosophum, de eodem de quo est affirmatio, possit etiam esse negatio. ||Reply to Objection 5. To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the "suppositum." Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
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| − | ||<div id="q39a5"><b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia in abstracto significata possint supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, essentia generat essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., pater et filius sunt una sapientia, quia una essentia; et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia. ||Objection 1. It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, generatis nobis vel corruptis, generantur vel corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt. Sed filius generatur. Ergo, cum essentia divina sit in filio, videtur quod essentia divina generetur. ||Objection 2. Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, idem est Deus et essentia divina, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed haec est vera, Deus generat Deum, sicut dictum est. Ergo haec est vera, essentia generat essentiam. ||Objection 3. Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (3, 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true: "Essence begets essence."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, de quocumque praedicatur aliquid, potest supponere pro illo. Sed essentia divina est pater. Ergo essentia potest supponere pro persona patris. Et sic essentia generat. ||Objection 4. Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, essentia est res generans, quia est pater, qui est generans. Si igitur essentia non sit generans, erit essentia res generans et non generans, quod est impossibile. ||Objection 5. Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not begetting": which cannot be.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., pater est principium totius deitatis. Sed non est principium nisi generando vel spirando. Ergo pater generat vel spirat deitatem. ||Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod nulla res generat seipsam. Sed si essentia generat essentiam, non generat nisi seipsam, cum nihil sit in Deo, quod distinguatur a divina essentia. Ergo essentia non generat essentiam. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, asserens quod, sicut dicitur, Deus genuit Deum, ita potest dici quod essentia genuit essentiam; considerans quod, propter divinam simplicitatem, non est aliud Deus quam divina essentia. Sed in hoc deceptus fuit, quia ad veritatem locutionum, non solum oportet considerare res significatas, sed etiam modum significandi ut dictum est. Licet autem, secundum re, sit idem Deus quod deitas, non tamen est idem modus significandi utrobique. Nam hoc nomen Deus, quia significat divinam essentiam ut in habente, ex modo suae significationis naturaliter habet quod possit supponere pro persona, et sic ea quae sunt propria personarum, possunt praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, ut dicatur quod Deus est genitus vel generans, sicut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen essentia non habet ex modo suae significationis quod supponat pro persona, quia significat essentiam ut formam abstractam. Et ideo ea quae sunt propria personarum, quibus ab invicem distinguuntur, non possunt essentiae attribui, significaretur enim quod esset distinctio in essentia divina, sicut est distinctio in suppositis. ||I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (4). Now although "God" is really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for instance, we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained (4). The word "essence," however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the "supposita."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ad exprimendam unitatem essentiae et personae, sancti doctores aliquando expressius locuti sunt quam proprietas locutionis patiatur. Unde huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed exponendae, ut scilicet nomina abstracta exponantur per concreta, vel etiam per nomina personalia, ut, cum dicitur, essentia de essentia, vel sapientia de sapientia, sit sensus, filius, qui est essentia et sapientia, est de patre, qui est essentia et sapientia. In his tamen nominibus abstractis est quidam ordo attendendus, quia ea quae pertinent ad actum, magis propinque se habent ad personas, quia actus sunt suppositorum. Unde minus impropria est ista, natura de natura, vel sapientia de sapientia, quam essentia de essentia. ||Reply to Objection 1. To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to "supposita." So "nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod in creaturis generatum non accipit naturam eandem numero quam generans habet, sed aliam numero, quae incipit in eo esse per generationem de novo, et desinit esse per corruptionem, et ideo generatur et corrumpitur per accidens. Sed Deus genitus eandem naturam numero accipit quam generans habet. Et ideo natura divina in filio non generatur, neque per se neque per accidens. ||Reply to Objection 2. In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Deus et divina essentia sint idem secundum rem, tamen, ratione alterius modi significandi, oportet loqui diversimode de utroque. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia divina praedicatur de patre per modum identitatis, propter divinam simplicitatem, nec tamen sequitur quod possit supponere pro patre, propter diversum modum significandi. Ratio autem procederet in illis, quorum unum praedicatur de altero sicut universale de particulari. ||Reply to Objection 4. The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est differentia inter nomina substantiva et adiectiva, quia nomina substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adiectiva vero non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum. Unde sophistae dicunt quod nomina substantiva supponunt; adiectiva vero non supponunt, sed copulant. Nomina igitur personalia substantiva possunt de essentia praedicari, propter identitatem rei, neque sequitur quod proprietas personalis distinctam determinet essentiam; sed ponitur circa suppositum importatum per nomen substantivum. Sed notionalia et personalia adiectiva non possunt praedicari de essentia, nisi aliquo substantivo adiuncto. Unde non possumus dicere quod essentia est generans. Possumus tamen dicere quod essentia est res generans, vel Deus generans, si res et Deus supponant pro persona, non autem si supponant pro essentia. Unde non est contradictio, si dicatur quod essentia est res generans, et res non generans, quia primo res tenetur pro persona, secundo pro essentia. ||Reply to Objection 5. The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective indicates something added to the "suppositum." Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 5 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod deitas, inquantum est una in pluribus suppositis, habet quandam convenientiam cum forma nominis collectivi. Unde cum dicitur, pater est principium totius deitatis, potest sumi pro universitate personarum; inquantum scilicet, in omnibus personis divinis, ipse est principium. Nec oportet quod sit principium sui ipsius, sicut aliquis de populo dicitur rector totius populi, non tamen sui ipsius. Vel potest dici quod est principium totius deitatis, non quia eam generet et spiret, sed quia eam, generando et spirando, communicat. ||Reply to Objection 6. So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita," it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
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| − | ||<div id="q39a6"><b>IЄ q. 39 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae non possint praedicari de nominibus essentialibus concretis, ut dicatur, Deus est tres personae, vel est Trinitas. Haec enim est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo suppositorum verificari potest, neque enim Socrates est omnis homo, neque Plato, neque aliquis alius. Sed similiter ista, Deus est Trinitas, pro nullo suppositorum naturae divinae verificari potest, neque enim pater est Trinitas, neque filius, neque spiritus sanctus. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus est Trinitas. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, "God is the Trinity," is false.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, inferiora non praedicantur de suis superioribus nisi accidentali praedicatione, ut cum dico, animal est homo, accidit enim animali esse hominem. Sed hoc nomen Deus se habet ad tres personas sicut commune ad inferiora, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo videtur quod nomina personarum non possint praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, nisi accidentaliter. ||Objection 2. Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an accidental sense.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de fide, credimus unum Deum unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem. ||On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [Serm. ii, in coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, licet nomina personalia vel notionalia adiectiva non possint praedicari de essentia; tamen substantiva possunt, propter realem identitatem essentiae et personae. Essentia autem divina non solum idem est realiter cum una persona, sed cum tribus. Unde et una persona, et duae, et tres possunt de essentia praedicari; ut si dicamus, essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Et quia hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod supponat pro essentia, ut dictum est, ideo, sicut haec est vera, essentia est tres personae, ita haec est vera, Deus est tres personae. ||I answer that, As above explained (5), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God" can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true to say, "God is the three persons."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, hoc nomen homo per se habet supponere pro persona; sed ex adiuncto habet quod stet pro natura communi. Et ideo haec est falsa, homo est omnis homo, quia pro nullo supposito verificari potest. Sed hoc nomen Deus per se habet quod stet pro essentia. Unde, licet pro nullo suppositorum divinae naturae haec sit vera, Deus est Trinitas, est tamen vera pro essentia. Quod non attendens, Porretanus eam negavit. ||Reply to Objection 1. As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man"; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject.On the contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita" of the divine nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Deus vel divina essentia est pater, est praedicatio per identitatem, non autem sicut inferioris de superiori, quia in divinis non est universale et singulare. Unde, sicut est per se ista, pater est Deus, ita et ista, Deus est pater; et nullo modo per accidens. ||Reply to Objection 2. When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of itself true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by no means accidentally.
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| − | ||<div id="q39a7"><b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 arg. 1 </b>Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia non sint approprianda personis. Quod enim potest vergere in errorem fidei, vitandum est in divinis, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis. Sed ea quae sunt communia tribus personis appropriare alicui, potest vergere in errorem fidei, quia potest intelligi quod vel illi tantum personae conveniant cui appropriantur; vel quod magis conveniant ei quam aliis. Ergo essentialia attributa non sunt approprianda personis. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, essentialia attributa, in abstracto significata, significant per modum formae. Sed una persona non se habet ad aliam ut forma, cum forma ab eo cuius est forma, supposito non distinguatur. Ergo essentialia attributa, maxime in abstracto significata, non debent appropriari personis. ||Objection 2. Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, proprium prius est appropriato, proprium enim est de ratione appropriati. Sed essentialia attributa, secundum modum intelligendi, sunt priora personis, sicut commune est prius proprio. Ergo essentialia attributa non debent esse appropriata. ||Objection 3. Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. I, Christum, Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. ||On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, ad manifestationem fidei, conveniens fuit essentialia attributa personis appropriari. Licet enim Trinitas personarum demonstratione probari non possit, ut supra dictum est, convenit tamen ut per aliqua magis manifesta declaretur. Essentialia vero attributa sunt nobis magis manifesta secundum rationem, quam propria personarum, quia ex creaturis, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, possumus per certitudinem devenire in cognitionem essentialium attributorum; non autem in cognitionem personalium proprietatum, ut supra dictum est. Sicut igitur similitudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et haec manifestatio personarum per essentialia attributa, appropriatio nominatur. Possunt autem manifestari personae divinae per essentialia attributa dupliciter. Uno modo, per viam similitudinis, sicut ea quae pertinent ad intellectum, appropriantur filio, qui procedit per modum intellectus ut verbum. Alio modo, per modum dissimilitudinis, sicut potentia appropriatur patri, ut Augustinus dicit, quia apud nos patres solent esse propter senectutem infirmi; ne tale aliquid suspicemur in Deo. ||I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (32, 1), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (32, 1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called "appropriation." The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod essentialia attributa non sic appropriantur personis ut eis esse propria asserantur, sed ad manifestandum personas per viam similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis, ut dictum est. Unde nullus error fidei sequitur, sed magis manifestatio veritatis. ||Reply to Objection 1. The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the truth.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, si sic appropriarentur essentialia attributa personis, quod essent eis propria, sequeretur quod una persona se haberet ad aliam in habitudine formae. Quod excludit Augustinus, in VII de Trin., ostendens quod pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, quasi solus filius sit sapientia; ut sic pater et filius simul tantum possint dici sapiens, non autem pater sine filio. Sed filius dicitur sapientia patris, quia est sapientia de patre sapientia, uterque enim per se est sapientia, et simul ambo una sapientia. Unde pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, sed sapientia quae est sua essentia. ||Reply to Objection 2. If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 7 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet essentiale attributum, secundum rationem propriam, sit prius quam persona, secundum, modum intelligendi; tamen, inquantum habet rationem appropriati, nihil prohibet proprium personae esse prius quam appropriatum. Sicut color posterior est corpore, inquantum est corpus, prius tamen est naturaliter corpore albo, inquantum est album. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 8 arg. 1 </b>Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter a sacris doctoribus sint essentialia personis attributa. Dicit enim Hilarius, in II de Trin., aeternitas est in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere. In quibus verbis ponit tria nomina propria personarum, scilicet nomen patris; et nomen imaginis, quod est proprium filio, ut supra dictum est; et nomen muneris, sive doni, quod est proprium spiritus sancti, ut supra habitum est. Ponit etiam tria appropriata, nam aeternitatem appropriat patri, speciem filio, usum spiritui sancto. Et videtur quod irrationabiliter. Nam aeternitas importat durationem essendi, species vero est essendi principium, usus vero ad operationem pertinere videtur. Sed essentia et operatio nulli personae appropriari inveniuntur. Ergo inconvenienter videntur ista appropriata personis. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates three names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image" proper to the Son (35, 2), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift," which is proper to the Holy Ghost (38, 2). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of existence; "species," the principle of existence; and 'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 8 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., sic dicit, in patre est unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia. Et videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia una persona non denominatur formaliter per id quod appropriatur alteri, non enim est sapiens pater sapientia genita, ut dictum est. Sed, sicut ibidem subditur, tria haec unum omnia sunt propter patrem, aequalia omnia propter filium, connexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum. Non ergo convenienter appropriantur personis. ||Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained (37, 2, ad 1). But, as he subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 8 arg. 3 </b>Item, secundum Augustinum, patri attribuitur potentia, filio sapientia, spiritui sancto bonitas. Et videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Nam virtus ad potentiam pertinet. Virtus autem invenitur appropriari filio, secundum illud I ad Cor. I, Christum, Dei virtutem; et etiam spiritui sancto, secundum illud Luc. VI, virtus de illo exibat, et sanabat omnes. Non ergo potentia patri est approprianda. ||Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness." Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, "Christ the strength [Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, "strength [Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Lk. 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 8 arg. 4 </b>Item, Augustinus, in libro de Trin., dicit, non confuse accipiendum est quod ait apostolus, ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso - ex ipso dicens propter patrem; per ipsum propter filium; in ipso propter spiritum sanctum. Sed videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia per hoc quod dicit in ipso, videtur importari habitudo causae finalis, quae est prima causarum. Ergo ista habitudo causae deberet appropriari patri, qui est principium non de principio. ||Objection 4. Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in a confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.'" This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle from no principle."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 8 arg. 5 </b>Item, invenitur veritas appropriari filio, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Et similiter liber vitae, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIX, in capite libri scriptum est de me, Glossa, idest apud patrem, qui est caput meum. Et similiter hoc quod dico, qui est, quia super illud Isa. LXV, ecce ego, ad gentes, dicit Glossa, filius loquitur, qui dixit Moysi, ego sum qui sum. Sed videtur quod propria sint filii, et non appropriata. Nam veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera religione, est summa similitudo principii, absque omni dissimilitudine, et sic videtur quod proprie conveniat filio, qui habet principium. Liber etiam vitae videtur proprium aliquid esse, quia significat ens ab alio, omnis enim liber ab aliquo scribitur. Hoc etiam ipsum qui est videtur esse proprium filio. Quia si, cum Moysi dicitur, ego sum qui sum, loquitur Trinitas, ergo Moyses poterat dicere, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos. Ergo et ulterius dicere poterat, ille qui est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, misit me ad vos, demonstrando certam personam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia nulla persona est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Non ergo potest esse commune Trinitati, sed est proprium filii. ||Objection 5. Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to Jn. 14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is. 65:1, "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 8 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus noster, qui ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem manuducitur, oportet quod Deum consideret secundum modum quem ex creaturis assumit. In consideratione autem alicuius creaturae, quatuor per ordinem nobis occurrunt. Nam primo, consideratur res ipsa absolute, inquantum est ens quoddam. Secunda autem consideratio rei est, inquantum est una. Tertia consideratio rei est, secundum quod inest ei virtus ad operandum et ad causandum. Quarta autem consideratio rei est, secundum habitudinem quam habet ad causata. Unde haec etiam quadruplex consideratio circa Deum nobis occurrit. Secundum igitur primam considerationem, qua consideratur absolute Deus secundum esse suum, sic sumitur appropriatio Hilarii, secundum quam aeternitas appropriatur patri, species filio, usus spiritui sancto. Aeternitas enim, inquantum significat esse non principiatum, similitudinem habet cum proprio patris, qui est principium non de principio. Species autem, sive pulchritudo, habet similitudinem cum propriis filii. Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur. Quantum igitur ad primum, similitudinem habet cum proprio filii, inquantum est filius habens in se vere et perfecte naturam patris. Unde, ad hoc innuendum, Augustinus in sua expositione dicit, ubi, scilicet in filio, summa et prima vita est, et cetera. Quantum vero ad secundum, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est imago expressa patris. Unde videmus quod aliqua imago dicitur esse pulchra, si perfecte repraesentat rem, quamvis turpem. Et hoc tetigit Augustinus cum dicit, ubi est tanta convenientia, et prima aequalitas, et cetera. Quantum vero ad tertium, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est verbum, quod quidem lux est, et splendor intellectus, ut Damascenus dicit. Et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit, tanquam verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei, et cetera. Usus autem habet similitudinem cum propriis spiritus sancti, largo modo accipiendo usum, secundum quod uti comprehendit sub se etiam frui; prout uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, et frui est cum gaudio uti, ut Augustinus, X de Trin., dicit. Usus ergo quo pater et filius se invicem fruuntur, convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo, usus ab illo appellatus est. Usus vero quo nos fruimur Deo, similitudinem habet cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est donum. Et hoc ostendit Augustinus cum dicit, est in Trinitate spiritus sanctus, genitoris genitique suavitas, ingenti largitate atque ubertate nos perfundens. Et sic patet quare aeternitas, species et usus personis attribuantur vel approprientur, non autem essentia vel operatio. Quia in ratione horum, propter sui communitatem, non invenitur aliquid similitudinem habens cum propriis personarum. Secunda vero consideratio Dei est, inquantum consideratur ut unus. Et sic Augustinus patri appropriat unitatem, filio aequalitatem, spiritui sancto concordiam sive connexionem. Quae quidem tria unitatem importare manifestum est, sed differenter. Nam unitas dicitur absolute, non praesupponens aliquid aliud. Et ideo appropriatur patri, qui non praesupponit aliquam personam, cum sit principium non de principio. Aequalitas autem importat unitatem in respectu ad alterum, nam aequale est quod habet unam quantitatem cum alio. Et ideo aequalitas appropriatur filio, qui est principium de principio. Connexio autem importat unitatem aliquorum duorum. Unde appropriatur spiritui sancto, inquantum est a duobus. Ex quo etiam intelligi potest quod dicit Augustinus, tria esse unum propter patrem, aequalia propter filium, connexa propter spiritum sanctum. Manifestum est enim quod illi attribuitur unumquodque, in quo primo invenitur, sicut omnia inferiora dicuntur vivere propter animam vegetabilem, in qua primo invenitur ratio vitae in istis inferioribus. Unitas autem statim invenitur in persona patris, etiam, per impossibile, remotis aliis personis. Et ideo aliae personae a patre habent unitatem. Sed remotis aliis personis, non invenitur aequalitas in patre, sed statim, posito filio, invenitur aequalitas. Et ideo dicuntur omnia aequalia propter filium, non quod filius sit principium aequalitatis patri; sed quia, nisi esset patri aequalis filius, pater aequalis non posset dici. Aequalitas enim eius primo consideratur ad filium, hoc enim ipsum quod spiritus sanctus patri aequalis est, a filio habet. Similiter, excluso spiritu sancto, qui est duorum nexus, non posset intelligi unitas connexionis inter patrem et filium. Et ideo dicuntur omnia esse connexa propter spiritum sanctum, quia, posito spiritu sancto, invenitur unde pater et filius possint dici connexi. Secundum vero tertiam considerationem, qua in Deo sufficiens virtus consideratur ad causandum, sumitur tertia appropriatio, scilicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Quae quidem appropriatio fit et secundum rationem similitudinis, si consideretur quod in divinis personis est, et secundum rationem dissimilitudinis, si consideretur quod in creaturis est. Potentia enim habet rationem principii. Unde habet similitudinem cum patre caelesti, qui est principium totius divinitatis. Deficit autem interdum patri terreno, propter senectutem. Sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum filio caelesti, inquantum est verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapientiae. Deficit autem interdum filio terreno, propter temporis paucitatem. Bonitas autem, cum sit ratio et obiectum amoris, habet similitudinem cum spiritu divino, qui est amor. Sed repugnantiam habere videtur ad spiritum terrenum, secundum quod importat violentam quandam impulsionem; prout dicitur Isa. XXV, spiritus robustorum quasi turbo impellens parietem. Virtus autem appropriatur filio et spiritui sancto, non secundum quod virtus dicitur ipsa potentia rei, sed secundum quod interdum virtus dicitur id quod a potentia rei procedit, prout dicimus aliquod virtuosum factum esse virtutem alicuius agentis. Secundum vero quartam considerationem, prout consideratur Deus in habitudine ad suos effectus, sumitur illa appropriatio ex quo, per quem, et in quo. Haec enim praepositio ex importat quandoque quidem habitudinem causae materialis, quae locum non habet in divinis, aliquando vero habitudinem causae efficientis. Quae quidem competit Deo ratione suae potentiae activae, unde et appropriatur patri, sicut et potentia. Haec vero praepositio per designat quidem quandoque causam mediam; sicut dicimus quod faber operatur per martellum. Et sic ly per quandoque non est appropriatum, sed proprium filii, secundum illud Ioan. I, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; non quia filius sit instrumentum, sed quia ipse est principium de principio. Quandoque vero designat habitudinem formae per quam agens operatur; sicut dicimus quod artifex operatur per artem. Unde, sicut sapientia et ars appropriantur filio, ita et ly per quem. Haec vero praepositio in denotat proprie habitudinem continentis. Continet autem Deus res dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suas similitudines; prout scilicet res dicuntur esse in Deo, inquantum sunt in eius scientia. Et sic hoc quod dico in ipso, esset appropriandum filio. Alio vero modo continentur res a Deo, inquantum Deus sua bonitate eas conservat et gubernat, ad finem convenientem adducendo. Et sic ly in quo appropriatur spiritui sancto, sicut et bonitas. Nec oportet quod habitudo causae finalis, quamvis sit prima causarum, approprietur patri, qui est principium non de principio, quia personae divinae, quarum pater est principium, non procedunt ut ad finem, cum quaelibet illarum sit ultimus finis; sed naturali processione, quae magis ad rationem naturalis potentiae pertinere videtur. ||I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God. According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is "a principle without a principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color. The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): "Where--that is, in the Son--there is supreme and primal life," etc. The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc. The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc. "Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the "use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons. The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father, "equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For "unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle." "Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united. According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness." This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength. According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition "by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 39 a. 8 ad 1 </b>Ad illud vero quod de aliis quaeritur, dicendum quod veritas, cum pertineat ad intellectum, ut supra dictum est, appropriatur filio, non tamen est proprium eius. Quia veritas, ut supra dictum est, considerari potest prout est in intellectu, vel prout est in re. Sicut igitur intellectus et res essentialiter sumpta sunt essentialia et non personalia, ita et veritas. Definitio autem Augustini inducta, datur de veritate secundum quod appropriatur filio. Liber autem vitae in recto quidem importat notitiam, sed in obliquo vitam, est enim, ut supra dictum est, notitia Dei de his qui habituri sunt vitam aeternam. Unde appropriatur filio, licet vita approprietur spiritui sancto, inquantum importat quendam interiorem motum, et sic convenit cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Esse autem scriptum ab alio, non est de ratione libri inquantum est liber; sed inquantum est quoddam artificiatum. Unde non importat originem, neque est personale, sed appropriatum personae. Ipsum autem qui est appropriatur personae filii, non secundum propriam rationem, sed ratione adiuncti, inquantum scilicet in locutione Dei ad Moysen, praefigurabatur liberatio humani generis, quae facta est per filium. Sed tamen, secundum quod ly qui sumitur relative, posset referre interdum personam filii, et sic sumeretur personaliter, ut puta si dicatur, filius est genitus qui est; sicut et Deus genitus personale est. Sed infinite sumptum est essentiale. Et licet hoc pronomen iste, grammatice loquendo, ad aliquam certam personam videatur pertinere; tamen quaelibet res demonstrabilis, grammatice loquendo, persona dici potest, licet secundum rei naturam non sit persona; dicimus enim iste lapis, et iste asinus. Unde et, grammatice loquendo, essentia divina, secundum quod significatur et supponitur per hoc nomen Deus, potest demonstrari hoc pronomine iste; secundum illud Exod. XV, iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum. ||Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth" belongs to the intellect, as stated above (16, 1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (24, 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun "this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 pr. </b>Deinde quaeritur de personis in comparatione ad relationes sive proprietates. Et quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum relatio sit idem quod persona. Secundo, utrum relationes distinguant et constituant personas. Tertio, utrum, abstractis per intellectum relationibus a personis, remaneant hypostases distinctae. Quarto, utrum relationes, secundum intellectum, praesupponant actus personarum, vel e converso. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q40a1"><b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis non sit idem relatio quod persona. Quaecumque enim sunt idem, multiplicato uno eorum, multiplicatur et aliud. Sed contingit in una persona esse plures relationes, sicut in persona patris est paternitas et communis spiratio, et iterum unam relationem in duabus personis esse, sicut communis spiratio est in patre et filio. Ergo relatio non est idem quod persona. ||Objection 1. It would seem that in God relation is not the same as person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration. Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, nihil est in seipso, secundum philosophum, in IV Physic. Sed relatio est in persona. Nec potest dici quod ratione identitatis, quia sic esset etiam in essentia. Ergo relatio sive proprietas et persona non sunt idem in divinis. ||Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or property, is not the same as person in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quaecumque sunt idem, ita se habent, quod quidquid praedicatur de uno, praedicatur et de alio. Non autem quidquid praedicatur de persona, praedicatur de proprietate. Dicimus enim quod pater generat, sed non dicimus quod paternitas sit generans. Ergo proprietas non est idem quod persona in divinis. ||Objection 3. Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not the same as person in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra, in divinis non differt quod est et quo est, ut habetur a Boetio in libro de Hebd. Sed pater paternitate est pater. Ergo pater idem est quod paternitas. Et eadem ratione aliae proprietates idem sunt cum personis. ||On the contrary, in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt. Quidam enim dixerunt proprietates neque esse personas, neque in personis. Qui fuerunt moti ex modo significandi relationum, quae quidem non significant ut in aliquo, sed magis ut ad aliquid. Unde dixerunt relationes esse assistentes, sicut supra expositum est. Sed quia relatio, secundum quod est quaedam res in divinis, est ipsa essentia; essentia autem idem est quod persona, ut ex dictis patet; oportet quod relatio sit idem quod persona. Hanc igitur identitatem alii considerantes, dixerunt proprietates quidem esse personas, non autem in personis, quia non ponebant proprietates in divinis nisi secundum modum loquendi, ut supra dictum est. Necesse est autem ponere proprietates in divinis, ut supra ostendimus. Quae quidem significantur in abstracto, ut quaedam formae personarum. Unde, cum de ratione formae sit, quod sit in eo cuius est forma, oportet dicere proprietates esse in personis, et eas tamen esse personas; sicut essentiam esse in Deo dicimus, quae tamen est Deus. ||I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons; and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations "assistant," as above explained (28, 2). But since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above (39, 1), relation must necessarily be the same as person. Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated above (32, 2). We must, however, say that there are properties in God; as we have shown (32, 2). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God, and yet is God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod persona et proprietas sunt idem re, differunt tamen secundum rationem. Unde non oportet quod, multiplicato uno, multiplicetur reliquum. Considerandum tamen est quod, propter divinam simplicitatem, consideratur duplex realis identitas in divinis eorum quae differunt in rebus creatis. Quia enim divina simplicitas excludit compositionem formae et materiae, sequitur quod in divinis idem est abstractum et concretum, ut deitas et Deus. Quia vero divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subiecti et accidentis, sequitur quod quidquid attribuitur Deo, est eius essentia, et propter hoc sapientia et virtus idem sunt in Deo, quia ambo sunt in divina essentia. Et secundum hanc duplicem rationem identitatis, proprietas in divinis est idem cum persona. Nam proprietates personales sunt idem cum personis, ea ratione qua abstractum est idem cum concreto. Sunt enim ipsae personae subsistentes; ut paternitas est ipse pater, et filiatio filius, et processio spiritus sanctus. Proprietates autem non personales sunt idem cum personis secundum aliam rationem identitatis, qua omne illud quod attribuitur Deo, est eius essentia. Sic igitur communis spiratio est idem cum persona patris et cum persona filii, non quod sit una persona per se subsistens; sed, sicut una essentia est in duabus personis, ita et una proprietas, ut supra dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above explained (30, 2).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod proprietates dicuntur esse in essentia, per modum identitatis tantum. In personis autem dicuntur esse per modum identitatis, non quidem secundum rem tantum, sed quantum ad modum significandi, sicut forma in supposito. Et ideo proprietates determinant et distinguunt personas, non autem essentiam. ||Reply to Objection 2. The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod participia et verba notionalia significant actus notionales. Actus autem suppositorum sunt. Proprietates autem non significantur ut supposita, sed ut formae suppositorum. Et ideo modus significandi repugnat, ut participia et verba notionalia de proprietatibus praedicentur. ||Reply to Objection 3. Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum." Now, properties are not designated as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita." And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties.
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| − | ||<div id="q40a2"><b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae non distinguantur per relationes. Simplicia enim seipsis distinguuntur. Sed personae divinae sunt maxime simplices. Ergo distinguuntur seipsis, et non relationibus. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, nulla forma distinguitur nisi secundum suum genus, non enim album a nigro distinguitur nisi secundum qualitatem. Sed hypostasis significat individuum in genere substantiae. Non ergo relationibus hypostases distingui possint. ||Objection 2. Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But "hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, absolutum est prius quam relativum. Sed prima distinctio est distinctio divinarum personarum. Ergo divinae personae non distinguuntur relationibus. ||Objection 3. Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction. Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, id quod praesupponit distinctionem, non potest esse primum distinctionis principium. Sed relatio praesupponit distinctionem, cum in eius definitione ponatur, esse enim relativi est ad aliud se habere. Ergo primum principium distinctivum in divinis non potest esse relatio. ||Objection 4. Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be relation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod sola relatio multiplicat Trinitatem divinarum personarum. ||On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod in quibuscumque pluribus invenitur aliquid commune, oportet quaerere aliquid distinctivum. Unde, cum tres personae conveniant secundum essentiae unitatem, necesse est quaerere aliquid quo distinguantur, ad hoc quod plures sint. Inveniuntur autem in divinis personis duo secundum quae differunt, scilicet origo, et relatio. Quae quidem quamvis re non differant, differunt tamen secundum modum significandi, nam origo significatur per modum actus, ut generatio; relatio vero per modum formae, ut paternitas. Quidam igitur, attendentes quod relatio consequitur actum, dixerunt quod hypostases in divinis distinguuntur per originem; ut dicamus quod pater distinguitur a filio, inquantum ille generat et hic est genitus. Relationes autem sive proprietates manifestant consequenter hypostasum sive personarum distinctiones, sicut et in creaturis proprietates manifestant distinctiones individuorum, quae fiunt per materialia principia. Sed hoc non potest stare, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia ad hoc quod aliqua duo distincta intelligantur, necesse est eorum distinctionem intelligi per aliquid intrinsecum utrique; sicut in rebus creatis vel per materiam, vel per formam. Origo autem alicuius rei non significatur ut aliquid intrinsecum, sed ut via quaedam a re vel ad rem, sicut generatio significatur ut via quaedam ad rem genitam, et ut progrediens a generante. Unde non potest esse quod res genita et generans distinguantur sola generatione, sed oportet intelligere tam in generante quam in genito ea quibus ab invicem distinguuntur. In persona autem divina non est aliud intelligere nisi essentiam et relationem sive proprietatem. Unde, cum in essentia conveniant, relinquitur quod per relationes personae ab invicem distinguantur. Secundo, quia distinctio in divinis personis non est sic intelligenda, quasi aliquid commune dividatur, quia essentia communis remanet indivisa, sed oportet quod ipsa distinguentia constituant res distinctas. Sic autem relationes vel proprietates distinguunt vel constituunt hypostases vel personas, inquantum sunt ipsae personae subsistentes, sicut paternitas est pater, et filiatio est filius, eo quod in divinis non differt abstractum et concretum. Sed contra rationem originis est, quod constituat hypostasim vel personam. Quia origo active significata, significatur ut progrediens a persona subsistente, unde praesupponit eam. Origo autem passive significata, ut nativitas, significatur ut via ad personam subsistentem; et nondum ut eam constituens. Unde melius dicitur quod personae seu hypostases distinguantur relationibus, quam per originem. Licet enim distinguantur utroque modo, tamen prius et principalius per relationes, secundum modum intelligendi. Unde hoc nomen pater non solum significat proprietatem, sed etiam hypostasim, sed hoc nomen genitor, vel generans, significat tantum proprietatem. Quia hoc nomen pater significat relationem, quae est distinctiva et constitutiva hypostasis, hoc autem nomen generans, vel genitus, significat originem, quae non est distinctiva et constitutiva hypostasis. ||I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by way of the form, as "paternity." Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the material principles. This opinion, however, cannot stand--for two reasons. Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting the person. It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term "Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod personae sunt ipsae relationes subsistentes. Unde non repugnat simplicitati divinarum personarum, quod relationibus distinguantur. ||Reply to Objection 1. The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod personae divinae non distinguuntur in esse in quo subsistunt, neque in aliquo absoluto, sed solum secundum id quod ad aliquid dicuntur. Unde ad earum distinctionem sufficit relatio. ||Reply to Objection 2. The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod quanto distinctio prior est, tanto propinquior est unitati. Et ideo debet esse minima. Et ideo distinctio personarum non debet esse nisi per id quod minimum distinguit, scilicet per relationem. ||Reply to Objection 3. The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod relatio praesupponit distinctionem suppositorum, quando est accidens, sed si relatio sit subsistens, non praesupponit, sed secum fert distinctionem. Cum enim dicitur quod relativi esse est ad aliud se habere, per ly aliud intelligitur correlativum, quod non est prius, sed simul natura. ||Reply to Objection 4. Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature.
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| − | ||<div id="q40a3"><b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod, abstractis per intellectum proprietatibus seu relationibus a personis, adhuc remaneant hypostases. Id enim ad quod aliquid se habet ex additione, potest intelligi remoto eo quod sibi additur, sicut homo se habet ad animal ex additione, et potest intelligi animal remoto rationali. Sed persona se habet ex additione ad hypostasim, est enim persona hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Ergo, remota proprietate personali a persona, intelligitur hypostasis. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that to which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken away; as man is something added to animal which can be understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a person, the hypostasis remains.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, pater non ab eodem habet quod sit pater, et quod sit aliquis. Cum enim paternitate sit pater, si paternitate esset aliquis, sequeretur quod filius, in quo non est paternitas, non esset aliquis. Remota ergo per intellectum paternitate a patre, adhuc remanet quod sit aliquis; quod est esse hypostasim. Ergo, remota proprietate a persona, remanet hypostasis. ||Objection 2. Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." So when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains "someone"--that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed from person, the hypostasis remains.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, V de Trin., non hoc est dicere ingenitum, quod est dicere patrem, quia etsi filium non genuisset, nihil prohiberet eum dicere ingenitum. Sed si filium non genuisset, non inesset ei paternitas. Ergo, remota paternitate, adhuc remanet hypostasis patris ut ingenita. ||Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit, IV de Trin., nihil habet filius nisi natum. Nativitate autem est filius. Ergo, remota filiatione, non remanet hypostasis filii. Et eadem ratio est de aliis personis. ||On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation be removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as regards the other persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod duplex fit abstractio per intellectum. Una quidem, secundum quod universale abstrahitur a particulari, ut animal ab homine. Alia vero, secundum quod forma abstrahitur a materia; sicut forma circuli abstrahitur per intellectum ab omni materia sensibili. Inter has autem abstractiones haec est differentia, quod in abstractione quae fit secundum universale et particulare, non remanet id a quo fit abstractio, remota enim ab homine differentia rationali, non remanet in intellectu homo, sed solum animal. In abstractione vero quae attenditur secundum formam et materiam, utrumque manet in intellectu, abstrahendo enim formam circuli ab aere, remanet seorsum in intellectu nostro et intellectus circuli et intellectus aeris. Quamvis autem in divinis non sit universale neque particulare, nec forma et materia, secundum rem; tamen, secundum modum significandi, invenitur aliqua similitudo horum in divinis; secundum quem modum Damascenus dicit quod commune est substantia, particulare vero hypostasis. Si igitur loquamur de abstractione quae fit secundum universale et particulare, remotis proprietatibus, remanet in intellectu essentia communis, non autem hypostasis patris, quae est quasi particulare. Si vero loquamur secundum modum abstractionis formae a materia, remotis proprietatibus non personalibus, remanet intellectus hypostasum et personarum, sicut, remoto per intellectum a patre quod sit ingenitus vel spirans, remanet hypostasis vel persona patris. Sed remota proprietate personali per intellectum, tollitur intellectus hypostasis. Non enim proprietates personales sic intelliguntur advenire hypostasibus divinis, sicut forma subiecto praeexistenti, sed ferunt secum sua supposita, inquantum sunt ipsae personae subsistentes, sicut paternitas est ipse pater, hypostasis enim significat aliquid distinctum in divinis, cum hypostasis sit substantia individua. Cum igitur relatio sit quae distinguit hypostases et constituit eas, ut dictum est, relinquitur quod, relationibus personalibus remotis per intellectum, non remaneant hypostases. Sed, sicut dictum est, aliqui dicunt quod hypostases in divinis non distinguuntur per relationes, sed per solam originem; ut intelligatur pater esse hypostasis quaedam per hoc, quod non est ab alio; filius autem per hoc, quod est ab alio per generationem. Sed relationes advenientes quasi proprietates ad dignitatem pertinentes, constituunt rationem personae, unde et personalitates dicuntur. Unde, remotis huiusmodi relationibus per intellectum, remanent quidem hypostases, sed non personae. Sed hoc non potest esse, propter duo. Primo, quia relationes distinguunt et constituunt hypostases, ut ostensum est. Secundo, quia omnis hypostasis naturae rationalis est persona, ut patet per definitionem Boetii, dicentis quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Unde, ad hoc quod esset hypostasis et non persona, oporteret abstrahi ex parte naturae rationalitatem; non autem ex parte personae proprietatem. ||I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold--when the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle, and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "substance is common and hypostasis is particular." So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular. But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the Father's hypostasis or person remains. If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own "supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained (2), it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however, think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons, remain. But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above (2); secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that, "person is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod persona non addit supra hypostasim proprietatem distinguentem absolute, sed proprietatem distinguentem ad dignitatem pertinentem, totum enim hoc est accipiendum loco unius differentiae. Ad dignitatem autem pertinet proprietas distinguens, secundum quod intelligitur subsistens in natura rationali. Unde, remota proprietate distinguente a persona, non remanet hypostasis, sed remaneret, si tolleretur rationalitas naturae. Tam enim persona quam hypostasis est substantia individua, unde in divinis de ratione utriusque est relatio distinguens. ||Reply to Objection 1. Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially to both.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod paternitate pater non solum est pater, sed est persona, et est quis sive hypostasis. Nec tamen sequitur quod filius non sit quis sive hypostasis; sicut non sequitur quod non sit persona. ||Reply to Objection 2. By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow, however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow that He is not a person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod intentio Augustini non fuit dicere quod hypostasis patris remaneat ingenita, remota paternitate, quasi innascibilitas constituat et distinguat hypostasim patris, hoc enim esse non potest, cum ingenitum nihil ponat, sed negative dicatur, ut ipsemet dicit. Sed loquitur in communi, quia non omne ingenitum est pater. Remota ergo paternitate, non remanet in divinis hypostasis patris, ut distinguitur ab aliis personis; sed ut distinguitur a creaturis, sicut Iudaei intelligunt. ||Reply to Objection 3. Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the Jews understand it.
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| − | ||<div id="q40a4"><b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionales praeintelligantur proprietatibus. Dicit enim Magister, XXVII dist. I Sent., quod semper pater est, quia genuit semper filium. Et ita videtur quod generatio, secundum intellectum, praecedat paternitatem. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i, D, xxvii) that "the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omnis relatio praesupponit, in intellectu, id supra quod fundatur; sicut aequalitas quantitatem. Sed paternitas est relatio fundata super actione quae est generatio. Ergo paternitas praesupponit generationem. ||Objection 2. Further, in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes quantity. But paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, sicut se habet generatio activa ad paternitatem, ita se habet nativitas ad filiationem. Sed filiatio praesupponit nativitatem, ideo enim filius est, quia natus est. Ergo et paternitas praesupponit generationem. ||Objection 3. Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes generation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra, generatio est operatio personae patris. Sed paternitas constituit personam patris. Ergo prius est, secundum intellectum, paternitas quam generatio. ||On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore in the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum illos qui dicunt quod proprietates non distinguunt et constituunt hypostases, sed manifestant hypostases distinctas et constitutas, absolute dicendum est quod relationes, secundum modum intelligendi, consequuntur actus notionales; ut dici possit simpliciter quod quia generat, est pater. Sed supponendo quod relationes distinguant et constituant hypostases in divinis, oportet distinctione uti. Quia origo significatur in divinis active et passive, active quidem, sicut generatio attribuitur patri, et spiratio, sumpta pro actu notionali, attribuitur patri et filio; passive autem, sicut nativitas attribuitur filio, et processio spiritui sancto. Origines enim passive significatae, simpliciter praecedunt, secundum intellectum, proprietates personarum procedentium, etiam personales, quia origo passive significata, significatur ut via ad personam proprietate constitutam. Similiter et origo active significata, prior est, secundum intellectum, quam relatio personae originantis quae non est personalis, sicut actus notionalis spirationis, secundum intellectum, praecedit proprietatem relativam innominatam communem patri et filio. Sed proprietas personalis patris potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, ut est relatio, et sic iterum, secundum intellectum, praesupponit actum notionalem; quia relatio, inquantum huiusmodi, fundatur super actum. Alio modo, secundum quod est constitutiva personae, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur relatio actui notionali, sicut persona agens praeintelligitur actioni. ||I answer that, According to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because He begets, He is the Father." A distinction, however, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive signification--active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person acting.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum Magister dicit quod quia generat est pater, accipit nomen patris secundum quod designat relationem tantum, non autem secundum quod significat personam subsistentem. Sic enim oporteret e converso dicere quod quia pater est, generat. ||Reply to Objection 1. When the Master says that "because He begets, He is Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de paternitate, secundum quod est relatio, et non secundum quod est constitutiva personae. ||Reply to Objection 2. This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but not as constituting a person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 40 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod nativitas est via ad personam filii, et ideo, secundum intellectum, praecedit filiationem, etiam secundum quod est constitutiva personae filii. Sed generatio activa significatur ut progrediens a persona patris, et ideo praesupponit proprietatem personalem patris. ||Reply to Objection 3. Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as constituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the personal property of the Father.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 pr. </b>Deinde considerandum est de personis in comparatione ad actus notionales. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum actus notionales sint attribuendi personis. Secundo, utrum huiusmodi actus sint necessarii vel voluntarii. Tertio, utrum, secundum huiusmodi actus, persona procedat de nihilo, vel de aliquo. Quarto, utrum in divinis sit ponere potentiam respectu actuum notionalium. Quinto, quid significet huiusmodi potentia. Sexto, utrum actus notionalis ad plures personas terminari possit. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q41a1"><b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionales non sint personis attribuendi. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod omnia genera, cum quis in divinam vertit praedicationem, in divinam mutantur substantiam, exceptis relativis. Sed actio est unum de decem generibus. Si igitur actio aliqua Deo attribuitur, ad eius essentiam pertinebit, et non ad notionem. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten "genera." Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, V de Trin., omne quod de Deo dicitur, aut dicitur secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem. Sed ea quae ad substantiam pertinent, significantur per essentialia attributa, quae vero ad relationem, per nomina personarum et per nomina proprietatum. Non sunt ergo, praeter haec, attribuendi personis notionales actus. ||Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, proprium actionis est ex se passionem inferre. Sed in divinis non ponimus passiones. Ergo neque actus notionales ibi ponendi sunt. ||Objection 3. Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, proprium patris est, quod filium genuit. Sed generatio actus quidam est. Ergo actus notionales ponendi sunt in divinis. ||On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod in divinis personis attenditur distinctio secundum originem. Origo autem convenienter designari non potest nisi per aliquos actus. Ad designandum igitur ordinem originis in divinis personis, necessarium fuit attribuere personis actus notionales. ||I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnis origo designatur per aliquem actum. Duplex autem ordo originis attribui Deo potest. Unus quidem, secundum quod creatura ab eo progreditur, et hoc commune est tribus personis. Et ideo actiones quae attribuuntur Deo ad designandum processum creaturarum ab ipso, ad essentiam pertinent. Alius autem ordo originis in divinis attenditur secundum processionem personae a persona. Unde actus designantes huius originis ordinem, notionales dicuntur, quia notiones personarum sunt personarum habitudines ad invicem, ut ex dictis patet. ||Reply to Objection 1. Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above explained (32, 2).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod actus notionales secundum modum significandi tantum differunt a relationibus personarum; sed re sunt omnino idem. Unde Magister dicit, in I Sent., XXVI dist., quod generatio et nativitas aliis nominibus dicuntur paternitas et filiatio. Ad cuius evidentiam, attendendum est quod primo coniicere potuimus originem alicuius ab alio, ex motu, quod enim aliqua res a sua dispositione removeretur per motum, manifestum fuit hoc ab aliqua causa accidere. Et ideo actio, secundum primam nominis impositionem, importat originem motus, sicut enim motus, prout est in mobili ab aliquo, dicitur passio; ita origo ipsius motus, secundum quod incipit ab alio et terminatur in id quod movetur, vocatur actio. Remoto igitur motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis, secundum quod a causa aliqua vel principio procedit in id quod est a principio. Unde, cum in divinis non sit motus, actio personalis producentis personam, nihil aliud est quam habitudo principii ad personam quae est a principio. Quae quidem habitudines sunt ipsae relationes vel notiones. Quia tamen de divinis et intelligibilibus rebus loqui non possumus nisi secundum modum rerum sensibilium, a quibus cognitionem accipimus; et in quibus actiones et passiones, inquantum motum implicant, aliud sunt a relationibus quae ex actionibus et passionibus consequuntur, oportuit seorsum significari habitudines personarum per modum actus, et seorsum per modum relationum. Et sic patet quod sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt solum secundum modum significandi. ||Reply to Objection 2. The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of signification.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod actio, secundum quod importat originem motus, infert ex se passionem, sic autem non ponitur actio in divinis personis. Unde non ponuntur ibi passiones, nisi solum grammatice loquendo, quantum ad modum significandi; sicut patri attribuimus generare, et filio generari. ||Reply to Objection 3. Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."
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| − | ||<div id="q41a2"><b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionales sint voluntarii. Dicit enim Hilarius, in libro de Synod., non naturali necessitate ductus, pater genuit filium. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, apostolus, Coloss. I, transtulit nos in regnum filii dilectionis suae. Dilectio autem voluntatis est. Ergo filius genitus est a patre, voluntate. ||Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love" (Colossians 1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, nihil magis est voluntarium quam amor. Sed spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio ut amor. Ergo procedit voluntarie. ||Objection 3. Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, filius procedit per modum intellectus, ut verbum. Sed omne verbum procedit a dicente per voluntatem. Ergo filius procedit a patre per voluntatem, et non per naturam. ||Objection 4. Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, quod non est voluntarium, est necessarium. Si igitur pater non genuit filium voluntate, videtur sequi quod necessitate genuerit. Quod est contra Augustinum, in libro ad Orosium. ||Objection 5. Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, quod neque voluntate genuit pater filium, neque necessitate. ||On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid esse vel fieri voluntate, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut ablativus designet concomitantiam tantum, sicut possum dicere quod ego sum homo mea voluntate, quia scilicet volo me esse hominem. Et hoc modo potest dici quod pater genuit filium voluntate, sicut et est voluntate Deus, quia vult se esse Deum, et vult se generare filium. Alio modo sic, quod ablativus importet habitudinem principii, sicut dicitur quod artifex operatur voluntate, quia voluntas est principium operis. Et secundum hunc modum, dicendum est quod Deus pater non genuit filium voluntate; sed voluntate produxit creaturam. Unde in libro de Synod. dicitur, si quis voluntate Dei, tanquam unum aliquid de creaturis, filium factum dicat, anathema sit. Et huius ratio est, quia voluntas et natura secundum hoc differunt in causando, quia natura determinata est ad unum; sed voluntas non est determinata ad unum. Cuius ratio est, quia effectus assimilatur formae agentis per quam agit. Manifestum est autem quod unius rei non est nisi una forma naturalis, per quam res habet esse, unde quale ipsum est, tale facit. Sed forma per quam voluntas agit, non est una tantum, sed sunt plures, secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae, unde quod voluntate agitur, non est tale quale est agens, sed quale vult et intelligit illud esse agens. Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt sic vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium natura est. Quod autem potest sic vel aliter esse, longe est a natura divina, sed hoc pertinet ad rationem creaturae, quia Deus est per se necesse esse, creatura autem est facta ex nihilo. Et ideo Ariani, volentes ad hoc deducere quod filius sit creatura, dixerunt quod pater genuit filium voluntate, secundum quod voluntas designat principium. Nobis autem dicendum est quod pater genuit filium non voluntate, sed natura. Unde Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit; sed naturam filio dedit ex impassibili ac non nata substantia perfecta nativitas. Talia enim cuncta creata sunt, qualia Deus esse voluit, filius autem, natus ex Deo, talis subsistit, qualis et Deus est. ||I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will--that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book De Synod, it is said: "If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa inducitur contra illos qui a generatione filii etiam concomitantiam paternae voluntatis removebant, dicentes sic eum natura genuisse filium, ut inde voluntas generandi ei non adesset, sicut nos multa naturali necessitate contra voluntatem patimur, ut mortem, senectutem, et huiusmodi defectus. Et hoc patet per praecedentia et subsequentia. Sic enim ibi dicitur, non enim, nolente patre, vel coactus pater, vel naturali necessitate inductus cum nollet, genuit filium. ||Reply to Objection 1. This saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity--as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus nominat Christum filium dilectionis Dei, inquantum est a Deo superabundanter dilectus, non quod dilectio sit principium generationis filii. ||Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if love were the principle of the Son's generation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem. Et similiter Deus naturaliter vult et amat seipsum. Sed circa alia a se, voluntas Dei se habet ad utrumque quodammodo, ut dictum est. Spiritus autem sanctus procedit ut amor, inquantum Deus amat seipsum. Unde naturaliter procedit, quamvis per modum voluntatis procedat. ||Reply to Objection 3. The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained (19, 3). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam in conceptionibus intellectualibus fit reductio ad prima, quae naturaliter intelliguntur. Deus autem naturaliter intelligit seipsum. Et secundum hoc, conceptio verbi divini est naturalis. ||Reply to Objection 4. Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Word is natural.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 2 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod necessarium dicitur aliquid per se, et per aliud. Per aliud quidem dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut per causam agentem et cogentem, et sic necessarium dicitur quod est violentum. Alio modo, sicut per causam finalem, sicut dicitur aliquid esse necessarium in his quae sunt ad finem, inquantum sine hoc non potest esse finis, vel bene esse. Et neutro istorum modorum divina generatio est necessaria, quia Deus non est propter finem, neque coactio cadit in ipsum. Per se autem dicitur aliquid necessarium, quod non potest non esse. Et sic Deum esse est necessarium. Et hoc modo patrem generare filium est necessarium. ||Reply to Objection 5. A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.
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| − | ||<div id="q41a3"><b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionales non sint de aliquo. Quia si pater generat filium de aliquo, aut de seipso, aut de aliquo alio. Si de aliquo alio, cum id de quo aliquid generatur, sit in eo quod generatur, sequitur quod aliquid alienum a patre sit in filio. Quod est contra Hilarium, VII de Trin., ubi dicit, nihil in his diversum est vel alienum. Si autem filium generat pater de seipso, id autem de quo aliquid generatur, si sit permanens, recipit eius praedicationem quod generatur; sicut dicimus quod homo est albus, quia homo permanet, cum de non albo fit albus, sequitur igitur quod pater vel non permaneat, genito filio, vel quod pater sit filius, quod est falsum. Non ergo pater generat filium de aliquo, sed de nihilo. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he is made white--it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, id de quo aliquid generatur, est principium eius quod generatur. Si ergo pater generat filium de essentia vel natura sua sequitur quod essentia vel natura patris sit principium filii. Sed non principium materiale, quia materia locum in divinis non habet. Ergo est principium quasi activum, sicut generans est principium geniti. Et ita sequitur quod essentia generet, quod supra improbatum est. ||Objection 2. Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, which was disproved above (39, 5).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod tres personae non sunt ex eadem essentia, quia non est aliud essentia et persona. Sed persona filii non est aliud ab essentia patris. Ergo filius non est de essentia patris. ||Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father's essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, omnis creatura est ex nihilo. Sed filius in Scripturis dicitur creatura, dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, ex ore sapientiae genitae, ego ex ore altissimi prodii, primogenita ante omnem creaturam; et postea ex ore eiusdem sapientiae dicitur, ab initio, et ante saecula, creata sum. Ergo filius non est genitus ex aliquo, sed ex nihilo. Et similiter potest obiici de spiritu sancto, propter hoc quod dicitur, Zac. XII dixit dominus, extendens caelum et fundans terram, et creans spiritum hominis in eo; et Amos IV, secundum aliam litteram, ego formans montes, et creans spiritum. ||Objection 4. Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Sirach 24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Sirach 24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zechariah 12:1): "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13) according to another version [the Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, pater Deus de sua natura sine initio genuit filium sibi aequalem. ||On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says: "God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod filius non est genitus de nihilo, sed de substantia patris. Ostensum est enim supra quod paternitas, et filiatio, et nativitas, vere et proprie est in divinis. Hoc autem interest inter generationem veram, per quam aliquis procedit ut filius, et factionem, quod faciens facit aliquid de exteriori materia, sicut scamnum facit artifex de ligno; homo autem generat filium de seipso. Sicut autem artifex creatus facit aliquid ex materia, ita Deus facit ex nihilo, ut infra ostendetur, non quod nihilum cedat in substantiam rei, sed quia ab ipso tota substantia rei producitur, nullo alio praesupposito. Si ergo filius procederet a patre ut de nihilo existens, hoc modo se haberet ad patrem ut artificiatum ad artificem, quod manifestum est nomen filiationis proprie habere non posse, sed solum secundum aliquam similitudinem. Unde relinquitur quod, si filius Dei procederet a patre quasi existens ex nihilo, non esset vere et proprie filius. Cuius contrarium dicitur I Ioan. ult., ut simus in vero filio eius Iesu Christo. Filius igitur Dei verus non est ex nihilo, nec factus, sed tantum genitus. Si qui autem ex nihilo a Deo facti filii Dei dicantur, hoc erit metaphorice, secundum aliqualem assimilationem ad eum qui vere filius est. Unde, inquantum solus est verus et naturalis Dei filius, dicitur unigenitus, secundum illud Ioan. I unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse enarravit. Inquantum vero per assimilationem ad ipsum alii dicuntur filii adoptivi, quasi metaphorice dicitur esse primogenitus, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Relinquitur ergo quod Dei filius sit genitus de substantia patris. Aliter tamen quam filius hominis. Pars enim substantiae hominis generantis transit in substantiam geniti. Sed divina natura impartibilis est. Unde necesse est quod pater, generando filium, non partem naturae in ipsum transfuderit, sed totam naturam ei communicaverit, remanente distinctione solum secundum originem, ut ex dictis patet. ||I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance. For it was explained above (27, 2; 33, 2,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true "generation," whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will be shown later on (45, 1), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1 John 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ." Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten. That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only begotten," according to John 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the "first begotten," according to Romans 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above (40, 2).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum filius dicitur natus de patre, haec praepositio de significat principium generans consubstantiale; non autem principium materiale. Quod enim producitur de materia, fit per transmutationem illius de quo producitur, in aliquam formam; divina autem essentia non est transmutabilis, neque alterius formae susceptiva. ||Reply to Objection 1. When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur filius genitus de essentia patris, secundum expositionem Magistri, V dist. I Sent., designat habitudinem principii quasi activi, ubi sic exponit, filius est genitus de essentia patris, idest de patre essentia; propter hoc quod Augustinus, XV libro de Trin., dicit, tale est quod dico, de patre essentia, ac si expressius dicerem, de patris essentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere ad sensum huiusmodi locutionis. Possumus enim dicere quod creatura est ex Deo essentia, non tamen quod sit ex essentia Dei. Unde aliter dici potest quod haec praepositio de semper denotat consubstantialitatem. Unde non dicimus quod domus sit de aedificatore, cum non sit causa consubstantialis. Possumus autem dicere quod aliquid sit de aliquo, quocumque modo illud significetur ut principium consubstantiale, sive illud sit principium activum, sicut filius dicitur esse de patre; sive sit principium materiale, sicut cultellus dicitur esse de ferro; sive sit principium formale, in his dumtaxat in quibus ipsae formae sunt subsistentes, et non advenientes alteri; possumus enim dicere quod Angelus aliquis est de natura intellectuali. Et per hunc modum dicimus quod filius est genitus de essentia patris; inquantum essentia patris, filio per generationem communicata, in eo subsistit. ||Reply to Objection 2. When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"--that is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father." This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur, filius est genitus de essentia patris, additur aliquid respectu cuius potest salvari distinctio. Sed cum dicitur quod tres personae sunt de essentia divina, non ponitur aliquid respectu cuius possit importari distinctio per praepositionem significata. Et ideo non est simile. ||Reply to Objection 3. When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, sapientia est creata, potest intelligi, non de sapientia quae est filius Dei, sed de sapientia creata, quam Deus indidit creaturis, dicitur enim Eccli. I, ipse creavit eam, scilicet sapientiam, spiritu sancto, et effudit illam super omnia opera sua. Neque est inconveniens quod in uno contextu locutionis loquatur Scriptura de sapientia genita et creata, quia sapientia creata est participatio quaedam sapientiae increatae. Vel potest referri ad naturam creatam assumptam a filio, ut sit sensus, ab initio et ante saecula creata sum, idest, praevisa sum creaturae uniri. Vel, per hoc quod sapientia creata et genita nuncupatur, modus divinae generationis nobis insinuatur. In generatione enim, quod generatur accipit naturam generantis, quod perfectionis est, in creatione vero, creans non mutatur, sed creatum non recipit naturam creantis. Dicitur ergo filius simul creatus et genitus, ut ex creatione accipiatur immutabilitas patris, et ex generatione unitas naturae in patre et filio. Et sic exponitur intellectus huius Scripturae ab Hilario, in libro de Synod. Auctoritates autem inductae non loquuntur de spiritu sancto, sed de spiritu creato; qui quandoque dicitur ventus, quandoque aer, quandoque flatus hominis, quandoque etiam anima, vel quaecumque substantia invisibilis. ||Reply to Objection 4. When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works" (Sirach 1:9-10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the beginning and before the world was I made"--that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.
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| − | ||<div id="q41a4"><b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis non sit potentia respectu actuum notionalium. Omnis enim potentia est vel activa, vel passiva. Sed neutra hic competere potest, potentia enim passiva in Deo non est, ut supra ostensum est; potentia vero activa non competit uni personae respectu alterius, cum personae divinae non sint factae, ut ostensum est. Ergo in divinis non est potentia ad actus notionales. ||Objection 1. It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (25, 1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (3). Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, potentia dicitur ad possibile. Sed divinae personae non sunt de numero possibilium, sed de numero necessariorum. Ergo respectu actuum notionalium, quibus divinae personae procedunt, non debet poni potentia in divinis. ||Objection 2. Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, filius procedit ut verbum, quod est conceptio intellectus, spiritus autem sanctus procedit ut amor, qui pertinet ad voluntatem. Sed potentia in Deo dicitur per comparationem ad effectus, non autem per comparationem ad intelligere et velle, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in divinis non debet dici potentia per comparationem ad actus notionales. ||Objection 3. Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above (25, 1). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, contra Maximinum haereticum, si Deus pater non potuit generare filium sibi aequalem, ubi est omnipotentia Dei patris? Est ergo in divinis potentia respectu actuum notionalium. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ponuntur actus notionales in divinis, ita necesse est ibi ponere potentiam respectu huiusmodi actuum, cum potentia nihil aliud significet quam principium alicuius actus. Unde, cum patrem intelligamus ut principium generationis, et patrem et filium ut principium spirationis, necesse est quod patri attribuamus potentiam generandi, et patri et filio potentiam spirandi. Quia potentia generandi significat id quo generans generat, omne autem generans generat aliquo, unde in omni generante oportet ponere potentiam generandi, et in spirante potentiam spirandi. ||I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut secundum actus notionales non procedit aliqua persona ut facta, ita neque potentia ad actus notionales dicitur in divinis per respectum ad aliquam personam factam, sed solum per respectum ad personam procedentem. ||Reply to Objection 1. As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod possibile, secundum quod necessario opponitur, sequitur potentiam passivam, quae non est in divinis. Unde neque in divinis est aliquid possibile per modum istum, sed solum secundum quod possibile continetur sub necessario. Sic autem dici potest quod, sicut Deum esse est possibile, sic filium generari est possibile. ||Reply to Objection 2. Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia significat principium. Principium autem distinctionem importat ab eo cuius est principium. Consideratur autem duplex distinctio in his quae dicuntur de Deo, una secundum rem, alia secundum rationem tantum. Secundum rem quidem, Deus distinguitur per essentiam a rebus quarum est per creationem principium, sicut una persona distinguitur ab alia, cuius est principium, secundum actum notionalem. Sed actio ab agente non distinguitur in Deo nisi secundum rationem tantum, alioquin actio esset accidens in Deo. Et ideo respectu illarum actionum secundum quas aliquae res procedunt distinctae a Deo, vel essentialiter vel personaliter, potest Deo attribui potentia, secundum propriam rationem principii. Et ideo, sicut potentiam ponimus creandi in Deo, ita possumus ponere potentiam generandi vel spirandi. Sed intelligere et velle non sunt tales actus qui designent processionem alicuius rei a Deo distinctae, vel essentialiter vel personaliter. Unde respectu horum actuum, non potest salvari ratio potentiae in Deo, nisi secundum modum intelligendi et significandi tantum; prout diversimode significatur in Deo intellectus et intelligere, cum tamen ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius essentia, non habens principium. ||Reply to Objection 3. Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.
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| − | ||<div id="q41a5"><b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentia generandi vel spirandi significet relationem, et non essentiam. Potentia enim significat principium, ut ex eius definitione patet, dicitur enim potentia activa esse principium agendi, ut patet in V Metaphys. Sed principium in divinis respectu personae dicitur notionaliter. Ergo potentia in divinis non significat essentiam, sed relationem. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, in divinis non differt posse et agere. Sed generatio in divinis significat relationem. Ergo et potentia generandi. ||Objection 2. Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of begetting.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ea quae significant essentiam in divinis, communia sunt tribus personis. Sed potentia generandi non est communis tribus personis, sed propria patri. Ergo non significat essentiam. ||Objection 3. Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod, sicut Deus potest generare filium, ita et vult. Sed voluntas generandi significat essentiam. Ergo et potentia generandi. ||On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod potentia generandi significat relationem in divinis. Sed hoc esse non potest. Nam illud proprie dicitur potentia in quocumque agente, quo agens agit. Omne autem producens aliquid per suam actionem, producit sibi simile quantum ad formam qua agit sicut homo genitus est similis generanti in natura humana, cuius virtute pater potest generare hominem. Illud ergo est potentia generativa in aliquo generante, in quo genitum similatur generanti. Filius autem Dei similatur patri gignenti in natura divina. Unde natura divina in patre, est potentia generandi in ipso. Unde et Hilarius dicit, in V de Trin., nativitas Dei non potest eam ex qua profecta est, non tenere naturam; nec enim aliud quam Deus subsistit, quod non aliunde quam de Deo subsistit. Sic igitur dicendum est quod potentia generandi principaliter significat divinam essentiam, ut Magister dicit, VII dist. I Sent.; non autem tantum relationem. Nec etiam essentiam inquantum est idem relationi, ut significet ex aequo utrumque. Licet enim paternitas ut forma patris significetur, est tamen proprietas personalis, habens se ad personam patris, ut forma individualis ad aliquod individuum creatum. Forma autem individualis, in rebus creatis, constituit personam generantem, non autem est quo generans generat, alioquin Socrates generaret Socratem. Unde neque paternitas potest intelligi ut quo pater generat, sed ut constituens personam generantis, alioquin pater generaret patrem. Sed id quo pater generat, est natura divina, in qua sibi filius assimilatur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod generatio est opus naturae, non sicut generantis, sed sicut eius quo generans generat. Et ideo potentia generandi significat in recto naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relationem. ||I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter. Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God." We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentia non significat ipsam relationem principii, alioquin esset in genere relationis, sed significat id quod est principium; non quidem sicut agens dicitur principium, sed sicut id quo agens agit, dicitur principium agens autem distinguitur a facto, et generans a generato, sed id quo generans generat, est commune genito et generanti; et tanto perfectius, quanto perfectior fuerit generatio. Unde, cum divina generatio sit perfectissima, id quo generans generat, est commune genito et generanti, et idem numero, non solum specie, sicut in rebus creatis. Per hoc ergo quod dicimus quod essentia divina est principium quo generans generat, non sequitur quod essentia divina distinguatur; sicut sequeretur, si diceretur quod essentia divina generat. ||Reply to Objection 1. Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod sic est idem in divinis potentia generandi cum generatione, sicut essentia divina cum generatione et paternitate est idem re, sed non ratione. ||Reply to Objection 2. As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dico potentiam generandi, potentia significatur in recto, et generatio in obliquo; sicut si dicerem essentiam patris. Unde quantum ad essentiam quae significatur, potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, sed quantum ad notionem quae connotatur, propria est personae patris. ||Reply to Objection 3. When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.
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| − | ||<div id="q41a6"><b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus notionalis ad plures personas terminari possit, ita quod sint plures personae genitae vel spiratae in divinis. Cuicumque enim inest potentia generandi, potest generare. Sed filio inest potentia generandi. Ergo potest generare. Non autem seipsum. Ergo alium filium. Ergo possunt esse plures filii in divinis. ||Objection 1. It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, filius non genuit creatorem. Neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit. ||Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, Deus pater est potentior ad generandum quam pater creatus. Sed unus homo potest generare plures filios. Ergo et Deus, praecipue cum potentia patris, uno filio generato, non diminuatur. ||Objection 3. Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod in divinis non differt esse et posse. Si igitur in divinis possent esse plures filii, essent plures filii. Et ita essent plures personae quam tres in divinis, quod est haereticum. ||On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Athanasius dicit, in divinis est tantum unus pater, unus filius, unus spiritus sanctus. Cuius quidem ratio quadruplex assignari potest. Prima quidem ex parte relationum, quibus solum personae distinguuntur. Cum enim personae divinae sint ipsae relationes subsistentes, non possent esse plures patres vel plures filii in divinis, nisi essent plures paternitates et plures filiationes. Quod quidem esse non posset nisi secundum materialem rerum distinctionem, formae enim unius speciei non multiplicantur nisi secundum materiam, quae in divinis non est. Unde in divinis non potest esse nisi una tantum filiatio subsistens; sicut et albedo subsistens non posset esse nisi una. Secunda vero ex modo processionum. Quia Deus omnia intelligit et vult uno et simplici actu. Unde non potest esse nisi una persona procedens per modum verbi, quae est filius; et una tantum per modum amoris, quae est spiritus sanctus. Tertia ratio sumitur ex modo procedendi. Quia personae ipsae procedunt naturaliter, ut dictum est, natura autem determinatur ad unum. Quarta ex perfectione divinarum personarum. Ex hoc enim est perfectus filius, quod tota filiatio divina in eo continetur, et quod est tantum unus filius. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis personis. ||I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given. The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness. The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost. The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (2), and nature is determined to one. The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis simpliciter concedendum sit quod potentiam quam habet pater, habeat filius; non tamen concedendum est quod filius habeat potentiam generandi, si generandi sit gerundivum verbi activi, ut sit sensus quod filius habeat potentiam ad generandum. Sicut, licet idem esse sit patris et filii, non tamen convenit filio esse patrem, propter notionale adiunctum. Si tamen hoc quod dico generandi, sit gerundivum verbi passivi, potentia generandi est in filio, idest ut generetur. Et similiter si sit gerundivum verbi impersonalis, ut sit sensus, potentia generandi, idest qua ab aliqua persona generatur. ||Reply to Objection 1. We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son--that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power of generation"--that is, a power by which it is generated by some person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus in verbis illis non intendit dicere quod filius posset generare filium, sed quod hoc non est ex impotentia filii, quod non generet, ut infra patebit. ||Reply to Objection 2. Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later on (42, 6, ad 3).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 41 a. 6 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod immaterialitas et perfectio divina requirit ut non possint esse plures filii in divinis, sicut dictum est. Unde quod non sint plures filii, non est ex impotentia patris ad generandum. ||Reply to Objection 3. Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 pr. </b>Deinde considerandum est de comparatione personarum ad invicem. Et primo, quantum ad aequalitatem et similitudinem; secundo, quantum ad missionem. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum aequalitas locum habeat in divinis personis. Secundo, utrum persona procedens sit aequalis ei a qua procedit, secundum aeternitatem. Tertio, utrum sit aliquis ordo in divinis personis. Quarto utrum personae divinae sint aequales secundum magnitudinem. Quinto, utrum una earum sit in alia. Sexto, utrum sint aequales secundum potentiam. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q42a1"><b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aequalitas non competat divinis personis. Aequalitas enim attenditur secundum unum in quantitate, ut patet per philosophum, V Metaphys. In divinis autem personis non invenitur neque quantitas continua intrinseca, quae dicitur magnitudo; neque quantitas continua extrinseca, quae dicitur locus et tempus; neque secundum quantitatem discretam invenitur in eis aequalitas, quia duae personae sunt plures quam una. Ergo divinis personis non convenit aequalitas. ||Objection 1. It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, divinae personae sunt unius essentiae, ut supra dictum est. Essentia autem significatur per modum formae. Convenientia autem in forma non facit aequalitatem, sed similitudinem. Ergo in divinis personis est dicenda similitudo, et non aequalitas. ||Objection 2. Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said (39, 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, in quibuscumque invenitur aequalitas, illa sunt sibi invicem aequalia, quia aequale dicitur aequali aequale. Sed divinae personae non possunt sibi invicem dici aequales. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., imago, si perfecte implet illud cuius est imago, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae. Imago autem patris est filius, et sic pater non est aequalis filio. Non ergo in divinis personis invenitur aequalitas. ||Objection 3. Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, aequalitas relatio quaedam est. Sed nulla relatio est communis omnibus personis, cum secundum relationes personae ab invicem distinguantur. Non ergo aequalitas divinis personis convenit. ||Objection 4. Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, quod tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales. ||On the contrary, Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere aequalitatem in divinis personis. Quia secundum philosophum, in X Metaphys., aequale dicitur quasi per negationem minoris et maioris. Non autem possumus in divinis personis ponere aliquid maius et minus, quia, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., eos differentia, scilicet deitatis, comitatur, qui vel augent vel minuunt, ut Ariani, qui gradibus meritorum Trinitatem variantes distrahunt, atque in pluralitatem deducunt. Cuius ratio est, quia inaequalium non potest esse una quantitas numero. Quantitas autem in divinis non est aliud quam eius essentia. Unde relinquitur quod, si esset aliqua inaequalitas in divinis personis, quod non esset in eis una essentia, et sic non essent tres personae unus Deus, quod est impossibile. Oportet igitur aequalitatem ponere in divinis personis. ||I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est quantitas. Una scilicet quae dicitur quantitas molis, vel quantitas dimensiva, quae in solis rebus corporalibus est, unde in divinis personis locum non habet. Sed alia est quantitas virtutis, quae attenditur secundum perfectionem alicuius naturae vel formae, quae quidem quantitas designatur secundum quod dicitur aliquid magis vel minus calidum, inquantum est perfectius vel minus perfectum in caliditate. Huiusmodi autem quantitas virtualis attenditur primo quidem in radice, idest in ipsa perfectione formae vel naturae, et sic dicitur magnitudo spiritualis, sicut dicitur magnus calor propter suam intensionem et perfectionem. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse, nam melius dicitur quod perfectius est. Secundo autem attenditur quantitas virtualis in effectibus formae. Primus autem effectus formae est esse, nam omnis res habet esse secundum suam formam. Secundus autem effectus est operatio, nam omne agens agit per suam formam. Attenditur igitur quantitas virtualis et secundum esse, et secundum operationem, secundum esse quidem, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt maioris durationis; secundum operationem vero, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt magis potentia ad agendum. Sic igitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, aequalitas intelligitur in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, inquantum nullus horum aut praecedit aeternitate, aut excedit magnitudine, aut superat potestate. ||Reply to Objection 1. Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of "virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source--that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod ubi attenditur aequalitas secundum quantitatem virtualem, aequalitas includit in se similitudinem, et aliquid plus, quia excludit excessum. Quaecumque enim communicant in una forma, possunt dici similia, etiamsi inaequaliter illam formam participant, sicut si dicatur aer esse similis igni in calore, sed non possunt dici aequalia, si unum altero perfectius formam illam participet. Et quia non solum una est natura patris et filii, sed etiam aeque perfecte est in utroque, ideo non solum dicimus filium esse similem patri, ut excludatur error Eunomii; sed etiam dicimus aequalem, ut excludatur error Arii. ||Reply to Objection 2. Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod aequalitas vel similitudo dupliciter potest significari in divinis, scilicet per nomina et per verba. Secundum quidem quod significatur per nomina, mutua aequalitas dicitur in divinis personis et similitudo, filius enim est aequalis et similis patri, et e converso. Et hoc ideo, quia essentia divina non magis est patris quam filii, unde, sicut filius habet magnitudinem patris, quod est esse eum aequalem patri, ita pater habet magnitudinem filii, quod est esse eum aequalem filio. Sed quantum ad creaturas, ut Dionysius dicit, IX cap. de Div. Nom., non recipitur conversio aequalitatis et similitudinis. Dicuntur enim causata similia causis, inquantum habent formam causarum, sed non e converso, quia forma principaliter est in causa, et secundario in causato. Sed verba significant aequalitatem cum motu. Et licet motus non sit in divinis, est tamen ibi accipere. Quia igitur filius accipit a patre unde est aequalis ei, et non e converso, propter hoc dicimus quod filius coaequatur patri, et non e converso. ||Reply to Objection 3. Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways--namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect. But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 1 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod in divinis personis nihil est considerare nisi essentiam, in qua communicant, et relationes, in quibus distinguuntur. Aequalitas autem utrumque importat, scilicet distinctionem personarum, quia nihil sibi ipsi dicitur aequale; et unitatem essentiae, quia ex hoc personae sunt sibi invicem aequales, quod sunt unius magnitudinis et essentiae. Manifestum est autem quod idem ad seipsum non refertur aliqua relatione reali. Nec iterum una relatio refertur ad aliam per aliquam aliam relationem, cum enim dicimus quod paternitas opponitur filiationi, oppositio non est relatio media inter paternitatem et filiationem. Quia utroque modo relatio multiplicaretur in infinitum. Et ideo aequalitas et similitudo in divinis personis non est aliqua realis relatio distincta a relationibus personalibus, sed in suo intellectu includit et relationes distinguentes personas, et essentiae unitatem. Et propterea Magister dicit, in XXXI dist. I Sent., quod in his appellatio tantum est relativa. ||Reply to Objection 4. In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both --namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative."
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| − | ||<div id="q42a2"><b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona procedens non sit coaeterna suo principio, ut filius patri. Arius enim duodecim modos generationis assignat. Primus modus est iuxta fluxum lineae a puncto, ubi deest aequalitas simplicitatis. Secundus modus est iuxta emissionem radiorum a sole, ubi deest aequalitas naturae. Tertius modus est iuxta characterem, seu impressionem a sigillo, ubi deest consubstantialitas et potentiae efficientia. Quartus modus est iuxta immissionem bonae voluntatis a Deo, ubi etiam deest consubstantialitas. Quintus modus est iuxta exitum accidentis a substantia, sed accidenti deest subsistentia. Sextus modus est iuxta abstractionem speciei a materia, sicut sensus accipit speciem a re sensibili, ubi deest aequalitas simplicitatis spiritualis. Septimus modus est iuxta excitationem voluntatis a cogitatione, quae quidem excitatio temporalis est. Octavus modus est iuxta transfigurationem, ut ex aere fit imago, quae materialis est. Nonus modus est motus a movente, et hic etiam ponitur effectus et causa. Decimus modus est iuxta eductionem specierum a genere, qui non competit in divinis, quia pater non praedicatur de filio sicut genus de specie. Undecimus modus est iuxta ideationem, ut arca exterior ab ea quae est in mente. Duodecimus modus est iuxta nascentiam, ut homo est a patre, ubi est prius et posterius secundum tempus. Patet ergo quod in omni modo quo aliquid est ex altero, aut deest aequalitas naturae, aut aequalitas durationis. Si igitur filius est a patre, oportet dicere vel eum esse minorem patre, aut posteriorem, aut utrumque. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omne quod est ex altero, habet principium. Sed nullum aeternum habet principium. Ergo filius non est aeternus, neque spiritus sanctus. ||Objection 2. Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne quod corrumpitur, desinit esse. Ergo omne quod generatur, incipit esse, ad hoc enim generatur, ut sit. Sed filius est genitus a patre. Ergo incipit esse, et non est coaeternus patri. ||Objection 3. Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, si filius genitus est a patre, aut semper generatur, aut est dare aliquod instans suae generationis. Si semper generatur; dum autem aliquid est in generari, est imperfectum, sicut patet in successivis, quae sunt semper in fieri, ut tempus et motus, sequitur quod filius semper sit imperfectus; quod est inconveniens. Est ergo dare aliquod instans generationis filii. Ante illud ergo instans filius non erat. ||Objection 4. Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, quod totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt. ||On the contrary, Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are co-eternal with each other."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere filium esse coaeternum patri. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid ex principio existens posterius esse suo principio, potest contingere ex duobus, uno modo, ex parte agentis; alio modo, ex parte actionis. Ex parte agentis quidem, aliter in agentibus voluntariis, aliter in agentibus naturalibus. In agentibus quidem voluntariis, propter electionem temporis, sicut enim in agentis voluntarii potestate est eligere formam quam effectui conferat, ut supra dictum est, ita in eius potestate est eligere tempus in quo effectum producat. In agentibus autem naturalibus hoc contingit, quia agens aliquod non a principio habet perfectionem virtutis naturaliter ad agendum, sed ei advenit post aliquod tempus; sicut homo non a principio generare potest. Ex parte autem actionis, impeditur ne id quod est a principio simul sit cum suo principio, propter hoc quod actio est successiva. Unde, dato quod aliquod agens tali actione agere inciperet statim cum est, non statim eodem instanti esset effectus, sed in instanti ad quod terminatur actio. Manifestum est autem secundum praemissa, quod pater non generat filium voluntate, sed natura. Et iterum, quod natura patris ab aeterno perfecta fuit. Et iterum, quod actio qua pater producit filium, non est successiva, quia sic filius Dei successive generaretur, et esset eius generatio materialis et cum motu, quod est impossibile. Relinquitur ergo quod filius fuit, quandocumque fuit pater. Et sic filius est coaeternus patri, et similiter spiritus sanctus utrique. ||I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above (41, 2), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (41, 2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini, nullus modus processionis alicuius creaturae perfecte repraesentat divinam generationem, unde oportet ex multis modis colligere similitudinem, ut quod deest ex uno, aliqualiter suppleatur ex altero. Et propter hoc dicitur in synodo Ephesina, coexistere semper coaeternum patri filium, splendor tibi denuntiet, impassibilitatem nativitatis ostendat verbum; consubstantialitatem filii nomen insinuet. Inter omnia tamen expressius repraesentat processio verbi ab intellectu, quod quidem non est posterius eo a quo procedit; nisi sit talis intellectus qui exeat de potentia in actum, quod in Deo dici non potest. ||Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod aeternitas excludit principium durationis, sed non principium originis. ||Reply to Objection 2. Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis corruptio est mutatio quaedam, et ideo omne quod corrumpitur, incipit non esse, et desinit esse. Sed generatio divina non est transmutatio, ut dictum est supra. Unde filius semper generatur, et pater semper generat. ||Reply to Objection 3. Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated above (27, 2). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod in tempore aliud est quod est indivisibile, scilicet instans; et aliud est quod est durans, scilicet tempus. Sed in aeternitate ipsum nunc indivisibile est semper stans, ut supra dictum est. Generatio vero filii non est in nunc temporis, aut in tempore, sed in aeternitate. Et ideo, ad significandum praesentialitatem et permanentiam aeternitatis, potest dici quod semper nascitur, ut Origenes dixit. Sed, ut Gregorius et Augustinus dicunt, melius est quod dicatur semper natus, ut ly semper designet permanentiam aeternitatis, et ly natus perfectionem geniti. Sic ergo filius nec imperfectus est, neque erat quando non erat, ut Arius dixit. ||Reply to Objection 4. In time there is something indivisible--namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above (10, 2 ad 1, 4 ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [Super Ps. 2:7 said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said.
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| − | ||<div id="q42a3"><b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis personis non sit ordo naturae. Quidquid enim in divinis est, vel est essentia vel persona vel notio. Sed ordo naturae non significat essentiam, neque est aliqua personarum aut notionum. Ergo ordo naturae non est in divinis. ||Objection 1. It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, in quibuscumque est ordo naturae, unum est prius altero, saltem secundum naturam et intellectum. Sed in divinis personis nihil est prius et posterius, ut Athanasius dicit. Ergo in divinis personis non est ordo naturae. ||Objection 2. Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quidquid ordinatur, distinguitur. Sed natura in divinis non distinguitur. Ergo non ordinatur. Ergo non est ibi ordo naturae. ||Objection 3. Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, natura divina est eius essentia. Sed non dicitur in divinis ordo essentiae. Ergo neque ordo naturae. ||Objection 4. Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra, ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. Sed in divinis personis non est confusio, ut Athanasius dicit. Ergo est ibi ordo. ||On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order exists.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter, scilicet secundum situm, ut punctus, secundum intellectum, ut principium demonstrationis, et secundum causas singulas; ita etiam dicitur ordo. In divinis autem dicitur principium secundum originem, absque prioritate, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem, absque prioritate. Et hic vocatur ordo naturae, secundum Augustinum, non quo alter sit prius altero, sed quo alter est ex altero. ||I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely, according to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause--so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated (33, 1): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo naturae significat notionem originis in communi, non autem in speciali. ||Reply to Objection 1. The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod in rebus creatis, etiam cum id quod est a principio sit suo principio coaevum secundum durationem, tamen principium est prius secundum naturam et intellectum, si consideretur id quod est principium. Sed si considerentur ipsae relationes causae et causati, et principii et principiati, manifestum est quod relativa sunt simul natura et intellectu, inquantum unum est in definitione alterius. Sed in divinis ipsae relationes sunt subsistentes personae in una natura. Unde neque ex parte naturae, neque ex parte relationum, una persona potest esse prior alia, neque etiam secundum naturam et intellectum. ||Reply to Objection 2. In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ordo naturae dicitur, non quod ipsa natura ordinetur, sed quod ordo in divinis personis attenditur secundum naturalem originem. ||Reply to Objection 3. The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to natural origin.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod natura quodammodo importat rationem principii, non autem essentia. Et ideo ordo originis melius nominatur ordo naturae, quam ordo essentiae. ||Reply to Objection 4. Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.
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| − | ||<div id="q42a4"><b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius non sit aequalis patri in magnitudine. Dicit enim ipse, Ioan. XIV, pater maior me est; et apostolus, I Cor. XV, ipse filius subiectus erit illi qui sibi subiecit omnia. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, paternitas pertinet ad dignitatem patris. Sed paternitas non convenit filio. Ergo non quidquid dignitatis habet pater, habet filius. Ergo non est aequalis patri in magnitudine. ||Objection 2. Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ubicumque est totum et pars, plures partes sunt aliquid maius quam una tantum vel pauciores; sicut tres homines sunt aliquid maius quam duo vel unus. Sed in divinis videtur esse totum universale et pars, nam sub relatione vel notione plures notiones continentur. Cum igitur in patre sint tres notiones, in filio autem tantum duae, videtur quod filius non sit aequalis patri. ||Objection 3. Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Philip. II, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo. ||On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere filium esse aequalem patri in magnitudine. Magnitudo enim Dei non est aliud quam perfectio naturae ipsius. Hoc autem est de ratione paternitatis et filiationis, quod filius per generationem pertingat ad habendam perfectionem naturae quae est in patre, sicut et pater. Sed quia in hominibus generatio est transmutatio quaedam exeuntis de potentia in actum, non statim a principio homo filius est aequalis patri generanti; sed per debitum incrementum ad aequalitatem perducitur, nisi aliter eveniat propter defectum principii generationis. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod in divinis est proprie et vere paternitas et filiatio. Nec potest dici quod virtus Dei patris fuerit defectiva in generando; neque quod Dei filius successive et per transmutationem ad perfectionem pervenerit. Unde necesse est dicere quod ab aeterno fuerit patri aequalis in magnitudine. Unde et Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., tolle corporum infirmitates, tolle conceptus initium, tolle dolores et omnem humanam necessitatem, omnis filius secundum naturalem nativitatem aequalitas patris est, quia est et similitudo naturae. ||I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes (27, 2; 33, 2,3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verba illa intelliguntur dicta de Christo secundum humanam naturam, in qua minor est patre, et ei subiectus. Sed secundum naturam divinam, aequalis est patri. Et hoc est quod Athanasius dicit; aequalis patri secundum divinitatem, minor patre secundum humanitatem. Vel, secundum Hilarium, in IX libro de Trin., donantis auctoritate pater maior est, sed minor non est cui unum esse donatur. Et in libro de Synod. dicit quod subiectio filii naturae pietas est, idest recognitio auctoritatis paternae, subiectio autem ceterorum, creationis infirmitas. ||Reply to Objection 1. These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety"--that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas "creatures are subject by their created weakness."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod aequalitas attenditur secundum magnitudinem. Magnitudo autem in divinis significat perfectionem naturae, ut dictum est, et ad essentiam pertinet. Et ideo aequalitas in divinis, et similitudo, secundum essentialia attenditur, nec potest secundum distinctionem relationum inaequalitas vel dissimilitudo dici. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, originis quaestio est quid de quo sit; aequalitatis autem, qualis aut quantus sit. Paternitas igitur est dignitas patris, sicut et essentia patris, nam dignitas absolutum est, et ad essentiam pertinet. Sicut igitur eadem essentia quae in patre est paternitas, in filio est filiatio; ita eadem dignitas quae in patre est paternitas, in filio est filiatio. Vere ergo dicitur quod quidquid dignitatis habet pater, habet filius. Nec sequitur, paternitatem habet pater, ergo paternitatem habet filius. Mutatur enim quid in ad aliquid, eadem enim est essentia et dignitas patris et filii, sed in patre est secundum relationem dantis, in filio secundum relationem accipientis. ||Reply to Objection 2. Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (1, ad 1), and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue--"the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity," for there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod relatio in divinis non est totum universale, quamvis de pluribus relationibus praedicetur, quia omnes relationes sunt unum secundum essentiam et esse, quod repugnat rationi universalis, cuius partes secundum esse distinguuntur. Et similiter persona, ut supra dictum est, non est universale in divinis. Unde neque omnes relationes sunt maius aliquid quam una tantum; nec omnes personae maius aliquid quam una tantum; quia tota perfectio divinae naturae est in qualibet personarum. ||Reply to Objection 3. In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (30, 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person.
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| − | ||<div id="q42a5"><b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius non sit in patre, et e converso. Philosophus enim, in IV Physic., ponit octo modos essendi aliquid in aliquo; et secundum nullum horum filius est in patre, aut e converso, ut patet discurrenti per singulos modos. Ergo filius non est in patre, nec e converso. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, nihil quod exivit ab aliquo, est in eo. Sed filius ab aeterno exivit a patre, secundum illud Micheae V, egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis. Ergo filius non est in patre. ||Objection 2. Further, nothing that has come out from another is within it. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Micheas v. 2: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, unum oppositorum non est in altero. Sed filius et pater opponuntur relative. Ergo unus non potest esse in alio. ||Objection 3. Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in the other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, ego in patre, et pater in me est. ||On the contrary, It is said (John 14:10): "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod in patre et filio tria est considerare, scilicet essentiam, relationem et originem; et secundum quodlibet istorum filius est in patre, et e converso. Secundum essentiam enim pater est in filio, quia pater est sua essentia, et communicat suam essentiam filio, non per aliquam suam transmutationem, unde sequitur quod, cum essentia patris sit in filio, quod in filio sit pater. Et similiter, cum filius sit sua essentia, sequitur quod sit in patre, in quo est eius essentia. Et hoc est quod Hilarius dicit, V de Trin., naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur immutabilis Deus, immutabilem gignens Deum. Subsistentem ergo in eo Dei naturam intelligimus, cum in Deo Deus insit. Secundum etiam relationes, manifestum est quod unum oppositorum relative est in altero secundum intellectum. Secundum originem etiam manifestum est quod processio verbi intelligibilis non est ad extra, sed manet in dicente. Id etiam quod verbo dicitur, in verbo continetur. Et eadem ratio est de spiritu sancto. ||I answer that, There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation, and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence, and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), "The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae in creaturis sunt, non sufficienter repraesentant ea quae Dei sunt. Et ideo secundum nullum eorum modorum quos philosophus enumerat, filius est in patre, aut e converso. Accedit tamen magis ad hoc modus ille, secundum quem aliquid dicitur esse in principio originante, nisi quod deest unitas essentiae, in rebus creatis, inter principium et id quod est a principio. ||Reply to Objection 1. What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod exitus filii a patre est secundum modum processionis interioris, prout verbum exit a corde, et manet in eo. Unde exitus iste in divinis est secundum solam distinctionem relationum, non secundum essentialem aliquam distantiam. ||Reply to Objection 2. The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the intereior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod pater et filius opponuntur secundum relationes, non autem secundum essentiam. Et tamen oppositorum relative unum est in altero, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 3. The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other.
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| − | ||<div id="q42a6"><b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius non sit aequalis patri secundum potentiam. Dicitur enim Ioan. V, non potest filius a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit patrem facientem. Pater autem a se potest facere. Ergo pater maior est filio secundum potentiam. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said (Jn. 5:19): "The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, maior est potentia eius qui praecipit et docet, quam eius qui obedit et audit. Sed pater mandat filio, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, sicut mandatum dedit mihi pater, sic facio. Pater etiam docet filium, secundum illud Ioan. V, pater diligit filium, et omnia demonstrat ei quae ipse facit. Similiter et filius audit, secundum illud Ioan. V, sicut audio, iudico. Ergo pater est maioris potentiae quam filius. ||Objection 2. Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son according to Jn. 14:31: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I." The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doth" (Jn. 5:20). Also, the Son hears: "As I hear, so I judge" (Jn. 5:30). Therefore the Father has greater power than the Son.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ad omnipotentiam patris pertinet quod possit filium generare sibi aequalem, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro contra Maximin., si non potuit generare sibi aequalem, ubi est omnipotentia Dei patris? Sed filius non potest generare filium, ut supra ostensum est. Non ergo quidquid pertinet ad omnipotentiam patris, potest filius. Et ita non est ei in potestate aequalis. ||Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as proved above (41, 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. V, quaecumque pater facit, haec et filius similiter facit. ||On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): "Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod filius est aequalis patri in potestate. Potentia enim agendi consequitur perfectionem naturae, videmus enim in creaturis quod quanto aliquid habet perfectiorem naturam, tanto est maioris virtutis in agendo. Ostensum est autem supra quod ipsa ratio divinae paternitatis et filiationis exigit quod filius sit aequalis patri in magnitudine, idest in perfectione naturae. Unde relinquitur quod filius sit aequalis patri in potestate. Et eadem ratio est de spiritu sancto respectu utriusque. ||I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (4) that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness--that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc quod dicitur quod filius non potest a se facere quidquam, non subtrahitur filio aliqua potestas quam habeat pater; cum statim subdatur quod quaecumque pater facit, filius similiter facit. Sed ostenditur quod filius habet potestatem a patre, a quo habet naturam. Unde dicit Hilarius, IX de Trin., naturae divinae haec unitas est, ut ita per se agat filius, quod non a se agat. ||Reply to Objection 1. The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se]."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod in demonstratione patris et auditione filii, non intelligitur nisi quod pater communicat scientiam filio, sicut et essentiam. Et ad idem potest referri mandatum patris, per hoc quod ab aeterno dedit ei scientiam et voluntatem agendorum, eum generando. Vel potius referendum est ad Christum secundum humanam naturam. ||Reply to Objection 2. The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 42 a. 6 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut eadem essentia quae in patre est paternitas, in filio est filiatio; ita eadem est potentia qua pater generat, et qua filius generatur. Unde manifestum est quod quidquid potest pater, potest filius. Non tamen sequitur quod possit generare, sed mutatur quid in ad aliquid, nam generatio significat relationem in divinis. Habet ergo filius eandem omnipotentiam quam pater, sed cum alia relatione. Quia pater habet eam ut dans, et hoc significatur, cum dicitur quod potest generare. Filius autem habet eam ut accipiens, et hoc significatur, cum dicitur quod potest generari. ||Reply to Objection 3. As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving," signified by saying that He can be begotten
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 pr. </b>Deinde considerandum de missione divinarum personarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum alicui divinae personae conveniat mitti. Secundo, utrum missio sit aeterna, vel temporalis tantum. Tertio, secundum quid divina persona invisibiliter mittatur. Quarto, utrum cuilibet personae conveniat mitti. Quinto, utrum invisibiliter mittatur tam filius, quam spiritus sanctus. Sexto, ad quos fiat missio invisibilis. Septimo, de missione visibili. Octavo, utrum aliqua persona mittat seipsam, visibiliter aut invisibiliter. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q43a1"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae divinae non conveniat mitti. Missus enim minor est mittente. Sed una persona divina non est minor alia. Ergo una persona non mittitur ab alia. ||Objection 1. It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omne quod mittitur, separatur a mittente, unde Hieronymus dicit, super Ezechiel., quod coniunctum est, et in corpore uno copulatum, mitti non potest. Sed in divinis personis nihil est separabile, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo una persona non mittitur ab alia. ||Objection 2. Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: "What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one person is not sent by another.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quicumque mittitur, ab aliquo loco discedit, et ad aliquem locum de novo vadit. Hoc autem divinae personae non convenit, cum ubique sit. Ergo divinae personae non convenit mitti. ||Objection 3. Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. VIII, non sum ego solus, sed ego et qui misit me, pater. ||On the contrary, It is said (John 8:16): "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod in ratione missionis duo importantur, quorum unum est habitudo missi ad eum a quo mittitur; aliud est habitudo missi ad terminum ad quem mittitur. Per hoc autem quod aliquis mittitur, ostenditur processio quaedam missi a mittente; vel secundum imperium, sicut dominus mittit servum; vel secundum consilium, ut si consiliarius mittere dicatur regem ad bellandum; vel secundum originem, ut si dicatur quod flos emittitur ab arbore. Ostenditur etiam habitudo ad terminum ad quem mittitur, ut aliquo modo ibi esse incipiat; vel quia prius ibi omnino non erat quo mittitur; vel quia incipit ibi aliquo modo esse, quo prius non erat. Missio igitur divinae personae convenire potest, secundum quod importat ex una parte processionem originis a mittente; et secundum quod importat ex alia parte novum modum existendi in aliquo. Sicut filius dicitur esse missus a patre in mundum, secundum quod incoepit esse in mundo visibiliter per carnem assumptam, et tamen ante in mundo erat, ut dicitur Ioan. I. ||I answer that, the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there: either because in no way was he present before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the world" (John 1:1).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod missio importat minorationem in eo qui mittitur, secundum quod importat processionem a principio mittente aut secundum imperium, aut secundum consilium, quia imperans est maior, et consilians est sapientior. Sed in divinis non importat nisi processionem originis; quae est secundum aequalitatem, ut supra dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above (42, 4,6).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod sic mittitur ut incipiat esse ubi prius nullo modo erat, sua missione localiter movetur, unde oportet quod loco separetur a mittente. Sed hoc non accidit in missione divinae personae, quia persona divina missa, sicut non incipit esse ubi prius non fuerat, ita nec desinit esse ubi fuerat. Unde talis missio est sine separatione; sed habet solam distinctionem originis. ||Reply to Objection 2. What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de missione quae fit secundum motum localem; quae non habet locum in divinis. ||Reply to Objection 3. This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God.
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| − | ||<div id="q43a2"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod missio possit esse aeterna. Dicit enim Gregorius, eo mittitur filius, quo generatur. Sed generatio filii est aeterna. Ergo et missio. ||Objection 1. It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But the Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, cuicumque convenit aliquid temporaliter, illud mutatur. Sed persona divina non mutatur. Ergo missio divinae personae non est temporalis, sed aeterna. ||Objection 2. Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the mission of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, missio processionem importat. Sed processio divinarum personarum est aeterna. Ergo et missio. ||Objection 3. Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. IV, cum venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum. ||On the contrary, It is said (Galatians 4:4): "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod in his quae important originem divinarum personarum, est quaedam differentia attendenda. Quaedam enim in sui significatione important solam habitudinem ad principium, ut processio et exitus. Quaedam vero, cum habitudine ad principium, determinant processionis terminum. Quorum quaedam determinant terminum aeternum, sicut generatio et spiratio, nam generatio est processio divinae personae in naturam divinam; et spiratio, passive accepta, importat processionem amoris subsistentis. Quaedam vero, cum habitudine ad principium, important terminum temporalem, sicut missio et datio, mittitur enim aliquid ad hoc ut sit in aliquo, et datur ad hoc quod habeatur; personam autem divinam haberi ab aliqua creatura, vel esse novo modo existendi in ea, est quoddam temporale. Unde missio et datio in divinis dicuntur temporaliter tantum. Generatio autem et spiratio solum ab aeterno. Processio autem et exitus dicuntur in divinis et aeternaliter et temporaliter, nam filius ab aeterno processit ut sit Deus; temporaliter autem ut etiam sit homo, secundum missionem visibilem; vel etiam ut sit in homine, secundum invisibilem missionem. ||I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express only relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth." Others express the term of procession together with the relation to the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as "generation" and "spiration"; for generation is the procession of the divine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For a thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal. Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in God; but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal; whereas "procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur de generatione temporali filii, non a patre, sed a matre. Vel, quia ex hoc ipso filius habet quod possit mitti, quod est ab aeterno genitus. ||Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean that He could be sent because eternally begotten.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod divinam personam esse novo modo in aliquo, vel ab aliquo haberi temporaliter, non est propter mutationem divinae personae, sed propter mutationem creaturae, sicut et Deus temporaliter dicitur dominus, propter mutationem creaturae. ||Reply to Objection 2. That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord temporally by change of the creature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod missio non solum importat processionem a principio, sed determinat processionis terminum temporalem. Unde missio solum est temporalis. Vel, missio includit processionem aeternam, et aliquid addit, scilicet temporalem effectum, habitudo enim divinae personae ad suum principium non est nisi ab aeterno. Unde gemina dicitur processio, aeterna scilicet et temporalis, non propter hoc quod habitudo ad principium geminetur, sed geminatio est ex parte termini temporalis et aeterni. ||Reply to Objection 3. Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal.
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| − | ||<div id="q43a3"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod missio invisibilis divinae personae non sit solum secundum donum gratiae gratum facientis. Divinam enim personam mitti, est ipsam donari. Si igitur divina persona mittitur solum secundum dona gratiae gratum facientis, non donabitur ipsa persona divina, sed solum dona eius. Quod est error dicentium spiritum sanctum non dari, sed eius dona. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but that His gifts are given.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, haec praepositio secundum denotat habitudinem alicuius causae. Sed persona divina est causa quod habeatur donum gratiae gratum facientis, et non e converso; secundum illud Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod persona divina secundum dona gratiae gratum facientis mittatur. ||Objection 2. Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to Rm. 5:5, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said that the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod filius, cum ex tempore mente percipitur, mitti dicitur. Sed filius cognoscitur non solum per gratiam gratum facientem, sed etiam per gratiam gratis datam, sicut per fidem et per scientiam. Non ergo persona divina mittitur secundum solam gratiam gratum facientem. ||Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, Rabanus dicit quod spiritus sanctus datus est apostolis ad operationem miraculorum. Hoc autem non est donum gratiae gratum facientis, sed gratiae gratis datae. Ergo persona divina non solum datur secundum gratiam gratum facientem. ||Objection 4. Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin., quod spiritus sanctus procedit temporaliter ad sanctificandam creaturam. Missio autem est temporalis processio. Cum igitur sanctificatio creaturae non sit nisi per gratiam gratum facientem, sequitur quod missio divinae personae non sit nisi per gratiam gratum facientem. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But mission is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of the divine person is only by sanctifying grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod divinae personae convenit mitti, secundum quod novo modo existit in aliquo; dari autem, secundum quod habetur ab aliquo. Neutrum autem horum est nisi secundum gratiam gratum facientem. Est enim unus communis modus quo Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, sicut causa in effectibus participantibus bonitatem ipsius. Super istum modum autem communem, est unus specialis, qui convenit creaturae rationali, in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante. Et quia, cognoscendo et amando, creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea sicut in templo suo. Sic igitur nullus alius effectus potest esse ratio quod divina persona sit novo modo in rationali creatura, nisi gratia gratum faciens. Unde secundum solam gratiam gratum facientem, mittitur et procedit temporaliter persona divina. Similiter illud solum habere dicimur, quo libere possumus uti vel frui. Habere autem potestatem fruendi divina persona, est solum secundum gratiam gratum facientem. Sed tamen in ipso dono gratiae gratum facientis, spiritus sanctus habetur, et inhabitat hominem. Unde ipsemet spiritus sanctus datur et mittitur. ||I answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone; and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace. For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace. Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per donum gratiae gratum facientis perficitur creatura rationalis, ad hoc quod libere non solum ipso dono creato utatur, sed ut ipsa divina persona fruatur. Et ideo missio invisibilis fit secundum donum gratiae gratum facientis, et tamen ipsa persona divina datur. ||Reply to Objection 1. By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia gratum faciens disponit animam ad habendam divinam personam, et significatur hoc, cum dicitur quod spiritus sanctus datur secundum donum gratiae. Sed tamen ipsum donum gratiae est a spiritu sancto, et hoc significatur, cum dicitur quod caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum. ||Reply to Objection 2. Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet per aliquos effectus filius cognosci possit a nobis, non tamen per aliquos effectus nos inhabitat, vel etiam habetur a nobis. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although the Son can be known by us according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us according to those effects.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod operatio miraculorum est manifestativa gratiae gratum facientis, sicut et donum prophetiae, et quaelibet gratia gratis data. Unde I Cor. XII, gratia gratis data nominatur manifestatio spiritus. Sic igitur apostolis dicitur datus spiritus sanctus ad operationem miraculorum, quia data est eis gratia gratum faciens cum signo manifestante. Si autem daretur solum signum gratiae gratum facientis sine gratia, non diceretur dari simpliciter spiritus sanctus; nisi forte cum aliqua determinatione, secundum quod dicitur quod alicui datur spiritus propheticus vel miraculorum, inquantum a spiritu sancto habet virtutem prophetandi vel miracula faciendi. ||Reply to Objection 4. The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the Spirit" (1 Corinthians 12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles.
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| − | ||<div id="q43a4"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam patri conveniat mitti. Mitti enim divinam personam est ipsam dari. Sed pater dat seipsum, cum haberi non possit, nisi se ipso donante. Ergo potest dici quod pater mittat seipsum. ||Objection 1. It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given. But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends Himself.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, persona divina mittitur secundum inhabitationem gratiae. Sed per gratiam tota Trinitas inhabitat in nobis, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Ergo quaelibet divinarum personarum mittitur. ||Objection 2. Further, the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him and make Our abode with him." Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quidquid convenit alicui personae, convenit omnibus, praeter notiones et personas. Sed missio non significat aliquam personam, neque etiam notionem, cum sint tantum quinque notiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo cuilibet personae divinae convenit mitti. ||Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all, except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as stated above (32, 3). Therefore every divine person can be sent.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II libro de Trin., quod solus pater nunquam legitur missus. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone is never described as being sent."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod missio in sui ratione importat processionem ab alio; et in divinis, secundum originem, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum pater non sit ab alio, nullo modo convenit sibi mitti; sed solum filio et spiritui sancto, quibus convenit esse ab alio. ||I answer that, The very idea of mission means procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod si dare importet liberalem communicationem alicuius, sic pater dat seipsum, inquantum se liberaliter communicat creaturae ad fruendum. Si vero importet auctoritatem dantis respectu eius quod datur, sic non convenit dari in divinis nisi personae quae est ab alio; sicut nec mitti. ||Reply to Objection 1. In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to the Person Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet effectus gratiae sit etiam a patre, qui inhabitat per gratiam, sicut et filius et spiritus sanctus; quia tamen non est ab alio, non dicitur mitti. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, IV de Trin., quod pater, cum in tempore a quoquam cognoscitur, non dicitur missus, non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat. ||Reply to Objection 2. Although the effect of grace is also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He proceeds."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod missio, inquantum importat processionem a mittente, includit in sui significatione notionem, non quidem in speciali, sed in generali, prout esse ab alio est commune duabus notionibus. ||Reply to Objection 3. Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in general; thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions.
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| − | ||<div id="q43a5"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filio non conveniat invisibiliter mitti. Missio enim invisibilis divinae personae attenditur secundum dona gratiae. Sed omnia dona gratiae pertinent ad spiritum sanctum, secundum illud I Cor. XII, omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus. Ergo invisibiliter non mittitur nisi spiritus sanctus. ||Objection 1. It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is according to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:11: "One and the same Spirit worketh all things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, missio divinae personae fit secundum gratiam gratum facientem. Sed dona quae pertinent ad perfectionem intellectus, non sunt dona gratiae gratum facientis, cum sine caritate possint haberi, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, si habuero prophetiam, et noverim mysteria omnia, et omnem scientiam, et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil sum. Cum ergo filius procedat ut verbum intellectus, videtur quod non conveniat sibi invisibiliter mitti. ||Objection 2. Further, the mission of the divine person is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held without the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, missio divinae personae est quaedam processio, ut dictum est. Sed alia est processio filii, alia spiritus sancti. Ergo et alia missio, si uterque mittitur. Et sic altera earum superflueret, cum una sit sufficiens ad sanctificandam creaturam. ||Objection 3. Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as expounded above (1,4). But the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Sap. IX dicitur de divina sapientia, mitte illam de caelis sanctis tuis, et a sede magnitudinis tuae. ||On the contrary, It is said of divine Wisdom (Wisdom 9:10): "Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod per gratiam gratum facientem tota Trinitas inhabitat mentem, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Mitti autem personam divinam ad aliquem per invisibilem gratiam, significat novum modum inhabitandi illius personae, et originem eius ab alia. Unde, cum tam filio quam spiritui sancto conveniat et inhabitare per gratiam et ab alio esse, utrique convenit invisibiliter mitti. Patri autem licet conveniat inhabitare per gratiam, non tamen sibi convenit ab alio esse; et per consequens nec mitti. ||I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace, according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet omnia dona, inquantum dona sunt, attribuantur spiritui sancto, quia habet rationem primi doni, secundum quod est amor, ut supra dictum est; aliqua tamen dona, secundum proprias rationes, attribuuntur per quandam appropriationem filio, scilicet illa quae pertinent ad intellectum et secundum illa dona attenditur missio filii. Unde Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod tunc invisibiliter filius cuiquam mittitur, cum a quoquam cognoscitur atque percipitur. ||Reply to Objection 1. Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (38, 1), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod anima per gratiam conformatur Deo. Unde ad hoc quod aliqua persona divina mittatur ad aliquem per gratiam, oportet quod fiat assimilatio illius ad divinam personam quae mittitur per aliquod gratiae donum. Et quia spiritus sanctus est amor, per donum caritatis anima spiritui sancto assimilatur, unde secundum donum caritatis attenditur missio spiritus sancti. Filius autem est verbum, non qualecumque, sed spirans amorem, unde Augustinus dicit, in IX libro de Trin., verbum quod insinuare intendimus, cum amore notitia est. Non igitur secundum quamlibet perfectionem intellectus mittitur filius, sed secundum talem instructionem intellectus, qua prorumpat in affectum amoris, ut dicitur Ioan. VI, omnis qui audivit a patre, et didicit, venit ad me; et in Psalm., in meditatione mea exardescet ignis. Et ideo signanter dicit Augustinus quod filius mittitur, cum a quoquam cognoscitur atque percipitur, perceptio enim experimentalem quandam notitiam significat. Et haec proprie dicitur sapientia, quasi sapida scientia, secundum illud Eccli. VI, sapientia doctrinae secundum nomen eius est. ||Reply to Objection 2. The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge with love." Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is said (John 6:45): "Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me," and (Psalm 38:4): "In my meditation a fire shall flame forth." Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia], according to Ecclus. 6:23: "The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum missio importet originem personae missae et inhabitationem per gratiam, ut supra dictum est, si loquamur de missione quantum ad originem, sic missio filii distinguitur a missione spiritus sancti, sicut et generatio a processione. Si autem quantum ad effectum gratiae, sic communicant duae missiones in radice gratiae, sed distinguuntur in effectibus gratiae, qui sunt illuminatio intellectus, et inflammatio affectus. Et sic manifestum est quod una non potest esse sine alia, quia neutra est sine gratia gratum faciente, nec una persona separatur ab alia. ||Reply to Objection 3. Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained (1), if we speak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying grace, nor is one person separated from the other.
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| − | ||<div id="q43a6"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod missio invisibilis non fiat ad omnes qui sunt participes gratiae. Patres enim veteris testamenti gratiae participes fuerunt. Sed ad illos non videtur fuisse facta missio invisibilis, dicitur enim Ioan. VII, nondum erat spiritus datus, quia nondum erat Iesus glorificatus. Ergo missio invisibilis non fit ad omnes qui sunt participes gratiae. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is said (John 7:39): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, profectus in virtute non est nisi per gratiam. Sed missio invisibilis non videtur attendi secundum profectum virtutis, quia profectus virtutis videtur esse continuus, cum caritas semper aut proficiat aut deficiat; et sic missio esset continua. Ergo missio invisibilis non fit ad omnes participes gratiae. ||Objection 2. Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, Christus et beati plenissime habent gratiam. Sed ad eos non videtur fieri missio, quia missio fit ad aliquid distans; Christus autem, secundum quod homo, et omnes beati perfecte sunt uniti Deo. Non ergo ad omnes participes gratiae fit missio invisibilis. ||Objection 3. Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, sacramenta novae legis continent gratiam. Nec tamen ad ea dicitur fieri missio invisibilis. Non ergo ad omnia quae habent gratiam, fit missio invisibilis. ||Objection 4. Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all that have grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod, secundum Augustinum, missio invisibilis fit ad sanctificandam creaturam. Omnis autem creatura habens gratiam sanctificatur. Ergo ad omnem creaturam huiusmodi fit missio invisibilis. ||On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, missio de sui ratione importat quod ille qui mittitur vel incipiat esse ubi prius non fuit, sicut accidit in rebus creatis; vel incipiat esse ubi prius fuit, sed quodam modo novo, secundum quod missio attribuitur divinis personis. Sic ergo in eo ad quem fit missio, oportet duo considerare, scilicet inhabitationem gratiae, et innovationem quandam per gratiam. Ad omnes ergo fit missio invisibilis, in quibus haec duo inveniuntur. ||I answer that, As above stated (3,4,5), mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two conditions.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod missio invisibilis est facta ad patres veteris testamenti. Unde dicit Augustinus, IV de Trin., quod secundum quod filius mittitur invisibiliter, fit in hominibus aut cum hominibus; hoc autem antea factum est in patribus et prophetis. Quod ergo dicitur, nondum erat datus spiritus, intelligitur de illa datione cum signo visibili, quae facta est in die Pentecostes. ||Reply to Objection 1. The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men. This was done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets." Thus the words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of Pentecost.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam secundum profectum virtutis, aut augmentum gratiae, fit missio invisibilis. Unde Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod tunc cuiquam mittitur filius, cum a quoquam cognoscitur atque percipitur, quantum cognosci et percipi potest pro captu vel proficientis in Deum, vel perfectae in Deo animae rationalis. Sed tamen secundum illud augmentum gratiae praecipue missio invisibilis attenditur, quando aliquis proficit in aliquem novum actum, vel novum statum gratiae, ut puta cum aliquis proficit in gratiam miraculorum aut prophetiae, vel in hoc quod ex fervore caritatis exponit se martyrio, aut abrenuntiat his quae possidet, aut quodcumque opus arduum aggreditur. ||Reply to Objection 2. The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him." Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his possessions, or to undertake any arduous work.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod ad beatos est facta missio invisibilis in ipso principio beatitudinis. Postmodum autem ad eos fit missio invisibilis, non secundum intensionem gratiae, sed secundum quod aliqua mysteria eis revelantur de novo, quod est usque ad diem iudicii. Quod quidem augmentum attenditur secundum extensionem gratiae ad plura se extendentis. Ad Christum autem fuit facta invisibilis missio in principio suae conceptionis, non autem postea, cum a principio suae conceptionis fuerit plenus omni sapientia et gratia. ||Reply to Objection 3. The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 6 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia est in sacramentis novae legis instrumentaliter, sicut forma artificiati est in instrumentis artis, secundum quendam decursum ab agente in patiens. Missio autem non dicitur fieri nisi respectu termini. Unde missio divinae personae non fit ad sacramenta, sed ad eos qui per sacramenta gratiam suscipiunt. ||Reply to Objection 4. Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.
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| − | ||<div id="q43a7"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 arg. 1 </b>Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spiritui sancto non conveniat visibiliter mitti. Filius enim, secundum quod visibiliter missus est in mundum, dicitur esse minor patre. Sed nunquam legitur spiritus sanctus minor patre. Ergo spiritui sancto non convenit visibiliter mitti. ||Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, missio visibilis attenditur secundum aliquam creaturam visibilem assumptam, sicut missio filii secundum carnem. Sed spiritus sanctus non assumpsit aliquam creaturam visibilem. Unde non potest dici quod in aliquibus creaturis visibilibus sit alio modo quam in aliis, nisi forte sicut in signo; sicut est etiam in sacramentis, et in omnibus figuris legalibus. Non ergo spiritus sanctus visibiliter mittitur, vel oportet dicere quod secundum omnia huiusmodi, eius missio visibilis attenditur. ||Objection 2. Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in all these things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quaelibet creatura visibilis est effectus demonstrans totam Trinitatem. Non ergo per illas creaturas visibiles magis mittitur spiritus sanctus quam alia persona. ||Objection 3. Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any other person.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, filius visibiliter est missus secundum dignissimam visibilium creaturarum, scilicet secundum naturam humanam. Si igitur spiritus sanctus visibiliter mittitur, debuit mitti secundum aliquas creaturas rationales. ||Objection 4. Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature--namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, quae visibiliter fiunt divinitus, dispensantur per ministerium Angelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Si ergo aliquae species visibiles apparuerunt, hoc factum fuit per Angelos. Et sic ipsi Angeli mittuntur, et non spiritus sanctus. ||Objection 5. Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, si spiritus sanctus visibiliter mittatur, hoc non est nisi ad manifestandum invisibilem missionem, quia invisibilia per visibilia manifestantur. Ergo ad quem missio invisibilis facta non fuit, nec missio visibilis fieri debuit, et ad omnes ad quos fit missio invisibilis, sive in novo sive in veteri testamento, missio visibilis fieri debet, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo spiritus sanctus visibiliter mittitur. ||Objection 6. Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent visibly.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. III, quod spiritus sanctus descendit super dominum baptizatum in specie columbae. ||On the contrary, It is said (Matthew 3:16) that, when our Lord was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus providet omnibus secundum uniuscuiusque modum. Est autem modus connaturalis hominis, ut per visibilia ad invisibilia manuducatur, ut ex supra dictis patet, et ideo invisibilia Dei oportuit homini per visibilia manifestari. Sicut igitur seipsum Deus, et processiones aeternas personarum, per creaturas visibiles, secundum aliqua indicia, hominibus quodammodo demonstravit; ita conveniens fuit ut etiam invisibiles missiones divinarum personarum secundum aliquas visibiles creaturas manifestarentur. Aliter tamen filius et spiritus sanctus. Nam spiritui sancto, inquantum procedit ut amor, competit esse sanctificationis donum, filio autem, inquantum est spiritus sancti principium, competit esse sanctificationis huius auctorem. Et ideo filius visibiliter missus est tanquam sanctificationis auctor, sed spiritus sanctus tanquam sanctificationis indicium. ||I answer that, God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as explained above (12, 12). Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures. This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius creaturam visibilem in qua apparuit, in unitatem personae assumpsit, sic ut quod de illa creatura dicitur, de filio Dei dici possit. Et sic, ratione naturae assumptae, filius dicitur minor patre. Sed spiritus sanctus non assumpsit creaturam visibilem in qua apparuit, in unitatem personae, ut quod illi convenit, de illo praedicetur. Unde non potest dici minor patre propter visibilem creaturam. ||Reply to Objection 1. The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by reason of any visible creature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod missio visibilis spiritus sancti non attenditur secundum visionem imaginariam, quae est visio prophetica. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, II de Trin., visio prophetica non est exhibita corporeis oculis per formas corporeas, sed in spiritu per spirituales corporum imagines, columbam vero illam et ignem oculis viderunt quicumque viderunt. Neque iterum sic se habuit spiritus sanctus ad huiusmodi species, sicut filius ad petram (quia dicitur, petra erat Christus). Illa enim petra iam erat in creatura, et per actionis modum nuncupata est nomine Christi, quem significabat, sed illa columba et ignis ad haec tantum significanda repente extiterunt. Sed videntur esse similia flammae illi quae in rubo apparuit Moysi, et illi columnae quam populus in eremo sequebatur, et fulgoribus ac tonitruis quae fiebant cum lex daretur in monte, ad hoc enim rerum illarum corporalis extitit species, ut aliquid significaret, atque praeteriret. Sic igitur patet quod missio visibilis neque attenditur secundum visiones propheticas, quae fuerunt imaginariae, et non corporales, neque secundum signa sacramentalia veteris et novi testamenti, in quibus quaedam res praeexistentes assumuntur ad aliquid significandum. Sed spiritus sanctus visibiliter dicitur esse missus, inquantum fuit monstratus in quibusdam creaturis, sicut in signis, ad hoc specialiter factis. ||Reply to Objection 2. The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is said, "The rock was Christ" (1 Corinthians 10:4). For that rock was already created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass away." Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet illas creaturas visibiles tota Trinitas operata sit, tamen factae sunt ad demonstrandum specialiter hanc vel illam personam. Sicut enim diversis nominibus significantur pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, ita etiam diversis rebus significari potuerunt; quamvis inter eos nulla sit separatio aut diversitas. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod personam filii declarari oportuit ut sanctificationis auctorem, ut dictum est, et ideo oportuit quod missio visibilis filii fieret secundum naturam rationalem, cuius est agere, et cui potest competere sanctificare. Indicium autem sanctificationis esse potuit quaecumque alia creatura. Neque oportuit quod creatura visibilis ad hoc formata, esset assumpta a spiritu sancto in unitatem personae, cum non assumeretur ad aliquid agendum, sed ad indicandum tantum. Et propter hoc etiam non oportuit quod duraret, nisi quandiu perageret officium suum. ||Reply to Objection 4. It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its use required.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod illae creaturae visibiles formatae sunt ministerio Angelorum, non tamen ad significandum personam Angeli, sed ad significandam personam spiritus sancti. Quia igitur spiritus sanctus erat in illis creaturis visibilibus sicut signatum in signo, propter hoc secundum eas spiritus sanctus visibiliter mitti dicitur, et non Angelus. ||Reply to Objection 5. Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 7 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod non est de necessitate invisibilis missionis, ut semper manifestetur per aliquod signum visibile exterius, sed, sicut dicitur I Cor. XII, manifestatio spiritus datur alicui ad utilitatem, scilicet Ecclesiae. Quae quidem utilitas est, ut per huiusmodi visibilia signa fides confirmetur et propagetur. Quod quidem principaliter factum est per Christum et per apostolos, secundum illud Hebr. II, cum initium accepisset enarrari per dominum, ab eis qui audierunt in nos confirmata est. Et ideo specialiter debuit fieri missio visibilis spiritus sancti ad Christum et ad apostolos, et ad aliquos primitivos sanctos, in quibus quodammodo Ecclesia fundabatur, ita tamen quod visibilis missio facta ad Christum, demonstraret missionem invisibilem non tunc, sed in principio suae conceptionis, ad eum factam. Facta autem est missio visibilis ad Christum, in Baptismo quidem sub specie columbae, quod est animal fecundum, ad ostendendum in Christo auctoritatem donandi gratiam per spiritualem regenerationem, unde vox patris intonuit, hic est filius meus dilectus, ut ad similitudinem unigeniti alii regenerarentur. In transfiguratione vero, sub specie nubis lucidae, ad ostendendam exuberantiam doctrinae, unde dictum est, ipsum audite. Ad apostolos autem, sub specie flatus, ad ostendendam potestatem ministerii in dispensatione sacramentorum, unde dictum est eis, quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis. Sed sub linguis igneis, ad ostendendum officium doctrinae, unde dicitur quod coeperunt loqui variis linguis. Ad patres autem veteris testamenti, missio visibilis spiritus sancti fieri non debuit quia prius debuit perfici missio visibilis filii quam spiritus sancti, cum spiritus sanctus manifestet filium, sicut filius patrem. Fuerunt tamen factae visibiles apparitiones divinarum personarum patribus veteris testamenti. Quae quidem missiones visibiles dici non possunt, quia non fuerunt factae, secundum Augustinum, ad designandum inhabitationem divinae personae per gratiam, sed ad aliquid aliud manifestandum. ||Reply to Objection 6. It is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is said (1 Corinthians 12:7)--"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"--that is, of the Church. This utility consists in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, according to Heb. 2:3, "which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard." Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My beloved Son" (Matthew 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was said, "Hear ye Him" (Matthew 17:5). To the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven" (John 20:23): and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to speak with divers tongues" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were, however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed, cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.
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| − | ||<div id="q43a8"><b>IЄ q. 43 a. 8 arg. 1 </b>Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla persona divina mittatur nisi ab ea a qua procedit aeternaliter. Quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, IV de Trin., pater a nullo mittitur, quia a nullo est. Si ergo aliqua persona divina mittitur ab alia, oportet quod sit ab illa. ||Objection 1. It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), "The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if a divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 8 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, mittens habet auctoritatem respectu missi. Sed respectu divinae personae non potest haberi auctoritas nisi secundum originem. Ergo oportet quod divina persona quae mittitur, sit a persona mittente. ||Objection 2. Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 8 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, si persona divina potest mitti ab eo a quo non est, nihil prohibebit dicere quod spiritus sanctus detur ab homine, quamvis non sit ab eo. Quod est contra Augustinum, XV de Trin. Ergo divina persona non mittitur nisi ab ea a qua est. ||Objection 3. Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 8 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod filius mittitur a spiritu sancto, secundum illud Isaiae XLVIII, et nunc misit me dominus Deus, et spiritus eius. Filius autem non est a spiritu sancto. Ergo persona divina mittitur ab ea a qua non est. ||On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Is. 48:16, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from Whom He does not proceed.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 8 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc inveniuntur aliqui diversimode locuti esse. Secundum quosdam enim, persona divina non mittitur nisi ab eo a quo est aeternaliter. Et secundum hoc, cum dicitur filius Dei missus a spiritu sancto, referendum est hoc ad humanam naturam, secundum quam missus est ad praedicandum a spiritu sancto. Augustinus autem dicit, II de Trin., quod filius mittitur et a se et a spiritu sancto; et spiritus sanctus etiam mittitur et a se et a filio, ut sic mitti in divinis non conveniat cuilibet personae, sed solum personae ab alio existenti; mittere autem conveniat cuilibet personae. Utrumque autem habet aliquo modo veritatem. Quia cum dicitur aliqua persona mitti, designatur et ipsa persona ab alio existens, et effectus visibilis aut invisibilis, secundum quem missio divinae personae attenditur. Si igitur mittens designetur ut principium personae quae mittitur, sic non quaelibet persona mittit, sed solum illa cui convenit esse principium illius personae. Et sic filius mittitur tantum a patre, spiritus sanctus autem a patre et filio. Si vero persona mittens intelligatur esse principium effectus secundum quem attenditur missio, sic tota Trinitas mittit personam missam. Non autem propter hoc homo dat spiritum sanctum, quia nec effectum gratiae potest causare. ||I answer that, There are different opinions on this point. Some say that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine, however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son; so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to the person proceeding from another, whereas to send belongs to each person. There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect of grace.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 43 a. 8 ad arg. </b>Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. ||The answers to the objections appear from the above.
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